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5Abstract
Existing practice on seismic risk assessment of critical infrastructure systems is reviewed in
terms of exposure, hazard, fragility, performance and interdependencies and a framework is
proposed for seismic risk assessment model development for the insurance sector. The
application of the framework is demonstrated with the electric power and water supply systems
in Christchurch, New Zealand. This includes the development of the first ground motion
residual spatial correlation model for the region and a simplified method for predicting the
occurrence of liquefaction. Empirical data from the 2010-11 Canterbury earthquake sequence
are used to derive new fragility functions for substations, buried cables, wells, pumping stations
and pipes, in terms of both ground shaking and permanent ground deformation. The model is
tested against performance observations from the February 22nd 2011 MW 6.2 Christchurch
earthquake and achieves reasonable results when interdependencies between substations and
pumps are modelled by nodal analysis with mapped substation supply zones rather than
proximity rules. The model is applied to construct a future risk projection and in a 10,000-year
stochastic catalogue, the electric power network exhibits high reliability with performance loss
in only 2% of events. The water supply system is less reliable, due to the effect of ground
shaking and liquefaction on pipes and the effect of power loss on the functionality of pumps,
which is shown to increase disconnections by up 30%. A new metric, the interdependency
index, is proposed to measure the degree of the dependency of the water supply system on
electric power. It is adapted from the Leontief input-output method for infrastructure
interdependency modelling and makes use of the system performance results acquired from the
future risk projection, by assuming a linear relationship between the change in performance of
the water supply system due to power loss and the performance of the electric power network.
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ρ Correlation of normalised intra-event residuals at a specified separation distance 
ρPGA,PGV Correlation between total residuals of PGA and PGV
ρWSS Proportion of additional water supply system customers disconnected due to physical
damage in sensitivity test that are also disconnected due to power failure
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τIZ Temporal component of earthquake interaction zone
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1. Introduction
Earthquakes are amongst the most devastating of natural hazards, giving rise to six of the ten
largest disasters since 1900, in terms of number of casualties (Guha-Sapir et al., 2015). They
also result in significant economic impacts for affected regions. Between 1900 and 2011, it is
estimated that total losses due to earthquakes exceeded $4 trillion USD (adjusted to present day
values) (Daniell et al., 2012). There have been nine earthquakes in which total losses have
amounted to more than half of the annual gross domestic product of the affected country
(Daniell et al., 2011). The importance of critical infrastructure performance and business
interruption in seismic events is exemplified by the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan. It is
estimated that nearly 30% of direct economic losses derived from infrastructure damage rather
than from damage to buildings, and $100 billion USD worth of losses were generated by
subsequent business interruption (Chang, 1996).
In middle and high income countries, insurance can play a vital role in mitigating the economic
impacts of earthquakes. The United States and Japan are the two largest earthquake insurance
markets (Coburn and Spence, 2002) but the benefit of insurance is perhaps best illustrated by
the sequence of earthquakes that struck the Canterbury region of New Zealand between 2010
and 2011. These generated losses in excess of $20 billion USD between them and
approximately 80% of these were insured, far higher in percentage terms than other earthquakes
that occurred around the same time (King et al., 2014). However, currently the risks arising
from damage to complex urban infrastructure systems are poorly understood by the insurance
industry. The focus of this research, which is funded by the reinsurance advisors, Willis Re, is
to help meet the demand within the industry to better understand the implications of these risks,
with specific reference to earthquakes. The remainder of this chapter provides some background
on catastrophe risk modelling in the insurance sector and a summary of key conceptual issues
relating to the risk assessment of critical infrastructure systems. It then goes on to describe how
this research has been approached and summarises the structure of the remainder of this thesis.
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1.1 Catastrophe insurance
Insurance is a process of risk transfer. Insurers take on risk in return for a premium payment and
agree to pay out to the policy holders if a loss-causing event occurs. Insurers then seek to
transfer some of their risk to reinsurers, who in turn can seek to transfer risk to the private
investment market, by selling catastrophe bonds – bonds that mature and pay back to the
purchaser only if no defined natural catastrophe occurs over the bond period (Woo, 2002).
Although there are examples of government-backed insurance schemes (e.g. the Earthquake
Commission in New Zealand, Flood Re in the United Kingdom), insurers are generally
commercial entities. Their business relies on pooling together premiums from policy holders
whose risk of requiring compensation at the same time is statistically independent. In the case of
natural hazards this is most easily achieved by ensuring geographical diversity. The aim of an
insurer is to set premiums such that there is a low probability in a given year that the claims paid
out exceed the sum of the premiums paid in and their cash reserves (Brillinger, 1993). This
process, known as risk pricing, requires a detailed understanding of the distribution of risk
within their portfolio, accounting for hazard (likelihood of an event occurring), vulnerability
(likelihood of damage) and exposure (potential cost of damage). This process is known as loss
estimation and is crucial to ensuring the financial security of insurance companies, as now
required in the United Kingdom by European Union (EU) law under the Solvency II directive
(Lloyds, 2015).
Economic losses resulting from an earthquake can be direct or indirect. Direct losses refer to the
cost associated with repairing or replacing physical assets that have suffered structural damage
and can be incurred by damage to buildings or to critical infrastructure, such as transport,
energy and other utility systems. Indirect losses refer to all other measurable non-property
losses. Sources of indirect losses can include: business interruption due to loss of utility supply
(arising from damage to external critical infrastructure); business interruption due to break down
of supply chain or unavailability of labour; provision of temporary accommodation; emergency
relief costs; clean-up costs; or household spending reduction (Daniell et al., 2010). Because
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building performance is more relevant to life safety, and because performance of buildings in
past earthquakes has been better documented, to date there has been limited research in the field
of seismic performance of infrastructure and the economic impacts of this. However, a
significant proportion of losses can arise from damage to critical infrastructure and the indirect
effects that disruption to their functionality has on commercial activity (Rose and Lim, 2002).
Furthermore, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 2015) lists the
reduction of economic losses and the reduction of damage to critical infrastructure and basic
services as two of its seven global targets for 2030. The first priority action of the Framework is
to improve understanding of all dimensions of disaster risk and if the targets are to be met, it is
essential that more research is conducted into the seismic performance of critical infrastructure.
Therefore, to estimate the total losses associated with an earthquake, it is necessary to
understand direct and indirect losses for both buildings and infrastructure.
Loss estimation studies have been conducted by the earthquake engineering community since
the 1970s (Reitherman, 1985) and are often described as seismic risk assessments. In seismic
risk assessments the losses can refer to financial costs, the number of casualties, counts of
property damage or some other measure of impact (Porter, 2003). Losses can be estimated for a
single scenario event or account for multiple events, and they can be measured either
deterministically or probabilistically. The input to a seismic risk assessment is the exposure
data, which describe the physical characteristics of the assets at risk and information that will be
used to measure losses e.g. asset replacement cost. The seismic risk assessment is then a three-
step process including a hazard module, which simulates the earthquake event to determine a
local intensity at each asset site; a vulnerability module, which estimates the level of damage
experienced by each asset, based on the local hazard intensity and its physical characteristics;
and a loss module, which translates the damage into an estimate of the loss metric. However,
Friedman (1984) and Clark (1986) were the first to conceive the idea of developing specialist
computer-based catastrophe models that could estimate losses and measure risk from natural
hazard events for the insurance sector (Kozlowski and Mathewson, 1997). These have
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subsequently been developed into commercial software developed by three major global
vendors: Risk Management Solutions (RMS), Applied Insurance Research (AIR) and EQE by
CoreLogic (Clark, 2002; Grossi et al., 2005). The specific scientific, engineering and financial
details of how these models operate are generally undisclosed due to commercial sensitivity, but
the frameworks applied by them follow the same structure process used by earthquake engineers
for loss estimation (Grossi and TeHennepe, 2008; AIR, 2012; Botts et al., 2012).
The value of insurance is more than simply financial reimbursement. The Hyogo Framework for
Action (UNISDR, 2005) prioritises the building of resilience as its objective for disaster
reduction. The re-accumulation of capital from insurance pay outs acts as a catalyst for carrying
out repairs and reconstruction and expedites community recovery. Tobin (1999) describes this
as the ‘recovery model’ for building sustainable and resilient communities, whilst in the
framework of Bruneau et al. (2003), insurance can build resilience through resourcefulness
(providing funding) and rapidity (reducing the recovery time). Without insurance, homes and
businesses may be lost, or proprietors may have to take on a significant debt burden to re-build.
Tobin (1999) also describes a ‘mitigation model’ for building disaster resilience and insurance
has a role here too, since the pricing of premiums to adequately reflect risk (i.e. high premiums
in high risk areas) can be used to encourage policy holders to invest in more cost-effective
measures to mitigate their risk and reduce their vulnerability (Kunreuther, 2008).
1.2 Critical infrastructure risk
The vendor catastrophe models focus primarily on losses accruing from building damage and it
the process used for buildings is not directly applicable to critical infrastructure. There are two
major differences in the assessment of infrastructure that require the process to be modified. The
first is that infrastructure systems are large and made up of a collection of spatially distributed
but connected components, which can be subjected to significantly different seismic actions
over their geographical extent. The estimation of indirect losses arising from infrastructure
depends not just on the performance of individual assets within the system, but also on how the
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locations of damaged assets inter-relate in terms of maintaining customer supply. This affects
the business operations of both the infrastructure provider itself (business interruption) and third
party businesses (contingent business interruption). The importance of system performance is
demonstrated by the impact on businesses after the 1994 Northridge, Los Angeles earthquake.
Gordon et al. (1998) found that over a quarter of all losses affecting businesses were attributed
to damage to the transportation sector, while Tierney (1997) concluded that more businesses
were affected by critical infrastructure disruption than by structural damage. Losses arising from
system performance issues are also not bound by the geographic extent of the physical
earthquake effects. Tatano and Tsuchiya (2008) found that after the 2004 Niigata, Japan
earthquake, the greatest losses did not occur in the prefecture in which the earthquake epicentre
was located. Nationwide supply chains led to greater economic losses in other prefectures and
so if only physical damage was accounted for, the total losses would be significantly
underestimated. Therefore, for critical infrastructure, a thorough loss estimation should account
for system performance, in addition to asset damage, so that business interruption losses can be
adequately predicted. However, currently available commercial models do not sufficiently
consider this (Rose and Huyck, 2016), which has led to the situation where loss estimates
provided by catastrophe modellers in the aftermath of natural catastrophes usually exclude
business interruption losses (AIR, 2016; RMS, 2016). Examples of recent natural catastrophes
in which infrastructure-related business interruption losses have been significantly
underestimated include the 1995 Kobe, Japan earthquake (Walker, 1997) and Hurricane Sandy,
which made landfall over New York in 2012 (Ruquet, 2012).
The second difference to buildings is the existence of interdependencies between infrastructure
systems, such that damage to one system may result in disruption to other systems. An example
is a water supply system, which may contain pumping stations that rely on electric power to
function. Another example is a natural gas delivery system, in which the main gas production
plant cannot operate unless there is an available water supply for fire safety. If the two examples
co-exist, then there is an indirect interdependency between the gas delivery system and the
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electric power network. Furthermore, if, using the same examples, the electric power network
includes a gas-fired power station, then there is a feedback relationship between the three
systems. Modelling of seismic infrastructure performance can become very complex, so it is
unsurprising that of the studies that do exist, many focus on a single system. However, this can
lead to an optimistic prediction of performance and subsequent under-prediction of impact, so it
is essential that interdependencies are identified and modelled as part of the loss estimation. Of
all the steps involved in the risk assessment of critical infrastructure systems, interdependencies
is a relatively recent research focus and hence it is the topic on which there is the least
consensus on how it should be incorporated into analysis (Pitilakis and Kakderi, 2011). This is
because the complexity of the problem has led to numerous different approaches being proposed
in an attempt to simplify the problem and make interdependency modelling tractable for
widespread application. The alternative approaches also reflect the fact that different sectors that
are interested in interdependencies have different needs in terms of accuracy and detail; varying
resources to allocate to the task; and different levels of access to model input data. The
importance of interdependencies to the insurance sector does not relate just to catastrophe
modelling. Many insurance brokers also provide risk management advice to clients in an
attempt to mitigate losses before they occur. Where the client is an infrastructure operator, if the
insurer is able to identify and quantify the magnitude of any interdependent relationships, then
this information can be used to encourage the company to invest in strategies to minimise the
potential impact of interdependencies. Both the catastrophe modelling and risk management
considerations of interdependency are addressed in this research, and it is useful this stage to
make the semantic distinction between interdependency simulation, which describes the
incorporation of interdependencies into system performance analysis, and interdependency
quantification, which describes the measurement of the scale of interdependency between two
systems.
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1.3 Research plan
The purpose of this research is to develop tools that can be used by the insurance industry to
model the seismic risk to critical infrastructure systems, with specific attention being given to
issues of system performance and interdependencies. Although methods for the seismic risk
assessment of critical infrastructure systems do exist in the academic literature, the insurance
industry has its own requirements with respect to the complexity of specific model components,
which may mean that these methods are not directly applicable. Another issue is that some
published methods might include model components that are location specific. Rather than
relying on such models, it would be beneficial for insurers to be able to develop bespoke models
as required, when empirical datasets are available. Finally, although interdependencies are
considered in some existing studies, there is no consensus on how best to model them for
seismic risk assessment or to quantify them for risk management.
One of the major reasons why the understanding of critical infrastructure system performance in
earthquakes has lagged behind that of buildings has been the lack of available data. Operators
are often unwilling to share data about their systems due to commercial sensitivity and security
issues and poor damage reporting after earthquakes has made it difficult to develop and validate
models. This has led to previous studies being predominantly based either on real systems, but
without any empirical development or validation (e.g. Dueñas-Osorio et al., 2007; Adachi and
Ellingwood, 2010), or in some cases even on theoretical systems (e.g. Wang et al., 2010; Bensi
et al., 2013). There are only a very small number of studies that have validated proposed system
performance models against real post-earthquake observations (Wang and O’Rourke, 2008;
Javanbarg and Takada, 2009; Bonneau and O’Rourke, 2009; Wu and Dueñas-Osorio, 2013).
Consequently a major motivation for this research has been to investigate the performance of
critical infrastructure with reference to a real case study for model development and validation.
This has led to collaborations with the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand
and Orion New Zealand Ltd. (referred to as Orion from hereon), the electricity distribution
company in Christchurch. Christchurch experienced significant damage to critical infrastructure
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during the Canterbury earthquake sequence between 2010-11 and much of this damage has been
recorded and documented with unusual thoroughness. Unlike in many other parts of the world,
in New Zealand there is a culture of knowledge sharing in the critical infrastructure sector. This
has resulted in Orion sharing exposure and observed damage data pertaining to the electric
power network and the University of Canterbury providing exposure and observed damage data
pertaining to the water supply system, which has been shared with them by the operator,
Christchurch City Council. These two systems exhibit interdependency since the water supply
system relies on electric pumps to extract groundwater from aquifers and to pump water into
hilly areas of the city.
Based on the issues summarised above, this research is therefore carried out with three main
objectives:
1. To review and appraise the current literature on seismic risk assessment of critical
infrastructure system in order to define a ‘best practice’ seismic risk assessment
modelling framework that includes methodologies for model development and model
application. The framework will account for system performance and interdependencies
and will satisfy the requirements and constraints of the insurance industry.
2. To demonstrate the application of the framework by developing an empirical model for
a real case study, which will be validated and then applied for future risk projection.
3. To propose a metric and derivation method for objectively characterising and
quantifying the magnitude of interdependency between critical infrastructure systems
for risk management purposes.
To satisfy objective no. 2, the proposed framework model development framework (objective
no. 1) will be applied to develop a catastrophe model specific to these two systems and the
model is then applied to two situations: a deterministic scenario event and a probabilistic future
risk assessment. The scenario event is the MW 6.2 earthquake that struck Christchurch on 22nd
February 2011, from here on referred to as the Christchurch earthquake. This deterministic
39
analysis mimics the regulatory stress tests and post-event rapid assessment described above.
Since it is based on a real event for which damage and system performance observations exist, it
also acts as a validation exercise for the developed model. However it is important to state that
the value of the validation is somewhat limited because the model development stage also partly
relies on empirical analysis of observed data from the Christchurch earthquake, meaning that the
test and model development datasets are not independent of each other. This is unavoidable
because of limitations of the datasets that has been provided. The Christchurch earthquake is the
only event that has affected Christchurch for which quantitative system performances
measurements are known and hence the only candidate for a validation event. For model
development, observed hazard and damage data have been made available for both the
Christchurch earthquake and the MW 7.1 earthquake that struck Christchurch on 4th September
2010, from here on referred to as the Darfield earthquake, due to the location of its epicentre.
However, the Darfield earthquake generated lower hazard intensities in the city and was
consequently significantly less damaging. As a result the dataset from the Darfield earthquake is
not sufficient on its own for model development and it is necessary to combine observations
from both events to ensure that the developed model is representative of as wide a range of
hazard intensities as possible.
1.4 Thesis structure
The remainder of this thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 presents a review of the
existing literature relevant to the seismic risk assessment of critical infrastructure. This consists
of a review of existing frameworks and algorithms for the overall process as well as a review of
existing methods for the detailed science and engineering analysis required at each step. The
latter includes asset characterisation for exposure data management, generation of hazard events
and intensities, asset fragility and damage modelling, system performance measurement and
interdependency characterisation and modelling. Although the case study in this research
focuses on electric power and water supply, for the purposes of developing a more general
framework, the literature review will also consider other critical infrastructure systems. Chapter
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3 presents the final proposed seismic risk assessment method and model development
framework. It also introduces the case study in more detail and presents the methods that will be
used to validate and apply the final model and the proposed metrics and methods for quantifying
interdependency. Chapter 4 describes the specific functions and methods proposed at each step
to develop the case study model from the framework. These are a mixture of existing functions
and methods identified in the literature or new functions to be derived specifically for the case
study by empirical analysis. Existing functions and methods are to be tested for applicability
against observations from the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes and the analytical
techniques used for testing are described. For new functions, the method used for derivation is
described. The results from the model validation are also presented and discussed. Chapter 5
presents the results and discussion from the model application and analysis and discussion of
alternative methods for quantifying interdependencies. The final conclusions from the thesis are
presented in Chapter 6.
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2. Literature Review
This chapter summarises the existing literature relevant to the seismic risk assessment of critical
infrastructure systems. It begins in section 2.1 with an introduction to types of critical
infrastructure, the features that are general to all systems, and summarises the previous studies
that have conducted critical infrastructure seismic risk assessments. The subsequent sections
focus on the individual components within a seismic risk assessment model. Since this thesis
focuses on engineering aspects of seismic risk assessments, no discussion is provided on
financial loss estimation. Section 2.2 identifies in more detail the specific aspects of each
infrastructure system that must be included in an exposure database for conducting seismic risk
assessments. Section 2.3 describes existing methods that can be applied for the hazard analysis,
in terms of conceptual mathematical approaches, event generation, prediction of ground shaking
intensity and prediction of permanent ground deformations. Section 2.4 reviews the literature on
vulnerability analysis, including existing fragility functions, methods for developing new
fragility functions, and the assignment of damage states. Section 2.5 provides an overview of
the methods and metrics that can be used for measuring system performance in infrastructure
systems. Section 2.6 explains the characteristics of interdependency and reviews existing
methods for interdependency modelling and quantification. Section 2.7 discusses existing risk
metrics that account for result distributions and in conclusion section 2.8 identifies the main
gaps in the literature and those that will be addressed in the case study application.
2.1 Critical infrastructure systems
Critical infrastructure systems are commonly referred to within the earthquake engineering field
as lifelines, reflecting their importance to earthquake relief and recovery, and the terms are used
interchangeably in the literature. They can be defined as “systems or networks, which provide
for the circulation of people, goods, services and information upon which health, safety, comfort
and economic activity depend” (Platt, 1991). Based on a definition such as this however, there
is considerable debate as to which systems qualify as critical infrastructure or lifelines. In the
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absence of an agreed supranational list, different groups have assembled their own lists. Table
2.1 summarises ten studies that have sought to comprehensively define or analyse an ecosystem
of critical infrastructures and the systems that they have selected.
Table 2.1 suggests that there is a core group of systems that are widely recognised as being
critical infrastructure: electricity, telecommunications, highways, transportation, water supply,
wastewater treatment, oil delivery, natural gas delivery, emergency services and healthcare. A
characteristic common to most of these systems is that they can be represented as networks of
physically inter-connected assets. Furthermore, the physically inter-linked systems can function,
for at least a limited time, without human operation or participation. The exceptions are
transport, emergency services and healthcare. Assets in a healthcare or emergency services
system may not all be physically linked. In addition, all three of these systems require human
participation, such that even if all their physical assets survived an earthquake, their
performance could still be affected due to labour issues. However, this study focuses on the core
group of physical networked systems, and in particular the electric power network and water
supply system for the case study.
A feature of networks is that they are made up of punctual (i.e. confined to a single point in
space) assets known as vertices or nodes, which are connected together by linear assets known
as edges or links. Examples of vertices are electricity substations or water treatment plants,
while examples of edges are water pipes or electric power transmission lines. The overall
geometric form of a network is known as its topology. There are many types of network
topology but the systems being considered in this study can be represented as one (or a hybrid)
of two of the types: a radial network or a mesh network as shown in Figure 2.1 (Lakervi and
Holmes, 1995). A radial network is characterised by a unidirectional hierarchical topology with
levels of decreasing significance. The highest level contains the system sources, and at the
lowest level are the system sinks, which for most systems are the customers (except for in the
case of the waste water system, where the customers are the sources).
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Table 2.1 – Alternative selections of lifelines presented in previous studies: 1) ATC-25 (ATC, 1991); 2) TCLEE
(Schiff, 1997); 3) Kameda (2000); 4) Rinaldi et al. (2001); 5) RISK-UE (Pitilakis et al., 2006); 6) Chang et al. (2007);
7) Hazus (FEMA, 2015); 8) Porter and Sherrill (2011); 9) NIPP 2013 (DHS, 2013); 10) SYNER-G (Pitilakis et al.,
2014a)
System Study
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Electricity          
Telecommunications         
Highways          
Transportation          
Water supply          
Wastewater treatment       
Oil delivery         
Natural gas delivery         
Building services 
Business   
Emergency services       
Financial systems   
Food supply   
Government   
Health care       
Solid waste 
Education 
Space 
Commodities 
Nuclear power 
Dams   
Chemical facilities   
Manufacturing   
Defence bases   
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There can be any number of levels in between and usually the number of edges and vertices in
each level increases from source to sink as the network branches out, hence radial networks are
often described as ‘tree-like’. A simple case is the electric power network shown in Figure 2.1,
which begins at ‘level 1’ with a single source node, the generation plant. This feeds two
substations in ‘level 2’, each of which feeds a larger number of sink nodes. Every node (except
source nodes) should be connected to at least one node in the level above and there should be a
path to every sink node from at least one of the source nodes. Usually in radial networks there is
no interconnection between nodes at the same level. In general, although they are efficient in
their asset requirements, they often have very low levels of redundancy so that they run a high
risk of system failure (Leelardcharoen, 2011). Mesh networks are often described as ‘grid-like’
and although they can be characterised in terms of a hierarchy for management purposes, in
operational terms any node at any level can act as a source or a sink. Mesh networks, as shown
in Figure 2.1 are predominantly bi-directional (although they may contain some unidirectional
links), meaning that there are many interconnections between nodes at all levels, including
between nodes at the same level. Mesh networks require more physical assets but the system
has greater redundancy, reducing risk of system failure.
Figure 2.1 – Examples of network types including hierarchical (electric power and potable water supply) and mesh
(highways)
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The inter-connected nature of infrastructure systems is important for loss estimation. For a
portfolio of buildings, the total loss from an earthquake can be determined simply by
aggregating the expected losses from each individual building. For infrastructure systems
however, the losses depend on the overall performance of the system, i.e. the ability of the
system to fulfil its customer demand, which depends on both damage to individual assets and on
how the assets inter-relate. Therefore the method for seismic risk assessment of buildings must
be adapted for application to critical infrastructure systems. Table 2.2 lists previous academic
and institutional studies on the seismic risk of core critical infrastructure systems including both
specific case studies and more general methodological frameworks. A basic description of the
methodologies applied in each study is provided in the adjacent columns. The second column
lists the systems considered in the analysis where: EP = electric power; WS = water supply;
WW = wastewater collection; NG = natural gas; OD = oil delivery; T = telecommunications;
and H = highways. The third column refers to whether the loss metric is calculated for a single
event or as a composite metric for multiple events. The fourth column lists the general types of
loss estimates considered in the analysis, where: AR = asset restoration time; BH = building
habitability index; C = number of casualties; DC = damage count; DEC = direct economic
costs; IEC = indirect economic costs; SD = system downtime; SP = system performance. Note
that since asset damage counts (or some probabilistic equivalent) are a necessary initial step to
calculate other metrics, the designation ‘DC’ is only listed where damage counts are the only
loss metric considered. The fifth column refers to whether the loss metrics are presented
deterministically (D) or probabilistically (P). The final column describes whether the analysis
considers interdependencies between systems.
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Table 2.2 – Summary of previous studies conducted on seismic risk assessment of critical infrastructure systems
Study System(s) Event Loss
metric(s)
Analysis Inter-
dependencies
ATC-13 (ATC, 1985) EP, WS, WW,
NG, H, T
Single DEC, IEC, SP,
SD
D No
ATC-25 (ATC, 1991) EP, WS, WW,
NG, OD, H
Single DEC, IEC, SP,
SD
D No
Shinozuka and Tanaka (1996) EP, WS Single SP D Yes
Vanzi (1996) EP Multi SP D No
Hwang et al. (1998) WS Single SP D No
Kawakami (2000) H Single SP P No
American Lifelines Alliance
(2001)
WS Single DC D No
Chang et al. (2002) WS Single SP, SD, DEC,
IEC
D No
American Lifelines Alliance
(2005)
EP Multi DEC, IEC, SP,
SD, C
P No
RISK-UE (Pitilakis et al.,
2006)
EP, WS, WW,
NG, H, T
Single /
Multi
DEC, IEC, SP,
AR
D, P Yes
Wang and O’Rourke (2006) EP, WS Single /
Multi
SP D, P Yes
Chang and Song (2007) NG Single SP P No
Shinozuka et al. (2007) EP Multi SP P No
Shiraki et al. (2007) H Multi SP P No
Adachi and Ellingwood
(2008)
EP, WS Single SP P Yes
Rasulo et al. (2008) EP, WS, H Single SP D No
Azevedo et al. (2009) EP, WS, NG,
OD, H
Single DC D No
Hazus-MH (FEMA, 2015) EP, WS, WW,
NG, OD, H, T
Single /
Multi
DEC, IEC,
AR, SP
D, P No
Bonneau and O’Rourke
(2009)
EP, WS Single SP, SD D Yes
Guikema and Gardoni (2009) H Single SP P No
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Study System(s) Event Loss
metric(s)
Analysis Inter-
dependencies
Javanbarg and Takada (2009) WS Single SP P No
Reed et al. (2009) EP, T Single SP, SD D Yes
Tang and Wen (2009) WS Multi DEC, C D No
Jayaram and Baker (2010) H Multi SP P No
Kim et al. (2009) EP, WS Multi SP P Yes
Wang et al. (2010) WS Single SP P No
Hernandez-Fajardo and
Dueñas-Osorio (2011)
EP, WS Multi SP D, P Yes
Leelardcharoen (2011) EP, T Single SP P Yes
Poljansek et al. (2012) EP, NG Multi SP P Yes
Wu and Dueñas-Osorio
(2013)
EP, WS Multi SP P Yes
Cavalieri et al. (2014a) EP Multi SP D No
SYNER-G (Pitilakis et al.,
2014a)
EP, WS, WW,
NG, OD, H
Multi SP, C, BH P Yes
Esposito et al. (2015) NG Multi SP P No
Of particular interest are the five studies in Table 2.2 that propose a methodological framework
for a wide range of physical systems, which could potentially provide a basis for the framework
proposed here. ATC-13 (ATC, 1985) was developed as a set of guidelines for seismic damage
evaluation in California and was the first study to include a proposed methodology for seismic
risk assessment of critical infrastructure. This was later developed into ATC-25 (ATC, 1991)
which focused specifically on critical infrastructure but for the whole of the United States.
Eventually these guidelines evolved into the Hazus-MH (abbreviated to Hazus from here on)
multi-hazard risk assessment software (NIBS, 1999; FEMA, 2003; FEMA, 2015). One
weakness of Hazus is in the estimation of indirect losses, since it does not account for
interdependencies between systems and business interruption losses are estimated at sectorial
level rather than for individual businesses. It also does not consider reduction in business
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functionality due to infrastructure damage (contingent business interruption), only business
interruption due to building damage. The impact of infrastructure on indirect losses is only
considered from the perspective of more rapid infrastructure repair being a catalyst for more
rapid building repair. The RISK-UE study (Pitilakis et al., 2006) was initially developed with
the intention of creating a European equivalent to Hazus. The final output from the project was
a methodological framework, which although thorough in terms of exposure and fragility
information, is relatively weak on methods for calculating loss metrics and interdependencies.
This was followed by the SYNER-G study (Pitilakis et al., 2014a), which set out with the same
aims as RISK-UE but with the benefit of the prior work undertaken, was able to focus more
strongly on loss metrics and does include analysis of unidirectional interdependencies.
Although each of the studies in Table 2.2 varies in terms of structure and methodology, the
commonality between all of them is that they follow the same basic process as the seismic risk
assessment of buildings described in Chapter 1, with hazard, fragility and loss calculations
being applied to an exposure database. The following sections provide a detailed technical
description and critique of the existing methods used for each of these stages, both in the studies
listed in Table 2.2 and other studies relevant to each stage.
2.2 Exposure
2.2.1 System classification
The purpose of an exposure database is to identify the assets at risk and the physical attributes
of each asset that need to be known in order to determine the vulnerability of the asset to
earthquakes. In addition to physical attributes, infrastructure assets also possess one or more
systemic attributes, i.e. the function that the asset performs in the system. Therefore four pieces
of information are needed to describe assets in an infrastructure system: its location, its
function, its physical attributes; and the adjacent assets to which it is connected. Whilst the
location and connections of an asset are straightforward to determine, the function and physical
attributes require specialist knowledge of the system to which it belongs. One objective of the
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framework to be proposed in this study is to provide an insurer with all the information that
could help describe and characterise an infrastructure system for seismic risk assessment. This
means that it is important to list all of the assets that could potentially exist in a system, together
with the important descriptive attributes related to that asset, that would ideally be needed for
the assessment of seismic losses. Appendix B includes tables detailing the infrastructure
classification schemes adopted by the studies listed in Table 2.2 and these are summarised in the
following sub-sections.
2.2.2 Electric power
The supply of electrical power can be divided into a three-stage process involving generation,
transmission and distribution (Lakervi and Holmes, 1995). Generation is the conversion to
electrical energy from alternative energy sources; transmission is the process of transferring
large amounts of electrical energy from generation areas to sites of demand; and distribution is
the process of providing electricity to the customer within the demand centres. Electric power
leaves generation plants at high voltages, which are stepped down along their route by
transformers, in order to provide power with a usable voltage level. The reason for transmitting
electricity at high voltages from generation plants is that this allows transmission at a lower
current, which means that thinner cables can be used, thus reducing resistance and power losses
(Cavalieri et al., 2014b). Some studies focus on regional or national assessments that consider
only the transmission network and treat the demand centres as end nodes (e.g. Vanzi, 1996;
Pitilakis et al., 2014a). Instead urban studies are more likely to focus on local distribution
networks and potentially exclude the transmission network altogether if generation plants are far
from the city, such that the probability of both the generation plant and the local distribution
network being damaged at the same time is very low. The majority of studies on the electric
power network focus on three basic system functions: generation plants, substations and
conduits.
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Generation plants are the sites where electric power is produced such as a fossil fuel power
station or a hydro-electric power plant. ATC-13 (ATC, 1985) treats generation plants as
buildings so that the only physical attribute used to distinguish between different plants is the
building construction class. Later studies (e.g. Pitilakis et al., 2014a; FEMA, 2015) treat
generation plants as separate entities to buildings and most of these identify capacity and
whether or not the plant has been seismically designed as the key physical attributes to inform
vulnerability analysis. Not all studies include generation plants in their classification scheme. In
the case of Reed et al. (2009) this is because of a deliberate focus on lines, but in the other cases
this is because the generation plants are located far from the actual case study area and therefore
the generation plant and the case study system are not considered to be simultaneously
vulnerable.
Substations are intermediate nodes in an electric power network and can perform one of two
functions (Cavalieri et al., 2014b). They can be distribution substations, which usually receive
power from a single high capacity conduit and re-distribute the power to a larger number of
lower capacity conduits. Distribution substations move power from one hierarchy level to the
next. Transformation substations perform the same distribution function and additionally
convert power from high voltage to low voltage. As with generation plants, ATC-13 (ATC,
1985) treats substations as buildings, differentiated by their construction class. Later studies
(e.g. Pitilakis et al., 2014a; FEMA, 2015) treat substations separately and most of these identify
voltage and whether or not the station has been seismically designed as the key physical
attributes. Substations can exist at different levels in a network hierarchy and there are different
approaches to how this is treated. Some studies identify substations at different levels as distinct
functions, whilst other studies identify different levels as distinct attributes of a single substation
function. Cavalieri et al. (2014a) and Pitilakis et al. (2014a) treat substations in a completely
different way. They do not consider a substation to be a single entity and instead treat it as an
inter-connected collection of small micro-components, each with its own function and set of
attributes to be analysed individually. This allows for more precise vulnerability analysis and
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more sophisticated system performance analysis, making it very useful for infrastructure
operators themselves to inform their own risk assessments. However, it is questionable whether
this method has value for the insurance sector given the requirements for data describing the
internal layouts of each substation in a network.
Conduits are the linear assets that transmit or distribute electricity between nodes and can be
either buried or above ground (overhead), supported by towers or poles. However, there is a
lack of consensus on terminology in the literature. Some studies use the term ‘lines’ as a general
term to refer to both buried and overhead assets (e.g. Pitilakis et al., 2006), whist other studies
(e.g. Adachi and Ellingwood, 2008) use the term ‘lines’ to refer specifically to overhead assets,
with the term ‘cables’ used to describe buried assets. For avoidance of doubt, in this study the
latter classification is adopted, so that overhead linear assets are ‘lines’, buried linear assets are
‘cables’ and ‘conduits’ is used as a general term for all types of linear asset. Two studies make a
functional distinction between conduits in the transmission network and conduits in the
distribution network (ATC, 1991; ALA, 2005) and only three studies identify any physical
attributes associated with conduits, in this case whether or not they have been seismically
designed (Pitilakis et al., 2006; Azevedo et al., 2009, FEMA, 2015).
Four studies consider an asset known as a gate station, although it is notable that all of these use
the same case study of the electric power network in Memphis. It is apparent that these studies
also do not include generation plants in their assessment because of distance and the name ‘gate
station’ is simply a label given to the substations at the entry points to the city network from the
generation plants. Therefore in physical and functional terms, they are same as substations.
ALA (2005) consider office buildings and control equipment in their analysis and
Leelardcharoen (2011) also considers a control centre. Since electricity cannot be stored, control
centres play a critical role in networks in balancing supply with demand to avoid wastage.
However the failure of a control centre or control equipment would not cut off supply to a city
and so has negligible impact on system performance and indirect losses.
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2.2.3 Water supply
A water supply system can be divided into two parts, the transmission system and the
distribution system (Kakderi and Argyroudis, 2014). In the transmission system, raw water is
taken from its source to a treatment plant. The distribution system delivers treated water to
customers and is often divided into a hierarchy of the mains system and submains system. Other
elements of a water supply system that feature regularly amongst the studies in Table 2.2
include pumping stations, storage facilities (e.g. reservoirs and tanks), and conduits to carry
water such as pipes, tunnels and canals.
Water sources include wells, springs, lakes, rivers and impounding reservoirs. However, from
the perspective of post-disaster system performance, it is the engineered assets such as wells and
reservoirs that are of primary interest. The majority of studies that consider sources refer
specifically to wells. Only ATC-25 (ATC, 1991) and Wang et al. (2010) consider reservoirs,
although RISK-UE (Pitilakis et al., 2006) and Javanbarg and Takada (2009) consider the
generic entity ‘sources’. One of the reasons why source reservoirs may be so uncommon is that
although they function as a water source, in physical terms they are more similar to a storage
facility. For damage estimation, the physical attribute of an asset is more important than the
functional attribute, so many studies treat reservoirs as a type of storage facility, irrespective of
their systemic function. The RISK-UE study (Pitilakis et al., 2006) considers five attributes for
wells: capacity, whether it requires a pump, whether it has back-up power for the pump (if
applicable), the building construction class and whether it is seismically designed. The SYNER-
G study (Pitilakis et al., 2014a) also considers the issue of seismic design as an attribute but is
the only other study to consider an attribute for wells.
Treatment plants are complex structures in which a number of physical and chemical processes
take place to improve the quality of the water. Whether treatment is necessary depends on how
the water is obtained and it is not uncommon in places where water is extracted from deep
aquifers (e.g. in Christchurch, New Zealand) for water to be delivered to customers untreated.
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As a result, some of the water system studies in Table 2.2 do not include treatment plants in
their classification schemes. ATC-13 (ATC, 1985) considers treatment plants as buildings and
so building construction class is used to distinguish between them. Later studies treat treatment
plants (e.g. Pitilakis et al., 2014a; FEMA, 2015) as separate entities to buildings and some of
these identify capacity and whether or not the plant has been seismically designed as the key
physical attributes.
Pumping stations are used to increase water pressure either because it is extracted at low
pressure or to distribute water into elevated areas where pressure head would otherwise be lost.
Whether pumping stations are necessary depends on the water source and the topography of the
study area. However, nearly all the studies in Table 2.2 include pumping stations in their
classification scheme. The exceptions are Rasulo et al. (2008) who focus on pipes and, without
explanation, ALA (2001). ATC-13 (ATC, 1985) considers pumping stations as buildings and so
building construction class is used to distinguish between them. Later studies treat pumping
stations (e.g. Pitilakis et al., 2014a; FEMA, 2015) as separate entities to buildings and most of
these identify capacity and whether or not the station has been seismically designed as the key
physical attributes. However the RISK-UE study (Pitilakis et al., 2006) also considers the
building class and whether or not the station has back-up power as attributes. The latter
particularly is important if interdependencies with electric power systems are being considered.
Storage facilities include covered tanks and open reservoirs, which can in turn be engineered
either artificially or from the natural landscape. Although not all systems will contain storage
facilities, all the water system studies in Table 2.2 consider them except Chang et al. (2002),
Rasulo et al. (2008) and Tang and Wen (2009). There are numerous attributes associated with
storage tanks that are considered by these studies including: elevation, material foundation,
whether the tank is anchored, the type of roof, storage capacity and whether it is seismically
designed. It is questionable however whether all of this information would be available to an
insurer for all tanks in a system and so it may be more realistic for an insurance-focused
framework to focus on the most important attributes. In this regard, elevation, material and the
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anchorage of the tank are the three attributes that feature most commonly in existing studies and
so could be interpreted as being the most important. Only ATC-25 (ATC, 1991) and Wang et al.
(2010) explicitly consider storage reservoirs as distinct entities from storage tanks. Neither of
these considers any attributes for reservoirs.
Water conduits can take the form of pipes, tunnels, canals or aqueducts. Pipes are the most
common and feature in all the water system studies in Table 2.2. Material, and to a lesser extent,
diameter are the most common attributes considered for pipes. Other attributes considered
include: type of joint (rigid or flexible), soil conditions, elevation (buried or above ground) and
whether the pipe has corrosion protection. Canals and tunnels feature in three studies: ALA
(2001), RISK-UE (Pitilakis et al., 2006) and SYNER-G (Pitilakis et al., 2014a). For tunnels, the
key attributes are the construction type and the local ground conditions. For canals, the RISK-
UE and SYNER-G studies focus on the construction type and whether the canals are reinforced.
However, the ALA study considers maximum flow capacity, complex geometric parameters and
the locations of in-line components such as valves and siphons. Aqueducts only feature in the
ATC-25 (ATC, 1991) and ALA studies. In the ALA study, elevation and the locations of pumps
and appurtenances are considered to be important attributes.
2.2.4 Waste water
A waste water collection system operates in four parts: the collection of waste water, its
transmission to treatment plants, its treatment and finally the disposal of the treated water
(Kakderi and Argyroudis. 2014). Only five studies consider waste water systems: ATC-13
(ATC, 1985), ATC-25 (ATC,1991), RISK-UE (Pitilakis et al., 2006), Hazus (FEMA, 2015) and
SYNER-G (Pitilakis et al., 2014a). The main components of a waste water system included in
all these studies are the conduits for the collection, transmission and disposal of the waste water,
treatment plants and pumping stations (also known as lift stations) which are needed to transport
water over topographical barriers. These components are treated in the same way as the
equivalent components in the water supply system.
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2.2.5 Natural gas
A natural gas delivery system can be considered to include: the production and processing of
natural gas followed by its transmission and distribution (Gehl et al., 2014). Natural gas is
extracted from underground wells and must be purified before it is distributed, hence the need
for processing. The gas must then be pressurised to provide the energy for transmission to
demand centres. Pressure reduction is then required to distribute the gas to customers at an
appropriate pressure. Transmission and distribution occurs in pipelines, which are usually
underground and known as buried pipelines. Levels of gas transmission vary according to
seasonal demand, with peak season in winter due to increased heating requirements and lower
demand in the summer (Esposito, 2011). To account for this variation, storage facilities are used
with excess gas produced in summer being stored for use in winter. Storage facilities tend to be
underground, such as depleted gas fields, depleted aquifers or salt caverns. However natural gas
can also be liquefied and stored in above ground tanks. Nine of the studies in Table 2.2 consider
natural gas systems. The key components included in all studies are compressors stations and
pipelines. Four of the studies also include storage tanks, but only one study, RISK-UE (Pitilakis
et al., 2006), includes the primary processing plant, perhaps because this activity is likely to take
place away from urban areas and has therefore been neglected by authors studying urban
systems. Esposito et al. (2015) also consider regulators but this is a type of compressor station
that exists in the case study area (Italy) at low pressures closer to the customers. The attributes
for pipelines and tanks are same as for their equivalents in the water supply systems. For
compressor stations, the only attribute considered by most studies is whether it is seismically
designed. The RISK-UE study also considers seismic design as an attribute for processing
plants.
2.2.6 Oil delivery
Oil delivery systems can be considered to be analogous to natural gas delivery systems with a
production and processing phase followed by a transmission and distribution phase (Gehl et al.,
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2014). Only four studies consider oil delivery systems: ATC-25 (ATC, 1991), Azevedo et al.
(2009), Hazus (FEMA, 2015) and SYNER-G (Pitilakis et al., 2014a). All of these studies
consider pipelines and tank farms in their classification, with the same attributes as their
equivalents in the natural gas system. All the studies except ATC-25 consider pumping stations
whose attribute is whether it is seismically designed. All studies except SYNER-G consider
refineries, whose attributes are capacity and whether it is seismically designed. In addition,
ATC-25 separately considers oil fields with no identifying attribute. The exclusion of this asset
from other studies is not specifically explained but may be because oil fields only exist in a
small number of places around the world and so are not relevant to the majority of case studies.
Even where they do exist, their engineered assets could be represented by a refinery or pumping
station (or combination of), depending on the specific activities that take place there. Ports are
often a critical part of the supply chain for oil, however these are usually considered separately
in studies.
2.2.7 Telecommunications
Wired telecommunications systems can be divided into local networks, which cover a small
geographic area, and toll networks which link local networks together (Leelardcharoen, 2011).
Local networks interface with toll networks at offices called access tandems. Within local
networks, central offices provide links between customers. The last central office in the network
is directly connected to the customer via telephone lines or loops, and is called an end office.
End offices are not directly connected to each other, but are connected via higher-level central
offices. The connections between central offices and end offices are known as trunks. Within
mobile communications, mobile phones connect to each other via base stations (Leelardcharoen,
2011). Groups of base transceiver stations are connected to a base station controller all of which
forms a base station subsystem. Many base station subsystems connect to a gateway switching
centre, which then connects to the wired system. Because of the number of transmitters required
in a mobile network, many are mounted to buildings, which means the seismic risk is related to
the building rather than the transmitter itself. Five studies consider telecommunications systems:
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ATC-13 (ATC, 1985), RISK-UE (Pitilakis et al., 2006), Hazus (FEMA, 2015), Reed et al.
(2009) and Leelardcharoen (2011). The main components considered by these studies are
overhead lines, buried cables and offices. ATC-13 does not consider lines or cables, but does
consider transmission towers. The RISK-UE study considers material, burial depth and
installation method as attributes for cables. For offices, seismic design (Hazus), anchorage of
internal equipment (RISK-UE) and building construction class (ATC-13) are potential
attributes.
2.2.8 Highways
The links in a highways system are the paved roads, which can either exist as roads by
themselves or along bridges and tunnels. Ordinary roads are considered in most studies and the
most common attribute is simply the level of the road in the hierarchy. However, the RISK-UE
study (Pitilakis et al., 2006) also considers the geometry and topography of the road and
whether there are buildings alongside the road. Bridges are also considered in most studies and
possess a long list of potential attributes including: road hierarchy level, construction type, pier
type, connection type, bearing type, span length, age, number of spans, skew, height, foundation
type, maximum span length, number of column alignments, presence of adjacent cross-over (or
cross-under) bridges, width and whether it is seismically designed. In practice however, it is
likely that much of this information would not be available to an insurer modelling an entire
system. Tunnels are also considered by most studies and its main attributes are construction
method and ground conditions. Unlike other systems, at most nodes (junctions) there are no
specific physical assets, although traffic signals will occur at some junctions. However,
although traffic signals may cause a highways system to operate less efficiently, they would not
cause a significant performance reduction in the highways system and so they are generally not
considered in analyses. Other potentially significant elements of a highways system include
embankments, trenches and slopes. However, this study is focused on infrastructure in an urban
setting and so examples of this are likely to be rare and are not considered further.
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2.2.9 Concluding remarks
This section has described in general terms, the main assets that exist in all of the critical
infrastructure systems and the key attributes of each asset are included in Appendix B. The
specific assets and corresponding attributes associated with the systems being analysed in the
case study for this research are presented in more detail in Chapter 3.
2.3 Hazard
2.3.1 Conceptual approaches
Historically there have been two major conceptual approaches to seismic hazard assessment:
deterministic seismic hazard assessment (DSHA) and probabilistic seismic hazard assessment
(PSHA) (Reiter, 1990). In DSHA, a single reference earthquake with specific characteristics is
used. It is assumed that the probability of occurrence of that earthquake within the design life of
an asset is one (Bommer, 2002). Any event can be chosen to be the reference earthquake and
possibilities might include the maximum credible earthquake or an event with characteristics
matching a significant historic event in the region. Both of these options rely on expert
judgement. The output of DSHA is an estimate of earthquake intensity (ground shaking and/or
ground deformation) across the region of interest, representing the effects of a specifically
defined earthquake. As described in Chapter 1, analysis of single events is an integral part of the
activities of an insurer, for regulatory requirements and for rapid post-earthquake assessments.
However, analysis of only a single event means that the uncertainty relating to which events
may actually occur over the life an asset are not taken into account, and therefore DSHA does
not provide a true representation of risk. Uncertainties in the evaluation of seismic hazard
include how many earthquakes might occur, their epicentral locations, their magnitudes and
other characteristics of the strong ground shaking that may affect the likelihood of assets being
damaged. Whilst it is possible at some locations that only one fault exists that is likely to
generate an earthquake, at most locations an asset will be within range of multiple faults.
Knowing which fault has generated an earthquake is important since the magnitude is related to
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the geometric properties of the fault and both magnitude and source-site distance affect the
intensity of ground motion at the site of interest and thus have a direct effect on asset damage
probability.
In PSHA, developed originally by Cornell (1968), the risk associated with multiple potential
earthquake sources is determined by first understanding the average activity rates of each source
and then estimating the ground motion intensities that are likely to occur across a region with a
specified probability of exceedance within a specified time period (known as a return period if
the probability is 1). This method has become the most widely used for seismic risk assessment
(Bommer, 2002). Since it accounts for the uncertainties in earthquake characteristics, the merits
of PSHA for representing overall risk are clear. However, when conducting PSHA for a region
rather than for a single site, the ground motion intensities generated by the analysis are a
statistical artefact. This means that the ground motion intensities calculated for two independent
sites in the region may have the same return period but are not necessarily caused by the same
earthquake event, particularly if the two sites are distant from each other. The ground motion
intensities presented in a PSHA map are a composite statistical representation of all possible
earthquakes, but do not realistically replicate what might be caused by a single event. For
spatially distributed infrastructure systems this is problematic. Suppose that there is a system
which fails only if two specific components, which are geographically distant, are both
completely damaged at the same time. PSHA tells us the ground motion intensities that will
occur at those two locations for a specified return period but not the simultaneous ground
motion intensities, so system performance, and hence indirect losses, cannot be calculated.
Because PSHA ground motion intensities are usually calculated for long return periods and
account for geographically spread sources, they are conservative compared to a realistic single
event ground motion intensity map which would exhibit attenuation of ground motion intensity
for sites further away from the source. This would increase the likelihood of predicting asset
failures and potentially result in a more conservative estimate of indirect losses.
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An alternative to using either DSHA or PSHA is to use a hybrid approach that combines the
optimal aspects of both (Bommer, 2002). In the hybrid approach, realistic specific events are
modelled to ensure that simultaneous intensities are estimated, but to account for uncertainties,
this is done for a set of events rather than for a single event. The simulated set of events should
be probabilistically representative of all potential earthquakes in a study area (a stochastic event
set). This means that the distributions associated with the uncertain variables (e.g. location,
magnitude) should be replicated in the catalogue and this requires that the catalogue is
sufficiently large. Final risk measures relating to losses can be determined by statistical analysis
of results from all events in the set.
Disaggregation of seismic hazard is a method that can be used to analyse scenario events within
a PSHA framework (Bazzurro and Cornell, 1999). For a ground motion with specified return
period, the disaggregation method identifies which events from the hazard source model
contribute to that level of ground motion and the proportion of the contribution. However,
whilst this method works well with single-site analyses, its applicability to spatially distributed
assets is questionable, since the events that produce the specified return period ground motion
intensity for one asset will not necessarily produce ground motion intensities of the same return
period for other assets.
Both RMS (Grossi and TeHennepe, 2008) and AIR (2012) software use stochastic event sets as
the basis for their hazard modules, even for risk assessment of buildings. The justification for
this is that insurers are generally interested in the risk faced by a portfolio of buildings, rather
than by a single building, and in particular the likelihood and potential implications of multiple
buildings being damaged simultaneously. As with infrastructure systems, this requires realistic
event scenarios. Given that hybrid methods are the most appropriate for infrastructure systems
and that existing catastrophe models already adopt this method anyway, the following sub-
sections focus on the components of hybrid methods with specific consideration of their
application to critical infrastructure seismic assessment.
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2.3.2 Stochastic event set
Since the stochastic earthquake set is intended to represent the collective risk of all potential
sources in a study area, it is necessary to define the potential sources and determine the activity
rates for each source. This requires knowledge of past earthquakes in the study area. Such
information can come from two sources: historic catalogues (anecdotal with magnitude
estimated) and instrumental catalogues (earthquakes recorded by seismometers with magnitude
calculated) (Coburn and Spence, 2002). Instrumental catalogues are better for low magnitude
earthquakes, which are commonly missed by anecdotal records. However instrumental
seismology only began becoming widespread in the mid-to-late 20th Century, so this is of
limited use for larger magnitude earthquakes with long return periods. Therefore to create a
complete catalogue across the magnitude range, records from both are required.
In some study areas it may be possible to identify the specific source (either point source or
fault) associated with an earthquake. However, some earthquakes may have occurred at sites
where there is no identifiable source. These events contribute to what is known as distributed or
background seismicity and the most common way of dealing with them when compiling a
catalogue is to divide the study area into areal source zones (Coburn and Spence, 2002). The
boundaries between source zones are subjective, but judgement can be informed by the
observation of earthquake clusters and tectonic and geological information. A defining feature
of a source zone is that there is an equal probability of an earthquake occurring at any point
within the zone.
When studying the activity rates of earthquake sources, Gutenberg and Richter (1944) found
that the distribution of magnitudes generally followed a linear relationship as shown in Eq. 2.1,
where NGR is the annual frequency of events with magnitude greater than or equal to M and aGR
and bGR are coefficients to be determined by model fitting. This is known as the Gutenberg-
Richter relation and the minimum information required in a catalogue to determine it, is the
date, location and magnitude of each event. Another method for describing the activity of a
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specific point or fault source is the characteristic earthquake model. Schwartz and Coppersmith
(1984) postulated that some sources have a tendency to repeatedly generate earthquakes of, or
very close to, a defined characteristic magnitude.
10log GR GR GRN a b M  (2.1)
Grossi and Windeler (2005) describe two ways of implementing a stochastic event set in
catastrophe modelling. The first is a logic tree approach, which includes every possible
earthquake from every source in the event set. In the final loss analysis, the results generated
from each event are weighted according to the annual probability of each event occurring, as
determined from the Gutenberg-Richter relation derived for the corresponding source. The
second approach is a Monte Carlo simulation, which can be implemented as either a specified
number of events or as a set of events within a specified number of years. The source of each
event can be assigned by randomly sampling from all sources, with weights equivalent to the
overall annual frequency associated with each source. Similarly the magnitude of each event can
be assigned by randomly sampling from the distribution represented by Gutenberg-Richter
relation for the assigned source. If the simulation is of years rather than events, then the time
between events in the set needs to be modelled. It is commonly assumed that occurrences of
earthquakes are independent of one another and that their recurrence pattern follows a Poisson
process with a mean inter-arrival time determined from the catalogue (e.g. Cornell, 1968;
Coburn and Spence, 2002). The time between events can then be modelled by randomly
sampling from an exponential distribution with the mean inter-arrival time as its rate parameter.
2.3.3 Ground shaking intensity
The expected damage caused to physical structures after an earthquake is related to the severity
of ground shaking caused by seismic waves. As seismic waves spread out from a source there is
a reduction in amplitude and subsequent loss of energy that causes the ground shaking intensity
to attenuate with distance (Bolt, 2006). The purpose of ground shaking intensity measures (IMs)
is to quantify the severity of ground shaking at sites of interest so that they can be used to relate
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loss or damage to hazard. Ground shaking intensity can be measured as either felt intensity or
instrumental intensity. Felt intensity (also referred to as macroseismic intensity) is a subjective
measurement based on observed damage to structures and human perception. Although felt IMs
can be used for seismic risk assessment, their subjectivity leads to significant uncertainty. For
engineering purposes, it is more desirable to use instrumental IMs that objectively record
physical characteristics of the seismic waves that cause ground shaking. Typically, strong
motions seismographs record the acceleration of ground shaking over the duration of an
earthquake. The resulting accelerogram, which is a composite of all the seismic waves produced
in an event, is the basis of instrumental IMs. Three types of IMs can be interpreted from a
accelerogram: amplitude parameters, duration parameters, and frequency-content parameters.
Peak ground acceleration (PGA) and peak ground velocity (PGV) are two amplitude parameters
that are commonly used in seismic risk assessments and fragility studies. PGA can be measured
directly as the maximum amplitude of the accelerogram. PGV can be measured as the maximum
amplitude after integration of the accelerogram. Peak ground displacement (PGD) can be
measured after double integrating the accelerogram, but this IM is rarely used in engineering
studies. Duration parameters are important since structures can suffer significant damage even
when amplitude of shaking is moderate, if the duration of shaking is long. An example of a
duration parameter is bracketed duration, which measures the time between the first and last
peaks of 0.05 g (0.49 m/s2) on an accelerogram. While amplitude and duration parameters
measure ground shaking as a single value that represents all seismic waves in an earthquake,
frequency-content parameters individually measure the shaking effect of the different wave
frequencies in the earthquake. Frequency-content parameters can be represented graphically as
response spectra, which are envelopes of the peak response at each frequency-level. The
measured response can be in terms acceleration, velocity or displacement and are referred to as
spectral acceleration (SA), spectral velocity (SV) and spectral displacement (SD).
For seismic risk assessments it is necessary to predict ground shaking severity at asset sites in
terms of one of these IMs. Ground motion prediction equations (GMPEs) are models that
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predict the ground shaking IM at a site based on magnitude, source-site distance and additional
relevant characteristics (e.g. Youngs et al., 1997; Campbell, 2003; Akkar and Bommer, 2010).
e.g. depth, soil conditions, fault type. The typical mathematical form of GMPEs is shown in Eq.
2.2 (Bradley, 2013), where θGMPE is a vector of predictor variables including magnitude, source-
site distance and other relevant characteristics (e.g. depth, soil conditions, fault type etc.), βGMPE
is a vector of the derived model coefficients, η is the inter-event residual and ε is the intra-event
residual.
 GMPE GMPEln IM |f    θ β (2.2)
The two residual terms represent the uncertainty associated with the empirical derivation of the
GMPE. Inter-event variability arises from separate earthquakes with identical characteristics
causing different ground shaking intensities at comparable distances. For a single earthquake,
the inter-event variability parameter is constant at all sites. Intra-event variability arises within a
single event and represents variation of ground shaking intensity at sites that are equidistant
from the earthquake source. The residual terms are random variables, where η has zero mean
and standard deviation τ, and ε has zero mean and standard deviation σ. Most ground motion
prediction equations described by Douglas (2015) define specific values of σ and τ. In the
seismic risk assessment studies listed in Table 2.2, the most commonly adopted ground shaking
IM is PGA, although PGV is sometimes also adopted since it is a good predictor of damage in
pipes (Pineda-Parros and Najafi, 2010). The likely reason for the prevalence of PGA is that it is
the IM for which the most GMPEs exist and the majority of fragility functions for critical
infrastructure assets predict damage probabilities in terms of PGA. A comprehensive list of all
GMPEs derived between 1964 and 2015 has been compiled by Douglas (2015) and includes
details of 384 GMPEs for PGA and a further 246 for SA. A GMPE is categorised by the
tectonic environment for which it has been developed. Delavaud et al. (2012) identify six such
tectonic environments: stable continental, oceanic crust, active shallow crustal, subduction
zones, deep-focus non-subduction earthquakes and active volcanoes. When selecting a GMPE,
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if no local equation is available, Delavaud et al. (2012) advise selecting one developed for the
same tectonic context.
It is common in studies on spatially distributed systems to either assume that all sites are
perfectly correlated (i.e. the residual terms are constant across all sites) or that all sites are
completely independent (i.e. the residual terms are generated randomly), but this can lead to
overestimation or underestimation of losses respectively (Weatherill et al., 2014). Moreover
neither assumption is realistic. For a single event, some spatial correlation of intensities will
occur at sites which are close together due to correlation of intra-event residuals, as
demonstrated by Boore et al. (2003). However, it is unlikely that ground conditions and seismic
wave characteristics would be sufficiently uniform for perfect correlation to occur. In
mathematical terms, Weatherill et al. (2014) describe spatial correlation as the covariance of the
intra-event residuals at all sites, which are independent of the earthquake itself. Many studies
have been conducted on spatial correlation (e.g. Wesson and Perkins, 2001; Boore et al., 2003;
Wang and Takada, 2005; Lee and Kiremidjian, 2007; Goda and Hong, 2008; Goda and
Atkinson, 2009; Jayaram and Baker, 2009; Foulser-Piggott and Stafford, 2010; Esposito and
Iervolino, 2011), with the objective of producing a covariance matrix, which is populated by the
spatial correlation co-efficients for all pairs of sites in the study area. The spatial correlation co-
efficients are determined by empirically fitting ground shaking intensity records from past
events to a statistical model. Some use single significant events such as the 1994 Northridge
earthquake (Lee and Kiremidjian, 2007; Jayaram and Baker, 2009; Foulser-Piggott and
Stafford, 2010) or the 2001 Chi-Chi earthquake (Jayaram and Baker, 2009; Foulser-Piggott and
Stafford, 2010) as these are amongst the few events for which significant ground motion
datasets exist. Other studies have used an ensemble of strong motion records from multiple
events to produce more general spatial correlation models for Japan (Wang and Takada, 2005)
and Europe (Esposito and Iervolino, 2011).
The correlation structure of a random variable can be represented by a semivariogram, which is
a measure of the average dissimilarity between the values at two sites, u and u+h, based on their
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separation distance, h (Goovaerts, 1997). The stationary semivariogram, γ, of the normalized
intra-event residuals at each site, ε'u and ε'u+h, is therefore given by Eq. 2.3, (where ε' = ε/σ). The
semivariogram measures the opposite of correlation, ρ, and the relationship between the two is
given by Eq. 2.4, where aSC is the sill, which is equal to the variance of the random variable, and
which is 1 since the intra-event residuals have been normalised.
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The observed stationary semivariogram for a specific value of h can be derived by calculating
the average observed value of γ for all NSC pairs of sites with separation distance h, as shown in
Eq. 2.5. When repeated for all values of h, this gives an observed semivariogram plot to which a
continuous semi-definite (non-negative) function is fit, so that the semivariogram and
correlation can then be predicted for any value of h.
  
2
1
1 ' '2
SC
i i
N
u u h
iN
   

 
(2.5)
When deriving the observed semivariogram, a balance has to be achieved between ensuring
there are sufficient points with which to fit the model but also ensuring that each point is itself
based on a sufficient number of observations to provide a reliable estimate of γ for that value of
h. Esposito and Iervolino (2011) suggest that each point should be based on a minimum sample
size of 30 and it may therefore be necessary to group the data into bins for h rather than using
individual values of h. To fit the model, a functional form has to be assumed that fits the
conditions of non-negativity and of γ = 0 for h = 0 and γ = 1 for h = ∞. For example, Boore et al. 
(2003), Wang and Takada (2005) and Jayaram and Baker (2009) all use variations of a single-
parameter exponential model, while Goda and Atkinson (2009) adopt a three-parameter variant
of the exponential model. Jayaram and Baker (2009) also test a Gaussian model and a spherical
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model but only proceed with the exponential model for detailed analysis. These six functional
forms are shown in Table 2.3. The least squares method can be used to determine the optimum
values of the parameters for each functional form by minimising the sum of the squares of the
errors. However, Jayaram and Baker (2009) state that the focus of the optimisation should be to
ensure that the model fits well at short separation distances when the correlation is high. At
greater distances, when the correlation is low, the effect that a site has on the residual of another
site is likely to be negligible. Jayaram and Baker (2009) and Esposito and Iervolino (2011)
therefore fit their models visually. Jayaram and Baker (2009) do not explicitly define a
maximum value that can be considered to be a short separation distance but a visual inspection
of their empirical semivariogram models for the 1994 MW 6.7 Northridge earthquake in Los
Angeles and the 1999 MW 7.6 Chi-Chi earthquake in Taiwan, indicate that the models have been
fit to optimise performance for site separation distances up to 15 km. Esposito and Iervolino
(2011) optimise their model to fit distances up to 13.5 km.
Table 2.3 – Functional forms for spatial correlation models in the literature
Study Functional form Eq. No.
Boore et al. (2003):  1 exp B h    (2.6)
Wang and Takada (2005):  1 exp WT h    (2.7)
Goda and Atkinson (2009):  1 max exp 1,0GAGA GA GAh          (2.8)
Jayaram and Baker (2009):
(exponential model)
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Jayaram and Baker (2009):
(Gaussian model) 2
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Jayaram and Baker (2009):
(spherical model)
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A method for simulating a field of spatially correlated intra-event residuals is described
Weatherill et al. (2014) and is based on the Matrix Decomposition method proposed by Davis
(1987). The final selected semivariogram model is used to calculate the correlation between
each pair of sites according to their separation distance, h. The site to site correlations are then
grouped into a matrix C, which is the covariance matrix. Since C is by definition positive-
definite (it is symmetric and all its eigenvalues are positive), there exists a lower triangular
matrix, L, such that C = LLT. The matrix L can be determined from C by Cholesky
factorisation. The final vector of spatially correlated intra-event residuals, Y, is then calculated
by Eq. 2.12, where μ is the vector of mean intra-event residuals, which is a null vector, and Z is
the vector uncorrelated intra-event residuals initially generated for each site.
 Y μ LZ (2.12)
An alternative method is to use the spatial correlation co-efficients to calculate joint ground
shaking intensity exceedance probabilities at pairs of sites (Wang and Takada, 2005; Lee and
Kiremidjian, 2007; Esposito and Iervolino, 2011). Whilst this approach is necessary for PSHA,
it is not useful for the hybrid Monte Carlo simulation approach being used in this research,
which does not consider ground shaking exceedance probabilities.
2.3.4 Ground deformation
Permanent ground deformations can be caused by three types of ground failure hazard:
liquefaction, landsliding and surface fault rupture. The following sections describe existing
methods for predicting permanent ground deformations caused by each hazard, with a focus on
simplified methods that can be more easily applied in the insurance sector.
2.3.4.1 Liquefaction
Liquefaction is a phenomenon in which saturated soil loses strength due to excess pore water
pressure generated by ground shaking. Not all soil is susceptible to liquefaction and it is more
likely to occur in soils that are unconsolidated or uncompacted artificial fills. Sands and silty
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sands are the soil types most susceptible to liquefaction but silt and gravel can also liquefy.
Since these soil types generally exist close to the surface, high water tables also increase the risk
of liquefaction. Liquefaction can manifest itself as either vertical settlement or horizontal lateral
spread. Lateral spread occurs when liquefied soil is able to flow towards a free face such as a
river.
The recent earthquakes in Haiti (2010), Canterbury, New Zealand (2010-11) and Tohoku, Japan
(2011) highlighted the significance of liquefaction as a secondary hazard of seismic events and
the significant damage that it can cause to buildings and infrastructure. However, the insurance
sector was caught out by these events, with catastrophe models underestimating the extent and
severity of liquefaction that occurred (Drayton and Verdon, 2013). A contributing factor to this
is that the method used by some catastrophe models to account for liquefaction is based only on
liquefaction susceptibility, a qualitative parameter that considers only surficial geology
characteristics. Furthermore, losses arising from liquefaction are predicted by adding an
amplifier to losses predicted due to building damage caused by ground shaking (Drayton and
Vernon, 2013). There is a paucity of past event data on which to calibrate an amplifier and
consequently, significant losses from liquefaction damage will only be predicted if significant
losses are already predicted from ground shaking, whereas it is known that liquefaction can be
triggered at relatively low ground shaking intensities (Quigley et al., 2013). Whilst liquefaction
is less likely than ground shaking to be responsible for major building failures (Bird and
Bommer, 2004), it can have a major impact on critical infrastructure such as roads, pipes and
buried cables.
Bird and Bommer (2004) surmised that there are three options for dealing with ground failure
hazards in loss estimation. They can be ignored; they can be modelled using a simplified
approach; or they can be modelled by conducting a detailed geotechnical assessment. The first
of these options will likely lead to underestimation of losses in earthquakes where liquefaction
is a major hazard and lead to recurrence of the problems faced by insurers following the 2010-
11 Canterbury earthquakes in particular. The last option, detailed assessment, is appropriate for
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single-site risk analysis but is impractical for insurance loss estimation purposes because: 1)
insurers are unlikely to have access to much of the detailed geotechnical data required as inputs
to these methods; 2) they may not have the in-house expertise to correctly apply such methods
and engaging consultants may not be a viable option; and 3) loss estimation studies are often
conducted on a regional, national or supra-national scale for which detailed assessment would
be too expensive and time-consuming. Therefore for the insurance sector, simplified approaches
currently offer the most practical option for accounting for ground failures.
There are three stages to predict the occurrence of liquefaction and its scale (Bird et al., 2006).
First it is necessary to determine whether soils are susceptible to liquefaction. Liquefaction
susceptibility is based solely on ground conditions with no earthquake-specific information.
This is often done qualitatively (Bird and Bommer, 2004) and currently this is also the full
extent to which liquefaction risk is considered in some catastrophe models (Drayton and
Verdon, 2013). The next step is to determine liquefaction triggering, which determines the
likelihood of liquefaction for a given earthquake based on the susceptibility and other
earthquake-specific parameters. Finally the scale of liquefaction can be predicted as a
permanent ground deformation (PGDf).
Whilst the majority of methods for modelling liquefaction triggering required detailed site-
specific geotechnical data, there are three methods that can potentially be used to predict
liquefaction triggering and that only require data which are in the public domain or could be
easily obtained without significant time or cost implications. These are the Liquefaction
Potential Index (LPI) method (Iwasaki et al., 1984); the HAZUS method (FEMA, 2015); and
the method developed by Zhu et al. (2015) that makes use only of remote sensing data that are
publicly accessible from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) website. Furthermore,
these methods are appropriate for regional-scale analysis and although some engineering
judgment is required in their application, they do not require specialist geotechnical expertise,
and as such they are appropriate for use by the insurance sector.
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The LPI method (Iwasaki et al., 1984) is an extension of the factor of safety method developed
by Seed and Idriss (1967). The basis of this framework is to compare two parameters: the cyclic
stress ratio and the cyclic resistance ratio. The cyclic stress ratio depends on acceleration and
shear stress and represents the load imposed on a site by an earthquake. The cyclic resistance
ratio depends on geotechnical properties of the soil and represents the ability of the ground to
withstand the load. The factor of safety against liquefaction is defined as the ratio of the cyclic
resistance ratio and the cyclic stress ratio, for a layer of soil at depth, z. Liquefaction is predicted
to occur if the factor of safety is less than 1. The cyclic stress ratio, CSR, is calculated by Eq.
2.13, where g is the acceleration of gravity; σv is the total overburden stress at depth z; σ'v is the
effective overburden stress at depth z; and rd is a shear stress reduction coefficient given by Eq.
2.14 or 2.15.
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for z < 9.2 m: 1 0.00765dr z  (2.14)
for z ≥ 9.2 m: 1.174 0.0267dr z  (2.15)
Cyclic resistance ratio is normally calculated from geotechnical parameters based on cone
penetration test (CPT) or standard penetration test (SPT) results. However, this data is rarely in
the public domain and difficult to acquire on a regional scale. Alternatively, Andrus and Stokoe
(2000) propose a method for calculating the cyclic resistance ratio, CRR, based on shear-wave
velocity, VS, as shown in Eq. 2.16, where VS1 is the stress-corrected shear wave velocity; V*S1 is
the limiting upper value of VS1 for cyclic liquefaction occurrence, which varies between 200-
215 m/s depending on the fines content of the soil; and MSF is a magnitude scaling factor to
account for earthquakes with moment magnitude other than 7.5. The advantage of this method
is that whilst it also requires ground investigation, VS can be measured by non-penetrative
techniques, which may be easier in many locations. Furthermore, for the insurance industry the
method may be advantageous if proxies for VS can be obtained from publicly available datasets,
72
e.g. the United States Geological Survey (USGS) Global VS30 Map Server (USGS, 2013). VS1 is
given by Eq. 2.17, where Pa is a reference stress of 100 kPa. The magnitude scaling factor is
given by Eq. 2.18.
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However Juang et al. (2005) found that Eq. 2.16 is conservative for calculating CRR, resulting
in lower factors of safety and over-prediction of liquefaction occurrence. To correct for this,
they propose a multiplication factor of 1.4, to obtain an unbiased estimate of the factor of safety,
FS*, given by Eq. 2.19. The value of the factor has been derived by comparing estimates of
CRR using Eq. 2.16 to observations from 225 liquefaction case histories.
* 1.4 CRRFS
CSR
  (2.19)
FS* is an indicator of potential liquefaction at a specific depth. However, Iwasaki et al. (1984)
noted that damage to structures due to liquefaction was affected by the severity of liquefaction
at ground level and so propose an extension to the factor of safety method, the liquefaction
potential index (LPI), which predicts the likelihood of liquefaction at surface-level by
integrating a function of the factors of safety for each soil layer within the top 20 m of soil. The
LPI at a site is calculated from Eq. 2.20, where F* = 1 – FS* for a single soil layer. The soil
profile can be sub-divided into any number of layers (e.g. twenty 1 m layers or forty 0.5 m
layers), depending on the resolution of data available. Using site data from a collection of nine
Japanese earthquakes between 1891 and 1978, Iwasaki et al. (1984) calibrated the LPI model
and determined guideline criteria for determining liquefaction risk. These criteria propose that
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liquefaction risk is very low for LPI = 0; low for 0 < LPI ≤ 5; high for 5 < LPI ≤ 15; and very 
high for LPI > 15.
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Probability of liquefaction can also be used as a way of predicting liquefaction triggering, either
by setting a threshold probability or by randomly sampling from a Bernoulli distribution with
parameter equal to the probability of liquefaction. Hazus (FEMA, 2015) includes a simplified
method for predicting the probability of liquefaction at a site, which only requires earthquake
magnitude, PGA, water table depth and liquefaction susceptibility as inputs.
The liquefaction susceptibility is inferred from existing geological maps, with areas divided into
six zones of liquefaction susceptibility, from ‘None’ to ‘Very high’, according to the
classification of Youd and Perkins (1978). For a given liquefaction susceptibility category, the
probability of liquefaction occurrence is given by Eq. 2.21, where P[Liq | PGA=amax] is the
conditional probability of liquefaction occurrence for a given susceptibility zone at a specified
level of peak horizontal ground motion, amax, based on work by Liao et al. (1988); KM is the
moment magnitude correction factor, which accounts for the fact that the conditional probability
relationships have been developed for a moment magnitude 7.5 earthquake; KW is the ground
water correction factor; and Pml is the proportion of map unit susceptible to liquefaction, which
accounts for the real variation in susceptibility across similar geologic units. The conditional
probability and map unit factor are zero for the susceptibility zone ‘None’. For the other zones,
the conditional probability is given by linear functions of PGA and the map unit factor is a
constant value and these are shown in Table 2.4. The moment magnitude and ground water
correction factors are given by Eq.’s 2.22 and 2.23, where dw is the depth to ground water. The
map unit factor is a constant for each susceptibility zone, with values of 0.25, 0.20, 0.10, 0.05,
0.02 and 0, going from ‘Very high’ to ‘None’.
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Table 2.4 – Zone varying parameters for HAZUS method for predicting liquefaction probability (excluding ‘None’
zone)
Liquefaction
susceptibility zone
Conditional liquefaction
probability, P[Liq | PGA=amax]
Map unit
factor, Pml
Very high 9.09amax – 0.82 0.25
High 7.67amax – 0.92 0.20
Medium 6.67amax – 1.00 0.10
Low 5.57amax – 1.18 0.05
Very low 4.16amax – 1.08 0.02
Zhu et al. (2015) also propose a simplified method for predicting the probability of liquefaction.
The focus of their study is the development of prediction functions for use in rapid response and
loss estimation, so they deliberately use predictor variables that can be calculated or are in the
public domain and do not require any specialist knowledge to be applied. The input data include
earthquake magnitude, PGA, VS30, which is the average shear wave velocity across the top 30 m
of soil, the compound topographic index (CTI), which is a proxy for saturation and the
normalised distance (ND), which is the ratio between the distance to the coast and the distance
between the coast and inland edge of the sedimentary basin (soil/rock boundary). Global
estimates for VS30 at approximately 674 m grid intervals are available as open-access from the
web-based USGS Global VS30 Map Server (USGS, 2013). CTI can also be obtained globally
from the USGS Earth Explorer web service (USGS, 2014) and to calculate ND, the location of
the inland edge can be estimated from a surface roughness calculation based on a digital
elevation model (USGS, 2014), or by using VS30 data such that the inland edge is assumed to be
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the boundary between NEHRP site classes C (soft rock) and D (stiff soil), (i.e. at VS30 = 360
m/s). Zhu et al. (2015) propose that the probability of liquefaction can be estimated as the
logistic function given by Eq. 2.24, where X is a linear function of some set of the predictor
variables.
1
1 X
P Liq
e
    
(2.24)
Zhu et al. (2015) propose three linear models that are applicable to Christchurch and are tested
in this study: a specific local model derived for Christchurch; a regional model for use in coastal
sedimentary basins (including Christchurch) and a global model that is applicable more
generally. For the global model, the linear predictor function, XG, is given by Eq. 2.25, where
the magnitude weighting factor, MWF, is given by Eq. 2.26. For the regional model, the linear
predictor function, XR, is given by Eq. 2.27 and for the Christchurch-specific local model, the
linear predictor function, XL, is given by Eq. 2.28.
  3024.1 ln 0.355 4.784lnG SX PGA MWF CTI V     (2.25)
2.56
2.2410
WMMWF  (2.26)
  3015.83 1.443ln 0.136 9.759 2.764lnR SX PGA MWF CTI ND V      (2.27)
 0.316 1.225ln 0.145 9.708LX PGA MWF CTI ND     (2.28)
Bird et al. (2006) list all the existing methods for predicting the scale of liquefaction in terms of
permanent ground deformation (PGDf). The methods are divided into those that predict vertical
settlement and those that predict lateral spreading. As with liquefaction triggering, almost all of
these methods require results from CPT or SPT tests and detailed geotechnical data e.g. fines
content, median particle size diameter. The likelihood that insurers possess or are able to acquire
such data is low, which means that these approaches are not suitable for regional-scale rapid
assessment. The lack of simplified models (i.e. simplified in the context of commercial
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insurance application) is not surprising given the small number of models that exist for
liquefaction triggering assessment and that by definition measuring the scale of liquefaction is
more complex.
Hazus (FEMA, 2015) is the only source of a simplified method for predicting PGDf due to
vertical settlement and is consistent with work presented by Tokimatsu and Seed (1987),
although Bird et al. (2006) note that this method is only accurate to within a factor 2 or 3. The
vertical permanent ground deformation, PGDfV, is calculated by Eq.2.29 where E[PGDfV] is the
expected vertical ground deformation, which is sampled from a uniform distribution whose
bounds are defined by a characteristic amplitude, such that the lower bound is half the
characteristic amplitude and the upper bound is double the characteristic amplitude. The
characteristic amplitude varies by liquefaction susceptibility zone and these are shown in Table
2.5.
V VPGDf P Liq E PGDf       (2.29)
Table 2.5 – Liquefaction susceptibility zone varying parameters for HAZUS method for predicting permanent ground
deformations (excluding ‘None’ zone)
Liquefaction
susceptibility zone
Liquefaction triggering
threshold, PGA(t) (g)
PGDfV characteristic
amplitude (m)
Very high 0.09 0.305
High 0.12 0.152
Medium 0.15 0.051
Low 0.21 0.025
Very low 0.26 0.000
Simplified methods for predicting PGDf due to lateral spread are proposed by Youd and Perkins
(1987), Rauch and Martin (2000) and Hazus (FEMA, 2015), although the Hazus method is an
extension of the Youd and Perkins method, so the latter is not discussed further. In Hazus,
horizontal permanent ground deformation, PGDfH, is calculated by Eq. 2.30, where KΔ is a
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displacement correction factor, given by Eq. 2.31, and the additional term on the right of Eq.
2.30 is the expected ground deformation for a given liquefaction susceptibility zone, which is a
function of the normalized peak ground acceleration, PGAnorm = PGA / PGA(t), where PGA(t) is
the liquefaction triggering threshold acceleration for that zone, as shown in Table 2.5.
 Δ | /H H SCPGDf K E PGDf PGA PL a     (2.30)
where,
3 20.0086 0.0914 0.4698 0.9835K M M M     (2.31)
for 1 < PGAnorm < 2:  | / 12 12normH SCE PGDf PGA PL a PGA      (2.32)
for 2 < PGAnorm < 3:  | / 18 24normH SCE PGDf PGA PL a PGA      (2.33)
for PGAnorm > 3:  | / 70 180normH SCE PGDf PGA PL a PGA     
(2.34)
The study by Rauch and Martin (2000), known as EPOLLS, propose a model where PGDfH is
given by Eq. 2.35, where Rf is the shortest horizontal distance to the surface projection of the
fault rupture, and Td is the duration of ground motion between the first and last occurrence of
accelerations ≥ 0.05 g at each site. 
 
2
0.613 0.0139 2.42 0.01147 2.21 0.149H W f dPGDf M R PGA T      (2.35)
2.3.4.2 Landslides
Landslides occur when the combination of static and inertia forces lead to instability in a mass
and cause that mass to slide. With respect to earthquakes, this instability occurs when PGA
exceeds a critical value, known as the critical acceleration. Two methods for predicting
permanent ground PGDf associated with landslides are proposed by Hazus (FEMA, 2015) and
Saygili and Rathje (2008). Both of these methods require the estimation of the critical
acceleration value. However, currently there are no generally accepted or simplified methods for
estimating the critical acceleration at a site. In the Hazus model, sites are classified into one of
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ten landslide susceptibility zone based on the ground type (rock, soft rock or clay/silty soil), the
groundwater level and the slope angle. A single value for critical acceleration is defined for each
susceptibility zone. The permanent ground deformation, PGDfLAND, is then given by Eq. 2.36,
where PGA is the observed peak ground acceleration, n is the number of cycles, given by Eq.
2.37, and E[d/PGA] is the displacement factor, which is a function of the ratio of the critical
acceleration to PGA, although the functional form is not published.
/ LANDLANDPGDf E d PGA PGA n     (2.36)
3 20.3419 5.5214 33.6154 70.7692LAND W W Wn M M M    (2.37)
In the empirically derived scalar model by Saygili and Rathje (2008), a median estimate of
PGDfLAND is given by Eq. 2.38, where ac is the critical acceleration; PGA is the observed peak
ground acceleration and εLAND is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and unit
standard deviation.
 
 
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3 4
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
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 

(2.38)
Since the equation for the displacement factor in the Hazus method is not published, only the
Saygili and Rathje (2008) method is viable. However, this requires the estimation of critical
acceleration, which can be achieved from the Hazus method, but only if information about
geological conditions and slope angle are available.
2.3.4.3 Surface fault rupture
The only existing simplified method for predicting permanent ground deformations due to
surface fault rupture, PGDfRUP, is an empirical function proposed by Wells and Coppersmith
(1994), which applies to all styles of faulting. This relates the median estimate of the maximum
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permanent ground deformation along the fault, PGDfRUPMAX, to the moment magnitude, MW, as
shown in Eq. 2.39.
 ln 5.26 0.79 WRUPMAXPGDf M   (2.39)
The maximum deformation can occur at any point along the rupture and is assumed to drop
linearly to zero at either end. To account for uncertainty in the model, PGDfRUPMAX is estimated
from a uniform distribution between 0.5 and 2 times the median estimate.
2.4 Fragility
The purpose of the vulnerability module of an earthquake catastrophe model is to estimate the
level of asset damage expected for different levels of earthquake intensity (Mahdyiar and Porter,
2005). In commercial catastrophe models this is usually achieved using vulnerability curves that
relate damage ratio (the ratio of expected repair cost to replacement cost) to ground shaking
intensity (LMA, 2013). More generally, a vulnerability curve is a function that relates a
parameter of loss to an IM (Rossetto et al., 2014). However, for engineering purposes, it is more
useful to relate the observed IM to a measure of damage, rather than directly to loss. A common
tool used in the seismic risk assessment of buildings are fragility curves, which relate the
probability of exceedance a defined damage state to a parameter of ground shaking (or ground
deformation) intensity (Rossetto and Elnashai, 2003). In the case of critical infrastructure, it is
necessary to know the expected physical condition of asset after an earthquake so that system
performance can be measured and indirect losses can be estimated. Therefore, if indirect loss
estimation is to be adequately addressed in catastrophe models, it must be through the
application of fragility curves rather than vulnerability curves.
Pitilakis et al. (2014b) have documented all existing methods for estimating the fragility of
assets in the systems considered by the SYNER-G study and it is observed that fragility curves
are used for all nodal assets. Fragility curves can take a range of functional forms although
Baker (2015) observes that the lognormal cumulative distribution is the most commonly
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adopted. Other functional forms are possible however, such as binomial distribution (e.g.
Ottonelli et al., 2015), beta distribution (e.g. Rossetto and Elnashai, 2003) or generalised linear
model (e.g. Charvet et al., 2014). Rossetto et al. (2015) state that the popularity of the lognormal
cumulative distribution is due to three reasons. Firstly, the y-axis is constrained between 0 and
1, which fits the probabilistic nature of fragility curves. Secondly, the x-axis is constrained
between 0 and ∞, which fits the range of most IMs. Finally, the lognormal cumulative 
distribution is skewed to the left, which better reflects the clustering of data at low IM values. If
a lognormal cumulative distribution is assumed, the fragility curve function takes the form
shown in Eq. 2.40, where P[d ≥ di | IM] is the exceedance probability for the ith damage state,
IM is the ground motion intensity (e.g. PGA), Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function, βdi is the standard deviation of the natural logarithm (dispersion) of ground motion
intensity for the ith damage state and
id
IM is the median value of ground motion intensity at
which the asset is expected to reach the ith damage state.
1| ln
i i
i
d d
IMP d d IM
IM
  
       
  
   (2.40)
If different damage states are defined for an asset, then distinct fragility curves exist for each
damage state with different values for the dispersion, βdi, and for the median ground motion,
id
IM . Therefore the risk to an asset being assessed for multiple damage states will be
represented by a set of fragility curves, as shown in Figure 2.2. Whilst the vertical axis of a
fragility curve specifies the exceedance probability of a damage state, the probability of being in
a specific damage state can be determined by taking the difference between the exceedance
probabilities for that damage state and the damage state above, as shown in Eq. 2.41 and on
Figure 2.2. For assets that can be classified by different typologies, each typology will have its
own set of fragility curves.
1| | |i i iP d d IM P d d IM P d d IM              (2.41)
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Figure 2.2 – Example set of fragility curves for an asset with three damage states
2.4.1 Existing fragility curves
When conducting a seismic risk assessment there is a choice between either using an existing
fragility curve for an asset or developing a new one. The advantage of using existing curves is
that the process is faster and does not require any specialist expertise to implement and therefore
this is the most practical option for insurers. When selecting an existing fragility curve, the
intention is to choose one for an asset that, in physical terms, matches as closely as possible the
assets being assessed. Other factors to consider are the IM used by the fragility curve and
whether it is one that is being predicted in the assessment and also the physical attributes used to
distinguish between different asset typologies. In some cases the attributes necessary to apply a
fragility curve from a particular study may not be known and so either the relevant attribute has
to be assumed or an alternative curve has to be used. Pitilakis et al. (2014b) compiled a
comprehensive database of all existing fragility curves for elements within the critical
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infrastructure systems being studies in this research, with the exception of telecommunications.
Based on their database, and supplemented by other sources found independently, Appendix C
lists the references of known critical infrastructure asset fragility curves and the physical
attribute data required to implement each one. A brief summary of this is provided in the
following paragraphs.
In the electric power network, the focus of fragility studies has been on substations. There have
been different approaches to this, with five studies producing fragility curves for substations as
single entities (e.g. Vanzi, 2000; FEMA, 2015), and a further nine producing fragility curves for
each internal components of a substation such as transformers, circuit breakers or switches.
Whilst some of the component studies focus on key components only (e.g. Anagnos and
Ostrom, 2000; Straub and der Kiureghian, 2008), others consider all components, which allows
a fault tree analysis to be conducted to predict overall substation failure (e.g. Hwang and Huo,
1998; Rasulo et al., 2004). Voltage and seismic design standards are the most common
classifying features. Hazus (FEMA, 2015) is the only study to produce fragility curves for
generation plants with different sets of curves based on capacity and seismic design standards.
Hazus (FEMA, 2015) also produces fragility curves for distribution circuits, although this is not
the same as a conduit. A distribution circuit is defined as a grouping of all the conduits,
supporting equipment and in-line equipment that feed off a single distribution substation. The
damage state of the entire circuit can be predicted but it is not clear how the vulnerability of
individual conduits can be predicted, which would be necessary for system performance
analysis. Park et al. (2006) produce fragility curves for conduits based on data from the
February 2001 MW 6.8 Nisqually earthquake, but make no distinction between whether the
conduits are overhead or buried, nor do they consider any other attribute.
For water supply and waste water system nodes, Hazus (FEMA, 2015) is the primary source of
fragility curves, with curves published for sources (wells), treatment plants (water supply and
waste water) and pumping/lift stations. Different curves are produced to account for different
seismic design standards and in the case of treatment plants, for different capacities. Hazus
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(FEMA, 2015) also publishes fragility curves for storage tanks although does not consider any
typologies. More refined tank fragility curves are produced by O’Rourke and So (2000) and
ALA (2001), which consider separate curves for attributes such as material and quantity of
stored content. The SRM-LIFE study produces fragility curves for treatment plants and
pumping stations, but this report is not in the public domain and its details are only available
from the SYNER-G database (Pitilakis et al., 2014b). There are 25 studies that consider the
fragility of pipes. A notable feature of all of these is that they do not in fact produce
probabilistic fragility curves. All the methods are deterministic calculations of mean repair rate
(RR), i.e. the mean number of repairs per unit distance. Repair rate functions can adopt a range
of functional forms, although almost all those listed in Appendix C use a power relationship as
shown in Eq. 2.42, where aRR and bRR are coefficients determined by regression.
RR
RR
bRR a IM  (2.42)
It is generally assumed that the distribution of intervals between repairs follows a Poisson
distribution (Hwang et al. 1998; Adachi and Ellingwood 2008) and in such a case, the repair
rate becomes the parameter of a Poisson process used to estimate the probability of a specified
number of repairs occurring on a segment of pipe with length, Lpipe km (it is most common for
repair rates to be expressed in terms of repairs per kilometre). Assuming that a pipe fails when it
suffers at least one break, the Poisson process can be used to estimate the failure probability of
the pipe as shown in Eq. 2.43 and Eq. 2.44.
     0 01fail repairs repairsP P P    (2.43)
  1 pipeRR LfailP e   (2.44)
Most of the existing studies produce models to predict repair rates due to ground shaking with
either PGA or PGV as IMs (although it is notable that the more recent studies tend to use PGV).
Pineda-Parros and Najafi (2010) state that PGV should be most relevant to buried infrastructure
since it relates more closely than PGA to ground strain. Furthermore, the studies by Isoyama
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(2000) and O’Rourke et al. (2001) show very strong correlation between PGV and pipe damage.
Seven of the studies produce models to predict repair rates due to ground deformation based on
PGDf. Material is the most common attribute for distinguishing between pipe typologies,
although to a lesser extent, diameter, soil type and joint type are also considered. There are six
studies that propose fragility curves for tunnels based on construction type and ground
conditions (e.g. ALA, 2001, FEMA, 2015), but only ALA (2001) propose fragility curves for
canals.
For natural gas and oil delivery networks, fragility curves for pipelines are the same as for the
water supply and waste water system pipes. The same applies to storage tanks, although there
are two additional studies that produce fragility curves specifically for liquefied gas/oil tanks
(Iervolino et al., 2004; Berahman and Behnamfar, 2007). For compressor stations, sources of
fragility curves include LESSLOSS, SRM-LIFE, and Hazus (FEMA, 2015), although only
Hazus, which identifies typologies by capacity and seismic design status, is in the public
domain (information for LESSLOSS and SRM-LIFE is reported indirectly by Pitilakis et al.
(2014b)).
For highways networks, only Hazus presents fragility curves for roads. These are with respect to
PGDf and roads area classified by their importance. There are fourteen fragility functions for
bridges and whilst in the past these were treated as single elements, more recently it has become
common practice to treat bridges as systems of components each with their own fragility
(Padgett and DesRoches, 2008). The most comprehensive study is Hazus (FEMA, 2015) which
has produced fragility curves for 28 typical bridge classifications, based on seismic design
status, number of spans, material, pier type, abutment type, bearing type and span continuity,
while Moschonas et al. (2009), produced fragility curves for eleven typical bridges found in
Greece, classified by the type of pier, the type of deck and the type of pier-deck connection.
Zhang et al. (2008) have produced fragility curves for six bridge classifications in California
based on span continuity and abutment type. Corrosion is also considered in some studies (Choe
et al., 2009; Gardoni and Rosowsky, 2009) by applying a factor to the failure probability that
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accounts for environmental, material and geometric properties that may make some bridges
more susceptible to corrosion. Notably nine of the fourteen bridge fragility curves are only valid
for a single specific typology. Fragility curves for tunnels are the same as for the water systems.
Fragility curves also exist for embankments, slopes and retaining walls, although in practice an
insurer would most probably focus on more easily identifiable assets such as roads, bridges and
tunnels.
For telecommunications networks, only two studies present fragility curves. Hazus (FEMA,
2015) presents for curves central offices, whilst Leelardcharoen (2011) expands on this by
producing separate curves for different types of central office. No fragility analysis has been
undertaken for linear assets in telecommunications systems as it is generally thought that this
type of infrastructure performs well in earthquakes (Schiff, 1997).
2.4.2 Development of new fragility curves
In some cases a fragility curve may not exist for the specific asset class being modelled, or even
if one does exist, differences in construction practices may mean that curves developed for an
asset class in one location may not be valid for the same asset class in another location. Using
existing fragility curves for a ‘similar’ asset class may be convenient but can also be inaccurate.
Therefore, if circumstances allow, the development of new curves is advantageous since it
ensures that fragility analysis is based on a function that is specific to the assets being studied
and their unique characteristics.
There are four ways new fragility curves can be developed: either empirically using data from
past events; analytically using numerical methods and engineering analysis; by expert
judgement; or by a hybrid of these methods, e.g. analytical methods used to enhance empirical
data (Rossetto and Elnashai, 2003). Each of the methods possesses its own advantages and
disadvantages as discussed by Rossetto and Elnashai (2003). Empirical functions are more
straightforward to produce since they require only statistical analysis rather than specialist
engineering knowledge but can be hindered by data deficiencies such as misclassification of
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observed damage states, clustering of data in a narrow ground motion range or attributing
damage to a single event that was actually caused by multiple earthquakes or separate
phenomena (Rossetto et al., 2014). Analytical functions are potentially more reliable than
empirical functions but require more computational effort, greater engineering expertise and
challenges remain in terms of accounting for all building features. Expert judgment can also
overcome some of the problems identified with empirical analysis but may suffer from the
experience and subjectivity of the experts consulted.
State-of-the-art guidelines for the Global Earthquake Model (GEM) (Rossetto et al., 2014) list
seven steps in the framework for empirical fragility curve development: preparation of damage
data; selection and estimation of IM levels; selection of statistical models; fitting of statistical
models; identification of optimum statistical model; validation of fragility curve; and reporting
of the fragility curve. GEM guidelines for analytical fragility curve development (D’Ayala et
al., 2013) list six steps: definition of index buildings; definition of components for response
analysis; selection of model type (1D/2D/3D); definition of damage states; selection of model
type (static or dynamic) and calculation of engineering demand parameter damage state
thresholds; and constriction of fragility curves. However this should be conducted by an
engineer with Master’s level training and the ability to perform non-linear structural analysis.
2.4.3 Bayesian updating of existing fragility curves
In some cases there may be insufficient data with which to develop new completely new
fragility curves for an asset but analysis shows that existing fragility curves are inadequate. In
these cases an alternative solution is to adopt a Bayesian approach to the development of new
fragility curves (e.g. Jaiswal et al., 2011; Rossetto et al., 2014). In the method proposed by
Rossetto et al. (2014) for the Global Earthquake Model (GEM), the parameters of an existing
fragility curve are used as prior estimates for the parameters of a new fragility curve developed
from empirical data. The existing function parameters are considered to be random variables
whose distribution is determined from observed data and some other prior knowledge. A prior
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distribution is assumed for each parameter. Using Bayes’ Theorem, the posterior distribution of
the parameters (i.e. the distribution of the parameters for the new curve) are proportional to the
assumed prior distribution (i.e. the distribution of parameters for the existing curve) and the
likelihood function, as shown in Eq. 2.45, where for a set of parameter values, θFRAG, the
likelihood function is the probability that the set of empirical observed damage states, αFRAG,
and corresponding IM observations, βFRAG, would occur given θFRAG.
     FRAG FRAG FRAG FRAG FRAG FRAG FRAG| , ; ,f f Lθ α β θ θ α β (2.45)
Rossetto et al. (2014) propose using a Gibbs sampling method (Kruschke, 2011) to estimate the
posterior distribution. The Gibbs sampling method is a type of Markov Chain Monte Carlo
algorithm applicable to multivariate probability distributions. Initial values of each parameter
are assumed from the prior distributions and the likelihood function is calculated to give a first
estimate of the posterior distribution for each parameter. The Gibbs sampling algorithm
subsequently generates a chain of sampled parameter values, where each sample realisation is
dependent on the previous one. The likelihood function and posterior distribution estimates are
calculated at each sample and after a large number of samples there should be convergence in
the results. To allow for this, Rossetto et al. (2014) suggest that chains of 100,000 samples are
used. The Bayesian method is particularly useful when an observed dataset is small or when the
specific objective is to improve a function with newly acquired data.
2.4.4 Damage assignment
Fragility curves estimate the probability of an asset being in a specified damage state or worse,
while repair rate functions can be manipulated to estimate the failure probability of a pipe.
There are two common methods in the existing literature for deterministically predicting
damage in a particular scenario with observed IMs. The first method evaluates the number or
proportion of assets in each damage state from amongst a group of assets of the same typology
and hence modelled with the same fragility curve (e.g. Kircher et al., 1997; King et al., 2004;
Tang and Wen, 2009). The assets are grouped into bins according to their corresponding
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observed IM. All the assets within in a bin are assumed to have the same IM value (usually the
midpoint of the bin) and exceedance probabilities for each damage state are calculated for that
assigned IM. For the assets in that bin, the proportion that are predicted to be in each damage
state can be calculated from Eq. 2.41. This is repeated for all bins to evaluate the total count.
The second method is to assign a damage state to each asset individually. For each asset the
damage state exceedance probabilities are evaluated from the fragility curve based on the
observed IM at its location. The asset is then assigned into a specific damage state by sampling
from a uniformly distributed random variable between 0 and 1. The process for assigning the
damage state is that if the random variate is smaller than the exceedance probability for the
worst damage state (i.e. complete damage or failure), then the asset is assigned to that damage
state. If not, the random variate is compared to the exceedance probability for the next worst
damage state and if it is smaller, the asset is assigned to that damage state. The process is
repeated for all damage states, going in order of decreasing severity. For critical infrastructure
system performance measurement, it is important to know not just how many assets are in a
damage state, but specifically which ones, since the systemic impact of a failure will vary
depending on the criticality of the failed asset (e.g. how many customers it serves, levels of
redundancy). Therefore this method is much more prevalent in existing seismic risk assessments
of critical infrastructure systems (e.g. Dueñas-Osorio et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2010; Poljansek
et al., 2012).
2.5 System performance
The performance of infrastructure, also known as residual functionality (Cimellaro, 2013), can
be measured in three different ways (Chang and Song, 2007). The first is to assess the
performance of individual assets in the system as described in the previous section; the second
is to assess whether there is a connection between two points in the system, (i.e. connectivity,
e.g. Dueñas-Osorio et al., 2007; Kang et al., 2008; Bensi et al., 2009); and the third is to assess
the quality of service, (i.e. serviceability, e.g. Chang and Nojima, 2001; Adachi and Ellingwood,
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2009; Romero et al., 2010). Whilst asset performance is informative for estimating direct
economic losses, the latter two perspectives are more useful for estimating indirect losses, since
they tell us more about how the level of service has been affected to customers.
Connectivity analysis determines whether there is a functioning system connection between a
source node and a demand node and only requires knowledge of whether the components that
exist on the paths between the two nodes are functional. However, fragility curves for assets
only predict a failure probability, not a functional state, and so given a set of IMs for a single
event, there is uncertainty relating to the actual functional state of each asset. For a particular
group of assets, fragility curves can estimate how many amongst that group will fail or be in a
specific damage state. However, it is not just how many assets are in a particular damage state
that is important but specifically which ones. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, systems can
exhibit redundancy, which means that overall performance does not necessarily relate to
quantity of failed assets. The geographical distribution of damaged components needs to be
known to determine whether redundancy will mitigate the effects of damage. Secondly, the size
and importance of areas served by assets can vary, so the system performance can vary
considerably depending on which particular assets have failed.
Many connectivity analysis studies have analysed lifeline systems in a binary fashion (e.g.
Chang and Song, 2007; Kang et al., 2008; Bensi et al., 2009). Every node or link is either in a
‘functional’ state or in a ‘failed’ state. If it is in a ‘functional’ state, then it is implicitly assumed
to be functioning at 100% of its capacity. In reality however, some components may only be
partially functioning. For example, a water pipe that has a number of leaks will still be able to
supply water, but at reduced levels. Such a performance reduction is not measured in
connectivity analysis, which is only concerned with whether or not a component is able to
provide a service, not the level of service.
In the binary connectivity analysis, a single earthquake is modelled and the functional state of
each asset has to be assigned. This is done by a random sampling procedure based on the failure
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probability of the asset (i.e. fragility) and the result is a randomly generated realisation of
damage to all the system assets. The performance of the whole system (connectivity or
serviceability) is then computed for that system damage realisation. To capture the uncertainty
in damage assignment, Monte Carlo simulation can be applied. If only a single scenario event is
being studied, then the process is repeated by re-sampling the damage states to create different
system damage realisation and by re-calculating the performance for each realisation. If
multiple events are being studied, then as long as the number of events is large, one can expect
that the uncertainty in damage assignment for a particular asset will be reflected across all event
simulations. Consequently, it is not necessary to consider more than one system damage
realisation per event. However, if only a small number of events are being studied, then it may
be necessary to create multiple system damage realisations per event to ensure the uncertainty is
adequately reflected.
An alternative to the binary approach to connectivity analysis is to estimate the probability that
a connection exists between two assets. This is often referred to as an analytical approach as it
does not require repeated sampling, and in theory allows for more rapid computation (Kim et
al., 2009). A common analytical method is the Matrix System Reliability method (e.g. Chang
and Song, 2007; Kang et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2009; Song and Kang, 2009; Song and Ok, 2010;
Kang et al., 2012). To apply this method it is necessary to identify all possible system damage
states and all the critical minimum paths between relevant node pairs (e.g. between sources node
and demand nodes). The probability of disconnection between a node pair can be calculated
from the failure probabilities of the assets along the minimum paths. For a single earthquake,
there is no need to generate multiple system damage realisations to account for the uncertainty
arising from the fragility curves, since failures are considered probabilistically. However, for
loss estimation it is still necessary to model multiple earthquake scenarios to account for
uncertainty in the hazard model. Therefore, whilst analytical methods are useful for single
scenario event assessment, their primary benefit becomes redundant in multi-event risk
assessment. Another disadvantage is that analytical methods can have problems dealing with
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large-scale systems since the computational effort increases exponentially as the number assets
in the system increases (Song and Ok, 2010). The problem of identifying all network states and
minimum paths can become intractable to the extent that it becomes necessary to use heuristic
sampling techniques, which negates the advantage of using analytical methods over simulation
methods.
System performance metrics used in connectivity analysis can be a single global index for the
entire system (e.g. Adachi and Ellingwood, 2008; Romero et al., 2010; Poljansek et al., 2012) or
a local index for each individual demand asset. The major advantage of a global index is
simplicity, as it allows a quick comparison to be made between different scenarios. However, a
global index does not allow for the identification of which geographical areas within a system
have problems. The value of global or local indices will depend on the needs of the assessment.
If losses are being estimated for a small number of assets (or clusters of assets), then the
geographical precision of local indices may be more beneficial. However, if the purpose of the
assessment is to predict more general region-wide impacts, then the simplicity a global index
might be more useful. An example of a local index for connectivity analysis is the connectivity
loss which can be estimated for each demand node. (e.g. Duenas-Osorio et al., 2007; Adachi and
Ellingwood, 2008; Kim et al., 2009; Poljansek et al., 2012; Cavalieri et al., 2014a; Esposito et
al., 2015). The connectivity loss is the ratio of the number of source nodes to which the demand
node is connected after an earthquake to the number of source nodes to which it is connected
normally. Poljansek et al. (2012) also propose taking the mean of the connectivity loss at each
demand node as a global index. One problem with connectivity loss as a metric is that although
it has a mathematical definition, its practical meaning is unclear to a non-expert. Furthermore, it
is possible for a system to have a high connectivity loss yet all customers are still connected to
the system. Conversely, a system can have some customers disconnected yet its connectivity
loss can be low. Since no population weighting is applied in the calculation of connectivity loss,
it does not account for the fact that the social impact of loss of connectivity will vary between
demand nodes. A more straightforward and meaningful global index for hierarchical systems is
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to simply count the number of customers connected to a system after an earthquake (e.g. Reed et
al., 2009) and this is often how system performances are reported after real earthquakes (e.g.
Kameda, 2000; Ministry of Health, 2012; Orion, 2014).
Serviceability analysis determines whether a customer has a functioning system connection and
also the quality of service the customer can expect to receive (e.g. is water at adequate
pressure). Each infrastructure system has its own unique metrics, and therefore methodology,
for measuring quality of service that depend on its components and the flow characteristics of
the utility. However, the need to understand flow makes this more difficult for an insurer apply
than connectivity analysis. As serviceability analysis allows consideration of partial
functionality of assets, it can provide a better assessment of losses. Overall, very few studies
exist that adopt serviceability analysis, and those that do exist tend to simply attribute a
functionality level based on a damage state inferred from the fragility curve (e.g. ALA, 2001;
Leelardcharoen, 2011).
For electric power networks standard power flow equations can be used to calculate the power
supplied to each node and the demand at each node. Ang et al. (1996) suggest a range of local
serviceability metrics that can be calculated at each node based on this data and a global metric
which compares demand to supply for the system as a whole. Hydraulic analysis can be used to
determine volume, pressure and head of water passing through each node of water supply, waste
water and oil delivery systems (Rasulo et al., 2008), and equivalent pressure and flow analysis
for gas networks can be conducted using the method described by Osiadacz (1987). For these
systems a common metric is the system serviceability index (e.g. Vanzi, 1996; Adachi and
Ellingwood, 2008; Javanbarg and Takada, 2009; Romero et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2010;
Poljansek et al., 2012, Cavalieri et al., 2014a; Esposito et al., 2015), which is equivalent to the
connectivity loss but instead of counting the number of sources connected to a demand node, it
measures the quantity of the utility being supplied to each demand node in terms of volume or
flow. For telecommunications networks Leelardcharoen (2011) proposes the blocking
probability as a system performance metric. It is the probability that a call cannot be connected
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because of system capacity constraints and can be calculated for a single node or for the
network as a whole. Examples of system performance metrics for highways networks include
length of highways open (Chang and Nojima, 2001), shortest path distance between node pairs
(Chang and Nojima, 2001), demand to capacity ratio (Kawakami, 2000), average travel time
delay (Kiremidjian et al., 2007; Jayaram and Baker, 2010)
System performance can be analysed as either steady-state or transient. Steady-state analysis
takes a snapshot of system operation in equilibrium at a discrete moment in time, whereas
transient analysis shows how the operation varies continuously over a time period. Ang et al.
(1996) and Vanzi (1996) both observe that for electric power systems, the computational effort
required for transient serviceability analysis is disproportionately large and so recommend the
use of steady-state analysis. Whilst there is value in assessing the change in system performance
over time from the earthquake to full restoration, transient analysis increases complexity and is
computationally very intensive, and so alternative methods may be more appropriate for loss
estimation. After an earthquake, improvements to system performance are likely to be step-like
rather than continuous, since the completion of individual restoration activities would occur at
discrete time intervals. Improvement of system performance can therefore be modelled as a
series of steady-state analyses at discrete time-steps rather than continuously and there are
methods in the literature to estimate the restoration time of assets (e.g. FEMA, 2015; Cagnan et
al., 2006) that can be used to determine the time-steps. As well as measuring the performance at
each time-step, the performance of a system can also be measured as a single value that
accounts for outage duration. In the utilities sector, temporal system performance is often
measured in people minutes, which is the total sum of the outage times for each individual
customer (Orion, 2009).
There are only a very limited number of studies that have previously attempted to validate
infrastructure system performance models with observed metrics from past earthquakes. Wang
and O’Rourke (2006) and Bonneau and O’Rourke (2009) validate models of the Los Angeles
water supply system with observations from 1994 Northridge earthquake. Wang and O’Rourke
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(2006) measure performance in terms of flow rates at key locations and find simulation errors of
up to 10%. Bonneau and O’Rourke (2009) measure the proportion of customers who remain
connected to the system and predict a connection level of 71.4%, which is in the range of 70-
75% estimated by the system operator. Javanbarg and Takada (2009) validate a model of the
Osaka water supply system with measurements of water pressure at 20 nodes after the 1995
Kobe earthquake. Errors are not reported and results are only presented as plots, but it can be
seen that in some cases errors exceed 50%. Wu and Dueñas-Osorio (2013) validate models of
the electric power network and water supply system in Concepcion, Chile with observations
from the 2010 Maule earthquake. While other studies aim for a mean prediction that is as close
as possible to the observation, Wu and Dueñas-Osorio (2013) set a different objective of
ensuring that the model does not underestimate performance. The performance metric is
connectivity loss, which measures the average percentage reduction in the number of
topological paths between each generation node and demand node. The calibrated model has a
probability of 0.96 for predicting an electric power network performance at least as bad as
observed and a corresponding probability of 0.72 for the water supply system.
Two other system performance validation studies exist in relation to hurricanes. Winkler et al.
(2010) validate a model of the Harris County, Houston electric power network with observation
from Hurricane Ike in 2008. The performance metric is the proportion of customers
experiencing power outages and is measured separately for each of the 137 zip codes in the
county. The mean absolute error is reported as 15.59%. Nateghi et al. (2011) validate five
candidate models for an unspecified part of the Gulf Coast electric power network with
observations from Hurricane Ivan in 2004 and from Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Dennis in
2005. The performance metric is the mean outage duration time. For Hurricane Ivan – the event
that is used for model development – the best performing model has an error of 16.4%. For
Hurricane Katrina the relative error is 19.9% and for Hurricane Dennis the error is 27%.
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2.6 Interdependencies
2.6.1 Characteristics of interdependency
It is possible to make a semantic distinction between dependency and interdependency when
analysing infrastructure systems (e.g. Rinaldi et al., 2001; Bigger et al., 2009). Dependency
describes a unidirectional relationship in which one system depends on another, whereas
interdependency describes a bidirectional relationship where each system depends on the other.
However, dependency can also be thought of as simply a specific case of interdependency in
which the relationship is null in one direction and it is common in natural hazards literature to
use the term ‘interdependency analysis’ to describe the analysis of any infrastructure system
interaction irrespective of directionality (e.g. Chang et al., 2007; Dudenhoeffer et al., 2007,
Adachi and Ellingwood, 2008; Reed et al., 2009; Poljansek et al., 2012). The general use of the
term ‘interdependency’ is adopted here.
Rinaldi et al. (2001) identify six dimensions for describing an interdependent infrastructure
relationship: infrastructure characteristics, environment, state of operation, type of
interdependency, type of failure and response behaviour. Infrastructure characteristics describe
the principal spatial, temporal, operational and organisational factors that affect how an
infrastructure system can be expected to respond to a perturbation. Environment refers to the
economic, political, legal, social and security context within which infrastructure systems
operate. State of operation refers to current demand levels for an infrastructure system, which
may impact on the ability of the system to absorb loss of capacity.
Rinaldi et al. (2001) summarised four main types of interdependent relationship: physical,
geographical, cyber and logical. Physical interdependency refers to operational links between
two systems in which the state of one system is dependent on the output of another, e.g. water
supply system requires electric power to operate pumps. Geographical interdependency refers to
the co-location of elements across two systems such that damage to one is likely to cause
physical damage to the other, e.g. a pipe traversing a bridge could potentially withstand
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earthquake forces but suffer damage due to collapse of the bridge. Cyber interdependency refers
to systems connected by informational links; and logical interdependency refers to all other
relationships not categorised by the other three types. Dudenhoeffer et al. (2007) propose a
fifth type – social interdependency, defined as behaviour linked by more abstract factors
such as public opinion, confidence, fear or culture. These are different to other ‘logical’
interdependencies which are policy-based or procedural. Duenas-Osorio and Kwasinski
(2012) propose the concept of logistical interdependency where there is no physical link
between systems but where damage to one system can hinder the repair and restoration of
another system. An example of a logistical interdependency is the impact that damage to
highways and telecommunications can have on the ability of other infrastructures to implement
repair and restoration works.
An infrastructure element can fail after an earthquake in two ways. One is that the element may
suffer physical damage as a direct result of seismic forces. If elements in different systems fail
in this way due to the same earthquake, this is an example of common cause failure (Rinaldi et
al., 2001) or inherent failure (Han and DeLaurentis, 2013). However an element may be able to
withstand the initial shock yet stop functioning because it is no longer receiving some input
from another system which it requires to operate normally, e.g. when a water pump loses its
power supply. Han and DeLaurentis (2013) refer to this as a propagating failure, although
Rinaldi et al. (2001) make a distinction between the case where failure in one system causes
failure in a second system – cascading failure – and the case where failure in one system
exacerbates an existing failure in a second system – escalating failure. In terms of seismic risk
to infrastructure, fragility analysis, as described in section 2.4, predicts the occurrence of
inherent failures in individual infrastructure assets. To correctly model system performance
however, it is also necessary to account for propagating failures resulting from the different
types of interdependency.
The final dimension of interdependency is response behaviour, which describes the coupling
between systems and how the performance of one system can affect that of another. The study
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of interdependencies in this thesis focuses specifically on this dimension for two purposes: the
simulation of interdependencies to predict system performance after a shock (also referred to as
interdependency simulation) and the quantification of the degree of interdependency between
systems for strategic risk management.
2.6.2 Interdependency simulation
There are many different techniques that can be utilised to simulate lifelines interdependencies
(Pitilakis and Kakderi, 2011) but collectively they fall into two paradigms, described by Oliva et
al. (2010) as decomposed and monolithic approaches and by Eusgeld et al. (2011) as the
integrated and coupled approaches. The primary distinctions between these two paradigms
relate to the scale at which interdependency is modelled and the stage at which
interdependencies are considered in the analysis. The differences in approach are summarised
schematically in Figure 2.3 for a fabricated pair of lifeline systems: an electric power network
and a water supply network. In this example, there is interdependency between the systems
because a pumping station in the water supply network relies on electric power.
In the integrated (or decomposed) approach the interdependency is defined at the asset level.
This means the specific assets between which the interdependency exists are identified and
represented in a single multi-system network model. In the schematic in Figure 2.3, this is
represented by the dashed line between the pumping station and the substation on which it is
reliant for power. Defining these specific interfaces integrates the individual lifelines together
into one single system, within which each lifeline becomes a sub-system. Once the
interdependencies are identified, inherent failures are identified using fragility functions (an
interdependency link may also have a fragility associated with it if it is representative of
physical equipment) and then propagated through the integrated system. In the trivial example
in Figure 2.3, the propagation of failures is straightforward, i.e. all elements downstream of the
inherent failures are assumed to be non-operational unless they have a back-up or secondary
input. However in more complex exercises, such as where more than two lifelines are being
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assessed or where there is bidirectional interdependency between two lifelines, there is a
possibility of an inherent failure propagating through a feedback mechanism back into its own
system.
Integrated interdependency modelling Coupled interdependency modelling
Figure 2.3 – Methodologies for high-resolution (integrated) and low-resolution (coupled) interdependency simulation
illustrated with example of electric power and potable water systems
Consider an example where a substation receives power from a gas-fired power plant. If the
substation fails due to earthquake damage, that failure may propagate into a pumping station,
which in turn prevents a key gas processing facility from operating, since water is needed for
fire safety. If that particular gas facility is critical to the operation of the generation plant, then
the generation plant may fail also, so the failure of the substation has propagated back into the
electric power network. Where feedback mechanisms such as this exist, the initial failures must
be repeatedly propagated through each system until they are prevented from progressing any
further (e.g. because the next downstream element has already failed). Depending on the
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complexity of the systems and their interdependencies, this may take many cycles. Once all the
failed elements are identified, they are removed from the model and the integrated system is
disaggregated back into the individual lifelines, with the remaining functional elements are used
to evaluate the performance of each system.
Since the integrated approach simulates interdependencies between specific elements, it is a
low-level high-resolution approach (i.e. it is a micro-analysis concerned with the performance of
individual components within a system). If the functional relationships between interdependent
elements are deterministic and accurately defined, then this is an exact method for simulating
interdependency (though uncertainty remains in hazard and fragility). The integrated approach
is the most realistic representation of the true conditions but is associated with long
development times, greater problems with data availability, long simulation times and non-
trivial validation (Eusgeld et al., 2011). This is because as the number of systems being
analysed increases and as the systems themselves become larger, so the feedback mechanisms
become more complex. Another drawback of integrated models is the identification of the
interdependency links. Often real connections cannot be identified and so assets across systems
are assumed to be linked by geographical proximity (e.g. Dueñas-Osorio et al., 2007; Kim et al.,
2009; Franchin, 2014), but the adequacy of this assumption has never been tested. Examples of
integrated interdependency simulation include nodal analysis models (e.g. Zio and Sansavini,
2010; Poljansek et al., 2012; Franchin, 2014), physics-based models and agent-based
simulations (e.g. Galli, 2010; Oliva et al., 2010; Eusgeld et al., 2011).
Nodal analysis models are the simplest implementation of integrated interdependency
simulation. It is a connectivity-based method in which inherent failures across assets in all
systems are predicted by fragility analysis and then propagated across identified
interdependency links to dependent assets. The relationship between the state of the supporting
asset and the state of the dependent asset can be defined deterministically (e.g. Adachi and
Ellingwood, 2008; Franchin, 2014) or probabilistically. In the latter case, either a specific
damage state can be assigned to the asset based on the determined propagating failure
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probability so that a single event system performance can be predicted (e.g. Duenas-Osorio et
al., 2007; Poljansek et al., 2012) or the system can be analysed in purely probabilistic
framework (e.g. Buxton et al., 2010). The extension of nodal analysis to account for
serviceability is known as physics-based analysis (Rinaldi, 2004). Agent-based models simulate
the actions of ‘agents’ and the reactions of systems to them (Railsback and Grimm, 2011).
Agent-based models are generally used to deal with complex adaptive systems, which include
critical infrastructure systems since after a shock the state of assets can change both
immediately and then continually over time (Rinaldi, 2004). In critical infrastructure systems,
the agents are the assets and each asset is autonomous with its own performance rules to
respond to a variety of system perturbations and changes to other assets in the system. The
advantage of agent-based models is that they can simulate very complex relationships and their
evolution over time. However, data requirements are extremely high and simulation times are
very long, which affects their applicability to a Monte Carlo simulation.
Whilst for some purposes the resources to carry out such intensive integrated analysis may be
justified, less resource-intensive methods are also needed for rapid assessment or where data
acquisition is problematic. In the coupled approach, interdependencies between specific
elements are not considered and instead interdependencies are considered at the system level.
Since this is an abstract representation of the real situation, it is considered to be a high-level
low-resolution approach (i.e. it is a macro-analysis that is not concerned with the performance
of individual components within a system). The advantage of coupled approaches is that they
are less resource-intensive than the integrated approach, but this is potentially at the cost of
some precision. In coupled models inherent failures are identified and propagated only within
each individual lifeline. The failed elements are removed from the model and the performance
of each system is evaluated based on the remaining elements within each system. No
interdependencies have been considered yet so the performance that has been evaluated is the
isolated system performance. To account for interdependencies, the isolated system
performances are used as inputs into a higher-level system linkage model in which the
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relationship between systems is quantified, thus allowing the isolated system performance
measures to be adjusted.
Examples of coupled interdependency simulation include system dynamics (e.g. Min et al.,
2007; Santella et al., 2009) and input-output models (Leontief, 1986). In system dynamics
models, the set of lifelines is represented by a causal loop diagram in which each lifeline is
represented as a single node that is assigned an initial value determined from the isolated system
performance. Interdependencies between systems are represented by links between the nodes
(with separate links for each direction of dependency if the relationship between a pair of
systems is bidirectional). Associated to each link is a relationship, (qualitative or quantitative)
that indicates how the performance of the dependent system changes with the performance of
the supporting system.
Input-output models are used in economics to assess the interdependencies between sectors of
the economy but Haimes and Jiang (2001) described how this model can be applied to lifelines
interdependency analysis, and this method has been adopted by other studies (e.g. Dueñas-
Osorio et al., 2004; Reed et al., 2009; Setola et al., 2009; Oliva et al., 2010). It is a matrix-based
methodology in which the inoperability of each system (i.e. the loss of functionality) is given by
Eq. 2.46, where x is a vector of the final system inoperabilities, A is a matrix describing the
interdependencies the systems and c is a vector describing the initial perturbation or disturbance
to each system. The interdependency matrix, A, is populated by indices which quantify, for
every pair of systems, the reduction in performance of the dependent system caused by a unit
reduction in the performance of the supporting system. The indices take values of between 0 and
1. The perturbation vector, c, contains the inoperabilities estimated for each system before
interdependencies are accounted for, i.e. loss of performance due to inherent failure only. For a
model with two systems, Eq. 2.46 can be written out in full as Eq. 2.47, where a12 represents the
effect of performance reduction in system 2 on performance in system 1, and a21 is the reverse.
The goal of the Leontief input-output method is to solve for x when A and c are known, and this
is achieved by rearranging Eq. 2.46 to give Eq. 2.48, where I is the identity matrix.
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One advantage of this method is that it solves for all systems at the same time, whereas the
systems dynamics method requires a starting point, from which it computes on a system-by-
system basis. The challenge associated with both of these methods is the definition and
derivation of the interdependency indices to populate the matrix A. This relates to the third
objective considered in this thesis, interdependency quantification.
2.6.3 Interdependency quantification
The quantification of the degree or strength of interdependency between two infrastructure
systems is necessary for the application of input-output models and can also be applied to
increase the power of system dynamics models. However, it is also valuable as an end in itself.
In summarising the dimensions associated with interdependent infrastructures, Rinaldi et al.
(2001) state that the degree of coupling between two systems is one of the primary
characteristics relating to the response dimension. For infrastructure operators it is useful to
know how tightly coupled their system is with other infrastructure as this can help to identify
vulnerabilities, threats and risks. Examples include system dependency matrices produced by
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force of Canada (Pederson et al., 2006) and the
‘Risks and Realities’ project in Canterbury, New Zealand (Lamb, 1997). These matrices identify
the strength of interdependency between every pair of systems in the study region. However, in
both cases the indices are qualitative, using a four-part scale from ‘none’ to ‘high’, and have
been derived subjectively.
There are two major issues concerning the quantification of interdependency. Firstly defining
what exactly the degree of interdependency means, and secondly developing a method for
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determining it objectively. There are few studies that have attempted to address this and the
primary source is the collection of studies that apply the input-output modelling method for
interdependencies as described in section 2.6.2. These adopt the inoperability definition
proposed by Haimes and Jiang (2001) whereby the strength of interdependency between two
systems takes a value between 0 and 1 and is equal to the loss of performance in the dependent
system for every unit loss of performance in the supporting system. So for example, if system 1
is dependent on system 2 with an index of 0.8, then 100% loss of performance in system 2
would result in an 80% loss of performance in system 1. The nature of this index is that it is
applied to percentages and so can only be applied with performance metrics that are bounded
and non-negative. Although many studies adopt this definition, only Setola et al. (2009) and
Oliva et al. (2010) actually seek to derive the strengths, whilst in the other input-output studies,
strengths are simply assumed in the application of a case study. However, Setola et al. (2009)
derive the values subjectively by an expert judgment approach. Oliva et al. (2010) propose that
the strengths can be quantified by carrying out a highly granular agent-based simulation of the
systems concerned.
Rinaldi et al. (2001) qualitatively define the degree of coupling in terms of time dependence
between systems such that the more tightly coupled the pair of systems, the faster disturbances
propagate between them. A number of studies have built on this definition and quantified
interdependency in terms of time relationships. Zimmerman and Restrepo (2009) and Galli
(2010) propose measuring interdependency in terms of relative duration, which is the ratio of
the outage time of the dependent system to the outage time of the supporting system. Duenas-
Osorio and Kwasinski (2012) quantify coupling strengths between systems observed in the MW
8.8 Maule, Chile earthquake by measuring cross-correlations and lag times between system
restoration curves. The problem with time-based methods is that they are mostly suited to the
quantification of interdependencies observed from real earthquakes. Time-based methods can be
applied to simulated events, but outage and restoration times need to be predicted. Methods for
doing so are few in number and increase the uncertainty associated with the quantification since
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an additional modelling step is required beyond standard system operability metrics. The
applicability of time-based methods is therefore restricted to systems and locations where
observed data exists.
2.7 Risk metrics
The purpose of a risk metric is to distil the results from a simulation exercise into probabilistic
estimates of specified outcomes in order to help decision makers understand the likelihood that
their assets will negatively impacted. From the seismic risk assessment studies listed in Table
2.2, the most common risk metric is the system risk curve (e.g. Wang and O’Rourke, 2006;
Shinozuka et al., 2007; Shiraki et al., 2007; Jayaram and Baker, 2010), which plots annual
exceedance probability against the system loss metric. A similar metric is already used in the
insurance sector. The exceedance probability (EP) curve plots estimated loss against return
period (the inverse of annual exceedance probability) and is the primary metric used by insurers
for risk modelling (Grossi et al., 2005). In both plots the risk is characterised annually.
Therefore the loss metric must be annualised, which means that there should be only one value
of the loss metric associated with each year in the event catalogue. In cases where there is more
than one event in a year, an appropriate manipulation of the observed loss metrics can be
applied, e.g. summation of losses, average of losses, maximum single loss. In insurance, when
losses are summed, the resulting EP curve is referred to as an aggregate EP curve, and when the
maximum loss value is used, the resulting EP curve is referred to as an occurrence EP curve
(Grossi and Kunreuther, 2005). After the losses have been annualised, the annual exceedance
probability, AEPi, of a particular value of the loss metric, i, is given by Eq. 2.49.
loss i
i
total
N
AEP
N
 (2.49)
In Eq. 2.49, Nloss≥i is the number of times in the annualised dataset that i is equalled or exceeded,
and Ntotal is the number of years in the catalogue.
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2.8 Summary
The literature review has shown that there are a number of studies that have previously
investigated the problem seismic risk to critical infrastructure systems. Only a few of these
propose a multi-system methodological framework for conducting seismic risk assessments, and
all of those that do contain weaknesses that mean that they do not fully meet the requirements
for a framework for insurance-focused seismic risk assessment. The SYNER-G (Pitilakis et al.,
2014a) and Hazus (FEMA, 2015) frameworks come closest, but SYNER-G does not consider
financial loss and is overly complex in certain aspects, e.g. electric power network functionality,
while Hazus does not adequately address interdependencies. Consequently there is a need to
define an insurance-specific method for seismic risk assessment that combines applicable
elements from different existing frameworks. Furthermore, whilst the existing frameworks
describe methods for seismic risk assessments that make use of model components that already
exist, it would be beneficial to the insurance industry to set out a procedure that would allow
seismic risk assessments to be tailored according to geographical requirements. Therefore a set
of model development guidelines, based on the defined seismic risk assessment method, are
proposed in Chapter 3. The model development guidelines and seismic risk assessment method
are demonstrated in this thesis with the case study of the electric power network and water
supply system in Christchurch, New Zealand. However, the research value of this case study
goes beyond just being an example application.
With respect to seismic hazard, spatial correlation models currently exist for Los Angeles, Chi-
Chi (Taiwan), Japan and Europe, but none exist for Christchurch or New Zealand more
generally. A spatial correlation model developed as part of the case study, using data from the
Canterbury earthquake sequence, would be the first of its kind. There are a number of simplified
models for predicting liquefaction triggering, and although one of these has been developed
with data from the Canterbury earthquake sequence (amongst other events), its performance to
other simplified models has not been compared. The model development presents an
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opportunity to determine the best simplified model for predicting liquefaction triggering in
Christchurch.
With respect to asset fragility, there are no existing functions that predict damage to buried
cables and so a function based on data from the Canterbury earthquake sequence would be the
first of its kind anywhere in the world. Whilst there are numerous repair rate functions in
existence for pipes, none are specific to Christchurch and so there is an opportunity to develop a
new function that is and therefore accounts for attributes of Christchurch pipes that may not be
addressed by functions developed from data from other countries. Fragility functions do exist
for substations, wells and pumping stations. However, these are few in number and based
primarily on data from the United States and Europe. New functions developed from
Canterbury earthquake sequence data will not only be the first of their kind for New Zealand,
they will also add globally to the range of options for modelling fragility of these assets.
Although many studies have developed models for predicting the performance of critical
infrastructure systems, the literature review has found that only four studies have previously
validated models against observations from a real earthquake, with a further two examples from
the literature on hurricane-induced performance issues. The validation of the case study model
with observations from the Christchurch earthquake means that the model may become one of
the few validated post-disaster system performance models in existence.
The study of interdependencies is a relatively recent consideration in the problem of seismic risk
assessment of critical infrastructure systems. A common approach when applying integrated
interdependency models is to assume assets across systems are linked by geographical
proximity because physical links cannot be identified. The data provided for the case study
allow both the geographical proximity and the physical link approaches to be tested and will be
the first study to compare the performance of the two approaches. Finally, there are very few
methods to quantify the interdependency between critical infrastructure systems. Those that do
exist are either subjective, or reliant on data from observed events, or make use of methods that
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are unsuitable for application by the insurance industry. There is a clear scope for developing a
new method that meets the requirements of the insurance industry, with particular consideration
being given to the requirement that the method should not be reliant on observed data, since
such data are scarce.
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3. Methodology
This chapter sets out how the three objectives of this research, defined in Chapter 1, will be met.
It presents the proposed seismic risk assessment modelling framework described in objective1,
which includes methodologies for model development and model application. It goes on to
present an introduction to the case study in Christchurch, New Zealand, to which the framework
will be applied to satisfy objective 2 and finally it describes the methodology for
interdependency quantification that will be applied to the results of the case study seismic risk
assessment to fulfil objective 3.
3.1 Modelling framework
The review of existing studies presented in Chapter 2 shows that methodologies adopted for
seismic risk assessment of lifelines in existing studies are generally similar. They broadly
follow the equivalent procedure already implemented within catastrophe models for building
portfolio risk assessment with inventory exposure as the input data and three modules: hazard,
vulnerability and loss. Within each of these modules, the specific models and functions applied
at each step vary from study to study, and it is possible to frame the different approaches in
terms of a methodological hierarchy, as summarised in Table 3.1, where ‘Low’ refers to the
least detailed analysis option and ‘High’ refers to the most detailed analysis option.
Whilst one would ideally adopt the methods at the highest hierarchy level, this is not always
feasible due to resource and data availability constraints. To meet the needs and constraints of
the insurance and catastrophe modelling, an industry-specific methodology is proposed in which
the basic modules of seismic risk assessment are sub-divided into eight steps. The following
sections describe each of the steps in terms of both model development and model application.
The overall procedure for model development is summarised diagrammatically in Figure 3.1
and the method for model application is summarised diagrammatically in Figure 3.2. The
proposed method pulls together elements from different studies reviewed in Chapter 2 and can
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be considered to be the best practice for the seismic risk assessment of lifelines in catastrophe
modelling. It is a general methodology that can be applied to any case study and will be the
basis of the model development in Chapter 4.
Table 3.1 – Methodological hierarchy in lifelines risk analysis
Hierarchy
Level
Exposure Hazard Vulnerability
derivation
System
Performance
Interdependency
Low Key facilities
only
None, ‘what-
if’ scenarios
Expert
judgment
No systemic
analysis
None
Medium Up to distribution
level or
equivalent
Single
scenario
earthquake
Empirical Connectivity
analysis
Coupled model
High Detailed to
property level
Monte Carlo
simulation
Analytical Serviceability
analysis
Integrated model
3.1.1 Step 1 – Exposure
The purpose of the exposure step is to identify and classify the assets within each system being
analysed. This includes their location, their function, their physical attributes and the adjacent
assets to which they are connected, both within the system and if applicable within other
systems too. Based on the review of existing practice in Chapter 2 and Appendix B, Table 3.2
lists the main asset types in each system whose existence and attributes should be recorded in an
exposure database.
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Figure 3.1 – Seismic risk assessment model development guidelines summarised as a process flowchart
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Figure 3.2 – Best practice generalised procedure for seismic risk assessment of lifelines systems based on existing
studies
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Table 3.2 – Primary asset types to be considered in seismic risk assessment of lifelines systems and relevant
attributes for documentation
Infrastructure
system
Components Component attributes
Electric power Generation plants Capacity, seismic design level
Substations Voltage, seismic design level
Cables Material, size
Potable water Wells Seismic design level
Water treatment plants Capacity, seismic design level
Pumping stations Capacity, seismic design level
Storage tanks Elevation, material, geometry, quantity of contents,
seismic design level
Pipes Material, joint type, age, diameter
Waste water Lift stations Capacity, seismic design level
Treatment plants Capacity, seismic design level
Pipes Material, joint type, age, diameter
Natural gas Pipelines Material, joint type, age, diameter
Compressor stations Capacity, seismic design level
Fuel Refineries Capacity, seismic design level
Pumping stations Capacity, seismic design level
Storage tanks Elevation, material, geometry, quantity of contents,
seismic design level
Pipelines Material, joint type, age, diameter
Telecommunications Central offices Seismic design level
Cables Material, size
Highways Roadways Importance level
Bridges Structural system, material, age, geometry, seismic
design level
Tunnels Construction method, geometry, local geology
Embankments Height, soil type
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3.1.2 Step 2 – Event generation
For infrastructure systems it is necessary to analyse performance based on scenario events rather
than probabilistic hazard. To establish a probabilistic view of risk it is also necessary to carry
out a Monte Carlo simulation of events, and to account for uncertainty the number of events in
the simulation must be sufficiently large to minimise variance in the output statistics. Rougier
(2013) states that the confidence interval around a Monte Carlo simulation statistic can be
estimated for a specified number of simulations by applying the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz
Inequality. With this method the 95% confidence interval is estimated to be ±4.3% relative to
the mean value for 1,000 simulations; ±1.9% for 5,000 simulations; and ±1.4% for 10,000
simulations. Therefore the number of simulations can be chosen to reflect the requirements of
the analyst to minimise variance. In many locations an earthquake source model may already
exist from which events can be stochastically generated based on the assumption that the time
interval between events follows a Poisson distribution. If this is not the case, an a bespoke
source model can be developed by following the procedure of Coburn and Spence (2002),
where data from historic and instrumental catalogues can be geospatially analysed to identify
sources and corresponding Gutenberg-Richter relations.
3.1.3 Step 3 – Hazard intensities
The first part of generating hazard intensities is to identify which IMs need to be predicted,
which depends in part on the fragility functions selected. For ground shaking induced damage,
the significant majority of fragility functions for lifelines assets are expressed with respect to
PGA (above ground assets) and PGV (buried assets) and so prediction of these two IMs should
be sufficient in most cases. The only other ground shaking IM that is occasionally used is SA
and so if an SA-based function is selected in step 4, then the hazard intensity generation will
need to be revisited. As documented by Douglas (2015), there are numerous existing GMPEs
for predicting ground shaking intensity and so it is not considered to be necessary to develop
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new empirical relationships even if data are available. It is however essential to select one that is
relevant to the seismo-tectonic environment being analysed.
A spatial correlation model must also be applied to correlate the GMPE residuals. In some
locations a spatial correlation model may already exist but otherwise, as discussed in Chapter 2,
there is a range of methods for developing bespoke empirical correlation models given a
sufficient quantity of local strong motion data (e.g. Boore et al., 2003; Wang and Takada; 2005;
Goda and Hong, 2008; Goda and Atkinson, 2009; Jayaram and Baker, 2010). No one method is
considered to be superior over the others, and so it is suggested that as many of these are tested
as possible to ascertain the best spatial correlation model for a specific case study. If no data are
available to create a new correlation model, then a model should be selected from the existing
literature that has been developed for a location that matches as closely as possible the
geological environment of the case study. The correlation model can be applied using the
method of Weatherill et al. (2014).
For liquefaction-induced ground deformation it is necessary to predict first whether liquefaction
is likely to occur. This requires analysis of liquefaction susceptibility maps to determine if
liquefaction can occur and application of a liquefaction triggering method to classify whether
liquefaction does occur. Liquefaction susceptibility maps may already exist in some locations. If
not, then the FEMA (2015) method for liquefaction prediction includes a table classifying
liquefaction susceptibility for different types of geological conditions, which can be compared
to geological maps of the case study area to determine the closest match. For liquefaction
triggering, if sufficient geotechnical data are available then the detailed method of Seed and
Idriss (1967) should be applied. However, in an insurance context it is more likely that a
simplified method will be required. Andrus and Stokoe (2000), Hazus (FEMA, 2015) and Zhu
et al. (2015) propose simplified methods for predicting likelihood of liquefaction. If empirical
data are available, it is suggested that all three are tested to ascertain the best liquefaction
triggering model for a specific case study.
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If liquefaction is predicted to occur, then its scale in both the horizontal (PGDfH, lateral spread)
and vertical (PGDfV, differential settlement) directions should be predicted. Only Rauch and
Martin (2000) and Hazus (FEMA, 2015) propose simplified methods appropriate for insurance
application. The model by Rauch and Martin (2000) only predicts horizontal movements and so
for consistency between vertical and horizontal movements, it is recommended to use the Hazus
model. The lack of existing models means that there is no accepted functional form for a PGDf
prediction equation (as there is for GMPEs) and there is no guidance on which predictor
variables should be included. Development of a new PGDf prediction equation would require
specialist scientific expertise and it is assumed to be unlikely that this will be available to an
insurer. It is therefore not recommended to attempt to develop new empirical models even if
observed PGDf data are available.
PGDf induced by surface fault rupture can be predicted by the equation of Wells and
Coppersmith (1994). However this is only necessary in assessments where there are seismic
sources directly under the study area. If sufficient data on geological conditions and slope
angles are available, then the method of Saygili and Rathje (2008) can be applied to predict
PGDf due to landslides. However, it is anticipated that this will not be feasible in the majority of
insurance studies.
3.1.4 Step 4 – Fragility evaluation
Asset damage can be described in physical terms or functional terms, with the former being
more important for estimating repair costs and the latter more important for estimating system
performance and business interruption effects. The relevant fragility function is applied to each
asset to predict the probability of being in a particular physical damage state based on the IM. If
system performance is modelled, it is necessary to map functional states. Partial functionality
can be considered by assuming a certain level of functionality given a particular damage state
but there is little literature on this and partial functionality is only of value if serviceability
system performance analysis is being applied. For pipes, the convention is for damage to be
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measured on a continuous scale as a repair rate (i.e. repairs per kilometre). Individual pipes are
grouped by typology and then within each group, sub-groups are created of pipes that are
subjected to the same range of IM values. For each sub-group the mean repair rate is calculated
from a repair rate function. It is assumed that the distance interval between repairs in a group
follows a Poisson distribution with a rate equal to the calculated mean repair rate. This
assumption allows the probability that an individual pipe has failed to be calculated (i.e. the
probability that there is at least one repair on the pipe).
As listed in Appendix C, there are many existing fragility functions available for lifelines assets.
However, it may be beneficial to create new bespoke fragility functions to reflect the specific
physical properties of the assets being studied. The most viable option for creating new fragility
functions is to use empirical damage data and follow the guidelines of the Global Earthquake
Model (GEM) (Rossetto et al., 2014). If there is only a small empirical dataset, which is deemed
insufficient for creating a new fragility function (e.g. a past event that resulted in no damage),
then the Bayesian updating method described in Chapter 2 can be applied to an existing fragility
function to make it more relevant to the case study. If no empirical dataset exists then a fragility
function can be selected from the existing literature that has been created for an asset whose
physical properties most closely match the asset being studied.
3.1.5 Step 5 – Damage assignment
For system performance analysis, the failure probability of an asset is converted to a
deterministic functional state by sampling a random variable that is uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1, and comparing the sampled value to the failure probability. If the sampled
value is less than or equal to the failure probability, the asset is designated as having failed.
Otherwise it is designated as operational. In cases where liquefaction is being modelled, the
functional state of each asset must be assessed in response to both ground shaking and
liquefaction effects.
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3.1.6 Step 6 – System performance
System performance can be modelled in terms of connectivity or level of service
(serviceability). The latter is an extension of connectivity analysis and is more informative, but
requires detailed technical knowledge of the physical processes involved in the flow of utility,
and is therefore less likely to be of relevance for insurance application. Connectivity
performance should be measured in terms of number of people affected or number of properties
affected rather than simply by area. The latter can be misleading in loss calculations since it
does not account for population or building density. To measure performance in terms of
population, the spatial distribution of people in the study location must be known. This can be
obtained from Census and administrative boundary data if this is accessible. The administrative
boundary data can be used to divide the study area into smaller units and population data for
each unit can be attributed from Census information. A method must then be adopted for
determining whether each unit is connected to the system. In some cases infrastructure operators
may publish zone maps that identify which specific assets areas are connected to, and so the
connectivity of a unit is related to the operational state(s) of the specified asset(s). If these are
not available then some assumption must be made, e.g. the connectivity of a unit is related to
the operational state of the closest asset. To measure performance in terms of property requires a
map identifying individual properties. For small study areas this may be feasible from satellite
imagery such as Google Earth, but for larger study areas this may require access to proprietary
databases. For loss estimation it may be useful to adopt an equivalent performance metric that
measures the economic value in a study area that is affected by loss of connectivity. This
requires geospatial data on the distribution of economic activity in the study area.
If multiple interdependent systems are being studied then this must be accounted for, ideally
with an integrated interdependency model if there is sufficient data to do this. Otherwise, a
simplified coupled model could be adopted. Nodal analysis is the simplest of the integrated
interdependency simulation methods to apply and therefore the most useful for insurance
purposes. It requires the links between assets within each system to be defined and this may be
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achieved with information already gathered in the exposure database. As with the population
maps for connectivity performance, if operators publish zone maps, then it may be possible to
identify the genuine links between assets. Otherwise, an assumption such as geographical
proximity could also be used. There may be situations where integrated interdependency
simulation becomes extremely complex (e.g. when there are many systems with multiple
feedback relationships), in which case a coupled approach such as system dynamics or Leontief
input-output modelling may be more appropriate. This requires definition of an index to
quantify the strength of the link between systems. Ideally this should be derived from empirical
data (not necessarily only from earthquakes), but this type of information has not been well-
recorded in the past. Alternatively, an infrastructure operator may be able to provide a
subjective assessment of the dependency of their system on others.
3.1.7 Step 7 – System restoration
Modelling of restoration times is important for modelling business interruption losses. For
insurance purposes, discrete time-step modelling is more appropriate than continuous
modelling. Even when an asset is repaired after an earthquake it is still subject to the effects of
interdependencies and so this must be re-modelled at each time-step. If a system restoration
model is applied, this allows more detailed system performance metrics to be used that account
for the outage time of assets, such as the measurement of outages in terms of people minutes.
There are few existing models to for system restoration (e.g. Cagnan et al., 2006; FEMA, 2015).
If sufficient empirical datasets exist then ideally new restoration functions should be developed
to allow at least for a time-step analysis.
3.1.8 Step 8 – Financial loss estimation
Losses associated with physical damage and business interruption are calculated for each event
in the stochastic catalogue and the relevant statistical analysis is undertaken according to the
requirements of the insurer. This should at a minimum typically include exceedance probability
curves, average annual loss and probable maximum loss. To convert physical damage to losses
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it is necessary to predict the mean damage ratio, which is the repair cost as a proportion of the
total replacement value of the asset. This can be done empirically by deriving models from
historic data that link damage ratio to physical damage state or directly to IM. Alternatively,
FEMA (2015) have published a comprehensive list of tables linking physical damage states to
damage ratios for a wide range of assets. For assessing business interruption losses, it is
necessary to use a model that links losses to restoration time. If sufficient datasets are available
this can be done empirically, or the method proposed by FEMA (2015) can be used.
3.2 Scope of case study application of framework
The proposed model development framework is applied to a case study of the electric power
and water supply systems in Christchurch, New Zealand. A seismic risk assessment model will
be developed for these two systems based on empirical data from the Canterbury earthquake
sequence that affected Christchurch in 2010 and 2011. The model will be validated against
observations from the Canterbury earthquake sequence and will then be applied to evaluate a
future projection of risk for these two systems. This section presents contextual information
about the Canterbury earthquake sequence and the engineering performance in those events. It
goes on to outline the specific elements of the model development guidelines that will be
implemented in the case study, the validation process for the model and the diagnostics used to
evaluate risk when the final validated model is applied for future projection.
3.2.1 The Canterbury earthquake sequence
Christchurch is located in the Canterbury region on the South Island of New Zealand and is the
second largest city in the country, with a population of around 350,000. The main economic
activity in Christchurch is agri-business, in particular the processing of agricultural produce
from the surrounding Canterbury region, but there is also a strong manufacturing base in the
city. This focus on primary and secondary sectors means that the economic vitality of
Christchurch is strongly linked to the ability of the electric power and water supply systems to
meet commercial demands. The Canterbury earthquake sequence occurred between 2010 and
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2011 and generated in excess of 10,000 individual seismic events, mostly of moderate
magnitude. However, their proximity to urban centres meant they resulted in significant damage
to buildings and infrastructure, particularly in Christchurch. For empirical model development
and model validation, this thesis focuses on the two most damaging events within the sequence:
the initial MW 7.1 main shock on 4th September 2010 (the Darfield earthquake) and the MW 6.2
aftershock on 22nd February 2011 (the Christchurch earthquake). A context map of New
Zealand and the locations of the epicentres of the two earthquakes in relation to the city of
Christchurch are shown in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 respectively. The key features of these two
events that are relevant to this research are summarised here, but a more detailed treatment of
the ground motion and seismic source aspects of the sequence can be found in Bradley et al.
(2014).
Figure 3.3 – Map of New Zealand showing highlighting Christchurch, the Canterbury region (shaded grey) and other
major cities
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The initial shock was the largest event in the sequence with its epicentre near the town of
Darfield, approximately 40 km west of Christchurch and at a depth of 8 km. It was the first
large earthquake to strike close to an urban centre in New Zealand since the MW 7.4 Hawke’s
Bay earthquake of 1931. Four rupture sources were identified but the most energetic of these
was the strike-slip rupture of the previously unrecognised Greendale Fault. Accelerograms were
recorded from 130 sites across South Island, ten of which had PGAs in the range 0.3 g to 0.82 g.
18 records showed PGVs exceeding 0.5 m/s, with three of them exceeding 1 m/s. It resulted in
no fatalities and only two serious injuries (Wood et al., 2010). In part this was due to the good
performance of buildings and also because the earthquake occurred in the middle of the night,
so few people were on the streets. The majority of building damage was observed amongst
historic and unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings. Although only two URM buildings
completely collapsed, many suffered irreparable damage and had to be demolished (Dizhur et
al., 2010).
Figure 3.4 – Location of epicentres of the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes in relation to the Christchurch
urban area and central business district
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Modern and seismically retrofitted URM buildings generally performed well. Some minor
damage occurred to substations and buried cables in the electric power system, but most
customers had power restored by the end of the day. The water supply system was almost fully
restored within five days. However, the waste water systems was more severely affected, with
some customers still relying on temporary sewage facilities after two months. Some minor
disruption occurred to the telecommunications systems and no damage was observed in the gas
system (Wood et al., 2010).
The 22nd February aftershock was the most damaging event in the sequence. It was caused by a
strike-slip rupture on a previously unrecognised fault, with an epicentre 10 km to the southeast
of the central business district (CBD) and a depth of 5-6 km. The shallow depth and proximity
created very high ground motions in the city itself. The PGA at the Christchurch Botanic
Gardens in the CBD was 0.5 g in the horizontal direction and the highest PGA recorded was
1.41 g (Bradley and Cubrinovski, 2011). This event caused 185 fatalities and 8,600 injuries
(Giovinazzi et al., 2011) and occurred while the Canterbury region was still recovering from the
Darfield earthquake, with many structures suffering from compounded damage. The majority of
damage occurred to URM buildings but in contrast to the Darfield earthquake, significantly
more damage was observed in reinforced concrete (RC) buildings. 16% of RC buildings in the
CBD collapsed (Kam et al., 2011) and 135 of the fatalities occurred across two RC building
collapses. Large parts of the city suffered power outages immediately after the earthquake,
primarily due to damage to buried cables but also some minor damage to substations. The water
supply system suffered extensive damage to pipes and it is estimated that 80% of the city
population lost mains connection immediately after the earthquake (Ministry of Health, 2012).
The waste water system also experienced extensive damage to pipes and the main waste water
treatment plant in the city suffered severe damage resulting in a major capacity reduction. The
city relied heavily on temporary sewage facilities, in some cases for over a year afterwards and
there were potential health risks due to cross-contamination between the two water systems.
There were numerous road closures and five of the six bridges crossing the River Avon were
125
closed. The gas system performed extremely well with no observed damage, although fire safety
concerns around the CBD resulted in services being manually shut off as a precaution
(Giovinazzi et al., 2011).
Both events, but in particular the Christchurch earthquake, caused unprecedented levels of
liquefaction throughout the southern and eastern suburbs of Christchurch alongside the Avon
River. The liquefaction resulted in settlement, lateral spreading, sand boils, and a large quantity
of ejected silt mud and water ponding on the ground surface. This was a consequence of the
alluvial deposits and high water table (between 0-3 m) that characterize the ground conditions in
these suburbs (Giovinazzi et al., 2011; Yamada et al., 2011). In the Darfield earthquake, 15,000
residential dwellings were affected by liquefaction, of which at least 1,000 were completely
destroyed (King et al., 2014). Initially geotechnical engineering solutions were proposed to
mitigate liquefaction risk from future earthquakes and ensure that affected suburbs remained
habitable. However this proposal was abandoned after the Christchurch earthquake. Fresh
liquefaction caused land close to the River Avon to sink further, effectively raising the level of
the river by up to 0.5 m and generating unacceptable flood risk for nearby properties (Hughes et
al., 2015). The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) initiated a policy to
designate all residential land in Christchurch according to its liquefaction risk. Some land was
so badly damaged that it was deemed uneconomic to repair and was designated as being in a
‘Red Zone’. Over 7,000 properties have been abandoned because of a ‘Red Zone’ designation
(King et al., 2014). After the Christchurch earthquake, differential movement of foundations
affected many commercial buildings in the CBD. The damage was so widespread and the risk of
tall building collapse so great, that the army was called in to man a temporary exclusion zone
around the city (Giovinazzi et al., 2011). The cordon gradually reduced in size, but was not
lifted until June 2013 and roads in the CBD did not completely re-open until July 2014. Over
1,500 commercial properties in the CBD had to be demolished (Saunders et al., 2014) and
because of the cordon, all 6,000 businesses in the CBD, even those whose property was
undamaged, were forced to relocate (Stevenson et al., 2012).
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New Zealand operates a compulsory government scheme for residential earthquake insurance,
managed by the Earthquake Commission (EQC). They received 150,000 claims for residential
building damage after the Darfield earthquake and a further 40,000 for land damage. After the
Christchurch earthquake they received 140,000 claims for residential building damage and a
further 60,000 for land damage (King et al., 2014). Swiss Re estimates total losses of 6 billion
USD from the Darfield earthquake and 15 billion USD from the Christchurch earthquake.
Analysis by King et al. (2014) shows that compared to other major loss-causing earthquakes in
the period 2009-2011, the two earthquakes caused relatively high losses as a percentage of gross
domestic product (15%), However 80% of the these losses have been covered by the insurance
sector, considerably more than for the next most insured (27% for the 27th February 2011
earthquake in Chile).
3.2.2 Model development
The research focuses on engineering issues and so the case study model will not include step 8
in Figure 3.2 relating to financial losses. Also step 7, relating to restoration times, is not
considered due to insufficient data being available for model development and validation. The
final loss metric for the model will therefore be a measure of system performance. Since
serviceability analysis is of little value to the insurance sector, system performance will be
measured only in terms of connectivity. Because of the need for the model to be validated, the
specific nature of the performance metric adopted in the model will depend on what
performance-related information is known or measurable from the validation events.
3.2.3 Model validation
In order to conduct the model validation it is necessary for the model to evaluate a system
performance metric for which the value is known for the validation event(s). No performance
information is known for either system in relation to the Darfield earthquake. For the
Christchurch earthquake, it is known that 80% of the population lost connection to the water
supply system (Ministry of Health, 2012). For the electric power, Orion are the local
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distribution network operator, and have measured system performance in the Christchurch
earthquake terms of customer outage minutes, which is the sum product of the disconnection
times of each individual customer. However, the time aspect of system performance is not being
considered in this study. As an alternative, the spatial extent of customers affected in the
immediate aftermath of the Christchurch earthquake is known from an outage map provided by
Orion. Orion have not provided a dataset that would enable the number of customers (i.e.
households and businesses) in a specified area to be determined, but using data from the 2006
Census (Statistics New Zealand, 2014a), it is possible to determine the residential population in
a specified area and so the number of affected residents, as distinct from customers, can be used
to measure of system performance. Cross-referencing the outage map with the spatial
population data finds that 71% of the population became disconnected from the electric power
network in the Christchurch earthquake. There is no known publicly available dataset that
describes the spatial distribution of economic activity within Christchurch. Furthermore, there
are no data that describe the economic impact of the two earthquakes that is specifically
attributable to electric power network or water supply system outage, which would be required
for validation.
Therefore it is proposed that the model should use the percentage of the total population in the
study area who become disconnected as the performance metric for both systems. If the
percentage is expressed as a proportion, which takes a value between 0 and 1, then the metric is
equivalent to the system inoperability metric proposed by Haimes and Jiang (2001) for the
Leontief input-output interdependency methodology. The values of the performance metrics
calculated by the model will be validated against the two observations from the Christchurch
earthquake – the proportion of total population disconnected from the water supply system
(80% or 0.8) and the proportion of total population disconnected from the electric power
network (71% or 0.71)
To validate the model, it will be run with known input parameters (magnitude and location) for
the Christchurch earthquake. However, the model will include various sources of uncertainty,
128
relating to ground motion prediction, prediction of liquefaction-induced permanent ground
deformations and the application of fragility and repair rate functions to assets, all of which
require an element of random sampling. To account for this, it is proposed is run the model
1,000 times, with random variables re-sampled each time.
3.2.4 Model application
It is proposed to apply the final seismic risk assessment model with a Monte Carlo simulation of
10,000 years’ worth of events. Risk will then be evaluated for both systems at three scales:
system-level, asset-level and neighbourhood-level. System-level risk will be evaluated by
plotting the distribution of predicted system performances from all events and by plotting an
occurrence exceedance probability curve to identify the expected system performance for
specified return periods. Asset-level risk will be evaluated by counting the number of times each
asset is predicted to fail in the event set. This information can be used to identify the most
vulnerable assets, which may be prioritised for upgrading. Neighbourhood-level risk will be
evaluated by sub-dividing the study area into smaller geographical units known as meshblocks,
which are used statistical reporting in New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2014b), and
counting the number of times in the event set that each meshbock loses connection to the
system. This information can be used to identify the most at-risk neighbourhoods and inform
strategies for improving the reliability of services to these locations.
3.3 Interdependency quantification
Interdependency quantification is useful for risk management purposes and it is proposed that
this can be achieved by making use of seismic risk assessment models, which are already
widely used within the insurance sector. The rationale is to use the results from a seismic risk
assessment to generate an objective quantitative measure of how tightly coupled two
infrastructure systems are. The concept of quantifying interdependency as a single index is
already proposed in the Leontief input-output method (Haimes and Jiang, 2001), although in
that study the index or indices are already known and the objective is to estimate the final
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system performances based on the indices and the initial pre-interdependency system
performance. However, when using the method proposed here in section 3.1, seismic risk
assessment models for critical infrastructure systems, estimate both the final and initial
performances of each system. Therefore, if the estimated system performances are expressed as
proportions (between 0 and 1), the problem defined by Haimes and Jiang (2001) can be
restructured to make the objective to estimate the interdependency indices that populate the
matrix A in Eq. 2.46.
One of the benefits of the Leontief input-output method when solving for final system
performance is that all system performances can be estimated at the same time rather than
iteratively. However, Eq. 2.46 cannot be rearranged to make A the subject and so the method
proposed here requires the indices to be estimated one at a time for each uni-directional
relationship. If there are two infrastructure systems where system 2 is dependent on system 1,
then the final interdependent performance of system 2, SP2 can be calculated from Eq. 3.1,
where SP1 is the performance of system 1, SP'2 is the performance of system 2 before
interdependencies are accounted for (i.e. the independent performance) and I21 is a constant. For
the purposes of this research a new term, ‘interdependency response’ is proposed. In this
example it is equal to the difference between the independent and interdependent performances
of system 2 (i.e. SP'2 – SP2) and therefore also to the term I21SP1 as shown in Eq. 3.2.
'
2 21 1 2SP I SP SP  (3.1)
'
21 1 2 2Interdependency Response I SP SP SP   (3.2)
The formulation in Eq. 3.1 implies that whilst the interdependency response will vary from
event to event depending on the performance of system 1, it is constrained by the constant I21.
When SP1 = 1, the interdependency response in system 2 is equal to I21, so I21 can therefore be
interpreted as a measure of the expected interdependency response in system 2 when there is a
total failure of system 1. This is an objective metric for quantifying the capability of a system to
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withstand total failure in a supporting system (and therefore how interdependent those two
systems are), with the advantage that it is a single global value that is independent of any
specific event and is therefore useful for high-level risk management and emergency planning
purposes. From here on, the term I21 is referred to as the ‘interdependency index’, representing
the potential effect of the performance of system 2 on the performance of system 1.
Defining and quantifying the interdependency according to the Leontief input-output method
has the additional benefit that once the interdependency index is calculated, it can be used as an
alternative to the nodal analysis method for simulating interdependencies more quickly in
subsequent seismic risk assessments. However, there is one drawback with using the
formulation of Eq. 3.1 for this purpose. The Leontief input-output method was developed
initially to model economic sector productivity, which numerically is unbounded in the positive
direction, i.e. its only constraint is non-negativity. For infrastructure system performance
however, metrics relating to the number of people or properties affected have an upper bound. If
the metric reports as a total number, then the upper bound is the total population or the total
number of buildings served. If the metric reports a proportion, the upper bound is 1. However, if
one applies Eq. 3.1 to estimate SP2, there is nothing to prevent SP2 being estimated as greater
than the upper bound. To overcome this a new modified formulation of the Leontief input-
output formulation is proposed here as Eq. 3.3, where system performance is reported as a
proportion with respect to the upper bound. Within Eq. 3.3 the bracketed term is equivalent to
the proportion of customers who remain connected after inherent physical asset damage is
accounted for but before interdependencies are considered and ensures that SP2 is less than 1.
This is more easily demonstrated by rearranging Eq. 3.3 to give a new mathematical definition
for the interdependency response, in proportional terms, as shown in Eq. 3.4. In this
formulation, the definition of I21 remains the same, i.e. is the expected interdependency response
in system 2 when there is total failure in system 1. Since the interdependency response cannot
exceed 1, I21 cannot exceed 1 either. Therefore I21SP1 cannot exceed 1, which in turn ensures
that the maximum possible value of SP2 in Eq. 3.3 is 1.
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Both Eq.’s 3.2 and 3.4 imply that the index I21 can be estimated as the gradient of a linear plot of
the interdependency response against the performance of system 1. The validity of this
assumption will be tested in the case study application by using the outputs from the system
performance and interdependency simulation analysis to create plots of interdependency
response against electric power network performance using both the original and adapted
Leontief methods. If the equations are valid, one would expect to observe a linear trend in the
data. Also, since there is no intercept term in either equation, one would expect a best-fit line
through the data to pass very close to the origin (this makes physical sense since the
interdependency response should be zero when there is no loss of performance in system 1).
The slope of this best-fit line is the interdependency index, I21, and this method is referred to as
the ‘linear slope method’. If the best fit line passes through or close to the origin, then the slope
is approximately equal to the expected performance when SP1 is equal to 1 (i.e. total failure in
system 1). This approximation facilitates an alternative method for estimating the
interdependency index. If within the plotted data there are multiple events where SP1 is equal to
1, then the interdependency index can be approximated as the mean of the interdependency
responses just for those events. This is referred to as the ‘extreme event method’ and is useful in
situations where the performance of one of the systems cannot be modelled explicitly, e.g. due
to unavailability of data or resources. Both methods are applied to the Christchurch case study
to estimate IWSS|EPN, the interdependency index for the effect of the electric power network on
the water supply system. For this specific case study there is little benefit in the application of
the extreme event method since both systems can be modelled explicitly, but the latter is applied
to compare its results to those obtained by the slope method.
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Two sensitivity tests are proposed to investigate the effect of certain system properties on the
index. The first sensitivity evaluates the effect on the interdependency index of the fragility of
assets in the water system. This is done by repeating the fragility, system performance and
interdependency analyses for all events whilst varying the parameters of the pipe repair rate
functions and parameters of the fragility functions used for wells and pumping stations. The
second sensitivity test evaluates the effect that the quantity of back-up power supplies has on the
index by repeating the interdependency analysis for all earthquake events whilst randomly
varying the number of wells and pumping stations that have access to back-up power.
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4. Model Development & Validation
This chapter describes in detail the development of the seismic risk assessment model for the
electric power network and water supply system in Christchurch. Individual sections are
presented for each of the model components identified in Chapter 3 (see Figure 3.2), with the
exception of restoration time and financial loss modelling, which are not addressed in this
research. Finally, the outcome of the model validation with respect to the system performance
observations from the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch earthquake, is presented and discussed.
4.1 Canterbury earthquake sequence intensity measures
The observed maximum horizontal PGA isoseismals for both the Darfield and Christchurch
earthquakes have been downloaded from the New Zealand Geotechnical Database (NZGD)
(EQC, 2016), based on work by Bradley and Hughes (2012). The NZGD is a web-based
repository for sharing geotechnical data relevant to the assessment of earthquake risk in the
region. It contains observations from the Canterbury earthquake sequence and is the source of
most of the observed data in this research for the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes. The
original PGA isoseismals are published at 0.01 g intervals, but are shown at 0.10 g intervals in
Figure 4.1 for clarity. Although there was an intention to include corresponding maximum
horizontal PGV isoseismals in the NZGD (Bradley, personal communication), this work has
never been completed and so PGV isoseismals have been obtained from the USGS ShakeMap
archive (USGS, 2015a, 2015b). The original PGV isoseismals are at 2 cm/s intervals, but are
shown in Figure 4.2 at 10 cm/s intervals for clarity. Tonkin and Taylor, geotechnical
engineering consultants to the EQC (van Ballegooy et al., 2014) have provided a GIS dataset
containing information about the location of over 70,000 investigative boreholes in the city,
with attribute information describing the qualitative surface land damage category at each
location for both earthquakes. The land damage attribute has been designated based on a
combination of post-earthquake on-ground surveys and aerial photography.
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Figure 4.1 – Peak ground acceleration (PGA) maps for the Christchurch urban area from the Darfield and
Christchurch earthquakes, based on data from the New Zealand Geotechnical Database
Figure 4.2 – Peak ground velocity (PGV) maps for the Christchurch urban area from the Darfield and Christchurch
earthquakes, based on data from the US Geological Survey.
There are six land damage categories, which are listed and described in Table 4.1. Land damage
category 2 is described by Tonkin & Taylor as ‘minor ground cracking’, reflecting the fact that
no liquefaction ejecta material is observed on the surface. However, even when no ejecta
material is observed, ground cracking can be interpreted as evidence of liquefaction in deeper
soil layers. In subsequent studies of liquefaction in the Canterbury earthquake sequence, this
category is described as either ‘liquefaction, certain’ (Brackley, 2012), which is defined as being
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greatly affected by liquefaction, or ‘marginal liquefaction’ (Green et al. 2014; Maurer et al.
2014). Van Ballegooy and Malan (2013) go further and use observations of ground cracking as
evidence of the direction, magnitude and extent of lateral spreading, implying that it is at the
very least a precursor to lateral spreading. Almost all observation of category 2 are in very close
proximity to other liquefaction observations and to waterways. So for the purposes of this
research, category 2 is considered to describe lateral spreading.
Table 4.1 – Land damage categories in data provided by Tonkin & Taylor for qualitative liquefaction observations
Land damage
category Description
1 No liquefaction
2 Minor ground cracking
3 Liquefaction – moderate settlement only
4 Liquefaction – severe settlement only
5 Liquefaction – moderate lateral spreading
6 Liquefaction – major lateral spreading
Based on the data provided by Tonkin and Taylor, Figure 4.3 shows the approximate extents of
liquefaction observations in both earthquakes. The extents have been extrapolated from the
borehole sample points by applying Thiessen polygons (de Smith et al. 2009), which is a type of
nearest neighbour analysis. In the Thiessen polygon method, discrete sampled point
observations of a variable can be extrapolated to a surface of discrete zones by assigning
locations in the unsampled space with the attributes of the closest sample point. For example, if
the closest sample point to an unsampled location is observed to be l, then the unsampled
location is assumed to be in land damage category 4 also. Maps of observed horizontal (PGDfH)
and vertical (PGDfV) permanent ground deformations, measured using LiDAR technology, have
been acquired from the New Zealand Geotechnical Database. LiDAR is a technique in which a
laser scanner, fires rapid pulses of laser light towards a target object and then uses a light sensor
to measure the distance between the scanner and the object based on the time taken for the pulse
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to return, given that the speed of light is constant (LiDAR-UK, 2016). When this is repeated
multiple times in quick succession, a complex 3D map of the surface of the target object can be
constructed.
Figure 4.3 – Surface liquefaction observations in the Christchurch urban area due to the Darfield and Christchurch
earthquakes based on sample data collected by Tonkin and Taylor. The maps indicate areas of no liquefaction (grey),
vertical settlement (orange) and lateral spreading (brown)
In Christchurch, airborne LiDAR systems have been used to construct digital elevation models
(DEMs) of the ground surface as rasters at a 5 m cell resolution. The first survey took place
prior to the earthquake sequence in 2003 and has subsequently been repeated after the Darfield
and Christchurch earthquakes. The differences between the DEMs from post-Darfield
earthquake survey and the 2003 survey represent the vertical movement due to the Darfield
earthquake, and similarly the differences between the DEMs from the post-Christchurch
earthquake and the post-Darfield earthquake surveys represent the movement due to the
Christchurch earthquake. In addition to liquefaction, elevation changes recorded by LiDAR
include changes caused by tectonic uplift. Therefore, to evaluate the vertical movement due to
liquefaction effects only, (i.e. the total settlement), the differences between LiDAR surveys have
been corrected to remove the effect of the tectonic movement.
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Figure 4.41 shows the total settlements after the Darfield earthquake. After the Christchurch
earthquake, the condition of a cable is dependent on the cumulative effects of liquefaction from
both earthquakes rather than just from Christchurch earthquake in isolation. Therefore Figure
4.51 shows the cumulative total settlements after the Christchurch earthquake. Horizontal
movements have been estimated using a pattern-matching co-registration process (Leprince et
al. 2007), also known as subpixel correlation, to find the relative position of corresponding
pixels across successive DEMs (van Ballegooy et al. 2014). Figure 4.61 shows the horizontal
movement after the Darfield earthquake and the cumulative horizontal movement after both the
Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes.
Figure 4.4 – LiDAR measurements of liquefaction-induced vertical settlement after the Darfield earthquake
1 Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 were created from maps and/or data extracted from the Canterbury
Geotechnical Database (https://canterburygeotechnicaldatabase.projectorbit.com), which were prepared
and/or compiled for the Earthquake Commission (EQC) to assist in assessing insurance claims made
under the Earthquake Commission Act 1993. The source maps and data were not intended for any other
purpose. EQC and its engineers, Tonkin & Taylor, have no liability for any use of the maps and data or
for the consequences of any person relying on them in any way. This "Important notice" must be
reproduced wherever Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 or any derivatives are reproduced.
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Figure 4.5 – LiDAR measurements of cumulative liquefaction-induced vertical settlement after the Darfield and
Christchurch earthquakes
Figure 4.6 – Maps of horizontal ground movements (PGDfH) after the Darfield earthquake and cumulatively after the
Christchurch earthquake from LiDAR surveys. The maps have been reproduced from data from the New Zealand
Geotechnical Database
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It can be seen that the extents of liquefaction identified in Figure 4.3 do not correspond exactly
to the extents of permanent ground deformations identified in Figure 4.4 to Figure 4.6. One
reason is that the land damage attributes associated with borehole samples only represent
observations of surface liquefaction and do not account for subsurface liquefaction, which could
be measured by LiDAR. The exception is the assumption that land damage category 2 (minor
ground cracking) is representative of subsurface lateral spreading. The use of Thiessen polygons
to extrapolate from the sample observations adds further uncertainty. Also the LiDAR method
for measuring ground deformations has some shortcomings. Metadata provided by the LiDAR
contractor indicates accuracy of up to ±0.15 m in the vertical direction and up to ±0.55 m in the
horizontal direction. To put this into context, the range of measured ground movements is up to
±1.5 m in the vertical direction and up to 3.2 m in horizontal direction. Furthermore, the pre-
earthquake LiDAR survey took place seven years prior to the Darfield earthquake. Without
intermediate surveys to identify and reconcile potential changes to elevation and position that
may have occurred during the intervening period, it is assumed that all changes identified by the
post-Darfield earthquake survey are due to liquefaction effects in that event, which may be an
overestimation. Furthermore, the LiDAR analysis may not estimate the magnitude of permanent
ground deformations with high precision. As a consequence it may yield false positive
observations of liquefaction, i.e. measuring ground movements in locations where no
liquefaction occurred. Therefore in this research, for analysis involving observed permanent
ground deformations (e.g. developing new empirical fragility functions), it is proposed to
validate the LiDAR measurements with the surface-level observations from the borehole data
provided by Tonkin and Taylor.
To validate the LiDAR measurements, the study area is divided into four observed liquefaction
‘zones’, based on the land damage categories, as shown in Table 4.2. The four zones are: A) no
liquefaction (category 1); B) observed liquefaction (categories 2 to 6); C) observed liquefaction
with settlement only (categories 3 and 4); and D) observed liquefaction with lateral spreading
(categories 2, 5 and 6). The zones are not exclusive since zones C and D are sub-divisions of
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zone B. For empirical fragility analysis, an asset is only considered to have been exposed to
lateral spreading if it is both located in Zone D and the LiDAR measurement shows a horizontal
movement. An asset is only considered to have been exposed to settlement if it is both located
in Zone C and the LiDAR measurement shows a vertical movement, All other assets are
assumed to have not been exposed to liquefaction.
Table 4.2 – Composition of observed liquefaction zones in terms of land damage categories
Land damage
category Description Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone D
1 No liquefaction Yes No No No
2 Minor ground cracking No Yes No Yes
3 Liquefaction – moderate settlement only No Yes Yes No
4 Liquefaction – severe settlement only No Yes Yes No
5 Liquefaction – moderate lateralspreading No Yes Yes Yes
6 Liquefaction – major lateral spreading No Yes Yes Yes
4.2 Step 1 – System classification
This section sets out the classification of assets within the electric power network and water
supply system in Christchurch. This is part of the exposure module of seismic risk assessment
and relates to step 1 in the seismic risk assessment methodology presented in Figure 3.2. For
each system, the description is divided into three parts: a general operational overview and
detail of asset inventory for the system prior to the Canterbury earthquake sequence; a
descriptive summary of damage suffered by the system in the Darfield and Christchurch
earthquakes; and a description of changes to the system that have occurred since the Canterbury
earthquake sequence. The final part represents the system classification for the seismic risk
assessment model, but the first two parts are included as this information is needed for asset
fragility function derivation/validation in section 4.5.
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4.2.1 Electric power network
4.2.1.1 Pre-earthquake
This section describes the electric power network before the Canterbury earthquake sequence
and, unless otherwise stated, is based on information from the most up-to-date Orion Asset
Management Plan (Orion, 2009) at the time of the Darfield earthquake. Electric power supply in
New Zealand is operated as a hierarchical network. Transpower is the national supplier,
transmitting power along high voltage lines from generation sites to demand centres, where it is
further transmitted and distributed by local suppliers to customers. Power generation for
Christchurch is primarily from hydro-electric schemes in the Alpine Lakes region, 250 km to
the south-west of the city and a seismically active location. However, New Zealand operates a
National Grid, meaning that in the event of the Alpine plants suffering outages, Christchurch
can still receive power from generation plants in other parts of the country including geothermal
sources on North Island. This redundancy is important not only because of the risk of
earthquakes, which are relatively rare, but also to mitigate the impact of the more common dry
periods, which prevent hydro-electric plants from generating at capacity. Because of this
redundancy and the extremely low probability that all generation sources will fail
simultaneously due to the same event, generation plants are not included in the analysis of the
Christchurch network, which focuses on substations and conduits.
Orion is the local company responsible for sub-transmission and distribution of power to
customers in Christchurch and the nearby suburbs and rural settlements. They receive power
from Transpower at five substations known as Grid Exit Points (GXPs), where the power is
transformed from 220 kV down to medium voltages (11 kV or 33 kV or 66 kV) and then re-
distributed into the sub-transmission network. At the next level in the network hierarchy, Orion
operates 50 district/zone substations (30 in the Christchurch urban area) that convert power to
11 kV (if required) and re-distribute into the 11 kV sub-transmission network. There are then a
further 271 network substations that do not transform voltage but simply re-distribute supply
into the 11 kV distribution network. It should be noted that in some parts of Christchurch, the
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distribution network is bypassed and power is carried directly from district/zone substations to
the final level of the hierarchy, the low voltage network, where Orion own over 10,000
distribution substations that convert power to 400 V and then supply directly to customers. A
schematic explaining the interactions between levels in the network hierarchy is shown in
Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7 – Schematic of Orion network hierarchy in Christchurch urban area (source: Orion Asset Management
Plan, 2009)
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Around 70% of the conduits within Christchurch are buried cables, equating to 4,718 km.
Buried cables can be categorised by their insulation type and their conduction material, although
since the insulation provides the structure to a cable, it is thought that insulation is more
susceptible to damage from ground movements (Orion, personal communication). The
predominant insulation types in Christchurch are: oil-filled cables; paper-insulated lead-covered
armoured cables (PILCA); PILCA cables reinforced with high density polyethylene (PILCA
HDPE); cross-linked polyethylene cables (XLPE); and polyvinyl chloride cables (PVC).
Conduction materials used in Christchurch are copper and aluminium. There are 2,176 km of
overhead lines in the city but 97% are low voltage 400 V and the remaining 59 km are 66 kV
lines in the sub-transmission network.
Orion has only provided the geospatial data required for analysis for the sub-transmission
network and so the analysis only considers assets upstream of (and including) the district/zone
substations, as shown in Figure 4.8, excluding the Moffett and Shands substations, which do not
serve customers in the urban area of Christchurch. At lower levels in the hierarchy of an
infrastructure network, there is greater redundancy in supply paths and hence a lower level of
functional vulnerability, i.e. the network at this level can accommodate a larger number of faults
without affecting functionality (Vanzi, 1996; Hwang et al., 1998). Therefore, whilst excluding
the lower voltage parts of the network will have some effect on system performance
measurements, it is likely to be a minor one. The distribution of types of conduits in the analysis
zone is summarised in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3 – Summary of electrical conduits managed by Orion in Christchurch urban area in 2009 from GIS data
Voltage Type Total Length Insulation Material
66 kV Overhead line 59 km n/a
66 kV Buried cable 64 km 58 km oil-filled
6 km XLPE
33 kV Overhead line 15 km n/a
33 kV Buried cable 27 km 18 km XLPE
5 km PILCA
4 km oil-filled
11 kV Buried cable 75 km 56 km PILCA
15 km XLPE
1 km PILCA HDPE
3 km unspecified
Figure 4.8 – Orion sub-transmission network prior to the Canterbury earthquake sequence (source: Orion Asset
Management Plan, 2009)
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4.2.1.2 Electric power network performance
Electric power infrastructure generally performed well in the Darfield earthquake. Minor
damage to transmission GXPs included: damage to a line at Papanui; transformer banks tripping
at Islington; and a leaning transmission tower at Bromley. Two of Orion’s district/zone
substations at Pages Road and Brighton experienced minor physical damage but remained
operational and the impact on Orion’s network was caused primarily by transformers tripping
(Kwasinski et al., 2014). Orion carried out 24 repairs on 11 kV buried cables but there were no
direct faults on buried 66 kV cables or on overhead lines. However, two 66 kV cables were
crushed at the Dallington Bridge, as the bridge failed due to liquefaction at the transition point
between the bridge and the adjoining ground. Almost 170,000 of Orion’s customers (from a
total of 193,000) lost power immediately after the Darfield earthquake, although by the end of
the day, just over 15,000 customers remained without power. In total, Orion estimate 90 million
customer minutes of outages after the Darfield earthquake (Kwasinski et al. 2014).
In the Christchurch earthquake, Transpower infrastructure was not greatly affected with damage
concentrated at the Bromley GXP, where damage occurred to switchgear in the control building
and a voltage transformer in the switchyard (Kwasinski et al., 2014). The level of damage at
Bromley was low considering the severity of liquefaction in the area. None of the district/zone
substations were damaged. Only one of the network substations, at St. Andrew’s Hill, suffered
damage due to ground shaking while one other suffered damage due to rock fall in Sumner, at
the foot of the Port Hills (Eidinger and Tang 2012). 50% of 66 kV cables experienced faults,
compared to 15% of 11 kV and just 0.6% of 400 V cables (Kwasinski et al, 2014). Immediately
after the Christchurch earthquake, over 70% of the city did not have access to power, in part
because automatic shutdown systems functioned as designed, preventing short circuits and
potential earthquake-induced fires (Giovinazzi et al., 2011). Most of the outages were caused by
liquefaction damage to cables, while above-ground components, including substations and
overhead lines performed well (Kwasinski et al., 2014). 50% of customers had power restored
the same day; 75% of customers had power restored within four days and after two weeks, 98%
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of customers were receiving power (Giovinazzi et al. 2011). In total, Orion estimate 629 million
customer minutes of outages after the Christchurch earthquake (Kwasinski et al. 2014). The
map in Figure 4.9 shows the approximate extent of the area affected by power outages.
Figure 4.9 – Map showing approximately the areas affected by power outages immediately after the Christchurch
earthquake
The good performance of the substations in both earthquakes can be traced back to the decision
by Orion in the 1990s to seismically reinforce all substations at a cost of 6 million NZD. This
followed lessons learned from the MW 6.5 earthquake that struck Edgecumbe on North Island in
1987 (Giovinazzi et al., 2011). Buried cable damage was found to be the most costly type of
damage to the power system and the main reason for long outages after the February 2011
earthquake (Kwasinski et al., 2014). Although 66 kV cables were significantly affected by the
earthquakes, Orion has provided geospatial damage data only for the 11 kV cables. The location
of 11 kV cable repairs in relation to areas where liquefaction was observed is shown in Figure
4.10. It can be seen that most of the cable damage occurred in areas of liquefaction and typical
examples of the type of damage caused by liquefaction are shown in Figure 4.11.
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Figure 4.10 – Locations of recorded buried 11kV cable faults due to each earthquake by insulation material, mapped
against areas of observed liquefaction (brown)
Figure 4.11 – Examples of typical curvature damage observed amongst buried cables due to the Canterbury
earthquakes (photos courtesy of Andrew Massie at the Christchurch Polytechnic Institute of Technology)
The average fault rate for 66 kV cables over the two earthquakes was 0.11 faults per kilometre
(Kwasinski et al., 2014) – since 1994 there have been no faults amongst these cables due to
plant failure or third party effects (Orion 2009). The average fault rate for 11 kV cables over the
two earthquakes is 0.12 faults per kilometre (calculated independently by the author from
geospatial data provided by Orion). This compares to pre-earthquake observed annual repair
rates of less than 0.03 faults per kilometre due to plant failure or third party effects (Orion
2009). Kwasinski et al. (2014) observe that both copper and aluminium should be able to
accommodate the moderate extension that could be expected due to liquefaction and therefore
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this significant cable faulting is more likely to be caused by yielding of the outer insulation
layer. Analysis of the geospatial data indicates that across both earthquakes, PILCA cables
exhibited a repair rate of 0.143 faults per km, whilst XLPE cables exhibited a repair rate of
0.022 faults per km. More detailed investigative analysis of cable fault rates is described in
section 4.5.2.
4.2.1.3 Post-earthquake
Since the Canterbury earthquake sequence, a small number of changes have been made to the
Christchurch power network. Some of these changes have been due to earthquake damage but
some have also been due to general network rationalisation and performance improvement. This
section briefly describes these changes based on information the latest Orion Asset Management
Plan (Orion, 2014). The general hierarchy of the system is the same although there is a minor
change in nomenclature. The level previously identified as the 11 kV sub-transmission network
is now known as the 11 kV primary distribution network; and the level previously known as the
11 kV distribution network, is now known as the 11 kV secondary distribution network. Orion
has only provided the geospatial data required for analysis for the sub-transmission network and
so the analysis only considers assets upstream of (and including) the district/zone substations, as
shown in Figure 4.12. A major change is that the Papanui GXP was taken over by Orion and
now operates as an 11 kV district/zone substation, which receives power from the Islington
GXP. This has led to the addition of three 66 kV lines to the Orion network, linking the two
substations, and to the closure of the nearby Harris district/zone substation. The Brighton and
Pages Road district/zone substations permanently closed after the Christchurch earthquake due
to liquefaction damage and have been replaced by a new substation at Rawhiti. Much of the
underground cabling that led out from the Bromley GXP was also damaged by liquefaction and
so the Dallington and new Rawhiti substations currently receive power from Bromley GXP
across temporary overhead lines. A new district/zone substation has also been constructed at
Prebbleton but this does not serve the urban area of Christchurch and so is not included in the
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analysis. The current inventory for conduits in the sub-transmission network is summarised in
Table 4.4.
Figure 4.12 – Orion sub-transmission network following changes implemented after the Canterbury earthquake
sequence (source: Orion Asset Management Plan, 2014)
Table 4.4 – Summary of electrical conduits managed by Orion in Christchurch urban area in 2014 from GIS data
Voltage Type Total Length Insulation Material
66kV Overhead line 90km n/a
66kV Buried cable 56km 41km oil-filled
15km XLPE
33kV Overhead line 7km n/a
33kV Buried cable 14km all XLPE
11kV Buried cable 75km 56km PILCA
15km XLPE
1km PILCA HDPE
3km unspecified
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4.2.2 Water supply system
4.2.2.1 Pre-earthquake
Christchurch City Council (CCC) is responsible for the water supply in the Christchurch urban
area and surrounding fringe settlements. Water is obtained by pumping through wells from
underground gravel aquifers, which extend under the city and westwards under the Canterbury
Plains, to depths of up to 220 m. Prior to the Canterbury earthquake sequence, approximately 50
million cubic metres of water was abstracted per year to supply customers (CCC, 2005). The
abstracted water is of high quality and requires no additional treatment. The Christchurch water
supply system is divided into ten pressure supply zones (seven in the urban area). Each zone
contains a number of wells and associated primary pumping stations to abstract water from
aquifers and a pipe network to carry water to customers. The majority of pipes in the city
operate by gravity in some of the supply zones also contain additional booster pumping stations
to carry water to properties on higher ground. The zones operate independently, meaning that a
customer can only receive water from a well in the same zone. A map of the CCC water supply
zones is shown in Figure 4.13.
Figure 4.13 – Map of water supply pressure zones and extraction sites in Christchurch
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The University of Canterbury acts as a custodian and access manager for CCC’s GIS data
service. The geospatial water supply system datasets used in this study have been acquired
through this resource rather than from CCC directly and the following summary of network
assets is based on these geospatial datasets. There are 56 extraction sites in the Christchurch
urban area, housing a total 105 primary pumping stations, of which 43 had access to back-up
power supply in the form of a diesel generator. Some pumping stations are linked to more than
one well and there are a total of 147 wells. The system is supported by 59 booster pumps,
spread across 41 sites, to provide water to the Port Hills area to the south of the city. This
includes nine sites that are outside of the urban area but which receive water from one of the six
urban pressure zones. None of the booster pumping stations had access to back-up power. The
locations of the extraction sites and booster pumps are shown in Figure 4.13, with reference to
their supply zones.
There is a total of 3,357 km of pipes in the Christchurch water system of which 53 km is
classified as ‘trunk mains’, 1,686 km is classified as ‘mains’ and 1,618 km classified as
‘submains’. Apart from size – 93% of trunk mains have a diameter of at least 300 mm, whilst
93% of mains have a diameter of less than 300 mm – the distinction between ‘trunk main’ and
‘main’ is not clear. The extent of the trunk main network only covers a small part of the city and
not every supply zone contains a trunk main. Furthermore, the majority of primary pumping
stations pump directly into a mains pipe. Although the question has been put to CCC, no
response has been forthcoming. Therefore in this study trunk mains and mains are assumed to
be topologically equivalent so that there are two levels in the water network hierarchy: trunk
mains/mains and submains. The total network consists of almost 120,000 individual pipes and
modelling both the fragility and connectivity of all of these will result in a very long
computation time even for just a single event and so may be prohibitive for a Monte Carlo
simulation. It is therefore proposed to use a simplified network. Even restricting the analysis to
only trunk mains and mains leaves almost 50,000 pipes, so a stricter condition is needed. The
network is initially thinned by only including pipes with diameter >300 mm. However, this
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results in a disjointed network, meaning that there are sections of pipe or booster pumps that are
not connected to a well, because water is carried through smaller diameter pipes to reach them.
It is therefore proposed to include some of the smaller diameter pipes in the simplified network,
to ensure that all large diameter pipes (>300 mm) and booster pumps are connected to a well. In
some cases there is more than one route option to link an isolated asset to the rest of the
network. When this arises, the route with the largest diameter is pipe selected if possible, or if
there is no difference in diameter then the shortest route is selected. The final analysis network
consists of 6,161 pipes. A range of materials are used to construct pipes in Christchurch and the
quantities of each material in the analysis network are shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5 – Lengths of pipe in pre-earthquake analysis network by construction material
Material Trunk
Asbestos Cement (AC) 108
Cast Iron (CI) 23
Cement Lined Ductile Iron (CLDI) 3
Cement Lined Steel (CLS) 36
Ductile Iron (DI) 18
Galvanised Steel (GALV) <1
High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) <1
Medium Density Polyethylene (MDPE80) <1
Modified Polyvinyl Chloride (MPVC) 14
Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) 31
Steel (STEEL) 16
Unplasticised Polyvinyl Chloride (UPVC) 15
Other 2
Unknown 1
Total 267
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4.2.2.2 Water supply system performance
In the Darfield earthquake a booster pumping station building was damaged due to ground
shaking. Eight wells failed and a further one was damaged, all due to liquefaction. Some wells
and booster pumping stations that did not have back-up generators lost power immediately after
the earthquake, but since there was sufficient water available to meet local demand, this did not
affect service provision (Eidinger and Tang 2012). Pipes in liquefaction areas were severely
damaged with approximately 280 repairs required, mostly completed within a week. The failure
of pipes and wells resulted in some loss of pressure in the water system, but fortunately fire was
not a major factor after the earthquake so this had no significant consequences. In the
Christchurch earthquake, 20 wells were damaged, in some cases inundating local streets with
water (Giovinazzi et al. 2011).The February earthquake resulted in almost 4,000 pipe repairs
spread across the city and took six weeks to complete (Eidinger and Tang, 2012). It was notable
that at Horseshoe Lake and Lyttelton, old asbestos cement and cast iron pipes that were
damaged in the Darfield earthquake were replaced immediately by new HDPE pipes and
subsequently no damage was reported in the new HDPE pipes following the Christchurch
earthquake.
The geospatial data acquired from the University of Canterbury includes information on pipe
damage observed in the Christchurch earthquake. More detailed investigative analysis of this
data is described in section 4.5.4 but a summary of the key points is presented here. The data
indicate that about one third of mains and submains repairs occurred in AC pipes, which is not
surprising given the high exposure of this material. However, a similar number of repairs
occurred on GALV pipes despite a much lower exposure and this exhibited the highest repair
rates of all materials. Amongst the materials that are more prevalent in the mains network, AC
pipes exhibited the highest rate in liquefaction areas, whilst CI pipes exhibited the highest rate
in non-liquefaction areas. In both areas, AC and CI pipes had significantly higher repair rates
than PVC or MPVC pipes. Overall, the repair rate for all pipes in liquefaction areas was 2.32
per km compared to 0.58 per km in non-liquefaction areas.
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In the immediate aftermath of the Christchurch earthquake, 80% of Christchurch lost connection
with mains water supply. For the first few days afterwards, this figure reduced to about 50% and
more than a third of households were without water for over a week (Ministry of Health, 2012).
To increase the supply of fresh water, two temporary desalination plants were set up by the
army at Lyttelton and New Brighton and tankers used to distribute water. Within a month over
95% of occupied units had water, but a ‘boil order’ was in place for over six weeks for most of
the city due to potential contamination caused by severe damage to the wastewater system. As a
precaution, portable chlorination stations were set up across the city. The boil orders were only
removed once the city experienced 14 consecutive days without water quality issues. Although
pumping stations generally performed well owing to pre-earthquake seismic engineering
upgrades, water conservation orders were put into place as a precautionary measure (Billings
and Charman 2011).
4.2.2.3 Post-earthquake
Since the Canterbury earthquake sequence, a number of changes have been made to the
Christchurch water supply network. Changes to the wells and primary pumping stations have
been found by searching the Environment Canterbury online consent database (ECan, 2014a),
for current water extraction permits in the Christchurch urban area. Six of the sites from which
water was previously extracted are no longer in use. These are: Withells Road, Mandeville
Street, Palmers Road, Chapman Road and two separate sites around the Lyttelton Tunnel Road.
However, there are seven new extraction sites at: Hills Road, Mairehau Road, Raymond Road,
Rawhiti Domain, Wilmers Road, Shands Road and Annex Road. In total there are currently 57
extraction sites housing 113 primary pumping stations and 153 wells. 46 of the pumping
stations have back-up power. There have been no changes to the number or location of booster
pumps. Changes to pipes are based on differences between the pre- and post-earthquake
sequence geospatial datasets provided by the University of Canterbury. The total length of pipes
in Christchurch has reduced after the earthquakes. This is due to the ‘red zoning’ policy of the
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA), which deemed certain suburbs in the east
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of the city that had been severely affected by liquefaction to be uninhabitable and therefore
abandoned. The current quantities of pipe by material in the analysis network are shown in
Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 – Lengths of pipe in post-earthquake analysis network by construction material
Material Length (km)
Asbestos Cement (AC) 109
Cast Iron (CI) 23
Cement Lined Ductile Iron (CLDI) 3
Cement Lined Steel (CLS) 36
Ductile Iron (DI) 18
Galvanised Steel (GALV) <1
High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) <1
Medium Density Polyethylene (MDPE80) <1
Modified Polyvinyl Chloride (MPVC) 14
Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) 31
Steel (STEEL) 16
Unplasticised Polyvinyl Chloride (UPVC) 16
Other 2
Unknown 1
Total 270
4.3 Step 2 – Seismic hazard model
4.3.1 Earthquake sources
As discussed in section 2.3, Monte Carlo simulation of scenario events is the most appropriate
way of modelling risk to spatially distributed infrastructure systems. For the case study, the
method of the New Zealand National Seismic Hazard Model (NSHM) (Stirling et al., 2012) is
used as the basis for generating the Monte Carlo simulation events. This includes both active
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fault and distributed seismicity sources within a 200 km radius of Christchurch. Geospatial data
for active faults has been provided by GNS Science, the national geoscience research
establishment for New Zealand, and has been supplemented by attribute data from Stirling et al.
(2008) and for the Greendale Fault from Beaven et al. (2010). A total of 80 active faults exist
within 200km of Christchurch, all of which are examples of shallow crustal seismicity (Stirling
et al., 2008). The known attributes of theses faults include: location of surface projection,
characteristic magnitude, fault style, length, strike, dip, width, depth to top of rupture and
approximate return period for characteristic magnitude. For distributed seismicity, Stirling et al.
(2012) identify 16 source zones for New Zealand, of which six contribute to the seismic risk of
Christchurch. The attributes for each source zone are the fault type, the maximum magnitude
(Mcutoff) and bGR (the slope of the Gutenberg-Richter relationship). The locations of the active
faults and extents of the source zones relevant to Christchurch are shown in Figure 4.14. The
author has assigned names to the six source zones from the Stirling et al. (2012) study: North,
West, North East, Mid-Canterbury, Christchurch and South. In addition, the author proposes a
new distributed seismicity zone, Offshore East, which has not been considered by Stirling et al.
(2012) but could generate large events that may affect Christchurch.
Figure 4.14 - Map of active faults and distributed seismicity source zones within 200km of Christchurch
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The Gutenberg-Richter b-value (bGR) for each zone has been estimated empirically by Stirling et
al. (2012) from the observed earthquake catalogue up to 2009. The catalogue is complete from
1964 for magnitude, M ≥ 4; from 1940 for M ≥ 5; and from 1840 for M ≥ 6.5. However, this 
means that events from the Canterbury earthquake sequence are not included in the calculation.
Hence bGR for each zone are re-calculated here using the approach stated by Stirling et al.
(2012), but with a catalogue up to the end of 2014. For each zone, the Gutenberg-Richter
relationship is determined on earthquakes with MW ≥ 4. However the earthquake catalogue 
dataset from GeoNet (GNS Science, 2014) includes earthquakes attributed with local
magnitudes, ML, or surface wave magnitudes, MS. To convert MS to MW, the global empirical
functions derived by Scordilis (2006) in Eq.’s 4.1 and 4.2 are employed.
for MW ≤ 6.1: 0.67 2.07W SM M  (4.1)
for MW > 6.1: 0.99 0.08W SM M  (4.2)
To convert ML to MW, the New Zealand-specific empirical functions derived by Ristau (2009)
in Eq.’s 4.3 and 4.4 are employed.
for depth ≤ 33km:
0.73
0.88
L
W
MM  (4.3)
for depth > 33km:
0.05
1.09
L
W
MM  (4.4)
The next step is to remove aftershocks from the catalogue, which is done using the declustering
algorithm of Reasenberg (1985). The algorithm identifies a spatial and temporal interaction
zone around the first earthquake in the catalogue. The spatial extent of the earthquake
interaction zone is based on an estimate of the stress redistribution around it. First the moment
of the earthquake, M0, measured in Nm, is calculated from the relationship proposed by Bakun
(1984) in Eq. 4.5. Then the source dimension, adim, measured in km and defined as the radius of
a circular crack corresponding to M0 with a stress drop of 30 bars (Kanamori and Anderson,
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1975), is calculated by Eq. 4.6. The spatial extent of the interaction zone is assumed to be 10
times the source dimension.
 17 1.2 7
0 10 10
MM    (4.5)
dim
0 33
5
7
16 10
30 10
M
a  

(4.6)
The temporal component, τIZ, of the earthquake interaction zone is estimated as the time period
within which there is 0.95 probability of observing an aftershock, assuming that the aftershock
sequence follows a time-dependent Poisson process. τIZ is calculated using Eq. 4.7, where t is
the time interval in days between the earthquake around which the interaction zone is being
determined and the previous earthquake in this equation (assumed to be 1 for the first event),
Mmin is the magnitude for which the earthquake catalogue is complete, which in this case is 4
and Mmax is the maximum magnitude observed so far in the aftershock sequence, which for the
first event is simply its own magnitude.
 max min2 13
3
10
IZ M M
t

 
 (4.7)
The next earthquake is classified as an aftershock of the first earthquake if it falls within the
spatial extent and time window of its interaction zone. For subsequent earthquakes, the location
and time are tested against the interaction zone of the previous earthquake in the same way.
However, if the previous earthquake has been classified as an aftershock, then the current
earthquake being tested should also be tested against the interaction zone of the highest
magnitude earthquake in that aftershock sequence. In this case the spatial extent of the
interaction zone is assumed to be equal to the source dimension of the largest aftershock.
After declustering, the next step is to rectify issues with the depths attributed to some of the
events. This applies to older events for which the location was poorly constrained and so a depth
of either 5 km, 12 km or 33 km was arbitrarily assigned in order to find a hypocentre solution.
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Rather than ignore these events, Stirling et al. (2012) use the McGinty (2001) method to
statistically re-assign their depths. In general, earthquakes assigned a depth of 5 km are known
to have occurred in the crust (top 10 km). Therefore depths for these events are re-assigned by
randomly sampling between 0 km and 10 km assuming a uniform distribution. For events with
an assigned depth of 12 km or 33 km, there is a two-stage process to re-assignment. The first
stage determines whether the event is classified as shallow (≤35 km) or deep (>35 km). For each 
zone, earthquakes in the catalogue with known depths are used to empirically determine the
proportion of shallow earthquakes in the zone. Then for each event with an assigned depth, a
random number is generated by uniformly sampling between 0 and 1. The event is classified as
shallow if the random number is less than or equal to the proportion of known shallow events,
or classified as deep otherwise. The second stage determines the actual depth. For shallow
events, depths are re-assigned by randomly sampling between 0 km and 35 km with a uniform
distribution and for deep events, depths are re-assigned by randomly sampling between 35 km
and 100 km with a uniform distribution. The final processed catalogue is used to determine new
Gutenberg-Richter b-values for each zone by carrying out linear regression of the logarithm of
the observed annual exceedance rate against magnitude at intervals of 0.1. The revised attributes
of each source zone are shown in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7 – Revised distributed seismicity source zone attributes for catalogue up to 2014
Zone Mcutoff Fault type bGR
North 7 Reverse 1.08
West 7.7 Reverse 1.06
North East 7 Strike-slip 1.01
Mid-Canterbury 7 Reverse/Strike-slip 0.86
Christchurch 7 Reverse 1.14
Offshore East 7 Reverse 0.85
South 7 Reverse 0.93
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Whilst values for bGR to the entire zone, the corresponding Gutenberg-Richter a-value (aGR)
varies within each zone. For a-values, Stirling et al. (2012) model New Zealand as a three-
dimensional grid of 0.1° x 0.1° cells (approximately 11 km in N-S direction and 8 km in E-W
direction) with five depth layers: 10 km, 30 km, 50 km, 70 km and 90 km. Each cell and depth
layer combination is treated as a distinct potential earthquake point source with its own
Gutenberg-Richter coefficients (aGR, bGR), fault type and maximum magnitude corresponding to
the source zone within which it is located. Two changes are made for this study. First, the grid is
modelled with a 10 km x 10 km interval for simplicity and secondly, since Stirling et al. (2008)
identified that all sources relevant to Canterbury are shallow, only two depth layers are used: 10
km and 30 km. With a 200 km buffer around Christchurch, there are 1,405 cells per layer and so
2,810 cells in total.
The procedure for calculating aGR depends firstly on calculating the Gutenberg-Richter annual
frequencies (NGR) for each cell and smoothing the initial cell attributes (NGR, bGR, maximum
magnitude) to prevent a situation where the value of an attribute changes abruptly between two
adjacent cells (e.g. at the boundary between source zones). Using the same catalogue used
previously to revise bGR for each source zone, each observed event is assigned to a cell based on
its location. For each cell, three values of NGR are then determined: NGR1 = NGR(M ≥ 4 for 1964 
to 2014); NGR2 = NGR(M ≥ 5 for 1940 to 1963); and NGR3 = NGR(M ≥ 6.5 for 1840 to 1939). The 
size of the catalogue mean that many individual cells will only have a very small number of
earthquakes or possibly none at all and so the NGR are estimated on very small datasets.
However, these initial NGR values, (and also the initial bGR values and maximum magnitudes),
are modified using of an adaptive kernel smoothing method with Gaussian kernel function
(Silverman, 1986; Stock and Smith, 2002). The smoothing procedure yields final values for the
cell attributes, which account not only for the seismicity within the cell, but also account for the
seismicity in all cells that are within a specified correlation distance of the cell. The correlation
distance is assumed here to be 50 km (Stirling et al., 2002) and this ensures that the final
smoothed attributes for each cell are based on larger datasets.
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The adaptive kernel method is a five-step process that is applied separately for each of the three
attributes. It is noted that the smoothing only takes place across a single grid depth layer and not
between layers. The first step is to calculate a pilot estimate for each cell, which is a weighted
sum of the initial value from the cell itself and the initial values from surrounding cells. For a
given cell, the weight given in the summation to a value from a nearby cell i is calculated by the
Gaussian kernel function given in Eq. 4.8, where dcorr is the correlation distance and dcell is the
distance between the two cells. Weights are only assigned to surrounding cells that are less than
three times the correlation distance (150 km) from the cell being analysed. The pilot estimate is
given by Eq. 4.9. The pilot estimate for each cell is then used to estimate a local bandwidth
factor, bf, for each cell, given by Eq. 4.10, where μ is the mean value across the entire grid
(excluding zero values). The local bandwidth factor is used to calculate a revised set of weights
for all cell pairs. First the distance limit for calculating weights is revised to 150 km multiplied
by the local bandwidth factor, bf. The revised weights are then calculated by Eq. 4.11. The final
estimate for each cell is then given by Eq. 4.12.
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The a-value for each cell is calculated by Eq. 4.13, using the smoothed bGR and NGR and where
Mmin1 = 4, ct1 = 2015 - 1964, Mmin2 = 5, ct2 = 1964 – 1940, Mmin3 = 6.5 and ct3 = 1940-1840.
     min 3min1 min 2
1 2 3
1 2 3
log
10 10 10
GR GR GR
M bM b M b
N N Na
ct ct ct  
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 
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 

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(4.13)
4.3.2 Stochastic event catalogue
For the seismic risk assessment Monte Carlo simulation, only earthquakes with MW ≥ 5 are 
considered at intervals of 0.1. This is slightly lower than the NSHM, which considers
earthquakes with MW ≥ 5.25. For active faults, the return periods supplied by GNS Science 
relate only to the characteristic magnitude. Although active faults can generate smaller
earthquakes, these are accounted for in the distributed seismicity sources. For the distributed
seismicity sources, each cell is a potential source and any magnitude up to the maximum for that
cell is possible. Therefore for active faults and distributed seismicity combined, there are a total
of 61,204 possible magnitude/source combinations. For the active faults the annual rate of
occurrence is defined in the dataset, and for distributed seismicity the annual rate of each
magnitude/source combination can be determined by the Gutenberg-Richter relation from the
calculated a-values and b-values. The total annual rate for earthquakes with MW ≥ 5 is 1.45 per 
year, which is equivalent to an earthquake occurring every 253 days. It is common for insurers
conducting risk assessment to consider hazard-induced losses on an annual basis rather than a
specific event basis and so it is proposed to generate a 10,000 year catalogue of events for this
study. Since the annual event rate is 1.45, it is expected that a 10,000 year catalogue would
generate more than 10,000 events and so the catalogue can be considered large in both year and
event terms.
The generation of events is a two-step process. Firstly the time interval to the next event is
determined in days and then a source and magnitude are assigned to the event. The time
between events is modelled as a Poisson process, which is exponentially distributed. By
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sampling a random number, U1, from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, the time to the
next earthquake in years can be generated by Eq. 4.14, where λ is the rate parameter, which is
1.45 events per year. The magnitude and source of the event are determined by weighted
random sampling from all magnitude/source combinations, with weights equal to the annual rate
of each combination.
 1ln UTime to event

 (4.14)
Whilst for the precise geometry of events generated from active faults is known, for distributed
seismic events, the determination of source only defines which cell and depth layer an
earthquake occurs in. Many of the more recently developed GMPEs, such as the PEER-NGA
equations, require more detailed geometries to be known and so additional attributes need to be
estimated or assigned. The first attribute to be determined is where in the cell an earthquake is
horizontally located, i.e. the surface projection of the top edge of rupture plane. It is assumed
that the edges of the ruptures are straight lines and the centre point of the top edge is randomly
assigned within the cell. The strike of the rupture is determined through a two-step process.
Analysis of the 80 active faults in the model shows that their strikes are not evenly distributed.
19 faults have a strike less than 90°, 14 have a strike between 90° and 180°, 45 have a strike
between 180° and 270° and just two faults have a strike between 270° and 360°. It is proposed
to preserve these proportions within the distributed seismicity, so the first step to determine
strike is to randomly assign a quadrant with weights according to the distribution observed
amongst active faults. The second stage is to randomly sample a strike within the assigned
quadrant assuming a uniform distribution. The length of the rupture, Lrup, is estimated using the
empirical functions derived by Wells and Coppersmith (1994), which depend on faulting style
as shown in Eq.’s 4.15 to 4.17. The equations predict a mean value for length and standard
deviations for length are identified as 0.15 for strike-slip faults, 0.16 for reverse faults and 0.17
for normal faults. So that events of the same magnitude and fault type are not all assigned with
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the same length, the standard deviations are used to add a random residual component to the
predicted mean value, assuming a normal distribution with zero mean.
for strike-slip faults:  2.57 0.6210rup
ML   (4.15)
for reverse faults:  2.42 0.5810rup
ML   (4.16)
for normal faults:  1.88 0.510rup
ML   (4.17)
For most of the distributed sources zones, only one faulting style is assumed. However for
sources in the Mid-Canterbury zone, both reverse and strike-slip fault mechanisms are possible.
Analysis of the 20 active faults in the Mid-Canterbury zone shows that 18 of these are reverse
faults and two are strike-slip faults. These proportions are preserved for distributed seismicity,
so if a distributed seismic event is generated from the Mid-Canterbury zone, its faulting style is
determined by weighted random sampling, with weights of 0.9 for reverse faults and 0.1 for
strike-slip. Kaklamanos et al. (2011) propose guidelines for estimating unknown geometric
input parameters for PEER-NGA equations. These guidelines are used to estimate dip, width
and depth for distributed seismic events. Dip is assumed to be 50° for normal faulting events,
40° for reverse faulting events and 90° for strike-slip events. For width, they propose that the
functions of Wells and Coppersmith (1994) are reasonable estimates, where the width, W,
depends on faulting style as shown in Eq.’s 4.18 to 4.20.
for strike-slip faults:  0.76 0.2710 MW   (4.18)
for reverse faults:  1.61 0.4110 MW   (4.19)
for normal faults:  1.14 0.3510 MW   (4.20)
For depth, Kaklamanos et al. (2011) propose the method of Kaklamanos et al. (2010), as shown
in Eq. 4.21, which determines the depth to the top of the rupture, ZTOR, in terms of the dip, δ, and
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hypocentral depth, ZHYP, which can in turn be estimated from magnitude with the relationships
proposed by Scherbaum et al. (2004) in Eq.’s 4.22 and 4.23.
 max 0.6 sin ,0HYPTORZ Z W    
(4.21)
for strike-slip faults: 5.63 0.68HYPZ M  (4.22)
for non-strike-slip faults: 11.24 0.2HYPZ M  (4.23)
The calculated geometric attributes allow the rupture plane to be fully described in three
dimensions. It is also useful for GMPEs, to be able to describe the surface projection of the
rupture plane. Since it is assumed that rupture planes are rectangular, their surface projection
can be described by determining the latitude and longitude co-ordinates of each corner, shown
in Figure 4.15, where (lat0, long0) are the co-ordinates of the centre point of the top edge of the
rupture, (lat1, long1) are the co-ordinates of the corner along the strike direction and subsequent
corners are numbered in a clockwise direction.
Figure 4.15 – Illustration of surface projection of rupture plane with geometric attributes
The haversine formula is used to measure distances and bearings along the Earth’s surface
(Sinnott, 1984). It can be rearranged so that given a pair of known co-ordinates (lata, longa) for
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some starting location, the co-ordinates of another location (latb, longb) on the Earth’s surface
can be calculated by Eq.’s 4.24 and 4.25, if the bearing, brng, and distance, dist, between the
two locations is known and the radius of the Earth, Rearth, is assumed to be 6,371 km. The inputs
to the haversine formula for calculating the co-ordinates are listed in Table 4.8.
     arcsin sin cos cos sin cosa ab
earth earth
dist distlat lat lat brng
R R
    
            
  (4.24)
       arctan 2 cos sin sin ,sin sin cos
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a ab
earth earth
long long
dist distlat lat brng lat
R R
    
            

 
(4.25)
Table 4.8 – Inputs to haversine formula to calculate co-ordinates of each corner of rupture surface projection
Corner Start point Distance = Bearing =
1 0 Lrup/2 Strike
2 1 W cos δ Strike + 90°, if Strike < 270°
Strike – 270°, if Strike ≥ 270° 
3 2 Lrup Strike + 180, if Strike < 180°
Strike – 180, if Strike ≥ 180° 
4 0 Lrup/2 Strike + 180, if Strike < 180°
Strike – 180, if Strike ≥ 180° 
4.4 Step 3 – Hazard intensity prediction
For the calculation of hazard intensity values there are two possible approaches: either to
calculate intensity at each site of interest (i.e. each infrastructure component) or to calculate
intensity on a regularly-spaced grid or mesh. Although site-specific intensity is more precise,
the grid/mesh approach is advantageous when the number of sites of interest is large, in
particular due to the complexity of determining the covariance matrix for spatial correlation
between sites, the computation time for which increases exponentially as the number of sites
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increases (Weatherill et al., 2014) – in this study the electric power and water supply system
contains nearly 7,000 elements between them. Furthermore, it is only when a site is close to an
earthquake source that the difference between an intensity approximated from a nearby grid
location is likely to differ noticeably from an intensity calculated based on an exact location. If
necessary, the precision of the grid/mesh approach can be increased by increasing the resolution
of the grid points/mesh cells. The use of a mesh or grid for calculating hazard intensity is
common for infrastructure risk assessment platforms. Hazus (FEMA, 2015) adopts a grid with
100 points per 1° latitude and 1° longitude (Neighbors et al., 2013), which is approximately 0.9-
1.1 km between points, depending on the precise latitude. SYNER-G adopts a variable mesh but
with a minimum cell size of 1 km x 1 km (Franchin, 2014) and the RiskScape platform for New
Zealand also adopts 1 km x 1 km cells as its highest resolution. However, it is known that
commercial catastrophe models sometimes adopt higher resolutions for hazard analysis,
particularly in areas of high seismicity (AIR, 2014). It is therefore proposed to test both a 1 km
x 1 km mesh (294 cells) and a 500 m x 500 m mesh (1,007 cells) in this study at the validation
stage in order to determine which should be adopted for the subsequent risk assessment. The
two proposed meshes are shown in Figure 4.16.
Figure 4.16 – 1km (left) and 500m (right) meshes for hazard analysis
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4.4.1 Peak ground acceleration
Maximum horizontal PGAs are predicted in this study by the GMPE of Bradley (2013), which
is a New Zealand-specific equation for shallow crustal earthquakes and therefore relevant to the
seismic hazard risk for Christchurch. Bradley (2013) tested the applicability of five GMPEs –
one New Zealand-specific and four foreign – by investigating the distributions of the residuals
generated by each GMPE for accuracy and precision against observations from the New
Zealand strong motion database (2,437 records from 213 events between 1973 and 2009). The
analysis found that the most applicable was the foreign GMPE of Chiou et al., (2010), which is
a modification of the PEER-NGA model of Chiou and Youngs (2008). However, the analysis
was able to identify a number of discrepancies in this model, relating to dependence between the
residuals and predictor variables. To rectify this, Bradley (2013) proposes five New Zealand-
specific modifications to the Chiou et al. (2010) model: i) small magnitude scaling; ii) normal
faulting factor; iii) site effects for site class A; iv) anelastic attenuation in the crust; and v)
increased attenuation effects in the Taupo Volcanic Zone (North Island). Median predictions
and confidence intervals from the resulting GMPE were compared to PGA observations from
the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes and found to achieve sufficient precision and
accuracy, whilst also demonstrating no dependence between the residuals and predictor
variables. The final Bradley (2013) GMPE model for median PGA at a site (centre of a cell) is
shown in Eq.’s 4.26 to 4.29, excluding the term for the Taupo Volcanic Zone which is not
relevant for Christchurch. The predictor variables for the model are: MW, moment magnitude;
Rrup, the slant distance to the closest point on fault rupture plane (km); RJB, Joyner-Boore
distance, which is the horizontal distance to the surface projection of the fault rupture plane
(km); RX, distance (km) from the surface projection of the up-dip edge of the fault plane,
measured perpendicular to the fault strike (positive in the down-dip direction); FHW, hanging-
wall flag (1 for RX ≥ 0 and 0 for RX < 0); δ, the fault dip angle; ZTOR, depth to top of the fault
rupture plane; FRV, reverse faulting flag; FNM, normal faulting flag; VS30; average shear-wave
velocity for the top 30 m of the site (m/s); and Z1.0, depth to shear-wave velocity of 1.0 km/s
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(m). Most of these values can be determined straightforwardly from the physical and geometric
attributes defined for each event at the hazard generation stage. VS30 is obtained from the USGS
Global Server (USGS, 2013), which provides global estimates on a grid with spacing of
approximately 674 m x 674 m. At any location in the study area, VS30 is assumed to be the same
as the value at the grid point closest to the site. Chiou and Youngs (2008) recommend
estimating a median value of Z1.0 based on VS30 as shown in Eq. 4.30.
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Visual representations of the three distance measurements are shown in Figure 4.17 and Figure
4.18. A new measurement, source-to-site azimuth, α, is introduced. The source-to-site azimuth
can be thought of as a bearing between the closest point on the surface projection of top edge of
the rupture and the site, and is measured relative to the strike rather than to north. Sites
perpendicular to the edge have an azimuth of 90° or -90°. Sites on the hanging wall side of a
rupture have positive azimuths (0° to 180°) and sites on the footwall side of a rupture have anti-
clockwise azimuths (-180° to 0°). RJB between a site and the surface projection is measured
automatically using the ‘geosphere’ package for R (Hijmans et al., 2015).
Figure 4.17 – Illustration depicting the three distance measurements needed for predicting PGA (redrawn from
Kaklamanos et al. (2011))
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Figure 4.18 – Illustration depicting the measurement of source-to-site azimuth, α, and distance, RX, relative to the
surface projection of the rupture (redrawn from Kaklamamos et al. (2011))
RX is positive for sites on the hanging wall side and negative for sites on the footwall side
Measurement of RX depends on the location of the site relative to the top edge of the rupture.
Sites can be categorized into one of nine cases depending on the value of α and, if the site is on
the hanging wall side, whether the perpendicular distance between the strike and the site (RJB
|tan α|) is less than or greater than the perpendicular distance between the top and bottom edges
of the rupture plane (W cos δ). An illustration of the nine cases is shown in Figure 4.19. For
cases 4, 5 and 6, RX can be measured automatically by the ‘geosphere’ package, since it is
simply the perpendicular distance to the top edge of the rupture. For other cases however, RX has
to be determined analytically based on surface trigonometry. The relationships, derived by
Kaklamanos et al. (2011), are given in Eq.’s 4.31 to 4.33.
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Figure 4.19 – Illustration of nine cases for combinations of source-to-site azimuth, α, and distance Rx (redrawn from
Kaklamanos et al. (2011))
for cases 1 and 7: sinX JBR R  (4.31)
for cases 2 and 8: tanX JBR R  (4.32)
for cases 3 and 9: 1
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Rrup is calculated from Eq.’s 4.34 to 4.41, which introduce two new interim measurements: R'rup,
the in-plane rupture distance, and RY, the closest distance to the rupture surface projection
measured parallel to the strike.
for δ = 90°: 2 2rup JB TORR R Z  (4.34)
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where:
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and:
for α = ±90°: 0YR  (4.39)
for α = 0° or ±180°: Y JBR R (4.40)
otherwise: cotY XR R  (4.41)
Bradley (2013) adopts the Chiou and Youngs (2008) GMPE standard deviation model without
change. The model for the inter-event residual standard error, τ, is shown in Eq. 4.42 and the
model for the intra-event residual standard error, σ, is shown in Eq. 4.43, where FInferred is 1 if
VS30 is inferred from geology or 0 otherwise; FMeasured is 1 if VS30 is measured or 0 otherwise.
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The non-linear term, NL, accounts for the non-linear response in the intra-event variability and
the parameter η is a random effects term which should be determined by integration. However
Chiou and Youngs (2008) propose a Taylor series approximation, shown in Eq. 4.45, which
allows the total standard error, σT, to be calculated without requiring integration.
 
0
22 2 2
01T NLNL     (4.45)
In Eq. 4.45, NL0 is the value of NL calculated for the case where η is 0 and σNLo is the value of σ
calculated when η is 0.
4.4.2 Spatial correlation
It is proposed to develop a new empirical Christchurch-specific spatial correlation model based
on data recorded at strong motion stations during the Canterbury earthquake sequence and using
the method proposed by Goovaerts (1997) as described in section 2.3.3. There are 33 strong
motion stations in the Christchurch City Council area, shown in Figure 4.20, and recordings
have been obtained from GeoNet (GNS Science, 2014) for four earthquakes: the Darfield
earthquake, the Christchurch earthquake, an MW 5.9 earthquake on 13th June 2011 and an MW
5.8 earthquake on 23rd December 2011. However, not all stations recorded observations for all
earthquakes. There are a total of 86 PGA observations across the four earthquakes, creating
1,796 correlation observations for the empirical model. For PGA, spatial correlation applies to
the intra-event residual, ε, which is randomly generated across sites for a given event. Here it is
proposed to use the normalised intra-event residual, ε' = ε/σ, as the variable to be correlated. For
a site-separation distance, h, the observed stationary semivariogram is derived by calculating the
average observed value of γ for all NSC pairs of sites separated by h, as shown in Eq. 4.46.
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Figure 4.20 – Locations of 31 strong motions station sites for spatial correlation analysis (the remaining two sites are
located on the Banks Peninsula, 10km to the south of the city and are not shown here for clarity)
Since this is an empirical analysis, ε' is defined as the normalised difference between the
observed PGA and the PGA predicted by the Bradley (2013) GMPE at a site. This is repeated
for all values of h to give an observed semivariogram plot to which a continuous semi-definite
(non-negative) function is fit, so that the semivariogram and correlation can be predicted for any
value of h. To confirm that a selected GMPE is adequate for empirical analysis of the
correlation structure of ground motions, Goda and Atkinson (2009) propose inspection of the
plot of normalised intra-event residuals, ε', against distance to rupture Rrup, as shown in Figure
4.21. This shows that 67 of the 86 residuals (78%) are within one standard deviation of the
predicted median and that the residuals show negligible dependence on distance to rupture, thus
confirming that the Bradley (2013) GMPE is adequate for analysing the correlation structure.
The distribution of site separation distances, h, amongst the 1,796 correlation observations is
shown in Figure 4.22.
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Figure 4.21 – Plot of normalised intra-event residuals against distance to rupture as calculated by Bradley (2013)
GMPE
Figure 4.22 – Distribution of separation distances amongst the 1,796 site pair observations from Christchurch
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However, when creating the observed semivariogram, a balance has to be achieved between
ensuring there are sufficient points with which to fit the model and ensuring that each point is
itself based on a sufficient number of observations to be a reliable estimate of γ for that value of
h. Esposito and Iervolino (2011) suggest that each point should be based on a minimum sample
size of 30. Therefore it is necessary to put the data into bins for h. The maximum separation
distance in the dataset is 26.7 km and so the proposed bin widths are 1 km, 2 km, 3 km and 4
km. Whilst a smaller bin width generates more data points, a larger bin width generates data
points based on larger sample sizes. Accuracy in the spatial correlation model is most important
at shorter separation distances and a comparison of the two bin widths shows that up to 12 m
separation (an arbitrary cut-off chosen for convenience since it is divisible by 2, 3 and 4), the 1
km bin width yields twelve points with an average sample size of 105; the 2 km bin width yields
six data points with an average sample size of 210; the 3 km bin width yields four data points
with an average sample size of 316; and the 4 km bin width yields three points with an average
sample size of 421.
The observed semi-variogram plots are shown in Figure 4.23 for data points based on samples
larger than 30 as suggested by Esposito and Iervolino (2011). The plot for the 1km bins exhibits
a very wide scatter across all distances and as so this dataset is not considered for further
analysis. The other plots show the expected general trend that the semi-variogram increases as
site separation distance increases. In all three cases however, the data points at the highest
separation distances show a pronounced decrease in the semi-variogram value compared to the
trend. It is notable that for the 2 km bin width, the two rightmost data points are based on just 52
and 38 samples, whilst for the 3 km bin width, the rightmost data point is based on just 52
samples. These are the three smallest samples of all the points plotted, and highlight the
importance of ensuring that data points are based on sufficiently large samples.
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Figure 4.23 – Observed semi-variogram plots for different separation distance bin widths:1km (top left), 2km (top
right), 3km (bottom left), 4km (bottom right)
To fit a model to the observed semivariogram, a functional form has to be assumed that fits the
conditions of γ = 0 for h = 0 and γ = 1 for h = ∞. Five of the functional forms discussed in the 
literature review (see Table 2.3) are tested in this study. The models by Boore et al. (2003) and
Wang and Takada (2005) are single parameter models fit to an optimum value of αB and αWT
respectively. The model by Goda and Atkinson (2009) is a three-parameter model, seeking to
find the optimum values of αGA, βGA and κGA. No physical meaning is defined for any of the
parameters in these three models. Since the variance of the normalised intra-event residual is 1,
in this study the three forms proposed by Jayaram and Baker (2009) are all effectively single
parameter models, seeking the optimum value of bJB, which is known as the range and has a
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physical meaning. For the exponential and Gaussian models, the range is the separation distance
at which γ is 0.95 times the sill, i.e. at which γ = 0.95 since aSC = 1. For the spherical model, the
range is the separation distance at which γ equals the sill, i.e. at which γ = 1. In Table 2.3 it can
be seen that the exponential model proposed by Jayaram and Baker (2009) is effectively the
same form as the Wang and Takada (2005) model since αWT is equivalent to 3/bJB. So that the
exponential model can be compared to the other models proposed by Jayaram and Baker (2009),
it is retained in the model testing and the Wang and Takada (2005) model is excluded.
To determine the optimum values of the parameters for each functional form, the least squares
method is used to minimise the sum of the squared residuals (SSR) between the predicted and
observed data points. However, as discussed by Jayaram and Baker (2009), the focus of the
optimisation should be to ensure that the model fits well at short separation distances when the
correlation is high. At greater distances, when the correlation is low, the effect that a site has on
the residual of another site is likely to be negligible. Jayaram and Baker (2009) do not explicitly
define a maximum value that can be considered to be a short separation distance. However, a
visual inspection of their empirical semivariogram models for the 1994 MW 6.7 Northridge
earthquake in Los Angeles and the 1999 MW 7.6 Chi-Chi earthquake in Taiwan, indicate that the
model is fit to optimize performance for site separation distances up to 15 km. It is therefore
proposed to use a 15 km cut-off for application of the least squares method for model fitting.
The optimisation bias towards short separation distances means that for 4 km bins, the model is
fitted to just four data points, compared to five data points for 3 km bins and seven data points
for 2 km bins. It is therefore proposed to consider only the 2 km and 3 km bin widths for model
fitting. The optimised parameters for both bin widths for all of the models is shown in Table
4.9. It is notable that with the exception of the Goda and Atkinson (2009) model, for each model
the optimised parameters are very similar irrespective of the bin width used. When a 3 km bin is
used, the exponential and spherical models of Jayaram and Baker (2009) fit short separation
distances equally well. When a 2 km bin is used, the spherical model is the best fitting model.
SSRs of the 3 km bin models and the 2 km bin models cannot be compared directly since the 2
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km bin analysis contains more data points. For the exponential and spherical models derived
from 3 km bin data, the average squared residual per observation is 0.019. For the spherical
model derived from the 2 km bin data, the average squared residual per observation is 0.022.
This indicates that the models fit to the 3 km bin data are a slightly better fit than the model fit
to the 2 km bin data.
Table 4.9 – Optimised parameters for semivariogram models fitted to Christchurch data
Model 3km bin width 2km bin width
Parameters SSR (h < 15km) Parameters SSR (h < 15km)
Boore et al. (2003) αB = 0.44 0.153 αB = 0.45 0.292
Goda and Atkinson
(2009)
αGA = 0.04, βGA =
0.64, κGA = 5
0.107 αGA = 0.03, βGA =
0.93, κGA = 5
0.193
Jayaram and Baker
(2009) (exponential)
bJB = 18 0.095 bJB = 17.5 0.189
Jayaram and Baker
(2009) (Gaussian)
bJB = 11 0.125 bJB = 11 0.215
Jayaram and Baker
(2009) (spherical)
bJB = 14 0.095 bJB = 15 0.173
These two models are plotted in Figure 4.24 alongside the observations for the 3 km bins. The
primary difference between the two models is that the spherical model has a separation distance
cut-off point, equal to the range, bJB, above which the semi-variogram equals 1 and hence the
correlation is 0, whereas the exponential model continues to approach 1 as separation distances
increases. The evidence to support the selection of either the exponential or spherical over the
other is inconclusive. It is proposed to adopt the exponential model for this case study, since it
yields a closer fit to the observation from the bin with the shortest site separation distance (<3
km). For simulating fields of spatially correlated intra-event residuals using this model, it is
proposed to use the method of Weatherill et al. (2014), described in section 2.3.3.
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Figure 4.24 – Plots of the two semivariogram models that fit best to the observed data when optimised to minimise
errors at separation distances up to 15km
4.4.3 Peak ground velocity
There are no GMPEs for maximum horizontal PGV that are specific to New Zealand. However,
the GMPE used here for PGA (Bradley, 2013) is based on the PEER-NGA models by Chiou
and Youngs (2008) and Chiou et al. (2010). The NGA models do include equations for
predicting PGV and so to be as consistent as possible with PGA prediction, it is proposed to use
these models here. The Chiou and Youngs (2008) model is proposed for earthquakes with M >
5.5 and the Chiou et al. (2010) model is proposed for earthquakes with M ≤ 5.5. Both models 
have the same functional form, but with variation in the coefficients c1, c3, cm and cγ2. The
different values for these coefficients used in each model are shown in Table 4.10 and the base
model is shown in Eq.’s 4.47 and 4.48, excluding the aftershock flag term, which is not required
in this research since the hazard model only predicts main shock occurrences.
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Table 4.10 – Coefficients for GMPEs for PGV prediction
Coefficient Chiou et al. (2010)
M ≤ 5.5 
Chiou and Youngs (2008)
M > 5.5
c1 2.2877 2.2884
c3 1.7267 3.45
cm 5.49 4.2979
cγ2 -0.000687 -0.00625
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Both models adopt the same function for the total residual standard error as used for the PGA
GMPE but with changes to the coefficient values used to calculate τ, σ and NL as shown in
Eq.’s 4.49 to 4.51.
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4.4.4 Ground shaking cross-correlation
Correlation between PGA and PGV intra-event residuals is accounted for in ground motion
simulation using the sequential conditional simulation method proposed by Weatherill et al.
(2014), which assumes that the correlation between residuals of PGA and PGV, ρPGA,PGV is
known. It is proposed to estimate the correlation here by calculating the Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient of the PGA and PGV observations from the same strong motion
station records used in the spatial correlation analysis. The correlated total residual for PGV at a
site is randomly sampled from a normal distribution, with a conditional mean, PGVcond and a
conditional standard deviation, σPGVcond, calculated by Eq.’s 4.52 and 4.53, respectively.
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ln ln T PGAPGA PGV T PGVcond med
T PGA
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2
, ,, 1T PGV PGA PGVT PGVcond    (4.53)
4.4.5 Liquefaction susceptibility
Both Brackley (2012) and CERA (2013) have produced liquefaction risk maps for different
parts of Christchurch and its surrounding districts, using a scale consisting of four levels of risk.
These maps have been based on topographic, geologic, soil type and borehole data and they
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have been combined by Environment Canterbury into a single liquefaction susceptibility map
shown in Figure 4.25 (ECan, 2014). The four zones are: ‘None’, ‘Low’, ‘Moderate’ and ‘High’.
Figure 4.25 – Liquefaction susceptibility map for Christchurch and surrounding districts, based on data from ECan
(2014)
4.4.6 Liquefaction triggering
It is proposed to use observations from the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes to test the
accuracy of the three simplified methods for predicting liquefaction triggering described in
section 2.3.4: the shear-wave velocity method for Liquefaction Potential Index (LPI) (Iwasaki et
al., 1984; Andrus and Stokoe, 2000); Hazus (FEMA, 2015) and Zhu et al. (2015). The following
sections describe how the methods are applied to Christchurch and provide a summary and
interpretation of the prediction results and diagnostic scores.
4.4.6.1 Application of methods
To implement the LPI method for Christchurch, the depth to ground water is assumed to be 2 m
across Christchurch, reflecting the averages described by Giovinazzi et al. (2011) (0-2 m in the
eastern suburbs and 2-3 m in the western suburbs) and soil unit weights are assumed to be 17
kPa above the water table and 19.5 kPa below the water table, as suggested by Wotherspoon et
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al. (2014). Wood et al. (2011) have published VS profiles for 13 sites across Christchurch
obtained using surface wave testing methods. In GIS, the profiles are converted to point data for
each 1 m depth increment from 0-20 m, so that each point represents the VS at that site for a
single soil layer and there are a total of 13 points for each soil layer. Ordinary kriging (with log
transformation to ensure non-negativity) is applied to the points in each soil layer to create
interpolated VS raster surfaces. Whilst Andrus and Stokoe (2000) advise that the maximum VS1
(the stress-corrected shear wave velocity) can range from 200-215 m/s depending on fines
content, subsequent work by Zhou and Chen (2007) indicates that the maximum VS1 could range
between 200-230 m/s. In the absence of specific fines content data, a median value of 215 m/s is
assumed. In practice, a soil layer may have a value of VS1 that is below this threshold but not be
liquefiable because the soil is not predominantly clean sand. Due to the regional scale of this
analysis though, site-specific soil profiles (as distinct from VS profile) are not taken into account
in determining whether a soil layer is liquefiable. Goda et al. (2011) suggest the use of ‘typical’
soil profiles to determine the liquefaction susceptibility of a soil layer at a regional scale.
Borehole data at sites close to the 13 VS profile sites are available from the New Zealand
Geotechnical Database (EQC, 2016). These indicate that in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch,
soil typically consists of clean sand to 20 m depth, with some layers of silty sand. On the
western side of Christchurch however there is an increasing mix of sand, silt and gravel in soil
profiles, particularly at depths down to 10 m. Therefore it is possible, particularly in western
suburbs, that the calculated VS1 values may indicate liquefiable soil layers when they are in fact
not, which could lead to overestimation of LPI and the extent of liquefaction. For testing, this
model is referred to as LPI1.
One of the critical considerations for insurers is availability of model input data. Although in
this case study the use of VS, for which profiles exist in the literature, negates the requirement
for ground investigation, for most sites VS data are not commonly in the public domain. As is
the case with Christchurch, even when data are available, it is not necessarily across an entire
study area, thus requiring geostatistical techniques to interpolate. Consequently, although this
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method is applicable here, it may not be in other study areas. Giving consideration to the wider
needs of the insurance sector, two approaches are proposed to extend the applicability of the LPI
model by approximating VS from more readily available datasets.
The first approach, referred to as model LPI2, uses VS30, the average shear wave velocity across
the top 30 m of soil, as a constant proxy for VS for all soil layers in 2.17. Global point estimates
for VS30 at approximately 674 m grid intervals can be found on the web-based USGS Global VS30
Map Server (USGS, 2013). Hence the use of VS30 fulfils the requirement for easily accessible
data. The disadvantage of this approach is that the likelihood of liquefaction occurrence in the
LPI method is controlled by the presence of soil layers near the surface with low VS.
Furthermore, there is a maximum value of VS at which liquefaction can occur. Hence the use of
VS30 as a proxy for all layers will result in an overestimation of VS, CRR and FS* at layers closer
to the surface, and therefore an underestimation of LPI and liquefaction risk.
The second approach, referred to as model LPI3, proposes the use of the same VS30 data but
manipulates it to simulate a more realistic VS profile in which velocities decrease towards the
surface rather than being constant. Boore (2004) proposes empirical functions to extrapolate
VS30 values in situations where shear wave velocity data are only known up to shallower depths,
based on observations from the United States and Japan. It is proposed to use these empirical
functions in reverse – to back-calculate shallower average shear wave velocities from VS30 data
from the USGS Global Server (USGS, 2013). For simplicity it is proposed to only use the
empirical functions to calculate VS(0-10) (average shear wave velocity across top 10 m) and VS(10-
20) (average shear wave velocity across top 20 m). The calculated value for VS(0-10) can then be
used as a proxy for VS at all soil layers between 0-10 m depth and both the VS(0-10) and VS(10-20)
values can be used to determine an equivalent proxy for all soil layers between 10-20 m. From
manipulation of the Boore (2004) empirical functions and the formula for calculating averaged
shear wave velocities, Eq.’s 4.54 and 4.55 determine the proxies to be used in the two depth
ranges.
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For the Hazus model, since it uses a different liquefaction susceptibility scale to the one that has
been developed for Christchurch in Figure 4.25, it is necessary to map the four Christchurch
zones onto four of the Hazus zones. The simplest way is to assume that ‘Low’ and ‘Very low’ in
Hazus are equivalent to ‘Low’ in Christchurch, and that ‘High’ and ‘Very high’ in Hazus are
equivalent to ‘High’ in Christchurch. However this creates problems when trying to selecting
parameters from Table 2.4. Three approaches for selecting parameters are proposed and these
are described in Table 4.11. The accuracy of all three approaches are tested against observations
in this analysis and are given corresponding model names: HAZ1, HAZ2, HAZ3.
Table 4.11 – Conversion between Canterbury and Hazus liquefaction susceptibility zones for three implementations
of Hazus methodology
Christchurch liquefaction
susceptibility zones
Equivalent Hazus liquefaction susceptibility zone parameters
HAZ1 HAZ2 HAZ3
None None None None
Low Low Very low Average low and very low
Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
High High Very high Average high and very high
For the Zhu et al. (2015) all three models are tested and the global, regional and local models
are given the names ZHU1, ZHU2 and ZHU3, respectively. All input data are available from
USGS websites (USGS, 2013; 2014), although here the PGA map from the New Zealand
Geotechnical Database (New Zealand Earthquake Commission, 2016) is used as a substitute for
USGS ShakeMaps. A list of all models is shown in Table 4.12.
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Table 4.12 – Liquefaction prediction models tested in this analysis
Model Description
LPI1 LPI with known VS profiles
LPI2 LPI with VS30 as VS proxy
LPI3 LPI with simulated VS profiles
LPIref LPI calculated from SPT results
HAZ1 Hazus with ‘direct’ conversion of susceptibility zones
HAZ2 Hazus with ‘extreme’ susceptibility zones
HAZ3 Hazus with ‘average’ conversion of susceptibility
ZHU1 Global model by Zhu et al. (2015)
ZHU2 Regional model by Zhu et al. (2015)
ZHU3 Local model by Zhu et al. (2015)
Table 4.12 includes an additional model LPIref. LPIref is a dataset of LPI values measured after
the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes by Tonkin and Taylor through geotechnical
investigation, specifically the standard penetration test (SPT). The locations of the
measurements correspond to the boreholes from which surface liquefaction observations have
been made, as described in section 4.1. When using a method, such as Hazus or Zhu et al.
(2015), that predicts a probability of liquefaction, one can interpret the probability as a regional
parameter that describes the spatial extent of liquefaction rather than discrete site specific
predictions. This is how Zhu et al. (2015) suggest that their model should be interpreted. So for
example, one would expect 30% of all sites with a liquefaction probability of 0.3 to exhibit
liquefaction and 50% of all sites with a liquefaction probability of 0.5, etc. However, when
using liquefaction predictions as means to estimate structural damage over a wide area, it is
useful to know not just the number of liquefied sites but also where these sites are. This is
particularly important for infrastructure systems since the complexity of these networks means
that damage to two identical components can have significantly different impacts on overall
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systemic performance depending on the service area of each component and the level of
redundancy associated with it.
There are two ways to generate site specific predictions from probabilistic assessments. One
approach is to group sites together based on their liquefaction probability, and then randomly
assign liquefaction occurrence to sites within the group based on that probability, e.g. by
sampling a uniformly distributed random variable. This method is good for ensuring that the
spatial extent of the site specific predictions reflects the probabilities and is useful for generating
site specific predictions for simulated earthquake scenarios. However, since the locations are
selected randomly it has limited value for comparison of predictions to real observations from
past earthquakes.
Another method is to set a threshold value for liquefaction occurrence, so all sites with a
probability above the threshold are predicted to exhibit liquefaction and all sites with a
probability below the threshold are predicted to not exhibit liquefaction. The disadvantage of
this approach is that the resulting predictions may not reflect the original probabilities. For
example if the designated threshold probability is 0.5 and all sites have a calculated probability
greater than this (even if only marginally), then every site will be predicted to liquefy.
Conversely if all sites have a probability below 0.5, then none of the sites will be predicted to
liquefy. However since there is no random element to the determination of liquefaction
occurrence, the predictions are more definitive in spatial terms and hence more useful for the
model testing in this study. The threshold approach can also be used to make site-specific
predictions based on LPI, by determining a value above which liquefaction is assumed to occur.
It is proposed to adopt the threshold approach here, but the value of the threshold needs to be
determined. No guidance is given for Hazus, whilst Zhu et al. (2015) propose a threshold of 0.3
to preserve spatial extent, although they also consider thresholds of 0.1 and 0.2. In their original
study, Iwasaki et al. (1984) suggest critical values of LPI of 5 and 12 for liquefaction and lateral
spreading, respectively. However other localized studies where the LPI method has been applied
have found alternative criteria that provide a better fit for observed data as summarized by
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Maurer et al. (2014). Since there is uncertainty in the selection of threshold values, this analysis
tests a range of values for each model.
The test area is defined as the area for which all input parameters for all models are available.
The controlling factor is the VS profiles, since the kriging technique can only be used to
interpolate values between sample points and not extrapolate values outside of the sample
extents. Consequently the northern, western and eastern extents of the test area are the same as
the extents of the VS samples. To the south, the controlling factor is PGA, since the data
presented in Figure 4.1 exclude the Port Hills and Lyttelton areas. The final test area includes
most of Christchurch and a region extending about 10 km to the north of the city towards the
town of Kaiapoi, where significant liquefaction was also observed. Surface liquefaction
observations for both earthquakes has been obtained from two sources: borehole data provided
by consultants Tonkin & Taylor (van Ballegooy et al., 2014), as visualised in Figure 4.3, and
maps from the New Zealand Geotechnical Database (New Zealand Earthquake Commission,
2016), which identify the land damage categories (see Table 4.1). The test area is divided into a
grid of 100 m x 100 m cells, generating 25,100 test sites and a site is classified as having
liquefied if it either contains a borehole observation with land damage category indicating
liquefaction or if the NZGD map shows that at least half the cell is occupied by a land damage
category indicating liquefaction. However, at some sites no liquefaction observations are
available from either source and so these sites are excluded from the analysis. As a result, the
test area consists of 20,147 sites for the Darfield earthquake and 22,803 sites for the
Christchurch earthquake.
Both the observation and prediction datasets are binary classifications, so standard binary
classification measures based on 2 x 2 contingency tables are used to test performance. The
contingency table identifies the true positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives (FP,
Type I error) and false negatives (FN, Type II error). A good predictive model would predict
both positive (occurrence of liquefaction) and negative (non-occurrence of liquefaction) results
well. Diagnostic scores for each model can be calculated based on different combinations and
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functions of the data in the contingency tables. The true positive rate (TPR or sensitivity) is the
ratio of true positive predictions to observed positives. The true negative rate (TNR or
specificity) is the ratio of true negative predictions to observed negatives. The false positive rate
(FPR or fall-out) is the ratio of false positive predictions to true negatives. The best model
would have a high TPR and TNR (> 0.5) and low FPR (< 0.5).
The results, presented in a contingency table and associated diagnostic scores, assume a single
initial threshold value. Further statistical analysis is undertaken to optimize the thresholds in
accordance with the observed data. For a single model, at a specified threshold, the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) is a graphical plot of TPR against FPR. The line representing
TPR = FPR is equivalent to random guessing (known as the chance or no-discrimination line).
A good model has a ROC above and to the left of the chance line, with perfect classification
occurring at (0,1). The diagnostic scores for each model are re-calculated with different
thresholds and the resulting ROC values are plotted as a curve for the model. Since better
models have points towards the top left of the plot, the area under the ROC curve, AUC, is a
generalized measure of model quality that assumes no specific threshold. Since the diagonal of
the plot is equivalent to random guessing, AUC = 0.5 suggests a model has no value, while
AUC = 1 is a perfect model. For a single point on the ROC curve, Youden’s J-statistic is the
height between the point and the chance line. The point along the curve which maximizes the J-
statistic represents the TPR and FPR values obtained from the optimum threshold for that
model.
As well as comparing the performance of simplified models to each other, it is also useful to
measure the absolute quality of each model. Simply counting the proportion of correct
predictions does not adequately measure model performance, since it does not take into the
account the proportion of positive and negative observations, e.g. a negatively biased model will
result in a high proportion of correct predictions if the majority of observations are negative.
The Matthews correlation coefficient, MCC, is more useful for cases where there is a large
difference in the number of positive and negative observations (Matthews, 1975). It is
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proportional to the chi-squared statistic for a 2 x 2 contingency table and its interpretation is
similar to Pearson’s correlation coefficient, so it can be treated as a measure of the goodness-of-
fit of a binary classification model (Powers, 2011). From contingency table data, MCC is given
by Eq. 4.56.
     
TP TN FP FNMCC
TP FP TP FN TN FP TN FN
  

   
(4.56)
Overall the best model will be chosen as the model which results in the highest AUC value that
also achieves a reasonable MCC value.
4.4.6.2 Threshold analysis
Model performance is compared by contingency table analysis of true positives (TP), true
negatives (TN), false positives (FP, Type I error) and false negatives (FN, Type II error). The
true positive rate (TPR) is the ratio of true positive predictions to observed positives. The true
negative rate (TNR) is the ratio of true negative predictions to observed negatives. The false
positive rate (FPR) is the ratio of false positive predictions to true negatives. An initial set of
results is shown in Table 4.13 alongside the corresponding diagnostic scores, using 5 as a
triggering threshold for the LPI models; 0.3 as a triggering threshold for the ZHU models; and
0.5 as a triggering threshold for the Hazus. The LPI1, LPI3 and LPIref models are the only
models that meet the criteria of having TPR and TNR >0.5 and FPR <0.5, with the LPI1 model
performing better despite being based on VS rather than penetrative ground investigation data
(i.e. CPT or SPT results). Table 4.13 shows that all Hazus models are very good at predicting
non-occurrence of liquefaction. However, this is only due to the fact that they are predicting no
liquefaction all the time, and so their ability to predict the occurrence of liquefaction is
extremely poor. The high TNR but relatively low TPR of the three ‘ZHU’ models indicate that
they all show a bias towards the prediction of non-occurrence of liquefaction. The difference
between TPR and TNR is indicative of the level of bias in the model and this regard ZHU2, the
regional model shows less bias than in ZHU1, the global model, as would be expected. The bias
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in the ZHU2 and ZHU3 models is approximately similar although the predictive power of
ZHU2 is slightly better.
Table 4.13 – Summary of contingency table data and diagnostic scores for all models using initial threshold estimates
Model TP TN FP FN TPR TNR FPR
LPI1 6345 25685 9442 1478 0.811 0.731 0.269
LPI2 147 35063 64 7676 0.019 0.998 0.002
LPI3 4287 30578 4549 3536 0.548 0.870 0.130
LPIref 5964 20826 14301 1859 0.762 0.593 0.407
HAZ1 0 35127 0 7823 0.000 1.000 0.000
HAZ2 0 35127 0 7823 0.000 1.000 0.000
HAZ3 0 35127 0 7823 0.000 1.000 0.000
ZHU1 1880 33483 1644 5943 0.240 0.953 0.047
ZHU2 3135 31931 3196 4688 0.401 0.909 0.091
ZHU3 2754 31017 4110 5069 0.352 0.883 0.117
The LPI2 model, using VS30 as a proxy, also shows a very strong bias towards predicting non-
occurrence. This is expected since VS30 generally provides an overestimate of VS for soil layers
at shallow depth. At sites where the soil profile of the top 30 m is characterized by some
liquefiable layers at shallow depth with underlying rock or very stiff soil (e.g. in western and
central areas close to the inland edge of the sedimentary basin), VS30 will be high. Hence, this
leads to false classification of shallow layers as non-liquefiable. The LPI3 model with simulated
VS profiles exhibits good performance in the prediction of non-occurrence of liquefaction and
correctly predicts just over half of the positive liquefaction observations, indicating bias towards
negative predictions. Although the VS profiles generated through this approach are more realistic
than using a constant VS30 value, the VS at each layer is related to VS30. Therefore, at sites
characterized by a high VS30 value with low VS values at shallow depths, even using Eq.’s 4.54
and 4.55 may not predict sufficiently low values of VS1 to classify the shallow layers as
liquefiable. Another factor in the LPI models is the use of the bias-correction factor proposed by
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Juang et al. (2005). Whilst this correction factor is appropriate when actual VS profiles are used,
as in LPI1, it may not be appropriate for LPI2 and LPI3 where non-conservative proxies for VS
are used and the resulting misclassification of liquefiable soil layers counteracts the
conservativeness of the Andrus and Stokoe (2000) model for estimating CRR. The sensitivity of
the models to the correction factor is tested by reproducing the contingency tables for LPI2 and
LPI3 with the same threshold values but ignoring the correction factor for the factor of safety,
FS. These models are referred to as LPI2b and LPI3b and the new contingency table analysis is
presented in Table 4.14.
Table 4.14 – Summary of contingency table data and diagnostic scores for LPI models subject to sensitivity test
without Juang et al. (2005) correction factors being applied to FS
Model TP TN FP FN TPR TNR FPR
LPI2b 610 34902 225 7213 0.078 0.994 0.006
LPI3b 6068 20509 14618 1755 0.806 0.584 0.416
These results show that not using the bias correction makes little difference to the performance
of LPI2, as LPI2b still exhibits an extremely strong bias towards predicting non-occurrence of
liquefaction. This is because the purpose of the correction factor is to reduce conservativeness
but LPI2 does not need this, since the use of VS30 as a proxy for VS already underestimates
liquefaction. For LPI3 however, the difference is more significant. Without the correction
factor, the TPR and TNR values for LPI3b reverse, with only just over half negative
liquefaction occurrences being correctly forecast. LPI3b therefore exhibits a bias towards
positive liquefaction forecasts and so it confers no advantage over LPI3. The results in Table
4.13 and Table 4.14 demonstrate the performance of each model with a single initial threshold
value. ROC analysis is used to optimize the thresholds and curves for the eleven simplified
models and reference model are generated using the ROCR package in R (Sing et al. 2005), as
shown in Figure 4.26. For this study, the threshold for the LPI models is assumed to be a whole
number. For the ‘HAZ’ and ‘ZHU’ models, the threshold is assumed to be a multiple of 0.05
subject to a minimum value of 0.1, which is the minimum tested by the Zhu et al. (2015).
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Figure 4.26 – Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for prediction models
The AUC values, maximum J-statistics, optimum thresholds and corresponding TPR and TNR
values for all models are shown in Table 4.15. With optimized thresholds all the LPI models,
except LPI2 and all the ZHU models meet the TPR and TNR criteria (>0.5). All ‘HAZ’ models
and both versions of LPI2 have AUC values closer to the ‘no value’ criterion, suggesting that
the problems with these models lie not just with threshold selection, but more fundamentally
with their composition and/or relevance to the case study being tested (noting that the ‘HAZ’
models have been developed for analysis in the United States). The reason these are to the left
of the chance line is because they are predicting non-occurrence of liquefaction at nearly every
site and hence they are guaranteed a low FPR value. LPI1 is the best performing model
according to both of the ROC diagnostics and although the optimum threshold value of 7 is
higher than proposed by Iwasaki et al. (1984), it is within the range for marginal liquefaction – 4
to 8 – proposed by Maurer et al. (2014) and so may be considered plausible.
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Table 4.15 – Model quality diagnostics and optimum threshold values for each model from ROC curves
Model AUC J-statistic Threshold TPR TNR MCC
LPI1 0.845 0.573 7 0.774 0.799 0.480
LPI2 0.630 0.122 1 0.131 0.991 0.269
LPI2b 0.630 0.206 1 0.224 0.982 0.348
LPI3 0.772 0.420 4 0.581 0.839 0.380
LPI3b 0.766 0.411 10 0.617 0.797 0.357
LPIref 0.748 0.366 6 0.689 0.678 0.290
HAZ1 0.679 0.238 0.1 0.073 0.999 0.238
HAZ2 0.608 0.316 0.1 0.134 0.997 0.316
HAZ3 0.661 0.315 0.1 0.133 0.998 0.315
ZHU1 0.753 0.355 0.1 0.556 0.799 0.311
ZHU2 0.760 0.371 0.1 0.767 0.604 0.287
ZHU3 0.718 0.306 0.1 0.712 0.594 0.237
The two versions of the LPI3 model perform similarly and have reasonable diagnostic scores
but LPI3, with the correction factor applied, produces a more plausible optimum threshold value
of 4. It is noted however that although the optimum threshold for LPI3b is 10, the TPR and
TNR criteria are met with a threshold of 4 but with a lower model performance and greater
positive forecast bias (J-statistic = 0.344, TPR = 0.806, TNR = 0.538). The ZHU1 and ZHU2
models perform reasonably with AUC values and J-statistics slightly lower than the LPI3
models, but the optimum thresholds are at the minimum of the tested range, confirming the
degree to which these models under-predict liquefaction occurrence. The ZHU2 model also
meets the TPR and TNR criteria with a threshold value of 0.2, albeit with a greater prediction
bias (J-statistic = 0.370, TPR = 0.555, TNR = 0.815). The ZHU3 model, despite being specific
to Christchurch, does not perform as well as ZHU1 or ZHU2. The reason for this anomaly may
be because the ‘ZHU’ models were calibrated to preserve the extent of liquefaction rather than
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to make site-specific predictions. The absolute quality of models is tested by calculating MCC.
In the preceding analysis, the best performing model is LPI1 and this has a value of MCC =
0.48. The correlation is only moderate, but nevertheless indicates that the model is better than
random guessing. As part of a rapid assessment or desktop study for insurance purposes, this
may be sufficient.
4.4.6.3 Conclusions
This analysis compares a range of simplified desktop liquefaction assessment methods that may
be suitable for use by the insurance sector where seismic risk assessments may be conducted
over large areas and where data availability and resources are key constraints. It finds that the
liquefaction potential index, when calculated using shear-wave velocity profiles (LPI1) is the
best performing model in terms of its ability to correctly predict liquefaction occurrence both
positively and negatively. Shear-wave velocity profiles are not always available to analysts
however and it is notable therefore that the analysis shows that the next best performing model
is the liquefaction potential index calculated with shear-wave velocity profiles simulated from
USGS VS30 data (LPI3). Since it is based on USGS data, which is publicly accessible online, this
method is particularly attractive to those undertaking rapid and/or regional scale desktop
assessments.
The Hazus methodology for estimating liquefaction probabilities performs poorly irrespective
of triggering threshold. This is significant since Hazus methodologies (not only in respect to
liquefaction) are often used as a default model outside of the US when no specific local (or
regional) model is available. Models proposed by Zhu et al. (2015) perform well and since they
are also based on publicly accessible data, represent another viable option for desktop
assessment. The only issue with these models is that they perform optimally with a low
threshold probability of 0.1, which may lead to over-prediction of liquefaction when applied to
other locations.
198
4.4.7 Permanent ground deformation
For this case study, only PGDf induced by liquefaction is considered. Landslide-induced PGDf
cannot be considered since the geological and topographic data required are not available. For
surface fault rupture, it is evident from the source model analysis section 4.3 that only a very
small fraction of the overall seismicity is directly under the study area. Surface fault rupture is
therefore only likely to affect a very small number of events, and within these events it is only
likely to affect a very small number of assets. It is anticipated that surface fault rupture will
therefore have negligible impact on the overall results and so is not considered further.
The LPI models selected in section 4.4.6 for predicting liquefaction triggering do not distinguish
between settlement and lateral spreading. Therefore it is necessary to predict both horizontal and
vertical permanent ground deformations at sites where liquefaction is predicted to occur. The
Hazus model (FEMA, 2015) is able to predict both of these parameters and so it is proposed to
use this for consistency. A proposed modification to the Hazus model is to use an alternative
method for calculating liquefaction probability, inferred from LPI, in place of the function
included in the Hazus model.
Since the occurrence of liquefaction at a site is a binary classification variable, it can be
modelled by a Bernoulli distribution with probability of liquefaction that depends on the value
of LPI. With data from the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes, functions relating the
probability to LPI can be derived using a generalised linear model with probit link function. The
probability of liquefaction occurring at site j, is given by Eq. 4.57, where Φ is cumulative 
normal probability distribution function, LPIj is the value of LPI at site j, and Y* is the probit
link function with the form by Eq. 4.58. The link function is a linear model with LPI as a
predictor variable and is derived from the individual site observations.
 *| jP Liq LPI Y     (4.57)
*
0 1 jY LPI   (4.58)
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Figure 4.27 displays the relationships between liquefaction probability and LPI fit by this
method for the two best performing LPI models, LPI1 and LPI3, including 95% confidence
intervals. The relationships are accompanied by plots of the observed liquefaction occurrence
rates, aggregated at each value of LPI.
Figure 4.27 – Plots of liquefaction probability against LPI derived from site specific observations by generalized
linear model with probit link function for two best performing LPI models. Plots also display the observed
liquefaction rates at each LPI value and classified by sample size
The plot for model LPI3b shows greater scatter of observed rates around the fit line than the plot
for model LPI1, although in both cases the confidence interval is very narrow, which is a
reflection of the large sample size. The confidence interval for LPI1 (±0.0014) is slightly
narrower that the confidence interval for LPI3 (±0.0021), indicating that LPI1 is the better
predictor of liquefaction probability, just as it is better at predicting liquefaction occurrence by
LPI threshold. It is noted in both models though that the observed rates that are furthest away
from the fit line are mostly those based on smaller sample sizes (arbitrarily defined here as 100)
and which therefore have less influence on the regression – since the use of individual site
observations implicitly gives more weight to observations in the region of LPI values for which
sample sizes are larger. Furthermore, the observed rates are themselves more unreliable for
smaller sample sizes. For example, for model LPI1, observations based on more than 100
samples have an average margin of error of 0.05 whereas the average margin of error for
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smaller samples is 0.19. For model LPI3b, observations based on more than 100 samples have
an average margin of error of 0.05 and this increases to 0.22 when considering the observations
based on smaller samples.
The Hosmer-Lemeshow test (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1980) is a commonly used procedure for
assessing the goodness of fit of a generalized linear model when the outcome is a binary
classification. However, Paul et al. (2013) show that the test is biased with respect to large
sample sizes, with even small departures from the proposed model being classified as
significant. They consequently recommend that the test is not used for sample sizes above
25,000. Pseudo-R2 metrics are also commonly used to test model performance (Smith and
McKenna 2013), but these compare the proposed model to a null intercept-only model rather
than comparing the model predictions to observations. Although the purpose of the analysis is to
develop a function that relates LPI to liquefaction probabilistically, contingency table analysis,
with a threshold probability to determine liquefaction occurrence, can be used to test the fit of
the model (Steyerberg et al. 2010). Assuming a threshold probability of 0.5, Table 4.16 presents
summary statistics from the contingency table analysis of each model and also the coefficients
of the corresponding probit link function.
Table 4.16 – Coefficients of link function and summary of contingency table analysis for the two best performing
LPI models
Model β1 Β0 TPR TNR J-statistic AUC
LPI1 0.067 -1.555 0.683 0.869 0.551 0.843
LPI3 0.098 -1.299 0.784 0.856 0.641 0.766
Both models have values of TPR and TNR above 0.5 and the values are of a similar order to
those obtained in Table 4.13 and Table 4.14 for the same models but using a value of LPI as a
threshold. In particular, values of TNR are now higher, which indicates that the probabilistic
LPI model is better at predicting non-occurrence of liquefaction. This is important as over 80%
of observations in this study are negative. The difference in values of AUC between Table 4.15
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and Table 4.16 are negligible but the J-statistic for LPI3 with a threshold probability of 0.5 is
considerably higher than the J-statistic that the optimal threshold found for LPI3 in Table 4.15.
This suggests that LPI3 is best implemented as a probabilistic model for liquefaction
occurrence. Overall these statistics indicate that both of the probabilistic LPI models proposed
are good fits to the observed data, and can therefore be used in the calculation of permanent
ground deformations with the Hazus model.
4.5 Step 4 – Fragility functions
This section summarises the procedure and analysis for selecting fragility functions for the key
asset types identified in section 4.2. With respect to liquefaction-induced fragility of nodal
assets – substations, wells and pumping stations – Hazus is the only existing source for a
fragility function and adopts the same function for all three. Therefore the same approach is
considered for the analysis of liquefaction-induced fragility of nodal assets here.
4.5.1 Substation fragility
Orion has provided geospatial data for the Transpower GXPs and the district/zone substations.
The low levels of damage observed amongst these assets in both earthquakes mean that there
are insufficient damage observations to derive new Christchurch-specific fragility functions for
substations. In this case, the two options for risk assessment are to either use an existing
fragility function as it is or to use a Bayesian updating procedure to modify an existing fragility
function to account for the new observed data. The first option is the more straightforward
procedure and so is attempted first.
4.5.1.1 Existing fragility functions
Two existing fragility function models for substations that are tested in this study. The first
model is the Hazus approach, which treats a substation as a single asset with a single set of
applicable fragility functions. The fragility functions have been developed based on empirical
data from the United States and expert judgment. For ground shaking damage, there are four
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fragility functions representing four damage states: minor, moderate, extensive and complete.
The definitions of each of these damage states are shown in Table 4.17. Hazus has different sets
of fragility functions for different voltage levels and also depending on whether components
within the substation are seismically anchored. The Transpower GXPs and Orion district/zone
substations are both most closely matched to the definition of low voltage in Hazus and due to
the seismic upgrading that took place in the 1990s (Giovinazzi et al., 2011), it is assumed that
all substations are anchored. Hazus fragility functions assume a cumulative lognormal shape
and the corresponding median and dispersion values for each damage state due to ground
shaking are shown in Table 4.17.
Table 4.17 – Damage state definitions for substations in the Hazus Technical Manual (FEMA, 2015)
Damage
state
Definition Median Dispersion
Minor Failure of 5% of disconnect switches or failure of 5% of circuit
breakers or building being in minor damage state
0.15 g 0.7
Moderate Failure of 40% of disconnect switches or failure of 40% of
circuit breakers or failure of 40% of current transformers or
building being in a moderate damage state
0.29 g 0.55
Extensive Failure of 70% of disconnect switches, failure of 70% of circuit
breakers, failure of 70% of current transformers or failure of
70% of transformers or the building being in an extensive
damage state
0.45 g 0.45
Complete Failure of all disconnect switches, all circuit breakers, all
transformers or all current transformers or building being in
complete damage state
0.9 g 0.45
For ground failure, Hazus considers the fragility of substations to be the same as for any other
building and assumes that buildings can only be undamaged or severely damage due to ground
failure. Therefore there is only a single damage state described as ‘at least extensive’, which
incorporates both extensive and complete damage. Hazus assumes that the likelihood of minor
or moderate damage due to ground failure is small relative to the likelihood of such damage due
to ground shaking. Hence the rare occasions when it may occur are tacitly included in the
predictions of minor or moderate damage due to ground shaking (FEMA, 2015). The median
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value of the fragility function for PGDfH (lateral spread) is 1.524 m and the median value for
PGDfV (vertical settlement) is 0.254 m. The dispersion for both fragility functions is 1.2.
The second model is that of SYNER-G (Cavalieri et al., 2014c). SYNER-G treats a substation
as a collection of smaller inter-connected sub-components, each with their own fragility
functions, which have been adapted from work by Vanzi (1996) and based on Italian
substations. The fragility functions consist of a single damage state and so represent the
probability of failure for that sub-component. The failure probability of the substation is
determined using fault tree analysis to identify the potential failure modes of sub-components
(i.e. combinations of sub-component failures that can cause complete substation failure) and
determining the probability that at least one of these failure modes will occur. Note that the
SYNER-G model only adopts this approach for ground shaking. For ground failure, SYNER-G
treats substations as a single asset and proposes the use of the Hazus fragility functions. Whilst
the SYNER-G approach provides more detailed analysis of substations, it is more complex to
apply and requires knowledge of the internal composition of the substation. In this study it is
assumed that substations in Christchurch have the same ‘typical’ layout used in the SYNER-G
work. As well as sub-components, this introduces the concept of macro-components. Macro-
components are collections of sub-components that exist in series in a substation, such that if
one sub-component in the series fails, the entire macro-component fails. A list of sub-
components that constitute each macro-component is provided in Table 4.18.
Table 4.18 – Description of constituent sub-components within macro-components in a ‘typical’ SYNER-G
substation
Macro-component Sub-components
Line without
transformer
Voltage transformer, coil support, vertical sectionalizing switch,
current transformer, circuit breaker, horizontal sectionalizing switch
Autotransformer 2 x horizontal sectionalizing switch, 2 x circuit breaker, 2 x current
transformer, 2 x discharger, autotransformer, box
Bars-connecting line 2 x vertical sectionalizing switch, circuit breaker, current
transformer, box
Bus 2 x voltage transformer, 2 x bar support
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Generic macro-component layouts of transformer and distribution-only substations based on the
work of Vanzi (1996) and Cavalieri et al. (2014c) are shown in Figure 4.28. The parameters for
the fragility functions are listed in Table 4.19.
Figure 4.28 – ‘Typical’ schematic layouts of macro-components in substations for SYNER-G risk assessment
(Cavalieri et al., 2014), with flow from left to eight
Table 4.19 – Fragility function parameters for SYNER-G substation sub-components
Sub-component Median Dispersion
Coil support 0.14 g 0.34
Circuit breaker 0.17 g 0.33
Current transformer 0.15 g 0.27
Voltage transformer 0.18 g 0.27
Horizontal sectionalising switch 0.18 g 0.22
Vertical sectionalising switch 0.17 g 0.34
Discharger 0.23 g 0.32
Bar support 0.15 g 0.44
Autotransformer 0.32 g 0.29
Box 0.30 g 0.52
Power supply 0.14 g 0.16
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The Orion AMP (Orion, 2009) details the number of transformers and circuit breakers in each
substation, and combined with the typical layouts, this information can be used to make
inferences on the internal composition of each substation. This has been done by following
some assumed rules for the numbers of sub-components and macro-components in each
substation, based on the information in Table 4.18 and Figure 4.28, and listed here:
 All lines without transformer have one circuit breaker.
 All autotransformer lines have one autotransformer and two circuit breakers.
 All bars-connecting lines have one circuit breaker.
 The number of bar supports is always four for a transformer substation and two for a
distribution-only substation.
 The number of bars-connecting lines is always two for a transformer substation and one
for a distribution-only substation.
 The number of incoming lines without transformer is equal to the specified number of
transformers in the Orion AMP (Orion, 2009).
 The number of autotransformer lines is equal to the specified number of transformers in
the Orion AMP (Orion, 2009).
 The number of outgoing transformer lines is equal to the total number of circuit
breakers subtracted by the number of bars-connecting lines and the number of incoming
lines without transformer and twice the number of autotransformer lines.
Failure modes for the substations can be considered in terms of individual sub-components or
aggregated macro-components. For sub-component analysis, ten failure modes can be identified
for a substation (Cavalieri et al., 2014c):
1. Failure of all autotransformers.
2. Failure of all dischargers.
3. Failure of at least one circuit breaker.
4. Failure of at least one horizontal sectionalising switch.
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5. Failure of at least one vertical disconnect switch.
6. Failure of at least one bar support.
7. Failure of at least one voltage transformer.
8. Failure of at least one current transformer.
9. Failure of at least one coil.
10. Failure of the power supply.
Failure probabilities for each sub-component can be determined based on ground motion
intensity and fault tree analysis can be used to determine the overall failure probability of the
substation, by calculating the probability that at least one of the ten failure modes will occur.
For macro-component analysis, six failure modes can be identified:
1. Failure of all incoming lines without transformer
2. Failure of all autotransformer lines
3. Failure of all outgoing lines without transformer
4. Failure of at least one bar support
5. Failure of at least one bars-connecting line
6. Failure of power supply
This method requires a two-stage fault tree analysis. The first stage determines the failure
probabilities of macro-components based on sub-component failure probabilities, and the
second stage determines the substation failure probability from the macro-component failure
probabilities.
To determine whether the ground shaking fragility functions are applicable to Christchurch,
observed damage is compared to model predictions. Damage to substations was caused by both
ground shaking and liquefaction and so descriptive reports by Eidinger and Tang (2012) are
used to classify which substations were damaged by ground shaking. Substations damaged by
liquefaction only are considered to be undamaged for the purposes of ground shaking fragility
assessment. A set of four damage state exceedance probabilities is calculated at each substation
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based on observed PGA. A damage state is then assigned to each substation by randomly
sampling a uniformly distributed variable U between 0 and 1, and then comparing the sampled
variable to the set probabilities. If for example a substation has an exceedance probability for
‘Minor damage’ of 0.6, then it is assigned ’no damage’ if the sampled random variable is greater
than 0.6. If the exceedance probability for ‘Moderate damage’ is 0.35, then the structure is
assigned to ‘Minor damage’ if the random variable is sampled between 0.35 and 0.6. The
structure therefore has a 0.25 probability that it will be assigned to ‘Minor damage’. By
repeating this procedure for all substations, a simulated system-wide damage scenario is
generated. Since this research focuses on system performance in terms of system connectivity, a
damage scenario is simply defined as the number of substations predicted or observed to fail.
The SYNER-G method consists of only a ‘Failure’ damage state but for the Hazus method, a
substation is predicted to fail if it is in either the ‘Extensive’ or ‘Complete’ damage states
(Cavalieri et al., 2014c). This procedure is repeated 1,000 times for each earthquake in a Monte
Carlo simulation. The subsequent distributions are then used to determine the expected number
of failed substations in each earthquake according to the fragility functions and the likelihood of
the two observed damage scenarios occurring given those fragility functions. If, according to
predictions, the observed damage scenarios are extreme, i.e. low probability, then one can
conclude that the fragility function model is not appropriate for Christchurch. The applicability
of the ground failure fragility functions is tested in the same way as the ground shaking fragility
functions except that the damage classification is changed, so substations damaged by ground
shaking are considered to be undamaged and only substations damaged by liquefaction are
considered to be damaged. If the candidate fragility functions are not deemed suitable for
Christchurch, the next approach is to use a Bayesian updating procedure with one of the existing
fragility functions. The method for this is discussed in section 2.4.3.
4.5.1.2 Existing fragility function testing
The Hazus (FEMA, 2015) and SYNER-G (Cavalieri et al., 2014b) substation fragility models
are tested by predicting failure and damage probabilities based on observed PGAs from the
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Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes and comparing these to the observed damage. For the
Darfield earthquake, only four of the 37 substations were affected by ground shaking, with three
substations experiencing damage and one substation experiencing failure. When applying the
Hazus model, every substation is estimated to have an exceedance probability for damage of
greater than 0.5, whilst for failure, the predicted failure probabilities range from 0 to 0.267, with
a median value of 0.056. When applying the SYNER-G model, the results vary depending on
whether sub-component or macro-component failure modes are considered. For sub-component
failure modes, all but two of the substations have failure probabilities greater than 0.5, whereas
for macro-component failure, there is an almost even split with 18 substations having predicted
failure probabilities greater than 0.5.
For the Christchurch earthquake only one substation experienced damage and none suffered
failure due to ground shaking. Two sites did fail due to liquefaction damage but are excluded
from the analysis. Again, when applying the Hazus model, every substation is estimated to have
an exceedance probability for damage of greater than 0.5. For failure, the predicted probabilities
range from 0 to 0.821, with a median value of 0.245. With the SYNER-G model, sub-
component failure mode analysis leads to all but three of the substations have predicted failure
probabilities greater than 0.9. Macro-component failure mode analysis is also seen to lead to 26
of the substations having predicted failure probabilities greater than 0.9.
Table 4.20 compares the Hazus model predictions to the observations by pooling together sites
within PGA bins of 0.05g intervals. The distribution of damage states within each bin is
proportional to the expected damage state distribution modelled by Hazus for the midpoint PGA
value of each bin. The bottom two rows compare the totals, and show that generally the Hazus
model significantly over-predicts both failure and damage. It is not possible to create an
equivalent table for the SYNER-G model, since failure probability depends not just on PGA,
but also on the specific layout of each substation. Therefore grouping substations together solely
by observed PGA would provide a misleading comparison. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
SYNER-G model also over-predicts failure, especially when sub-component failure modes are
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applied, generating higher failure probabilities than the macro-component failure modes in
every case.
Table 4.20 – Comparison of predictions from Hazus model to observations from Darfield and Christchurch
earthquake
Observed
PGA (g)
Darfield Christchurch
Failure Damage
only
No damage Failure Damage
only
No damage
0-0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.06-0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.11-0.15 0 0 0 0 0 1
0.16-0.2 0 4 2 0 0 0
0.21-0.25 2 15 6 1 6 3
0.26-0.3 0 2 1 1 2 1
0.31-0.35 1 2 1 1 2 0
0.36-0.4 0 0 0 1 2 0
0.41-0.45 0 1 0 3 4 0
0.46-0.5 0 0 0 1 1 0
0.51-0.55 0 0 0 1 0 0
0.56-0.6 0 0 0 1 0 0
0.61-0.65 0 0 0 1 0 0
0.66-0.7 0 0 0 2 0 0
Total
predicted
3 27 7 13 17 5
Total
observed
1 3 33 0 1 34
This phenomenon can be explained with an example. One of the sub-component failure modes
is failure of a circuit breaker. If any circuit breaker in the substation fails, then it follows that the
entire substation fails. However if macro-component failure modes are considered, then the
impact of a failed circuit breaker will depend on the location of the circuit breaker. If the circuit
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breaker is in a bars-connecting line, then it will also cause failure of the entire substation.
However, if the failed circuit breaker is on an autotransformer line, then it will cause failure of
that line, but because there is redundancy amongst autotransformer lines, it will not cause failure
of the substation. Consequently the overall likelihood of failure is reduced. Nevertheless,
although the application of macro-component failure modes is less conservative, the failure
probabilities it generates are still high.
An alternative method for testing model applicability is to randomly assign a damage state to
each substation according to its predicted failure probability in order to create a system damage
scenario. This is repeated 1,000 times in a Monte Carlo simulation. For the Darfield earthquake,
the Hazus model does not generate any damage scenarios with fewer than 15 damaged
substations, while the SYNER-G model (with macro-component failure modes) does not
generate any damage scenarios with fewer than 12 failed substations. For the Christchurch
earthquake, the Hazus model generates a minimum of 21 damaged substations in the Monte
Carlo simulation, whilst the SYNER-G model generates a minimum of 26 failed substations.
The implication of the simulation results is that with both the Hazus and SYNER-G models,
there is a less than 1 in 1000 chance of either of the two observed damage scenarios occurring.
This means that neither model can be considered suitable for application to substations in
Christchurch. The contrast between the observations and the predictions highlights the very low
fragility of the substation. This is attributed to the foresight and accomplishment of the program
initiated by Orion to seismically upgrade their substations in the years leading up to the
Canterbury earthquake sequence.
4.5.1.3 Bayesian updating
Since neither of the existing models is adequate for Christchurch, it is proposed to apply
Bayesian analysis to the Hazus substation fragility function to estimate model parameters for a
new Christchurch-specific substation fragility function, using the method described in section
2.4.3. Although the GEM procedure is used to fit generalised linear models, the principles can
be applied to any parametric model including cumulative lognormal distributions, which are
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more common amongst existing fragility functions. It can be assumed that the natural log of the
median for the new function follows a normal distribution whose prior mean is equal to the
natural log of the median of the Hazus function. The dispersion parameter has the constraint that
it cannot be negative, so it can be assumed to follow a gamma distribution whose mean is equal
to the dispersion of the Hazus function. Gamma distributions can be defined by a shape
parameter, αγ, and a rate parameter, βγ, and the mean of a gamma distribution is the ratio of
these two (αγ/βγ). Approximations of the posterior distributions are obtained using the Gibbs
sampling method (Kruschke, 2011), and their mean values are then considered to be the values
of the median and dispersion parameters for the new fragility functions, assuming the same
cumulative lognormal shape of the original Hazus functions. The Gibbs sampling algorithm is
run using the specialised OpenBUGS™ software (Lunn et al., 2009) in conjunction with
relevant libraries in R for data input.
Prior knowledge for the new fragility functions are the model parameters for the Hazus
substation fragility functions. It is proposed to only produce two fragility curves for
Christchurch: one for failure (equivalent to the ‘Extensive’ or ‘Complete’ damage states in
Hazus) and one for damage only (i.e. the substation remains operational, and is equivalent to the
‘Minor’ and ‘Moderate’ damage states in Hazus). Since observed damage data are available for
two earthquakes, there are two options to produce and validate a new fragility function: one
trained on observations from only the Darfield earthquake and tested on observations from the
Christchurch earthquake (the Darfield model); and one trained on observations only from the
Christchurch earthquake and tested on observations from the Darfield earthquake (the
Christchurch model). Table 4.21 summarises the new parameters for each of these proposed
models, estimated in the OpenBUGS software (Lunn et al., 2009). Table 4.22 compares the
predictive performance of the new model parameters against observations from the independent
dataset. The predictions for each damage state have been made by placing substations into bins
based on PGA, as in section 4.5.1.2. Fisher’s exact test is used to determine if the differences
between the observed and predicted results are significant (Agresti, 2002). This is an alternative
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to chi-squared test for cases where some of the predicted values are less than 5 (McDonald,
2014). The null hypothesis in each case is that the difference between observed and predicted
data is not significant. Both tests yield p-values greater than 0.05, meaning that the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 95% level.
Table 4.21 – New model parameters for fragility functions based on data either only from the Darfield earthquake or
only from the Christchurch earthquake
Fragility function Failure Damage
Median PGA Dispersion Median PGA Dispersion
Hazus 0.45 0.45 0.15 0.70
Darfield model 0.95 0.33 0.42 0.25
Christchurch model 1.10 0.25 0.64 0.19
Table 4.22 – Comparison of observed damage data to predictions from new models (note: predictions for Darfield
earthquake are from Christchurch model and predictions for Christchurch earthquake are from Darfield model)
Damage state Darfield earthquake Christchurch earthquake
Observed Predicted Observed Predicted
Failure 1 0 0 0
Damage 3 0 1 7
No damage 33 37 34 28
p-value 0.115 0.055
However, both datasets are relatively small and ideally a new Christchurch-specific fragility
function should be based on as much data as possible. The results in Table 4.22 show that the
data from both events produce models that can be validated with independent data and so it is
proposed that a new fragility function developed using the entire dataset (Darfield and
Christchurch observations combined) would also generalise well to independent data. The final
parameters for each damage state are shown in Table 4.23, alongside the new model predictions.
It is notable that the final parameters are similar to those estimated in Table 4.22 when based
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solely on data from the Christchurch earthquake. Therefore, although there are no independent
data with which to test the new combined functions, it is assumed that if the Christchurch-only
function generalises to independent data, as concluded from Table 4.22, then the combined
function must also do so.
Table 4.23 – Model parameters for final substation fragility function and comparison with observed data
Damage state Median PGA Dispersion Darfield earthquake Christchurch earthquake
Observed Predicted Observed Predicted
Failure 1.11 0.47 1 0 0 0
Damage 0.61 0.36 3 2 1 7
No damage n/a n/a 33 35 34 28
p-value 0.674 0.055
4.5.2 Electrical conduit fragility
Electrical conduits in Christchurch are either overhead lines or buried cables. Vanzi (1996)
observed that the transmission towers that support overhead lines are designed for severe wind
loading and designed to withstand the asymmetrical pull of cables that can result if an adjacent
tower collapses for any reason. This latter condition means that in the event of an earthquake,
whilst a tower might be damaged or even collapse, it does not affect the functionality of the
attached lines. This view is supported by evidence from the Canterbury earthquakes which
shows that there were negligible levels of damage to overhead line infrastructure and even
where there was, this had no effect on functionality (Transpower, 2011; Eidinger and Tang,
2012; Kwasinski et al., 2014; Orion, personal communication). Since this study focuses on
infrastructure system functionality, it is therefore assumed that overhead lines are not
seismically vulnerable.
Buried cables however have been shown to be highly vulnerable to earthquakes. Only Park et al.
(2006) specifically consider the vulnerability of conduits, by creating fragility curves based on
data from the February 2001 MW 6.8 Nisqually, Washington earthquake. However, these curves
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do not distinguish between overhead lines and buried cables and nor do they consider any
physical attributes of the conduits that may impact on their fragility. Furthermore, they only
relate fragility to types of ground shaking intensity measures that are not predicted in this case
study. Therefore it is necessary to develop new functions empirically with the observations from
the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes.
4.5.2.1 Methodology for empirical function derivation
Orion have provided geospatial damage records for 11 kV buried cables, and by analysing this
information in conjunction with geospatial earthquake intensity data, it is possible to develop
new functions that can relate metrics of physical damage to cables with IMs. Since buried cables
are linear infrastructure, the same procedure as the determination of the seismic vulnerability of
pipes can be followed. For pipes, damage is measured in terms of repair rate (number of repairs
per unit length), rather than in terms of ‘damage states’ as is common with buildings or
infrastructure nodes. It is therefore proposed to measure cable damage in terms of repair rates
and empirically derive repair rate functions, considering a range of IMs and cable attributes. The
cable attributes of interest are insulation material, conduction material and decade of
construction. It is expected based on the work and views of others (Kwasinski et al., 2014;
Orion, personal communication) that insulation material is the uniquely critical factor, but the
dataset provides an ideal opportunity to test this supposition.
There are a number of intensity measures that can be used to evaluate ground shaking but it is
assumed that maximum horizontal PGV is the most relevant to buried infrastructure since it
relates to ground strain (Pineda-Parros and Najafi, 2010). PGV has also been shown in the
literature to be well-correlated with damage to pipes (Isoyama et al., 2000; O’Rourke et al.,
2001). Whilst in some areas of Christchurch ground shaking was the only observed hazard, in
other areas both ground shaking and permanent ground deformation were observed. Kwasinski
et al. (2014) conclude that the peak ground velocities observed during the Canterbury
earthquakes were not sufficiently large to cause strains in 66 kV cables that would induce
failure. Therefore, for this analysis it is assumed that ground deformation is the critical hazard
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(O’Rourke et al., 2014), and PGV is only expected to be a factor in areas where liquefaction was
not observed.
For permanent ground deformation, five different candidate IMs are proposed. These include
PGDfV for vertical ground deformation and PGDfH for horizontal ground deformation. In this
analysis, PGDfV is defined as the differential vertical settlement imposed on a cable, which is
distinct from the total vertical settlement shown in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5. For each 5 m cell
in the LiDAR raster map, the difference in total settlement is calculated between the cell itself
and each of its eight immediate neighbours in a 3 x 3 cell matrix. The differential settlement is
then estimated as the maximum of these eight differences in total settlement. Additionally, three
IMs are proposed that combine the effect of horizontal and vertical ground deformation:
PGDfMAX, which is the maximum of PGDfV and PGDfH; PGDfVECT, which is the vector mean of
PGDfV and PGDfH; and PGDfGEOM, which is the geometric mean of PGDfV and PGDfH. The
primary purpose of these three combined IMs is to provide a more detailed analysis in areas
where lateral spreading occurred, since lateral spreading can induce both horizontal and vertical
movements. It is also of interest to assess whether the combined effect may relate better to cable
damage. The specific combinations have not been selected for any known physical relationship.
All three methods are however commonly applied to the measurement of ground shaking
intensity (ALA 2001; Toprak and Taskin 2006; Akkar and Bommer 2007), which is usually
recorded at a station in three orthogonal directions before being reported as a single composite
value. The formulae for the combined effect IMs are shown in Eq.’s 4.59 to 4.61.
 max ,H VMAXPGDf PGDf PGDf (4.59)
2 2
H VVECTPGDf PGDf PGDf  (4.60)
H VGEOMPGDf PGDf PGDf  (4.61)
The observed ground deformation dataset used in this analysis is at a high resolution – 5 m for
vertical and 56 m for horizontal – and so when assigning IM values to cables, it is observed that
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most are exposed to more than one value of PGDfV and PGDfH. There are different ways that
this can be addressed to assume a single value for the entire cable, e.g. maximum, mean,
median, mode or another statistical permutation of each value observed along its length. For
relatively short cables such an approximation may have little influence on the calculations, but
for longer cables (e.g. some cables are in excess of 1 km and so would have over 200 separate
PGDfV observations), there may be significant implications. In particular, exposures to very low
and very high values of PGDf may be underestimated due to the averaging process, which in
turn could lead to conservative estimates of repair rates at these values. Conversely, exposures
to moderate values of PGDf may be overestimated, leading to an underestimation of repair rates.
An alternative is to discretise the cables according to the PGV contours and/or PGDf raster cells
(e.g. ALA, 2001; Wang and O’Rourke, 2006; Pineda-Porras and Ordaz, 2010; Wang, 2013).
This approach allows more precise IM data to be captured in the measurements of exposure,
resulting in more reliable repair rates. Discretisation is therefore adopted in this analysis, with
cables split into 5 m segments to match the resolution of the most precise IM dataset, PGDfV.
Each segment is assigned the PGV value from the closest contour, and the PGDfV and PGDfH
values from the raster cell in which it is located.
For a particular cable typology and IM combination, the repair rate at each IM level is
calculated as the number of observed repairs per kilometre of exposure at that IM level. A repair
rate function, in the form of either a linear relationship or a power relationship (see Eq. 2.42), is
then generated by performing a linear regression on the series of repair rate (RR) versus IM data
points. For PGV, repair rates are only estimated for the Christchurch earthquake since the
number of repairs observed in the Darfield earthquake is too small to produce meaningful repair
rates. For each zone and PGV combination, the total length of cable exposed and number of
repairs is evaluated. The repair rate, RR, for a zone and PGV pair, is the number of repairs,
Rcable, divided by the length of cable exposed, Lcable, as shown in Eq. 4.62.
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However, for liquefaction, the effects are cumulative and therefore the values of PGDfV and
PGDfH experienced by a cable in the Christchurch earthquake are not independent of the values
of PGDfV and PGDfH experienced in the earlier Darfield earthquake. Therefore, for PGDf repair
rates, each cable should only contribute to the analysis once, which makes the assignment of IM
value and liquefaction zone more complex. For cables damaged in the Darfield earthquake, the
assigned IM value and liquefaction zone is simply the observation from that event. For other
cables, the assigned IM value is the cumulative deformation after the Christchurch earthquake
and liquefaction zones are assigned based on a hierarchy. A cable is classified as being in zone
D (and by extension zone B) if it is located in an area where lateral spreading was observed in
either event. A cable is classified as being in zone C (and zone B) if it is located in area where
settlement was observed in either event but no lateral spreading was observed. All other cables
are classified as being in zone A. For a given zone and PGDf combination, the repair rate is the
number of repairs observed divided by the total cable length exposed.
When deriving repair rate functions for pipes from the Canterbury earthquakes, O’Rourke et al.
(2012) use a screening criterion to determine which repair rate data points should be included in
the regression, since some may be unreliable due to being based on a small number of faults or
small measured area. The principle of the criterion is to calculate the observed repair rate and
subsequently determine what is the minimum total cable length required to be statistically
confident in the reliability of the repair rate. The latter is defined by the authors as a probability
of 0.94 of observing at least two repairs if the distance interval between repairs is assumed to
follow a Poisson distribution. The smaller the observed repair rate, the larger the exposure
length needs to be. If the exposure on which a repair rate is calculated is below the minimum
length, the data point is excluded from the analysis. The formula for the minimum length (Lmin)
is shown in Eq. 4.63.
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 min ln 0.01 /L RR  (4.63)
Additional screening criteria are applied to the repair rate observations, including an absolute
minimum exposure of 1 km (O’Rourke et al., 2012), in order to limit the influence of potentially
unusual localised conditions that only affect small lengths of cable. Furthermore, a minimum of
two observed repairs per IM value is included as a condition, since the objective is to calculate a
rate. Due to these criteria and the need to ensure that each repair rate observation is based on a
sufficient number of faults and total cable length, the regression is performed on the observed
repair rates across IM bins rather than for unique IM values. The bin width for PGV is 5 cm/s
and the bin width for PGDf is either 0.05 m or 0.1 m, with the width selected in order to
maximise the number of data points that meet the screening criteria.
In order to provide a measure of the uncertainty of each repair rate observation, lower and upper
bounds of the 95% confidence intervals are calculated by adapting the method of Ulm (1990)
and Dobson et al. (1991) for confidence intervals around a Poisson mean, as shown in Eq.’s
4.64 to 4.65. The confidence interval is a function of exposure length, i.e. the greater the
exposure, the smaller the confidence interval.
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Another source of uncertainty is in the regression procedure itself. The regression confidence
interval at a specified IM value, CIIM, is given by the formula in Eq. 4.66, where RRIM is the
mean estimate of the repair rate from the fitted regression model at that IM value, IMതതതത is the
mean of the observed IM values used in the regression, nRR is the number of observations used
in the regression, Syx is the standard error of the repair rate estimates from the regression and tcrit
is the critical t-statistic with n-2 degrees of freedom (df) and significance level, αRR = 0.05.
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Although fragility of linear infrastructure is commonly expressed in terms of repair rates, when
system functionality is the primary objective, it is also useful to know the probability that a
cable will fail. Since in repair rate analysis the spatial distribution of repairs along a cable is
assumed to follow a Poisson distribution (Hwang et al., 1998; Adachi and Ellingwood, 2008),
the repair rate is the mean of that distribution for a 1km length of cable. Assuming that cables
cannot conduct electricity if they experience one or more faults, then the probability that a cable
will fail is equal to the probability that the cable will have at least one repair (Eq. 4.67).
Rearranging the probability mass function of the Poisson random variable for zero repairs gives
Eq. 4.68, for the probability of failure of a cable of length, Lcable km, with repair rate, RR.
     0 01fail repairs repairsP P P    (4.67)
  1 cableRR LfailP e   (4.68)
Repair rate is a function of IM, so it is then possible to generate fragility curves for different
cable typologies that predict failure probability against IM, similar to those commonly produced
for buildings and infrastructure nodes.
4.5.2.2 Repair rate analysis
Repair rate analysis is conducted for the four liquefaction zones summarised in Table 4.2. In
each zone, all proposed IMs are analysed. Table 4.24 summarises the observations in each study
area for each cable insulation typology. It is important to note that the majority of cables in
Christchurch are of the PILCA typology. Consequently, although the final column presents
figures for all typologies combined for reference, this is strongly influenced by the PILCA
typology. Generally it is observed that across all cable typologies, repair rates are considerably
larger in liquefied zones than in zones where ground shaking was the only observed hazard.
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Table 4.24 – Observed buried cable repair data by liquefaction zone from both the Christchurch and Darfield
earthquakes
Zone PILCA XLPE PILCA
HDPE
Other All
A – No
liquefaction
Exposure (km) 2271 639 93 27 3030
Repairs 64 1 1 1 67
Repair rate 0.028 0.002 0.011 0.037 0.022
B – Liquefaction Exposure (km) 711 121 24 4 860
Repairs 362 16 10 2 390
Repair rate 0.509 0.132 0.419 0.545 0.454
C – Liquefaction,
with settlement
only
Exposure (km) 649 113 23 3 788
Repairs 257 14 6 2 279
Repair rate 0.396 0.124 0.266 0.586 0.354
D – Liquefaction,
with lateral spread
Exposure (km) 62 8 1 0 72
Repairs 105 2 4 n/a 111
Repair rate 1.698 0.242 2.969 n/a 1.548
Furthermore, repair rates in the ground shaking zone are very low. This concurs with the
observations of Kwasinski et al. (2014), that the cable materials present in Christchurch should
be able to accommodate the ground strains generated by the earthquakes without yielding, as
well as the observations from other earthquakes that ground deformation is the primary source
of damage to buried cables (Tanaka et al. 2008; Fujisaki et al. 2014). The reliability of the repair
rates for the XLPE and PILCA HDPE typologies in the non-liquefaction zone are somewhat
uncertain since they are based on a single repair observation. However, they are of a similar
magnitude to the repair rates calculated for the PILCA typology and are also similar in the fact
that repair rates calculated in the non-liquefaction zone are much smaller than the repair rates
calculated in the liquefaction zones. Consequently these repair rates can be considered plausible.
Within the liquefaction zone, repair rates are higher in the areas where lateral spreading is
observed than in the areas where only settlement is observed, indicating that movement in the
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horizontal plane is more damaging to cables. Finally, in general higher repair rates are observed
for the PILCA typology than for XLPE or PILCA HDPE typologies. The exception is in the
lateral spread zone where the repair rate for PILCA HDPE is very high, although this is based
on just a 1km exposure and so may be influenced by unusual local conditions.
Figure 4.29 shows the repair rate observations and fitted regression models for PILCA cables as
a function of each of the candidate IMs. For conciseness, only the best performing (as defined
by highest coefficient of determination, R2) of the linear and power relationship models is
shown for each IM, although all models are presented on linear axes. Information provided on
each plot includes the equation of the best-fit model for predicting a mean value of the repair
rate, RRMEAN, R2, and the p-value for regression significance. Since the repair rate functions are
derived from empirical datasets, the observation are characterised by significant natural scatter.
Although it is very rare in the literature for empirical functions to be accompanied by estimates
of uncertainty (Rossetto et al. 2015), the plots in Figure 4.29 also include information on the
regression standard error, SE (in terms of ln RR for the power relationship models) and an error
range encompassing one standard error either side of the median prediction of the fitted model.
Since the standard error for power relationship models is in terms of ln RR, the standard error
becomes a multiplicative factor when converted to natural scale.
The plots show that repair rates do not correlate well with PGV even in the non-liquefaction
zone. This supports the observations of Tanaka et al. (2008), Fujisaki et al. (2014) and
Kwasinski et al. (2014) that only ground deformation should cause damage to buried cables.
Well-correlated and significant regressions are also achieved using PGDfV and PGDfGEOM,
which suggests that some cables in this zone may be subjected to subsurface liquefaction. Given
that liquefaction is more prevalent when ground shaking is more vigorous and that the zoning
study is based on surface evidence of liquefaction only, it is possible that the small number of
repairs observed in this zone are the result of zoning misclassification. Due to the small number
faults observed, it is not possible to derive a repair rate versus IM model for XLPE, PILCA
HDPE or other cable typologies.
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Figure 4.30 shows the repair rate observations and fitted regression models for PILCA cables as
a function of each of the candidate IMs. In this zone, PGDfGEOM produces the highest R2 value
and the only R2 > 0.7. The regression with this IM is also significant at the 5% level and the
error range is not very large relative to the magnitude of the model predictions. Consequently
one can conclude that PGDfGEOM is the optimal IM for predicting cable repair rates in liquefied
soils.
Figure 4.31 shows the repair rate observations and fitted regression models for PILCA cables as
a function of each of the candidate IMs. In this zone, PGDfGEOM produces the highest R2 value
and the only R2 > 0.7. The regression with this IM is also significant at the 5% level. However,
since there should be no horizontal movement in an area where only settlement is observed, in
practice the PGDfGEOM model can never be applied. This is because the geometric mean of a set
of values cannot be calculated if one of the values is zero. The presence of horizontal
movements in the empirical dataset is likely to be due to a combination of LiDAR measurement
errors or zoning misclassification. As expected PGV and PGDfH are poor predictors in this
zone. Since settlement relates to vertical ground deformation, PGDfV is the only IM that is
physically logical in this zone and would be expected to perform well as predictor. However,
although the regression is significant, it performs only moderately in terms of explanatory
power, with R2 = 0.6. The error range for the PGDfV model is relatively narrow however, and so
this model may be acceptable. As in zone B, once screening criteria are applied, there are
insufficient observations to perform a meaningful regression for other cable typologies.
Figure 4.32 shows the repair rate observations and fitted regression models for PILCA cables as
a function of each of the candidate IMs. No IM results in a regression with R2 > 0.7, but the best
performing IM is PGDfH (R2 = 0.672), which is what one would expect in the lateral spreading
zone. Also as expected PGV and PGDfV perform poorly, further indicating the lack of influence
that vertical deformation has in areas where lateral spreading is observed. It is notable however
that although the R2 of PGDfGEOM (0.635) is lower than the R2 for PGDfH, its standard error is
also smaller and its 95% confidence interval is narrower indicating lower uncertainty.
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Consequently, if one is able to specifically identify areas where lateral spreading will occur,
then both PGDfH and PGDfGEOM could be used as the IM and the final decision rests on the
trade-off the analyst is willing to make between explanatory power and uncertainty.
From the preceding analysis it is possible to conclude that ground shaking alone has negligible
impact on repair rates compared to liquefaction. Figure 4.29 to Figure 4.32 show that the
majority of data points in Zone A have repair rates in the region of 0.01 to 0.1 repairs per km,
whilst in Zones B to D, the majority of data points have repair rates greater than 0.1 repairs per
km, with many in excess of 1 repair per km. However if an analyst wishes to model risk to
buried cables in non-liquefied areas, then PGV is the optimal IM. In areas where liquefaction
occurs, PGDfGEOM is the best performing IM, except in areas subjected to lateral spreading,
where PGDfH performs slightly better (but potentially at the cost of increased uncertainty). The
repair rate functions associated with the optimal IMs in each zone are summarised in Table
4.25. The uncertainty associated with each model is presented in the corresponding plots in
Figure 4.29 to Figure 4.32.
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Figure 4.29 – Plots of repair rates versus candidate intensity measures (IMs) for PILCA cables in Zone A (no
liquefaction), including Poisson confidence interval around each observation (error bars), best fit linear regression
model (solid line) and confidence interval around best fit (dashed line)
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Figure 4.30 – Plots of repair rates versus candidate intensity measures (IMs) for PILCA cables in Zone B
(liquefaction), including Poisson confidence interval around each observation (error bars), best fit linear regression
model (solid line) and confidence interval around best fit (dashed line)
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Figure 4.31 – Plots of repair rates versus candidate intensity measures (IMs) for PILCA cables in Zone C
(liquefaction with settlement only), including Poisson confidence interval around each observation (error bars), best
fit linear regression model (solid line) and confidence interval around best fit (dashed line)
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Figure 4.32 – Plots of repair rates versus candidate intensity measures (IMs) for PILCA cables in Zone D
(liquefaction with lateral spread), including Poisson confidence interval around each observation (error bars), best fit
linear regression model (solid line) and confidence interval around best fit (dashed line)
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Table 4.25 – Optimal IMs and corresponding repair rate functions for each liquefaction analysis zone
Zone Repair rate function
No liquefaction No reliable relationship
All Liquefaction 4.317 0.324MEAN GEOMRR PGDf  
Liquefaction –
settlement only
0.4961.23MEAN VRR PGDf 
Liquefaction – lateral
spreading
4.665 1.035MEAN HRR PGDf  
or
7.951 0.18MEAN GEOMRR PGDf  
The low number of faults in other cable insulation typologies has prevented repair rate versus
IM functions being derived for XLPE, PILCA HDPE and ‘Other’ cable typologies. Yet between
them they constitute approximately a quarter of the total cable exposure in Christchurch and
must be considered in any risk assessment of the electric power system. As summarized by
Kakderi and Argyroudis (2014), it is common with pipe repair rate functions, for the same basic
function to be used with a coefficient to account for different material types. A similar approach
is proposed for buried cables using the data in Table 4.24.
Taking the PILCA cable repair rate functions as a base model, then the coefficients for
alternative typologies can be defined as the ratio of the repair rate in the alternative typology to
the repair rate in PILCA cables, not accounting for IM. Therefore to estimate the repair rate for
these typologies, one can calculate the repair rate for PILCA cables first and then multiply by
the corresponding coefficient. The coefficients for each alternative typology, divided by zone,
are shown in Table 4.26.
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Table 4.26 – Proposed coefficients for alternative cable typologies to be applied to base PILCA repair rate functions
Zone XLPE PILCA HDPE Other
A 0.06 0.38 1.31
B 0.26 0.82 1.07
C 0.31 0.67 1.48
D 0.14 1.75 0.00
All zones 0.16 0.66 0.68
4.5.2.3 Conduction material
Based on their material properties, Kwasinski et al. (2014) observe that cables that use copper
and aluminium as conduction materials (as in the case of Christchurch) should be able to
accommodate the moderate liquefaction-induced extensions observed in the two earthquakes,
and that other factors primarily affect the fragility of cables. The cable repair dataset includes
information on conducting material and so the influence of this factor can be tested. Table 4.27
summarises the repair rates in each zone for cables classified by conducting material, and also
for cables classified by their conducting/insulation material combination.
Table 4.27 – Repair rates calculated in each zone for cables classified by conducting material
Zone Copper
All
Aluminium
All
Copper
PILCA
Aluminium
PILCA
Copper
XLPE
Aluminium
XLPE
A 0.031 0.015 0.032 0.023 0 0.002
B 0.553 0.346 0.553 0.441 0.477 0.120
C 0.417 0.288 0.416 0.366 0.479 0.110
D 1.862 1.104 1.851 1.392 0 0.242
All 0.166 0.078 0.169 0.109 0.052 0.021
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Analysing the data for cables classified by conducting material alone, it seems there is a clear
difference between copper and aluminium cables, with copper cables approximately twice as
vulnerable as aluminium cables in all zones. However, 96% of copper cables are insulated with
PILCA, compared to just 61% of aluminium cables. It has been shown in the preceding analysis
that PILCA is considerably more vulnerable than other insulation materials and so it is possible
that the discrepancy between copper and aluminium as conducting materials is due to the
vulnerability of the corresponding insulation rather than due to the influence of the conducting
material itself. It is more useful to therefore compare the influence of conducting material
between cables with the same insulation material. The dataset for copper XLPE cables is
relatively unreliable given that it is based on a low exposure (34 km) and just two repairs.
Comparison within PILCA cables is more useful and shows that across all zones, repair rates for
copper cables are higher than for aluminium cables. The linear regression procedure for deriving
repair rate functions is applied to copper PILCA and aluminium PILCA cables for each zone,
using the best performing IMs as determined in the preceding sections. Table 4.28 presents
some of the key statistical metrics from the regression analysis.
Table 4.28 – Statistical comparison of repair rate functions derived for copper PILCA and aluminium PILCA cables
Zone IM R2 Copper
PILCA
R2 Aluminium
PILCA
t-test p-value
A PGV 0.626 0.983 0.384
B PGDfGEOM 0.682 0.897 0.559
C PGDfV 0.795 0.163 0.554
C PGDfGEOM 0.729 0.818 0.057
D PGDfH 0.275 0.138 0.146
D PGDfGEOM 0.316 0.666 0.342
R2 values for the best model fits are presented and indicate that moderate to well-correlated
models can be generated for both cable typologies in all zones except zone D, where both IMs
result in poor correlations for damage to copper PILCA cables. T-tests are performed to
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compare the copper PILCA and aluminium PILCA models in each zone and determine whether
they are significantly different. The null hypothesis of each t-test is that there is no significant
difference (at the 5% level) between the slopes of regression best fit lines for each typology. In
all cases presented in Table 4.28 the p-value is greater than 0.05, so the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected. There is insufficient evidence from the data to conclude that conducting material
influences repair rates, which corresponds to the observations of Kwasinski et al. (2014). This
can be further illustrated by the plots in Figure 4.33. These show that not only do the confidence
intervals for the two materials overlap, but that more notably, in each case the best fit line of one
material is contained within the confidence bounds of the other. This indicates that there is no
significant difference between them.
4.5.2.4 Cable age
A potential factor that may influence the repair rate is the age of the cables. One might expect
that older cables would be more vulnerable leading to higher repair rates observed in the data.
The dataset provided by Orion includes information on the decade in which each cable was laid.
A notable statistic is that 87% of XLPE cables were laid in the 2000s and accordingly, all but
one of the faults observed amongst XLPE cable occurred on cables laid during this decade.
Consequently a comparison of repair rates with age amongst XLPE cables is not possible.
However, this analysis can be performed for PILCA cables and the results are summarized in
Table 4.29 and plotted in Figure 4.34, where the age of the cable is taken from the midpoint of
each decade to 2010, the year of the first earthquake.
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Figure 4.33 – Linear regression model fits and confidence intervals (dashed lines) for copper PILCA and aluminium
PILCA cables for selected IMs in each zone
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Table 4.29 – Repair rates for PILCA cables in each zone by age (blank cells indicate that the one or more of the
screening criteria have not been met)
Decade
laid
Age Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone D All zones
2000s 5 0.392 0.359 0.084
1990s 15 0.019 0.259 0.159 1.379 0.064
1980s 25 0.043 0.341 0.274 0.991 0.104
1970s 35 0.018 0.641 0.513 2.020 0.181
1960s 45 0.032 0.557 0.406 1.983 0.160
1950s 55 0.037 0.591 0.514 1.466 0.183
1940s 65 0.259 0.221 0.075
1930s 75 0.397 0.169 0.122
Figure 4.34 – Plot of repair rates versus age in each zone for PILCA cables
The plots do not show any strong trend for repair rate increasing with age in any of the four
zones. Linear regression models have been fit for each zone both directly and using logarithmic
transformations. None of the models are significant at the 5% level and the highest value of R2
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is 0.213. This indicates that in Christchurch, cable age does not influence its fragility during
earthquakes.
4.5.2.5 Fragility curves
Since failure probability depends on length as well as IM, one way to visualise this metric is by
plotting a suite of curves on the same axes for different cable lengths. Examples of cable
fragility curve suites are shown in Figure 4.35, which plots the failure probability of different
lengths of cables in Zones C (settlement only) and D (lateral spread), using PGDfGEOM as an IM.
For the PILCA curve, repair rates have been calculated using the corresponding functions
plotted in Figure 4.31 and Figure 4.32. For the XLPE curve, repair rates have been calculated by
applying the relevant material coefficient from Table 4.26 to the PILCA repair rates.
4.5.2.6 Conclusions
This study has used the observations from Christchurch to produce the empirical repair rate
functions for buried cables with respect to ground shaking and liquefaction-induced ground
deformation. As an empirical dataset, it is characterised by significant natural scatter and this is
captured by the inclusion of confidence intervals and uncertainty measurements on the
regression plots. Insulation material is a critical factor that influences cable damage as
demonstrated by the fact that repair rates in PILCA cables are considerably higher than those
observed in XLPE cables. Since there are insufficient damage data to derive specific repair rate
functions for materials other than PILCA, all IM analysis has been conducted for PILCA cables
and coefficients, derived from the overall repair rates, are proposed to modify the ‘base’ PILCA
functions for other materials. The analysis confirms that liquefaction is the main hazard
affecting buried cables, with very low repair rates observed in areas where no liquefaction
occurred and even this may be the result of misclassification. There is a poor correlation
between repair rate and PGV in this zone, whereas PDfV and PGDfGEOM show good correlations.
This suggests that subsurface liquefaction, which is not accounted for in the liquefaction zoning,
may be the primary driver here and that ground shaking alone has only minimal impact on
buried cables.
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PILCA – Zone C XLPE – Zone C
PILCA – Zone D XLPE – Zone D
Figure 4.35 – Example suite of fragility curves for PILCA and XLPE cables exposed to settlement only (top row)
and to lateral spread (bottom row) measured in terms of PGDf. (Note: legend is the same for all graphs)
Within the liquefaction zone it is notable that lateral spreading is considerably more damaging
than vertical settlement alone. In areas where lateral spreading was observed, PGDfH is the IM
that explains the most variance, but PGDfGEOM is only slightly lower in this regard but has
smaller uncertainty bounds and so may be considered to be more acceptable to some analysts. In
areas where only settlement was observed, PGDfGEOM is the best performing IM in terms of
variance explained. However theoretically PGDfGEOM cannot be calculated in a settlement-only
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zone and so it is advised to use the function with PGDfV instead, which has moderate
correlations and low uncertainty. When no distinction is made between settlement and lateral
spreading, the best performing model is predictably one of the composite IMs, PGDfGEOM. Other
factors such as conducting material and age have also been considered but there appears to be
no trend between repairs and increasing age, while the difference between the repair rates of
copper and aluminium cables is not statistically significant. This analysis confirms the findings
of Kwasinski et al. (2014) that conduction material should not affect vulnerability.
Although this analysis has been based on data that are characterised by scatter and moderate
correlations, they are the first of their kind and there are limited alternatives for addressing
buried cables in the literature. Therefore it is proposed to use the optimal functions derived in
Table 4.25 for PILCA cables in the seismic risk assessment model and the coefficients in Table
4.26 for other cable typologies. Since the proposed liquefaction triggering models in section
4.4.6.3 do not distinguish between settlement and lateral spreading, it is proposed to use the
function in Table 4.25 for zone B (all liquefaction) for liquefaction-induced damage, rather than
the individual functions for zones C (settlement) and D (lateral spreading). Also the function for
zone B fits the observed data better than the other functions in terms of variance explained (R2).
4.5.3 Well and pumping station fragility
Damage data for wells and pumping stations are only fully available for the Christchurch
earthquake. This dataset identifies which assets failed and which assets were damaged but
remained operational, giving two measurable damage states. Since the focus of this study is on
system connectivity, establishing fragility functions for complete failure is most critical. In the
Christchurch earthquake however, only five wells failed due to ground shaking and these
failures occurred across a very narrow range of intensities – 0.19-0.30 g – so developing new
fragility functions based solely on this data is of little value.
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4.5.3.1 Existing fragility function
Hazus (FEMA, 2015) is the only source for existing fragility functions for wells or pumping
stations and includes separate fragility functions for each. In Christchurch many of the wells are
attached to pumping stations (known as primary pumping stations). For this type of
arrangement, Hazus assumes that the fragility of the primary pumping station is implicit within
the fragility function of the associated well. Therefore for fragility analysis, only booster
pumping stations need to be considered and not primary pumping stations. Hazus fragility
functions have been developed based on empirical data from the United States and expert
judgment. For ground shaking damage, there are four fragility functions representing four
damage states: minor, moderate, extensive and complete. The definitions of each of these
damage states for wells, and the corresponding median and dispersion values are shown in
Table 4.30.
Table 4.30 – Damage state definitions for wells in the Hazus Technical Manual (FEMA, 2015)
Damage
state
Definition Median Dispersion
Minor Light damage to buildings 0.15 g 0.75
Moderate Considerable damage to mechanical/electrical equipment
or moderate damage to buildings
0.36 g 0.65
Extensive Building extensively damaged or well pump and vertical
shaft being badly distorted and non-functional
0.72 g 0.65
Complete Building collapsing 1.5 g 0.8
For pumping stations Hazus has different sets of fragility functions for different capacities and
also depending on whether the pumping stations have anchored sub-components. The geospatial
dataset acquired for booster pumping stations is incomplete in terms of capacity information.
Based on the information that does exist, and the fact that all booster pumping stations in
Christchurch serve relatively small populations, it is assumed that all stations are ‘small’ by the
Hazus definition (<10 million gallons per day). Billings and Charman (2011) state that booster
pumping stations performed well in the earthquakes because of earlier seismic upgrades.
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Therefore it is assumed that all booster pumping stations have anchored sub-components. The
definitions of the damage states for pumping stations, and the corresponding median and
dispersion values are shown in Table 4.31.
Table 4.31 – Damage state definitions for booster pumping stations in the Hazus Technical Manual (FEMA, 2015)
Damage
state
Definition Median Dispersion
Minor Light damage to buildings 0.15 g 0.7
Moderate Considerable damage to mechanical/electrical equipment
or moderate damage to buildings
0.36 g 0.65
Extensive Building extensively damaged or the pumps being badly
damaged beyond repair
0.66 g 0.65
Complete Building collapsing 1.5 g 0.8
For ground failure, Hazus considers the fragility of wells and pumping stations to be the same as
for buildings and substations. The parameters of the fragility functions are as described in
section 4.5.1. The procedure for testing the applicability of these functions to Christchurch is the
same as for the procedure used to test the applicability of substation fragility functions,
described in section 4.5.1. If the candidate fragility functions are not deemed suitable for
Christchurch, the next approach is to use a Bayesian updating procedure with one of the existing
fragility functions. The method for this is discussed in section 2.4.3.
4.5.3.2 Existing fragility function testing
The Hazus (FEMA, 2015) fragility functions for wells and pumping stations are tested by
predicting failure and damage probabilities based on observed PGAs from the Christchurch
earthquake and comparing these to the observed damage. Comparison with observations from
the Darfield earthquake is not possible since although the failed assets are known (Eidinger and
Tang, 2012), no information is provided with regard to which assets suffered damage but
remained operational. Based on data provided by the University of Canterbury, in conjunction
with observations reported by Eidinger and Tang (2012), the damage states are known for 124
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wells (out of 147) and for all 59 booster pumping stations. Some of these assets have been
damaged by liquefaction and so these observations have to be removed from the analysis of the
ground shaking fragility function. However, according to the Hazus methodology, ‘Minor’ or
‘Moderate’ damage (equivalent here to the ‘Damage only’ case) caused by liquefaction is
intended to be modelled implicitly in the ground shaking fragility function. Therefore only
assets that were observed to completely fail due to liquefaction are removed, leaving 113 wells
and 57 booster pumping stations. Hazus predictions are generated in the same way as for
substations, i.e. by grouping sites into PGA bins, although in this case the bin width is 0.1g. The
comparison of predictions with observations is shown in Table 4.32.
Table 4.32 – Comparison of damage predictions from Hazus fragility functions with observations from Christchurch
earthquake
Observed PGA
(g)
Wells Booster pumping stations
Failure Damage
only
No
damage
Failure Damage
only
No
damage
0-0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.11-0.2 0 1 1 0 0 0
0.21-0.3 1 25 10 0 0 0
0.31-0.4 4 22 4 0 3 0
0.41-0.5 4 14 1 5 13 0
0.51-0.6 2 3 1 7 12 0
0.61-0.7 9 11 0 6 7 0
0.71-0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.81-0.9 0 0 0 3 1 0
Total predicted 20 76 17 22 35 0
Total observed 5 86 22 2 22 33
The results show quite clearly that there is a significant over-prediction of failure and damage
by both fragility functions. For wells, a chi-squared test on the totals yields a p-value of 0.0009.
For the booster pumping stations, it is necessary to apply a Fisher’s exact test since one of the
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predicted values is less than 5, and the p-value is less than 1 x 10-14. This confirms that both
existing fragility functions are inadequate for Christchurch.
4.5.3.3 Bayesian updating
Since neither of the existing functions is adequate for Christchurch, it is proposed to apply
Bayesian analysis to estimate model parameters for new Christchurch-specific well pumping
station fragility functions. The method described in section 2.4.3 is adopted with the Hazus
parameters forming the prior knowledge, and observed data from the Christchurch earthquake
used. Table 4.33 summarises the new fragility function parameters obtained from this
procedure. Since a complete damage dataset is not available for the Darfield earthquake, an
independent validation of the model is not possible. However for information, the model
predictions for the Christchurch earthquake are shown in Table 4.34.
Table 4.33 – New parameters for well and pumping station fragility functions from Bayesian updating of Hazus
functions with observations from Christchurch earthquake
Fragility
function
Failure Damage
Median PGA Dispersion Median PGA Dispersion
Well Hazus 0.72 0.65 0.15 0.75
Updated 1.39 0.88 0.13 1.29
Pumping station Hazus 0.66 0.65 0.15 0.70
Updated 1.22 0.60 0.37 1.45
Table 4.34 – Comparison of existing and updated fragility function predictions with observations from Christchurch
earthquake
Model Wells Booster pumping stations
Failure Damage
only
No damage Failure Damage
only
No damage
Observed 5 86 22 2 22 33
Hazus 20 76 17 22 35 0
Updated 10 78 25 6 28 23
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4.5.4 Pipe fragility
There are numerous existing repair rate functions for pipes but since a large number of repairs
were observed across both earthquakes, new Christchurch-specific functions can be developed
based on the observed data. The advantage of a locally specific function is that it is able to
implicitly capture the effect of pipe attributes that are specific to the locality and are otherwise
immeasurable or unobservable, e.g. local construction method or local differences in material
production. Although local repair rate functions have been developed previously for
Christchurch by O’Rourke et al. (2014), in their analysis each pipe is treated as a single entity
with a single observed IM value. In this thesis, it is proposed to discretise the pipes into smaller
units and assign observed IM values at a higher resolution. The method for deriving the repair
rate functions is identical to the method used for deriving repair rate functions for cables. Based
on the data available, the only pipe attribute explicitly analysed is construction material.
Fragility functions are also determined for pipes in the same way as for cables but with one
difference. With pipes, the presence of a single repair does not automatically mean that the pipe
has failed in connectivity terms, since the repair could be the result of a leak, in which case the
pipe is still able to convey water. Consequently, whilst a fragility function for pipes would take
the same form as Eq. 4.68, it would predict probability of damage rather than probability of
failure.
4.5.4.1 Repair rate observations
Repair rate analysis is conducted for the four liquefaction zones summarised in Table 4.2. Table
4.35 summarises the observations in each zone for every pipe material and additionally
aggregated repair rates for all brittle materials and all ductile materials. Generally it is observed
that across all materials repair rates are considerably larger in liquefied zones than in zones
where ground shaking only was observed, and repair rates are also higher where lateral spread
occurred compared to where there was only settlement. In contrast to buried cables, the repair
rates in the ‘No liquefaction’ zone are sufficiently high to suggest that ground shaking does
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impact pipe vulnerability, which confirms the work of previous studies (Kakderi and
Argyroudis, 2014).
Table 4.35 – Observed water supply pipe repair data by liquefaction zone from both the Christchurch and Darfield
earthquakes
Material Zone A – No
liquefaction
Zone B -
Liquefaction
Zone C –
Liquefaction,
settlement only
Zone D –
Liquefaction, with
lateral spread
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AC 630 351 0.557 263 885 3.361 234 692 2.955 29 193 6.623
CI 118 102 0.865 84 232 2.750 75 149 1.977 9 83 9.212
CLDI 5 1 0.188 2 2 1.040 2 1 0.577 <1 1 5.246
CLS 23 9 0.393 29 58 2.002 25 35 1.417 4 23 5.388
DI 27 9 0.331 22 29 1.327 20 24 1.222 2 5 2.266
GALV 119 333 2.806 109 841 7.715 99 709 7.173 10 132 12.99
HDPE 541 263 0.486 371 419 1.130 339 332 0.979 32 87 2.761
MDPE80 244 45 0.185 144 109 0.756 123 57 0.464 21 52 2.432
MPVC 113 4 0.036 35 12 0.345 31 5 0.160 3 7 2.048
PVC 179 30 0.168 91 81 0.893 78 35 0.450 13 46 3.543
STEEL 21 13 0.608 15 38 2.531 14 34 2.478 1 4 3.095
Unknown 23 6 0.259 <1 2 4.845 <1 2 9.184 0 0 na
UPVC 66 6 0.090 20 9 0.459 18 7 0.388 2 2 1.274
Other 9 65 7.296 5 39 8.336 4 31 6.922 <1 8 39.98
Brittle 1224 826 0.675 605 2060 3.423 536 1597 2.982 66 463 6.985
Ductile 862 340 0.395 583 655 1.124 522 483 0.926 61 172 2.826
All 2118 1237 0.584 1189 2756 2.317 1062 2113 1.990 128 643 5.038
Repair rates are particularly high for galvanised iron (GALV) pipes and for ‘Other’ materials,
although in the latter case this is based on relatively short exposure. Other brittle materials such
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as asbestos cement (AC) and cast iron (CI) also exhibit high repair rates, whilst ductile materials
such as ordinary and modified polyvinyl chloride (PVC and MPVC) exhibit the lowest repair
rates. The summary at the bottom of Table 4.35 confirms that when aggregated, brittle materials
experienced higher repair rates than ductile materials.
4.5.4.2 Repair rate functions
Repair rate functions that predict mean repair rates in terms of IM are developed from the
observations by ordinary least squares regression. According to Kakderi and Argyroudis (2014),
a set of repair rate functions can be developed either to distinguish between each specific
material or to distinguish by material property (brittle or ductile). This analysis develops repair
rate functions for each combination of liquefaction zone and material (or material property).
Given the twelve identifiable construction materials and the two properties (brittle and ductile)
with the four zones, there are 56 potential repair rate functions. For each material/zone
combination, the same six IMs that were used for the cable repair rate analysis are tested: PGV,
PGDfV, PGDfH, PGDfMAX, PGDfVECT, PGDfGEOM. Since every combination is tested with both a
linear and power law relationship as a functional form, there are potentially a total of 672
regressions in this analysis. Many of these do not pass the screening criteria (O’Rourke et al.,
2012) described in section 4.5.2.1 for buried cables and therefore do not progress to the stage of
the regression being performed. However there are still a total of 328 regressions performed.
For conciseness, the full set of results are supplied in Appendix D, whilst this section focuses on
the derived repair rate functions that are deemed significant and therefore applicable to the final
model, which is defined here as a function with R2 > 0.7 and p-value < 0.05. In some cases, it is
possible to derive more than one significant repair rate function for a material/zone
combination. In this case the optimum repair rate function for that combination is the one with
the highest R2. Table 4.36 shows that only 15 of the material/zone combinations yield
significant repair rate functions. The optimum functions and corresponding observations are
plotted in Figure 4.36 to Figure 4.39.
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Table 4.36 – Significant pipe repair rate functions derived from Canterbury earthquake sequence observations
Zone Material Optimum function
Form IM R2 p-value
A AC Power PGV 0.713 0.004
A HDPE Power PGV 0.895 0.0001
A MDPE80 Linear PGV 0.813 0.036
A Brittle Power PGV 0.746 0.001
A Ductile Power PGV 0.900 1x10-5
B AC Power PGDfGEOM 0.807 0.0002
B CI Linear PGDfGEOM 0.897 0.001
B CLS Power PGDfH 0.777 0.048
B MDPE80 Power PGDfVECT 0.884 2x10-5
B PVC Linear PGDfH 0.771 0.021
B Ductile Linear PGDfGEOM 0.764 0.002
C AC Power PGDfGEOM 0.75 0.001
C CI Linear PGDfV 0.841 0.028
D AC Power PGDfH 0.877 0.0002
D MDPE80 Power PGDfGEOM 0.844 0.027
The liquefaction triggering model proposed in this case study (section 4.4.6.3) predicts the
occurrence of liquefaction but does not distinguish between liquefaction with settlement only or
liquefaction with settlement and lateral spread. Therefore only repair rate functions for zones A
and B can be applied in the seismic risk assessment. Only asbestos cement (AC), medium
density polyethylene (MDPE80) and the ductile material grouping yield significant repair rates
in both zones. In the simplified analysis network proposed for the seismic risk assessment (see
Table 4.6), AC is by far the most common material, making up 40% (109 km) of the total
network by length, so it is beneficial to have functions specific to this material.
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AC HDPE
MDPE80 Brittle
Ductile
Figure 4.36 – Plots of significant repair rate functions for pipes in Zone A (no liquefaction), including Poisson
confidence interval around each observation (error bars), best fit linear regression model (solid line) and confidence
interval around best fit (dashed line)
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AC CI
CLS MDPE80
PVC Ductile
Figure 4.37 – Plots of significant repair rate functions for pipes in Zone B (liquefaction), including Poisson
confidence interval around each observation (error bars), best fit linear regression model (solid line) and confidence
interval around best fit (dashed line)
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AC CI
Figure 4.38 – Plots of significant repair rate functions for pipes in Zone C (liquefaction with settlement only),
including Poisson confidence interval around each observation (error bars), best fit linear regression model (solid
line) and confidence interval around best fit (dashed line)
AC MDPE80
Figure 4.39 – Plots of significant repair rate functions for pipes in Zone D (liquefaction with lateral spread),
including Poisson confidence interval around each observation (error bars), best fit linear regression model (solid
line) and confidence interval around best fit (dashed line)
In contrast, there is less than 1 km of MDPE80 pipes in the simplified network and so this is of
limited value for this particular case study, although may be useful in future studies that take
account of the lower hierarchical levels in the Christchurch water supply system. There are
significant repair rate functions for high density polyethylene (HDPE) and the brittle material
grouping in Zone A and for cast iron (CI), cement-lined steel (CLS) and polyvinyl chloride
(PVC) in Zone B. Given the quality of the derived repair rate functions for the most common
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pipe material, (i.e. asbestos cement), it is proposed in this case study to apply repair rate
functions by material rather than by material property. For other materials that do not yield
significant repair rate functions, it is proposed to adopt the same approach as for buried cables.
By identifying a base model and applying coefficients to the base model, specific functions for
each material are created, using the data in Table 4.35. Taking the AC pipe repair rate functions
as a base model, then the coefficients for alternative materials can be defined as the ratio of the
repair rate in the alternative material to the repair rate in AC pipes, not accounting for IM.
Therefore to estimate the repair rate for these materials, one can calculate the repair rate for AC
pipes first and then multiply by the corresponding coefficient. The coefficients for each
alternative material, divided by zone, are shown in Table 4.37. For reference, coefficients for
the brittle and ductile material properties are also included in Table 4.37.
Table 4.37 – Proposed coefficients for alternative pipe materials to be applied to base AC repair rate functions
Material Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone D
CI 1.55 0.82 0.67 1.39
CLDI 0.34 0.31 0.20 0.79
CLS 0.71 0.60 0.48 0.81
DI 0.59 0.39 0.41 0.34
GALV 5.03 2.30 2.43 1.96
HDPE 0.87 0.34 0.33 0.42
MDPE80 0.33 0.23 0.16 0.37
MPVC 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.31
PVC 0.30 0.27 0.15 0.53
STEEL 1.09 0.75 0.84 0.47
Unknown 0.47 1.44 3.11 0.00
UPVC 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.19
Other 13.09 2.48 2.34 6.04
Brittle 1.21 1.02 1.05 1.01
Ductile 0.71 0.33 0.43 0.31
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4.5.4.3 Fragility curves
Since the probability of a pipe being damaged depends on length as well as IM, one way to
visualise this metric is by plotting a suite of curves on the same axes for different pipe lengths.
Examples of pipe fragility curve suites are shown in Figure 4.40, which plots the failure
probability of different lengths of AC pipe in each of the four zones, assuming the optimum
repair rate functions defined in Figure 4.36 to Figure 4.39.
AC – Zone A AC – Zone B
AC – Zone C AC – Zone D
Figure 4.40 – Example suite of fragility curves for AC pipes exposed to different liquefaction zones
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4.5.5 Node vulnerability to liquefaction
4.5.5.1 Existing fragility functions
The Hazus (FEMA, 2015) fragility functions for liquefaction-induced failure to nodes are tested
by predicting failure probabilities based on observed values of PGDfV and PGDfH and
comparing these to the observed damage states. It is noted that the Hazus fragility function only
accounts for ‘Extensive’ and ‘Complete’ damage states (equivalent to failure in this study),
since liquefaction-induced damage is assumed to be implicit in the relevant ground shaking
fragility function for each asset. When multiple earthquakes occur in sequence, measurements
of ground shaking are independent from one earthquake to the next, but measurements of
ground deformation are cumulative and hence the observations from each event cannot be
treated separately. For each ground deformation metric, there is a single dataset in which an
asset appears only once. If an asset failed due to liquefaction in the Darfield earthquake, then the
corresponding observed ground deformation metric for that asset is the observation from the
Darfield earthquake. Otherwise the observed ground deformation metric is the cumulative
deformation across both the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes. Only assets exposed to
liquefaction in either of the two earthquakes are included in the dataset. This is determined from
the observed land damage categories reported by van Ballegooy et al. (2014, see Table 4.2). The
cause of asset failures (i.e. liquefaction or ground shaking) is determined from reporting by
Eidinger and Tang (2012).
For vertical settlement (PGDfV), there are 61 asset observations (45 wells and 16 substations)
but for lateral spread (PGDfH) there are only observations from five wells. The lack of
observations for pumping stations is as expected since these predominantly serve communities
in the Port Hills area, which is built on rocky ground. Table 4.38 shows the predictions from the
Hazus fragility functions based on PGDf bin widths of 0.1 m. The results show that the Hazus
functions over-predict failure due to vertical settlement and under-predict failure due to lateral
spread. A chi-squared test applied to the totals for vertical settlement yields a p-value less than
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1x10-4, whilst a Fisher’s exact test applied to the totals for lateral spread yields a p-value of
0.167, although this needs to be interpreted with caution given the very small sample size.
Table 4.38 – Comparison of failure predictions from Hazus fragility functions with cumulative observations from
Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes
Observed
PGDf (m)
Hazus Predictions
Vertical settlement Lateral spread
Failure No failure Failure No failure
0-0.1 3 27 0 0
0.1-0.2 5 10 0 1
0.2-0.3 3 3 0 2
0.3-0.4 4 2 0 0
0.4-0.5 3 1 0 0
0.5-0.6 0 0 0 1
0.6-0.7 0 0 0 0
0.7-0.8 0 0 0 0
0.8-0.9 0 0 0 0
0.9-1.0 0 0 0 1
Total predicted 18 43 0 5
Total observed 5 56 3 2
4.5.5.2 Bayesian updating
Since the existing function for vertical settlement is inadequate for Christchurch, it is proposed
to apply Bayesian analysis to estimate model parameters for new Christchurch-specific
function. The method described in section 2.4.3 is used with the Hazus parameters taken as the
prior knowledge and observed cumulative data from the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes.
Although the p-value for the lateral spread model suggest that the existing Hazus function may
be acceptable for application in Christchurch, it is proposed to update the function with the
observed data anyway so that it is more specific to Christchurch. Table 4.39 summarises the
new fragility function parameters obtained from this procedure and the corresponding
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predictions, although since the test and training datasets are the same, this is presented only for
information, not validation. It is noted that whilst the Bayesian updating procedure has
significantly reduced the median value for the lateral spread function (from 1.52 m), this has not
been sufficient to alter the predictions.
Table 4.39 – New parameters for liquefaction fragility functions from Bayesian updating of Hazus functions with
corresponding predictions
Model Median PGDf Dispersion Predicted Observed
Failure No failure Failure No failure
Vertical settlement 0.48 1.18 9 52 5 56
Lateral spread 1.03 1.54 0 5 3 2
4.6 Step 5 – Damage assignment
The first step in damage assignment is the application of fragility or repair rate functions to
determine the failure probabilities of the asset with respect to each earthquake hazard (ground
shaking and liquefaction). To apply the fragility function, the relevant IM and ground
deformation values must be assigned to the asset. For nodes, i.e. substations, wells and pumping
stations, values are assigned to an asset corresponding to the analysis grid cell (see Figure 4.16)
in which it the asset located. The relevant fragility functions for each hazard are applied to
estimate the failure probabilities. For linear assets, i.e. buried cables and pipes, damage
assignment is less straightforward. Since linear assets can cross cells, in some cases it is
possible to attribute multiple values of intensity to each individual asset. As discussed in section
4.5.2, it is preferable in these cases to discretise the asset according to hazard intensity rather
than assigning a single value. Consequently cables and pipes with this situation are divided at
cell borders and the corresponding hazard intensity is assigned to each section. The relevant
repair rate function is applied to estimate the mean repair rate for each section, RRMEAN, and this
is converted to a failure probability by applying Eq. 4.69. For an asset made up of j sections, the
failure or damage probability for the asset as a whole is given by Eq. 4.70.
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The application of a fragility function to an asset only evaluates the failure probability with
respect to a single earthquake hazard. However, in events where there is more than one
earthquake hazard, e.g. due to liquefaction, the overall failure probability of the asset must
account for the failure probability due to all hazards. For all assets, the method for damage
assignment proposed by Hazus (FEMA, 2015) is adopted. The overall failure probability for an
asset is given by Eq. 4.71
1P fail P no fail        (4.71)
Two earthquake hazards are considered in this case study, each triggering ground shaking and
liquefaction. In the Hazus method, failure due to ground shaking and failure due to liquefaction
are assumed to be independent. Therefore, the probability that the asset will not fail is the
product of the individual probabilities that the asset will not fail due to each hazard, as shown in
Eq. 4.72.
1 | |P fail P no fail PGA P no fail PGDf             (4.72)
However, there are two types of liquefaction hazard – vertical settlement and lateral spreading –
and as summarised in section 4.5, the method for predicting liquefaction-induced failure
probabilities varies by asset. In some cases, liquefaction-induced failure probabilities are
predicted separately for vertical settlement and lateral spreading, e.g. substations, wells,
pumping stations and some pipe typologies. In other cases, a single liquefaction-induced failure
probability is predicted based on a composite IM such as PGDfGEOM, e.g. buried cables and
some pipe typologies. For assets that are assessed in terms of a single failure probability, the
overall failure probability is given by Eq. 4.72. For assets that are assessed in terms of separate
failure probabilities, Hazus proposes that the maximum of the failure probabilities is used as the
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liquefaction-induced failure probability, as shown by Eq. 4.73. The rationale is that the different
liquefaction hazards do not represent independent failure modes and so cannot be multiplied
together, (which would overestimate the overall failure probability). Eq. 4.73 can be rewritten in
terms of failure probabilities as in Eq. 4.74.
 1 | min | ; |V HP fail P no fail PGA P no fail PGDf P no fail PGDf               (4.73)
    1 1 | 1 max | ; |V HP fail P fail PGA P fail PGDf P fail PGDf                 (4.74)
The functionality of each asset is then assigned by randomly sampling from a uniform
distribution between 0 and 1, and comparing the sampled variate to the failure probability. The
asset is assumed to have failed if the variate is less than or equal to the failure probability, and is
assumed to have survived otherwise. In the specific case of pipes, this method only determines
whether a pipe is damaged, not whether it has failed. Therefore an additional step is needed to
determine the type of damage. The assumptions of Hazus (FEMA, 2015) are adopted here. This
assumes that in the presence of liquefaction, 80% of damage to pipes are breaks and 20% are
leaks, with the percentages reversed in the absence of liquefaction. So for each damaged pipe,
another uniform random variable is sampled between 0 and 1. If the variate is greater than 0.8,
the damage is assumed to be a leak if the pipe experiences liquefaction or a break if the pipe
does not experience liquefaction. If damage is classified as a break, then the pipe is assumed to
have failed. If the damage is classified as a leak, then the pipe is assumed to be functional.
4.7 Step 6 – System performance
4.7.1 Electric power network
The proposed performance metric for the electric power network is the proportion of the
population disconnected from the network, as discussed in section 3.2.3. Since only the sub-
transmission network is analysed, the demand nodes, i.e. the downstream points at which
system performance is measured, are the district/zone substations. The functionality of each
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district/zone substation is determined by its physical damage state, as assigned by the method
described in section 4.6, and whether there is an undamaged path between it and an operational
source node, i.e. a Transpower GXP. To measure system performance it is necessary to know
the population served by each district/zone substation. Orion have provided a map visualising
the approximate current service area of each district/zone substation as shown in Figure 4.41.
Figure 4.41 – Map of Orion district/zone substation supply areas
To use the service area map for the pre-earthquake network, some assumptions are made. The
Papanui substation replaced the Harris substation after the earthquake and so it is assumed that
the pre-earthquake service area for the Harris substation is the same as the current Papanui
service area. The Rawhiti substation replaced the Brighton and Pages substations after the
earthquake. It can be seen in Figure 4.8 that the Brighton and Pages substations are very close to
each other in latitude. So for simplicity, the Rawhiti service area is divided by a horizontal line
between the two substations and it is assumed that the area to the north is supplied by the
Brighton substation and the area to the south is supplied by the Pages substation.
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The population served within each supply area is determined using night time population data
from the 2006 Census for model validation, and from the 2013 Census for future risk projection
(Statistics New Zealand, 2014a). The total population in the study area is 328,814. Meshblocks
are the smallest geographic unit for which statistical data are collected in New Zealand and
there are 3,352 in the study area. Analysis is conducted on the grids shown in Figure 4.16. On
the periphery of the grids, there some meshblocks that are only partially within the gridded area.
In these cases only the part of a meshblock that is within the gridded area is analysed and so the
population of the meshblock is reduced in proportion to the area of the meshblock that is within
the gridded area. This affects 735 meshblocks.
The largest meshblock has a population of 963 and they have an average population of 98. It is
assumed that a meshblock is supplied by a particular substation if the centroid of the meshblock
falls within the supply area of that substation. In some locations, especially around the city
centre, the supply areas overlap, meaning that some meshblocks can be supplied by more than
one substation. After an earthquake, it is assumed that the entire population of a meshblock is
connected to the power network if at least one of its supply substations remains operational. The
overall system performance, SPEPN, is then determined by Eq. 4.75, where Popi is the population
of meshblock i and w(i,EPN) is a weight assigned to each meshblock, which equals 0 if the
meshblock is connected to an operational substation and 1 otherwise.
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4.7.2 Water supply system
The proposed performance metric for the water supply system is the proportion of the
population disconnected from the network, as discussed in section 3.2.3. The system
performance SP'WSS is given by Eq. 4.76, where Popi is the population of meshblock i and
w'(i,WSS) is a weight assigned to each meshblock, which equals 0 if the meshblock is connected to
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the water supply system and 1 otherwise. A prime symbol is included in the notation for this
metric and the weights. This is to signify that this is an initial system performance value
calculated before interdependencies have been accounted for.
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The method for determining whether a meshblock is connected to the water supply system is
different to the case of electric power network. The use of a simplified network means that only
major pipes and associated nodes are included in the analysis. Therefore, the only obvious
demand nodes in this simplified network described in section 4.2.2 are the 41 booster pumping
station sites. There are no defined service areas for these assets so they must be determined
manually. The extent of the supply area of each booster pumping station is determined visually
by overlaying the pipes shapefile onto the map of meshblocks and satellite imagery for the
elevated parts of the city. Two methods are then used to assign each meshblock to the supply
area of a pumping station. If a meshblock contains a pipe that is downstream of a pumping
station, then it is assumed to be part of the supply area of that pump. If a meshblock does not
contain a pipe that is downstream of a booster pumping station, but is in a part of the city that is
expected to receive water by pumping (e.g. the south and southeast due to the Port Hills), then
based on the assumption that pipes are generally constructed along roads, the satellite imagery is
examined to determine which booster pumping station is the most likely source for that
community.
However, most of Christchurch is not served by booster pumps and so to represent these areas,
demand nodes must be manually created. Creating a demand node at the end of every pipe
would lead to a very large number of demand nodes, including some that are very close
together. Not only does this increase computation time, it also leads to some meshblocks
containing more than one demand node and so assumptions would have to be made regarding
how populations are assigned to each one. It is proposed to create demand nodes at less regular
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intervals along the pipe network. Initially demand nodes are created at all simplified network
endpoints and also at all junctions where paths from two different wells meet. Then, to increase
the resolution of the analysis, additional demand nodes are located subjectively at intermediate
pipe junctions based on factors including population density and meshblock size. This is done to
ensure that there are more demand nodes in densely developed areas and that no meshblock
contains more than one demand node. A total of 299 manually assigned demand nodes, referred
to as sinks, are created in addition to the 41 booster pumping station sites, as shown in Figure
4.42. The average separation distance of the manual demand nodes is 571m.
Figure 4.42 – Map showing location of nodes in water system performance analysis, including wells (primary
pumping stations), booster pumping station sites and demand sinks
Each meshblock is assigned to either a booster pumping station, if the meshblock falls within its
supply area, or otherwise it is assigned to the closest sink. Each meshblock is only assigned to a
single sink. The entire population of a meshblock is deemed to be connected to the water
network if there is an undamaged path to its assigned sink node from any operational well
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within its pressure zone. Where a meshblock is assigned to a booster pumping station sink node,
the pump must also itself be operational.
4.7.3 Interdependency simulation
In addition to calculating the performance of each system independently, the interdependent
performance of the water supply system must be calculated as this represents its true
performance. The choice of interdependency model is dependent on the type of data available.
For this case study there is sufficient information to link assets across systems, and so an
integrated model is proposed in the form of a nodal analysis, as described in section 2.6.2. The
interdependency between the two systems exists because pumping stations rely on electric
power. This includes booster pumping stations and wells, since they are attached to primary
pumping stations. Two methods are proposed for linking the two assets: supply relationship and
geographical proximity.
Each pumping station is located in a specific meshblock, and each meshblock is assigned to one
or more district/zone substations. In this way it is possible to determine a supply relationship
between each pumping station and the district/zone substations. This method allows for
pumping stations to be connected to more than one substation and so accounts for redundancy in
power supply. An alternative method, adopted in some other studies (e.g. Pitilakis et al., 2014a),
is to assign each dependent asset (i.e. pumping station) to its closest supporting asset (i.e.
substation). This is a simplification that does not account for redundancy and so may potentially
be conservative. Both methods are tested in this study to assess the validity of the geographical
proximity assumption.
For both methods, if a district/zone substation is designated as failed, then this failure is
propagated across the identified interdependency links to downstream dependent assets. A
specific pumping station (and corresponding well if applicable) is designated as failed if all of
its supply substations have failed and it does not have a back-up power supply. The final
interdependent performance of the water supply system, SPWSS, is then calculated for each
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linkage method, by re-applying Eq. 4.76 with a new set of weights, w(i,WSS), that account for the
new operational states.
4.8 Model validation
The Christchurch seismic risk assessment model is initially tested against observations from the
Christchurch earthquake. As discussed in Chapter 1, this serves both as an example of model
application for scenario events (for either rapid assessment or regulatory purposes) and in a
limited capacity as a model validation exercise. It is also proposed to use the model validation to
test three aspects of the model methodology: the analysis grid resolution, which is either 1 km
or 500 m as in Figure 4.16; the choice of liquefaction triggering model, which is either model
LPI1 (LPI based on shear-wave velocity profile) or LPI3b (LPI based on simulated shear-wave
velocity profile) as discussed in section 4.4.6; and the application of interdependency to the
water supply system (either by substation zone or by substation proximity) as discussed in
section 2.6.2. This means that eight different versions of the Christchurch model are tested in
the validation exercise, as shown in Table 4.40. Since the method chosen for applying
interdependency only affects water supply system performance, the ‘a’ and ‘b’ versions of each
method produce identical results for the electric power network.
Table 4.40 – Versions of Christchurch model to be validated against observations from Christchurch earthquake
Model Grid resolution Liquefaction triggering model Interdependency
Version 1a 1km LPI1 Substation zone
Version 1b 1km LPI1 Substation proximity
Version 2a 500m LPI1 Substation zone
Version 2b 500m LPI1 Substation proximity
Version 3a 1km LPI3b Substation zone
Version 3b 1km LPI3b Substation proximity
Version 4a 500m LPI3b Substation zone
Version 4b 500m LPI3b Substation proximity
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The GMPE adopted in the model has already been validated against the Christchurch
earthquake (Bradley, 2013). Therefore the observed PGA map (Figure 4.1), produced from that
GMPE (Bradley, 2013) is used as input for the validation, along with the corresponding PGV
ShakeMap (Figure 4.2). In the case of PGA, the map produced for the New Zealand
Geotechnical Database by Bradley and Hughes (2012) does not quite fill the extent of the
proposed analysis grids. In the 1 km grid, 34 of the 294 grid locations do not have a PGA value
and in the 500 m grid, 77 of the 1,007 grid locations do not have a PGA value. The majority of
the affected grid locations are in the Port Hills area to the south of the city. USGS ShakeMap
PGA observations are available across the entire grid area (USGS, 2015b) and could be used as
an alternative. However, there are significant discrepancies between the NZGD and USGS
datasets. When comparing PGA observations at grid locations for which both data sources are
available, USGS observations are on average over 30% larger and so the two cannot simply be
used interchangeably. It is assumed here that the NZGD dataset is more reliable since it has
been produced locally and the specific methodology used to develop the maps, including local
strong motion station records and locally specific ground motion prediction equation and spatial
correlation model for interpolation, has been described in detail by Bradley and Hughes (2012).
Conversely, there is more limited information available on the production of the ShakeMap for
the Christchurch earthquake (USGS, 2015b). It is proposed therefore to use the NZGD PGA
maps but to supplement this with USGS data at locations outside the NZGD map extents. Since
the USGS data appear to overestimate PGA, it is proposed to use the data at locations where
both NZGD and USGS data are available to develop predictive relationships between the two
datasets so that a ‘NZGD equivalent’ value of PGA can be estimated from the USGS value.
Figure 4.43 shows plots of the corresponding PGA values from each dataset, separately for the 1
km grid and the 500 m grid. Both cases show a general linear trend and ordinary least squares
regression is used to derive a linear predictive function. Since both cases yield high coefficients
of determination (R2) and p-values confirm that the functions are statistically significant at the
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5% level, it is reasonable to use these functions to simulate ‘NZGD equivalent’ PGAs at the
non-mapped grid locations.
1km grid 500m grid
Figure 4.43 – Linear relationships linking PGA observations from NZGD dataset to PGA observations from USGS
dataset
In order to account for uncertainties in individual model components, the model is run 1,000
times in a Monte Carlo simulation with re-sampled random variables. Sources of uncertainty
include, ground motion prediction, prediction of liquefaction-induced permanent ground
deformations and the application of fragility and repair rate functions to assets, all of which
require an element of random sampling. With respect to PGA, the uncertainty is small and has
been quantified by Bradley (2013) as part of the GMPE validation. The uncertainty is assumed
to be the same across the affected area and since the same PGA and PGV inputs are used for all
simulations, the effects of uncertainty from other model components can be more closely
investigated without being masked by the influence of uncertainty from ground motion. The
following sections present the results of the Monte Carlo simulation and a geospatial validation
of the results.
4.8.1 Simulation results
Figure 4.44 to Figure 4.46 show histograms of the system performance results obtained when
each version of the model listed in Table 4.40 is run. The performance of the system is
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measured as the percentage of the study area population disconnected from the system, (rounded
to the nearest 1%). The histogram displays the distribution of results across the 1,000
simulations for each version of the model. In addition, the observed performances are displayed
on each plot, (71% for the electric power network and 80% for the water supply network as
summarised in section 3.2), as well as the mean value from all simulations.
Figure 4.44 shows the results for the electric power network. It can be seen that all versions of
the model generate performance distributions that are predominantly better than observed (i.e.
fewer customers disconnected) but versions 3 and 4 produce results closer to those observed
than versions 1 and 2. Model version 1 only produces nine simulations out of 1,000 with worse
performance than observed, i.e. if version 1 is assumed to be applicable, the probability of the
system performing at least as badly as was observed is just 0.013, indicating that this model
version has very low applicability to Christchurch. Version 2 can be considered not to be
applicable at all since no simulations produced a performance as extreme as the observed value.
For version 3, the probability of a performance equalling or exceeding the observed value or
worse is 0.223 and for version 4 this figure is 0.180. Although these probabilities are relatively
low, they show that the model could plausibly simulate scenarios similar to the Christchurch
earthquake. In both cases, the observed performance is within one standard deviation of the
mean model prediction. For version 3, the absolute error is 5.3%, which is equivalent to a
relative error of 7.5% (relative to the observed performance). This compares favourably to
previous studies that have attempted to validate infrastructure system performance model with
real natural hazard events (Wang and O’Rourke, 2006; Javanbarg and Takada, 2009; Winkler et
al., 2010; Nateghi et al., 2011). Thus versions 3 and 4 are deemed applicable for the case of the
Christchurch electric power network. Versions 1 and 2 use model LPI1 for liquefaction
triggering while versions 3 and 4 use model LPI3b. Although the analysis in section 4.4.6 shows
that both of these models have a similar predictive capability, it is possible that there is a
geographic bias in each model such that LPI1 is poorer at predicting liquefaction occurrence in
264
areas that are more densely populated and contain a higher concentration of network assets, and
hence under-predicts the damage to, and performance of, the system.
Version 1 Version 2
Version 3 Version 4
Figure 4.44 – Results of electric power network performance from model runs with observed Christchurch
earthquake ground motion
Figure 4.45 shows the results for the water supply system with interdependency applied by
substation zone analysis. A notable observation is that the range of the results is much narrower
and more symmetrical than for the electric power network. This is because there are
significantly more demand nodes in the water supply system than in the electric power network
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and so the analysis is at a higher resolution in population terms. In the electric power network
there are 30 demand nodes and so on average each demand node serves 3.33% of the
population. Therefore for two simulations, in which the only difference is the operational state
of one demand node, the average change in performance is 3.33%. In the water supply system
there are 340 demand nodes and so the corresponding average change in performance would be
0.29%.
Version 1a Version 2a
Version 3a Version 4a
Figure 4.45 – Results of water supply system performance (with interdependency by zone) from model runs with
observed Christchurch earthquake ground motion
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It can be seen that, as was the case with the electric power network, versions 3a and 4a produce
results closer to those observed than versions 1a and 2a, although in this case the results for
versions 3a and 4a are mainly worse than observed. For model version 1a, the histogram shows
that the probability of a performance at least as poor as observed is just 0.005. For version 2a
there are no simulations that are as extreme as the observed value. For version 3a, the
probability of a performance better than or equal to observed value is 0.132 and for version 4
this figure is 0.248. As with the electric power network, these versions of the model imply that
the Christchurch earthquake and its consequences on the water system are rare events but ones
that can be plausibly simulated. The observation is within one standard deviation of the mean
prediction from version 4a, but is 1.26 times the standard deviation away from the mean
prediction from version 3a. However, the relative error of the mean predictions are 4.8% for
version 3a and 3.2% for version 4a, both of which compare favourably to previous studies
(Wang and O’Rourke, 2006; Javanbarg and Takada, 2009; Winkler et al., 2010; Nateghi et al.,
2011). This validates versions 3a and 4a for application to the Christchurch water supply
system, whilst versions 1a and 2a can be discarded.
Figure 4.46 shows the results for the water supply system with interdependency applied by
substation proximity. It can be seen that in this case, versions 1b and 2b produce results closer
to those observed than versions 3b and 4b. The results for versions 1b and 2b show that they
mainly predict performances better than observed. Instead, versions 3b and 4b result in
predictions that are mainly worse than observed. For model version 1b, the histogram shows
that the probability of a performance at least as poor as observed is 0.121 and for version 2b this
figure is 0.21. For version 3b, the probability of a performance better than or equal to the
observed value is 0.007 and for version 4b this figure is 0.008. The observation is within one
standard deviation of the mean prediction from version 2b, but is 1.29 times the standard
deviation away from the mean prediction from version 1b. However, the relative error of the
mean predictions are 5.1% for version 1b and 3.9% for version 4b, both of which compare
favourably to previous studies (Wang and O’Rourke, 2006; Javanbarg and Takada, 2009;
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Winkler et al., 2010; Nateghi et al., 2011). This validates versions 1b and 2b for application in
Christchurch for the water supply system, whilst versions 3b and 4b can be discarded.
Version 1b Version 2b
Version 3b Version 4b
Figure 4.46 – Results of water supply system performance (with interdependency by proximity) from model runs
with observed Christchurch earthquake ground motion
Three model parameters have been tested in the validation exercise: interdependency
methodology, liquefaction triggering model, and analysis grid resolution. The relative
performance of the two interdependency methodologies is considered by comparing the ‘a’
versions of the model (interdependency by substation zone analysis) to the corresponding ‘b’
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version (interdependency by proximity). It is noted that in each case, performances are on
average worse when interdependency is analysed by proximity. This result is anticipated since
when interdependency is analysed by proximity, redundancy is not taken into account. When
interdependency is analysed by substation zones, each pumping station (both primary and
booster) can receive power from one or more substations as per the network topology. The
pumping stations are therefore more resilient since even if one substation fails, the pumping
station may still be able to function, thus improving the overall system performance. Conversely
when interdependency is analysed by proximity, each pumping station is assigned to a single
substation. If that substation fails, the pumping station also fails, and so overall system
performances are worse. In general one might expect that because it does not account for the
real-world redundancy, the proximity method would always over-predict damage but it is noted
that in versions 1b and 2b, the simulation predictions are generally better than observed. Both of
these versions use liquefaction triggering model LPI1 and so there is an implication that LPI1
may under-predict damage. At this point the choice between the two methods is inconclusive
since there are validated model versions using both the substation zone method (3a and 4a) and
the proximity method (1b and 2b).
To consider the relative impacts of the alternative liquefaction triggering models, the remaining
parameters must be kept constant so version 1 is compared to version 3 and version 2 is
compared to version 4. In all cases the model versions with liquefaction triggering model LPI3b
(i.e. model versions 3 and 4) on average simulate worse performances than the corresponding
model versions with liquefaction triggering model LPI1 (i.e. model versions 1 and 2). This
supports the notion that model LPI1 under-predicts damage. Although the analysis in section 4.2
shows that overall both models have a similar predictive capability, it is possible that there is a
geographic bias in each model such that LPI1 is poorer at predicting liquefaction occurrence in
areas that are more densely populated and contain a higher concentration of network assets, and
hence predict lower levels of damage and better performance of the systems. This is discussed
further in section 4.8.2. For the electric power network it is evident that model versions that use
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LPI3b produce results closer to the observed performance. It is essential that the final model is
valid for both the electric power network and water supply system and therefore the final model
must be either version 3 or version 4. Since versions 3a and 4a have been shown to be valid, but
not versions 3b and 4b, then the final model must be an ‘a’ model, i.e. it must use the substation
zone method for interdependency.
Grid resolution is considered by comparing model version 3a (1 km) to version 4a (500 m). For
both the electric power network and water supply system, predicted performances are more
conservative (i.e. higher proportion of disconnections) when the 1 km grid model is used. In the
case of the electric power network, the consequence is that the mean prediction is closer to the
observed performance when the 1km grid is used. Instead, for the water supply system, the
mean prediction is closer to the observed performance when the 500 m grid is used. Intuitively
one would expect a higher grid resolution to enhance the predictive power for a model. The fact
that this is not the case for the electric power network, coupled with the fact that the 1 km grid
model still provides reasonable, albeit slightly more conservative, predictions for the water
supply system, brings into question whether the additional work and time associated with the
500 m grid is worthwhile. For the 1,000 simulations in this validation exercise, the 1 km grid
model had an average run time of 15.3 seconds per event and the 500 m grid had an average run
time of 23.5 seconds per event, more than 50% longer, (on a Windows PC with 2 GB of RAM
and a 2.5 GHz processor). If this is extrapolated to a full 10,000 year seismic risk assessment
with a rate of 1.45 events per year (see section 4.3.2), then this corresponds to a run time of
around 62 hours for the 1 km grid and around 94.5 hours for the 500 m grid. On balance, the
benefits of using the higher resolution grid are inconclusive and when set against the additional
time costs incurred, there is little evidence to support the adoption of the 500 m grid. Therefore,
the 1 km grid, i.e. version 3a, is adopted for the final model. This is in line with the analysis
resolution adopted by Hazus (Neighbors et al., 2013), SYNER-G (Pitilakis et al., 2014a) and
RiskScape (NIWA, 2015).
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4.8.2 Geospatial validation
In addition to checking how well the proposed final model (version 3a) predicts overall
performance, it is also instructive to compare how well the model predicts the spatial
distribution of performance across the city. For the electric power network this is relatively
straightforward since the observed functionality (i.e. operational or failed) for each meshblock
can be deduced by overlaying the meshblocks onto the observed outage map in Figure 4.9. A
meshblock is then assumed to have failed if its centroid is within the mapped outage area.
Cross-referencing with the outage map identifies that 2,402 meshblocks lost electric power
supply and 950 remained connected following the Christchurch earthquake. To compare this
spatially with the model predictions, contingency table analysis is applied in the same manner as
for the validation of liquefaction triggering models in section 4.4.6. For each meshblock there
are 1,000 models simulations of the electric power network functionality. The average model
prediction for that meshblock is simply the binary state (operational or failed) that is predicted
most frequently in the simulations. For the purposes of this validation, a positive prediction is
defined as the average model prediction of the meshblock being operational and therefore, in
terms of a contingency table analysis, this is equivalent to a predictive model for the operability
of a meshblock with a threshold of 500. Table 4.41 summarises the contingency table data
comparing the average model predictions for each meshblock to the observed state and the
corresponding diagnostic scores: true positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives (FP),
false negatives (FN), true positive rate (TPR, the ratio of true positive predictions to observed
positives), true negative rate (TNR, the ratio of true negative predictions to observed negatives),
false positive rate (FPR, the ratio of false positive predictions to true negatives) and false
negative rate (FNR, ratio of false negatives to true positives). In total the model correctly
predicts the functionality at 2,393 meshblocks (71%). A good model is represented by high
scores (>0.5) for TPR and TNR and low scores (<0.5) for FPR and FNR. Table 4.41 shows that
these conditions are met by the model and therefore it can be concluded that model satisfactorily
replicates the geospatial distribution of electric power network functionality across meshblocks.
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Table 4.41 – Contingency table results and diagnostic score for average model prediction for electric power network
functionality
TP TN FP FN TPR TNR FPR FNR
503 1890 512 447 0.529 0.787 0.213 0.471
For the water supply system a geospatial validation of functionality is not possible since there is
no information on how observed system outages were distributed across the city. As an
alternative it is proposed to assess the geospatial validity of the model by comparing the
predicted and observed proportions of pipe repairs in each of the pressure zones (Figure 4.13) in
the city in a chi-square goodness of fit test (Hines et al., 2003). The input data for the chi-square
test are shown in Table 4.42.
Table 4.42 – Observed and predicted distribution of pipe repairs across pressure zones
Zone Expected proportion Expected frequency Observed frequency
Central 76% 149 152
North West 7% 13 10
West 3% 7 8
Riccarton 1% 2 5
Rocky Point 9% 18 15
Parklands 4% 7 6
Total 196 196
The expected proportions of pipe repairs in each zone are taken as the mean value from the
1,000 model simulations. To enable direct comparison between model predictions and
observations, only the simplified pipe network, identified in section 4.2.2, is used in the
comparison. A total of 196 repairs were observed in this part of the network after the
Christchurch earthquake. The null hypothesis of the chi-square test is that the proportions of
repairs in each zone are as expected from the model simulations and the alternative hypothesis
is that at least one of the proportions is different. The dataset has five degrees of freedom and a
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significance level of 0.05 is used for the analysis. Based on the observed and expected
frequencies, the chi-square test statistic is calculated to be 6.04. The p-value is the probability of
the chi-square test statistic having five degrees of freedom being more extreme than 6.04 and is
calculated to be 0.30. Therefore at the 0.05 significance level, the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected and one can conclude that the observed proportions are in line with the model
predictions. The model is therefore geospatially validated for damage to the water supply
system.
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5. Results
5.1 Seismic risk assessment
The final validated seismic risk assessment model, (i.e. version 3a with 1km grid, liquefaction
triggering model LPI3b and zonal interdependency analysis) is applied to the current (2014)
electric power and water supply systems in Christchurch to assess the future risk to the city.
5.1.1 Hazard
Application of the seismic hazard model, described in section 4.3, generates 14,428 events of
MW ≥ 5 in a 10,000 year catalogue. The frequency distribution of magnitudes in the catalogue is 
shown in Figure 5.1 and follows an expected pattern of lower magnitude events occurring with
higher frequency. In total there are 1,801 event with MW ≥ 6, which is just over 1 every 5.5 
years and compares to just under 1 every 5 years in the historic catalogue. There are 520 events
with MW ≥ 7, which is approximately 1 every 19 years and compares to 1 every 25 years in the 
historic catalogue. There are 29 events with MW ≥ 8, which is approximately 1 every 345 years.  
Figure 5.1 – Frequency distribution of earthquake magnitudes in simulated 10,000 year catalogue with a total of
14,428 events
274
It is common in loss estimation to report metrics on an annualised basis and Figure 5.2 shows
the frequency distribution of the maximum annual magnitudes, i.e. the highest magnitude event
observed to occur in each of the 10,000 years of the catalogue. A notable observation is that in
almost a quarter of the catalogue (2,278 years), no earthquakes of MW ≥ 5 are observed to occur. 
Since many of the low magnitude events will occur in years when other larger events also occur,
the shape of the graph in Figure 5.2 differs from Figure 5.1, with a significant reduction in the
absolute frequency of low magnitude events, although in relative terms they still occur more
frequently than high magnitude events.
Figure 5.2 – Frequency distribution of maximum annual earthquake magnitudes in simulated 10,000 year catalogue
Figure 5.3 shows the geospatial distribution of events in the simulated catalogue with MW ≥ 6 
(for clarity). They are generally evenly spread across the 200km buffer zone although with a
denser cluster in the quadrant to the north west of Christchurch around the Alpine Fault. It
should be noted that the points plotted on Figure 5.3 represent the centroid of the earthquake
source. In the case of active faults, this means that multiple events generated by the same source
are plotted in the same location. Hence, even though there are 29 MW ≥ 8 events in the 
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catalogue, there is only one location visible in Figure 5.3, since they are all generated by the
same fault (the Fjord-Kelly section of the Alpine Fault).
Figure 5.3 – Geospatial distribution of events in simulated 10,000 year catalogue with MW  ≥ 6 
Table 5.1 summarises the frequency distribution of the maximum ground motions observed in
the study area for each event. For comparison, in the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes, the
maximum PGAs observed are greater than 0.4 g and 0.9 g, respectively. These values are
exceeded 244 (once every 41 years) and 42 times (once every 238 years) respectively in the
simulated catalogue. In terms of PGV, the maxima observed in the Darfield and Christchurch
earthquakes are greater than 31 cm/s and 80 cm/s, respectively. In the simulated catalogue these
values are exceeded 585 times (once every 17 years) and 75 times (once every 133 years),
respectively.
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Table 5.1 – Frequency distribution of maximum ground motions per event as observed in study area
Max PGA (g) Frequency Max PGV (cm/s) Frequency
< PGA PGA ≤  < PGV PGV ≤  
0.1 12702 10 11894
0.1 0.2 1006 10 20 1399
0.2 0.3 318 20 30 560
0.3 0.4 158 30 40 263
0.4 0.5 84 40 50 114
0.5 0.6 49 50 60 59
0.6 0.7 33 60 70 38
0.7 0.8 22 70 80 26
0.8 0.9 14 80 90 13
0.9 1.0 11 90 100 11
1.0 1.5 26 100 150 32
1.5 5 150 19
Table 5.2 summarises the extent of liquefaction in each simulated event in the catalogue in
terms of the number of grid squares affected (out of a total of 294), and shows that liquefaction
is only predicted to occur in 882 events (approximately 6%). Of these, 68 events are seen to
affect over 150 sites in the study area (approximately half the city), with 29 events observed to
affect over 200 sites (approximately two thirds of the city). In the case of two events, over 250
sites in the city are affected. The latter events are a MW 7 and a MW 6.7 event, both of which
have hypocentres located directly under the city and result in 254 and 252 sites being affected
by liquefaction, respectively.
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Table 5.2 – Summary of number of analysis grid sites affected by liquefaction in each event
No. of sites affected Frequency
0 13546
1 – 10 395
11 – 20 105
21 – 30 69
31 – 40 44
41 – 50 38
51 - 60 26
61 – 70 24
71 – 80 15
81 – 90 15
91 - 100 16
101 - 150 69
151 – 200 37
201 – 250 27
> 250 2
Figure 5.4 presents the liquefaction occurrence data by site, with the colours representing the
number of times each grid square experiences liquefaction within the simulated catalogue. The
maximum liquefaction occurrence frequency is 290 events and as expected, the most frequently
affected sites (dark orange and red) are in the central and north eastern parts of the city,
following the path of the River Avon where more liquefiable soil types are found.. Similarly,
the least frequently affected areas (dark green) are to the south of the city in the Port Hills area
where the ground is more rocky. Here there are two sites that are completely unaffected by
liquefaction and 24 sites that are only affected by one event.
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Figure 5.4 – Frequency of liquefaction occurrence within simulated catalogue at each grid square in study area
5.1.2 Electric power network
Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 summarise the effect of each event in the simulated catalogue on
electric power network assets in terms of the number of failed cables (from a total of 244) and
substations (from a total of 32). This shows that the vast of the majority of events do not affect
the functionality of any assets, with cables failures only observed in 200 events (1.4% of all
events) and substation failures only observed in 224 events (1.6%). The maximum number of
cables affected in a single event is 72 (30%), caused by the same MW 6.7 event that is seen to
lead to 252 grid squares experiencing liquefaction. The same event is also associated with the
occurrence of the maximum number of substation failures – 24 (75%). These low failure
frequencies are in agreement with the findings of the fragility analysis conducted in Chapter 4,
where the repair rate function analysis (section 4.5.2) shows that buried cables are primarily
affected by liquefaction-induced permanent ground deformations. The results in Table 5.2 show
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that this occurs only in a small number of events and in many of these, liquefaction may not
occur directly under a cable or may not induce a sufficiently large permanent ground
deformation to cause failure. The fragility function analysis in section 4.5.1 shows that the
median PGA for causing substation failure is very high (1.13 g), reflecting the seismic
strengthening program implemented by Orion in the 1990s (Giovinazzi et al., 2011).
Table 5.3 – Frequency distribution of number cable failures per event in simulated catalogue
No. of cables failed Frequency
0 14228
1 – 10 130
11 – 20 33
21 – 30 14
31 – 40 13
41 – 50 3
51 - 60 2
61 – 70 3
> 70 2
Table 5.4 – Frequency distribution of number of substation failures per event in simulated catalogue
No. of substations failed Frequency
0 14204
1 – 5 175
6 – 10 32
11 – 15 12
16 – 20 3
> 20 2
Figure 5.5 presents the failure occurrence frequency data by asset, with the colours representing
the number of times each asset fails in the simulated catalogue.
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Figure 5.5 – Frequency of failures per electric power network asset in simulated catalogue of 14,428 events
Two cables fail in more than 60 events. Both of these cables run from the Addington GXP to the
Milton district/zone substation and are coincident, and hence indistinguishable, in Figure 5.5.
Both cables are constructed with oil-filled insulation, which relates to the ‘Other’ category for
the repair rate model derived in section 4.3 and hence is subject to higher repair rates than other
insulation materials. A further 14 cables fail in more than 40 events, including seven
constructed from oil-filled insulation, five constructed with PILCA insulation and surprisingly
two constructed with the more reliable XLPE insulation. It is noted however that both of these
XLPE cables are located in the north eastern part of the city (one from the Bromley GXP and
one from the Dallington district/zone substation), in the region most frequently affected by
liquefaction, as shown in Figure 5.4. Two substations fail in more than 50 events, including the
Oxford-Tuam and Montreal district/zone substations in the city centre. A further eight
substations fail more than 40 times, including the Armagh, Dallington, Fendalton, Knox,
Lancaster, Pages-Kearneys, Rawhiti and Spreydon district/zone substations, and it is notable
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that these are mainly in the central and north eastern parts of the city where liquefaction is most
frequent.
The seismic risk assessment indicates that the electric power network only suffers a loss of
performance in 228 of the 14,428 events. Whilst there are an additional 37 events in which at
least one asset fails, the provision of redundancy in the network means that this damage does
not result in any customers being disconnected. The distribution of the loss metric for the 228
performance-affecting events is shown in Figure 5.6. In the majority of these events, the
disruption to customers is relatively low (<25%), although there are a small number of events
that do cause major disruption to the system. One event, the MW 6.7 event that results in
maximum damage to cables and substations, causes 100% customer disconnection. The other
three events that cause over 80% customer disconnection are a MW 7.5 event from the Awatere
SW fault, and MW 7 and MW 6.2 earthquakes directly under Christchurch.
Figure 5.6 – Distribution of loss metric for 228 events that affect the performance of the electric power network
Figure 5.7 identifies how frequently each meshblock loses supply of electric power. Every
meshblock becomes disconnected at least ten times and the maximum observed disconnection
frequency is 124. 99 meshblocks become disconnected at least 100 times and these are
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concentrated in the city centre where the substations are observed to be more frequently
damaged.
Figure 5.7 – Frequency of electric power service failures in simulated catalogue of 14,428 events by meshblock
5.1.3 Water supply system – direct physical damage
Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 summarise the effect of each event in the simulated catalogue on the
water supply system assets in terms of the number of failed pumping stations (from a total of
154 including 113 primary pumping stations and 41 booster pumping station sites) and the
number of failed (broken) pipes (from a total of 6,161). For the pumping stations, the numbers
only include inherent failures due to direct physical damage and do not consider failures due to
loss of electric power supply. Since the fragility of primary pumping station is considered to be
implicit in the fragility of wells, a primary pumping station is considered to be operational if at
least one of the wells from which it pumps is operational. A booster pumping station site is
considered to be operational if at least one of the pumps within it is operational.
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Table 5.5 – Frequency distribution of number pumping station failures per event in simulated catalogue
No. of pumping stations affected Frequency
0 13928
1 – 10 377
11 – 20 58
21 – 30 26
31 – 40 11
41 – 50 11
51 - 60 7
61 – 70 3
71 – 80 2
81 – 90 2
> 90 3
Table 5.6 – Frequency distribution of number pipe failures per event in simulated catalogue
No. of pipes affected Frequency
0 0
1 – 20 51
21 – 40 11469
41 – 60 2602
61 – 80 85
81 – 100 47
101 - 150 64
151 – 200 39
201 – 300 35
301 - 400 21
401 – 500 7
501 – 1000 7
> 1000 1
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The results show that in the vast of the majority of events, direct physical damage does not
affect the functionality of pumping stations, with failures only observed in 500 events (3.5% of
all events). Conversely at least one pipe fails in every event. The largest number of pumping
station failures in a single event is 129 (84%) and the largest number of pipe failures is 1,181
(19%), both caused by the same MW 6.7 event that is seen to lead to 252 grid squares
experiencing liquefaction and maximum damage to the electric power network assets.
Figure 5.8 presents the failure occurrence frequency data by asset, with the colours representing
the number of times each asset fails in the simulated catalogue.
Figure 5.8 – Frequency of failures per water supply system asset in simulated catalogue of 14,428 events
Twelve pipes fail in more than 2,000 events, including four that fail more than 2,500 times (with
maximum failure frequency of 2,857). These include seven pipes constructed from PVC, five
pipes constructed from UPVC and two cast iron pipes. The most frequently damaged pipes are
spread across the city but there is a noticeable cluster in the Lyttelton and Governor’s Bay on
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the southern coast and in the north western part of the city. 24 substations fail in more than 60
events, including eight that fail in more than 70 events. The maximum failure frequency is 77
occurring at the Thompsons Road 1 pumping station in the far north of the city. The other seven
pumping stations with a failure frequency above 70 are Hills Road 2 and 3, Edgeware Road 1,
Thompsons Road 2, Blighs Road 1 and Averill Street 3 and 4. All of these are located in the
northern half of the Central pressure zone except for the Thompson Road stations, which are
located in the North West pressure zone. The lower reliability of the water supply system as
compared to the electric power network is confirmed by the system performance results, where
every event is seen to cause some loss of performance, even when interdependencies are not
taken into account. The data in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 show that in percentage terms, a higher
proportion of pumping stations suffer failure than pipes in the most damaging earthquakes.
However, the median values for the fragility functions for water supply system nodes imply that
in general very high accelerations are needed to cause these assets to fail. What this suggests is
that whilst the fragility of pumping stations becomes a critical factor in strong high return period
earthquakes, the main cause of the general vulnerability in this system across all events is likely
to be the fragility of the pipes. Since they are susceptible to ground shaking as well as to
liquefaction, they are inherently more vulnerable than buried cables, which partially explains
why so many more events affect the water supply system than affect the electric power network.
This vulnerability was observed in the Canterbury earthquake sequence and is reflected in the
repair rate functions derived for this study. In terms of overall system performance, all 14,428
events in the catalogue result in some customer disconnection due to direct physical damage
(the smallest value is 5%). Figure 5.9 shows the frequency distribution of the performance
metric across all events. It can be seen that in the vast majority of events, the performance
metric is in the range 10% to 30%. Only 210 events (1.5%) lead to more than 30% of customers
being disconnected. 68 events lead to more than 50% of customers being disconnected. While
only four events lead to more than 80% of customers losing electric power, this occurs nine
times for the water supply system. Figure 5.10 identifies how frequently each meshblock is
observed to lose water supply connection.
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Figure 5.9 – Distribution of loss metric for 14,428 events that affect the performance of the water supply system
Figure 5.10 – Frequency of water supply service failures in simulated catalogue of 14,428 events by meshblock
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Every meshblock experiences failure at least twice, but while there are 512 meshblocks that
experience failure fewer than 100 times, there are also 142 meshblocks that suffer service
failure in over 8,000 events. These occur in six clusters across the city: three locations around
the city centre (Riccarton, Edgeware and Linwood), all of which are classified as having
‘Moderate’ or ‘High’ liquefaction susceptibility; Halswell in the south west of the city, which is
classified as having ‘Moderate’ liquefaction susceptibility; and two areas on the southern shore
(Lyttelton and Governor’s Bay) where the ground is rocky and so there is no liquefaction risk.
In these areas however, there is almost no redundancy in the system, with meshblocks
connected to the water sources in the main city only by long chains of individual pipes.
Therefore only one pipe in the chain needs to break for the meshblock to lose supply, and hence
it is unsurprising that private water tanks are prevalent in this area.
5.1.4 Water supply system – effect of interdependency
The effect that loss of electric power has on the performance of the water supply system is
accounted for by reclassifying the functionality of undamaged pumping stations that are not
located in an operational power supply zone and do not have access to a back-up power supply.
There are 200 events in which consideration of interdependency causes the number of pumping
station failures to increase. Since the electric power network only experiences loss of
performance in 228 events, it is observed that the water supply system is affected in 88% of the
events in which there is potential for the interdependency to be activated. This section presents a
summary of the effect of interdependencies in these events, although more detailed performance
data corresponding to each event are provided in Appendix E. The largest increase in pumping
station failures in a single event is 67. Amongst the 200 events in which the pumping station
failure rate is affected by power loss, the mean increase is 15, which is approximately 10% of
the total number of pumping stations. Table 5.7 summarises the number of pumping station
failures per event when interdependency is considered. The number of events in which there are
more than 20 pumping station failures increases from 65 to 123 due to interdependency and
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there are now also 10 events in which more than 100 pumping stations fail. The largest number
of failures in a single event is 144 (out of 154).
Table 5.7 – Revised distribution of number of pumping station failures with consideration of interdependency
No. of pumping
station failures
Frequency
Without interdependency With interdependency
0 13928 13921
1 – 10 377 331
11 – 20 58 53
21 – 30 26 45
31 – 40 11 22
41 – 50 11 14
51 - 60 7 8
61 – 70 3 6
71 – 80 2 8
81 – 90 2 4
91 – 100 2 6
> 100 1 10
The water supply system performance is then re-evaluated based on the new functionality
classifications. The performance is observed to change in 188 events. Since the electric power
network only experiences loss of performance in 228 events, it is observed that the water supply
system is affected in 82% of the events in which there is potential for the interdependency to be
activated. Amongst the 188 events in which the effects of interdependency are observed, the
largest increase in the performance metric is 13.1%, which is equivalent to 43,075 customers,
and the mean increase is 4.1%, which is equivalent to 13,383 customers. Since water supply
system performance is unaffected by most events in the catalogue, a graphical representations of
the new distribution of the performance metric would be indistinguishable from Figure 5.9.
Instead, Table 5.8 summarises how the distribution of the water supply system performance
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metric changes due to interdependency when grouped into bins. This shows that consideration
of interdependency leads to 16 additional events in which the level of customer disconnection is
in excess of 50%.
Table 5.8 – Effect of electric power network interdependency on distribution of performance metric for water supply
system
% Customers disconnected Frequency
Without interdependency With interdependency
< 10 877 877
10 – 20 10916 10913
20 – 30 2425 2425
30 – 40 90 84
40 – 50 52 45
50 - 60 25 32
60 – 70 15 13
70 – 80 19 18
80 – 90 6 14
> 90 3 7
The consideration of interdependency increases the frequency with which 1,601 (48%) of the
meshblocks become disconnected from the water supply system. The largest observed increase
in meshblock failure frequency is 68 events. Figure 5.11 shows the change in frequency in each
meshblock. It is notable that most of the affected meshblocks are towards the edges of the city
where there is a lower level of redundancy in the electric power network. Across all
meshblocks, the mean increase is 8 events, while the mean increase amongst the 1,601 affected
meshblocks is 16 events. In percentage terms, the largest observed increase is 500%. Table 5.9
summarises the distribution of the absolute and percentage changes in failure frequency
amongst the affected meshblocks.
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Figure 5.11 – Increase in frequency of meshblock water supply service failures in simulated catalogue due to
interdependency with electric power network
Table 5.9 – Summary of changes in meshblock failure frequency caused by interdependency
Absolute increase in failure
frequency (no. of events)
No. of
meshblocks
Relative increase in
failure frequency (%)
No. of
meshblocks
1 – 10 959 0 – 10 1238
11 – 20 169 10 – 20 112
21 – 30 104 20 – 30 2
31 – 40 202 30 – 40 14
41 – 50 78 40 – 50 71
51 - 60 71 50 – 60 12
61 – 70 18 60 – 70 21
71 – 80 0 70 – 80 71
81 – 90 0 80 – 90 0
91 – 100 0 90 – 100 0
> 100 0 > 100 60
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5.1.5 Risk metrics
In engineering studies, results from seismic risk assessments of critical infrastructure systems
are commonly presented as system risk curves. These plot annual exceedance probabilities
against system performance. The curves for the electric power and water supply systems are
shown in Figure 5.12, where the system performance metric has been annualised by taking the
maximum value observed to occur in each year. For the water supply system, this includes
curves for independent performance and both methods for interdependent performance: by
electric power supply zone as part of the final developed model and by geographical proximity
as a sensitivity test. The different approaches to modelling interdependency only yield different
results for low frequency events and so for clarity, the annual exceedance probability is plotted
on a logarithmic scale.
Figure 5.12 – System risk curves Christchurch electric power and water supply systems
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In the insurance sector it is more common to present the loss metrics corresponding to specified
return periods. The points marked on each curve in Figure 5.12 represent the performances
corresponding to the following return periods, measured in years: 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500,
1,000, 2,000, 5,000 and 10,000. The values corresponding to these points are listed in Table
5.10.
Table 5.10 – Performance metrics for each system corresponding to key return periods (the change in water supply
system performance metric due to interdependency is indicated in brackets)
Return
period
(yrs)
Performance metric
Electric power
network
Water supply system –
without interdependency
Water supply system –
with interdependency
10,000 100 96.2 98.6 (+2.4)
5,000 100 95.2 97.9 (+2.7)
2,000 82.2 88.1 94.1 (+6.0)
1,000 75.2 80.2 86.8 (+6.6)
500 64.9 73.8 81.6 (+7.8)
200 34.7 56.9 61.9 (+5.0)
100 17.9 44.3 46.3 (+2.0)
50 3.6 30.9 31.2 (+0.3)
20 0 25.5 25.6 (+0.1)
10 0 23.2 23.3 (+0.1)
5 0 21.0 21.0 (-)
The risk metrics highlight that whilst the electric power network is very robust with respect to
weak high frequency events, significant disruption is expected for stronger low frequency
events. In particular, whilst no events are predicted to cause total failure of the water supply
system, for the electric power network, total failure is predicted to occur three times. For the
water supply system, at moderate to high frequencies (annual exceedance probability ≥0.01), 
there is negligible difference in performance regardless of whether or not interdependencies are
taken into account or how. This is because at these frequencies, there is little or no loss of
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performance in the electric power network and so interdependencies are not activated. As
annual exceedance probability decreases, the difference between independent and
interdependent performances also increases. The difference between the two interdependency
modelling methods appears relatively small. However, when compared to independent system
analysis, modelling interdependency by electric power supply zones increases the performance
metric by 7.7% (in relative terms) when averaged across the 228 events where the electric
power network suffered loss of performance, whilst when interdependency is modelled by
proximity, the increase is 11.8%, confirming that the geographical proximity method is
conservative in this case study as it does not account for redundancy.
5.1.6 Mitigation strategies
An important function of a seismic risk assessment model for critical infrastructure systems is
the ability to investigate the impact of potential mitigation works that could improve system
reliability. This can be done by comparing the seismic risk assessment results obtained with the
current system to new sets of results obtained from corresponding assessments that include
proposed changes. Multiple proposed strategies can be assessed to compare effects and identify
priorities.
Mitigation in the electric power network is investigated by comparing the effects of
strengthening different substations. Ten potential mitigation strategies are proposed, each
involving the strengthening of one substation. The ten substations with the highest failure
frequencies from the original seismic risk assessment are selected as the candidates for
strengthening and these are listed in Table 5.11. Each mitigation strategy test uses the same
events and asset damage states as the original seismic risk assessment, with the exception of the
candidate substation, which is manually set to ‘No damage’ for all events in order to mimic the
effect of being strengthened. The system performance is then re-calculated for each event based
on the revised damage states. For the electric power network, there are 228 events in which loss
of performance is observed. For each mitigation strategy test, Table 5.11 summarises the mean
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increase in customer connections across the 228 events and the number of events in which the
mitigation strategy significantly improves system performance.
Table 5.11 – Effect on seismic risk assessment results due to strengthening of least reliable substations
Substation Failure
frequency
in original
seismic risk
assessment
Effect of strengthening
Mean increase in
no. of EPN
customer
connections
No. of events with
EPN performance
improvement > 5%
of population
No. of events with
EPN performance
improvement >
10% of population
Oxford-Tuam 58 199 0 0
Montreal 54 205 0 0
Dallington 50 4784 42 1
Pages-Kearneys 50 3755 31 4
Rawhiti 49 4375 39 0
Armagh 46 683 1 0
Spreydon 46 1075 0 0
Lancaster 44 1336 0 0
Fendalton 43 2650 21 0
Knox 41 475 0 0
The results show that although the Oxford-Tuam and Montreal substations are the least reliable
in terms of physical damage, its strengthening would lead to minimal improvement in system
performance. This may be because they are centrally located in an area where there is greater
redundancy in the network and so although they are failing frequently in the original seismic
risk assessment, their failure does not cause significant loss of performance. However, the
Dallington, Pages-Kearneys and Rawhiti substations, which are all located in suburban
Christchurch, do all have a strong positive effect on system performance if strengthened. The
average improvement corresponding to these substations is between 1% and 2% of the total
population, but they also result in many individual events in which the improvement is greater
than 5% and strengthening of the Pages-Kearneys substation in particular results in four events
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in which the improvement is greater than 10%. It is clear that these three substations should be
the priority for seismic upgrading.
In the water supply system, mitigation is investigated by comparing the effects of strengthening
the ten least reliable pumping stations as listed in Table 5.12. The method is the same as for the
electric power network, with the damage state of the candidate pumping stations manually set to
‘No damage’ for all events. To reduce the computation time, and because the impact of
mitigation is most important in highly damaging earthquakes, the mitigation strategies are only
tested for events in the original seismic risk assessment where the loss of performance in the
water supply system is observed to be at least 25% after interdependencies are modelled. This
results in a total of 617 events. For each mitigation strategy test, Table 5.12 summarises the
mean increase in customer connections across the 617 events and the number of events in which
the mitigation strategy significantly improves system performance.
Table 5.12 – Effect on seismic risk assessment results due to strengthening of least reliable pumping stations
Pumping station Failure
frequency in
original
seismic risk
assessment
Effect of strengthening
Mean increase in
no. of WSS
customer
connections
No. of events with
WSS performance
improvement > 5%
of population
No. of events with
WSS performance
improvement >
10% of population
Thompsons Road 1 77 71 0 0
Edgeware Road 1 74 41 0 0
Blighs Road 1 74 41 0 0
Hills Road 2 73 41 0 0
Hills Road 3 73 41 0 0
Thompsons Road 2 73 71 0 0
Averill Street 4 72 51 0 0
Averill Street 3 71 51 0 0
Woodham Road 70 64 0 0
Picton Avenue 2 69 104 0 0
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The results show that for all of the pumping stations the average improvement in system
performance from strengthening is very small. In terms of individual events, the maximum
observed improvement is just 6,950 customers (just over 2%) at Woodham Road. This
reinforces the conclusion from the results presented in Figure 5.8 that it is damage to pipes
rather than pumping stations that is driving loss of performance in the water supply system and
therefore pipes should be prioritised in any seismic mitigation strategy.
5.2 Interdependency quantification
This section presents the analysis of the seismic risk assessment results to quantify the
interdependency between the electric power network and water supply system. The sections
begins with the application of the proposed ‘linear slope method’, as described in section 3.3,
before carrying out sensitivity tests on the observed interdependency response by varying the
fragility of assets and the availability of back-up power in the water supply system. The section
then presents the results from the application of the simplified ‘extreme event method’ for
quantifying interdependency response, which is also proposed and described in section 3.3.
5.2.1 Linear slope method
As described in section 3.3, the proposed interdependency index, IWSS|EPN can be estimated from
the slope of the line of best fit on a plot of the interdependency response in the water supply
system against electric power network performance. Interdependency only becomes a
consideration in cases where there is some loss of performance in the electric power network,
and so Figure 5.13 plots the interdependency response in the water supply system against
electric power network performance for the 228 events in which this is the case (for other events
the points would all plot at the origin).
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Figure 5.13 – Plot of observed interdependency response against electric power network performance for 228 events
in seismic risk assessment catalogue where electric power network suffered loss of performance
In 166 events the interdependency index is less than 0.1 and in a further 32 events it is less than
0.2. The index exceeds 0.5 in only two of the events, which indicates that in general the impact
of electric power network performance on the water supply system is low. The plot shows the
general trend that the interdependency response increases as the performance of the electric
power network worsens. Ordinary least squares linear regression is applied to derive a
predictive function for interdependency response based on electric power network performance
as printed on the graph. Although there is some scatter around the best fit line, the regression is
significant at the 5% level and the calculated coefficient of determination (R2) indicates that the
electric power network performance explains approximately 80% of the variance in the
interdependency response in the water supply system and confirms that a linear function is a
good fit between the datasets. Therefore, using the slope method, the seismic risk assessment
yields a mean value for the proposed interdependency index of 0.48, with a 95% confidence
interval between 0.45 and 0.51. However, a sample size of 228 may be considered to be
relatively small and inconclusive. This is particularly true here, since the majority of
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observations are clustered in the bottom left corner and so the predictive power of the model is
effectively weighted towards low damage scenarios, at the expense of the more devastating
scenarios for which it could be argued that the prediction of interdependency response is more
important. Therefore, further interdependency analysis is undertaken to attempt to replicate the
result for the interdependency index using different event sets.
The proposed model for predicting interdependency response (the adapted Leontief input-output
method) is deterministic, i.e. the same value of interdependency response will always be
predicted for a given value of electric power network performance. Therefore, the process for
deriving the predictive function does not need to be based on a stochastically representative
event catalogue. The only requirement is that a spread of electric power network performances
are included as this is the only independent variable. In fact it could be argued that a non-
stochastic catalogue is better for deriving the interdependency response model, as by ignoring
event probability, it is likely to include more high magnitude events and likely to provide
greater balance between predictive power for high frequency low impact events and predictive
power for low frequency high impact events. Here, the interdependency quantification analysis
is therefore repeated for four new catalogues, each containing 250 events generated non-
stochastically from the Christchurch earthquake source model. Each event is subject to the full
seismic risk assessment methodology incorporating hazard, fragility and system performance
analyses and nodal interdependency simulation. The process for generating each catalogue is
iterative, as events that lead to no loss of performance in the electric power network are
discarded and replaced until all 250 events contribute to the interdependency analysis. To
accelerate the process and increase the likelihood of generating events that cause loss of
performance to the electric power network, the source model is simplified to include only events
of MW ≥ 6 within 50 km of Christchurch. Figure 5.14 shows the geographical distribution of 
events in the four catalogues and the frequency distribution of magnitudes is summarised in
Figure 5.15.
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Figure 5.14 – Geographical distribution of events in four non-stochastic catalogues for interdependency analysis (the
size of the circles increase with moment magnitude ranging from 6.0 to 7.3)
Figure 5.15 – Frequency distribution of earthquake magnitudes in four non-stochastic catalogues for interdependency
analysis
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Figure 5.16 shows the distribution of system performances resulting from the events generated
for the four new catalogues combined. As expected, given the high reliability of the electric
power network, there is a bias in the catalogue towards events with good system performances.
However, there is a greater spread of performances compared to the 228 events from the seismic
risk assessment catalogue in which the electric power network suffered loss of performance (see
Figure 5.6). Of those 228 events, 62% have a performance metric less than or equal to 0.2,
compared to 39% in the new catalogues. Just 12% of events have a performance metric greater
than 0.5 in the seismic risk assessment catalogue compared to 30% in the new catalogues. This
improved spread suggests that the new catalogues may produce models that are more robust for
higher electric power network performance metrics. For the water supply system, significantly
more than half the events result in performances worse than 0.5. There are no events with
performance lower than 0.1, but this is a consequence of the low reliability of the system,
combined with the need for events that cause performance loss in the more reliable electric
power network.
Figure 5.16 – Distribution of system performances resulting from events in supplementary catalogue for
interdependency analysis
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Figure 5.17 plots the interdependency response in the water supply system against electric
power network performance for the four new catalogues.
Figure 5.17 – Plot of observed interdependency response against electric power network performance for four non-
stochastic 250 event catalogues
In all the catalogues the interdependency response is less than 0.5 for the majority of events
with only 49 instances exceeding this value (combined across all catalogues). There are a lower
proportion of events with the lowest values of interdependency response (<0.1), compared to the
seismic risk assessment catalogue, but generally all four non-stochastic catalogues indicate that
the impact of the electric power network on the water supply system is only moderate. New
linear predictive functions are printed on each graph, including the 95% confidence interval for
the slope. There is more scatter in these datasets, as reflected by the lower coefficients of
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determination. However, they are all greater than 0.7 and so still indicative of a good linear fit
and all the regressions are significant at the 5% level.
The interdependency indices derived from these catalogues range from 0.5 to 0.55, which
indicates that there is some consistency in the value of the derived index, although it is slightly
higher than the value derived from the seismic risk assessment catalogue. This is an expected
consequence of the new catalogues having a higher proportion of high impact events but the
significance of this difference needs to be ascertained. The first step is to determine whether the
four slopes derived from non-stochastic catalogues are significantly different from each other by
comparing the two datasets with the largest (top left) and smallest (bottom right) slopes. Since
the sample size is large (>30), a two-sample Z-test is applicable. The null hypothesis is that the
slopes from these two datasets are the same and the Z-statistic is given by Eq. 5.1, where βIR1
and βIR2 are the slopes of the models (0.55 and 0.50), and SE is the standard error of the slopes
(0.020 and 0.021).
1 2
1 2
2 2
IR IR
IR IRZ
SE SE 
 


(5.1)
The calculated Z-statistic for the two models is 1.59. At the 5% significance level, the critical
value of Z is 1.96, giving a p-value of 0.11. The null hypothesis cannot therefore be rejected and
so it is assumed that all four slopes from the non-stochastic catalogues are not significantly
different from each other. This means that the four catalogues can be combined to derive a more
robust model from a larger sample of 1,000 events. The combined scatter plot is shown in
Figure 5.18, with the new best linear function fit. It is notable that the confidence interval for
the interdependency index does not overlap with the value derived from the stochastic
catalogue. Since the sample sizes are large, a two-sample Z-test is applied to formally test
whether the difference between the stochastic and non-stochastic catalogues is significant, with
a null hypothesis that they are not significantly different.
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Figure 5.18 – Plot of observed interdependency response against electric power network performance for combined
non-stochastic catalogue of 1,000 events
For the stochastic model, the slope is 0.48 and the standard error of the slope is 0.016. For the
non-stochastic model, the slope is 0.53 and the standard error of the slope is 0.010.The
calculated Z-statistic for the two models is 2.33. At the 5% significance level, the critical value
of Z is 1.96, giving a p-value of 0.02. Therefore the null hypothesis is rejected and the
interdependency indices derived from the stochastic and non-stochastic catalogues are
significantly different. Given the deterministic nature of the interdependency index and the fact
that the spread of events is wider in the non-stochastic catalogue, this should then be the
preferred method of calculation.
5.2.2 Non-linear interpretations
The analysis so far has assumed that the interdependency response function is linear, since this
is a basic premise of input-output interdependency modelling. However, visual inspection of the
plots in Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18 show a pronounced upwards kink when the performance
metric in the electric power network exceeds 0.8, suggesting that an exponential or polynomial
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curve may provide a better fit than a linear function. In general a simple exponential relationship
can be fit to a dataset by applying a logarithmic transformation to both the dependent and
independent variables and then carrying out linear regression on the transformed data. However,
since observations of the interdependency response include zero values, this method cannot be
applied. Polynomial curves do not require transformation for fitting and do accommodate zero
values in both variables, and so three forms of polynomial curve are proposed for fitting to the
non-stochastic catalogue results as shown in Eq.’s 5.2 to 5.4, where IRWSS is the interdependency
response in the water supply system, SPEPN is the performance metric for the electric power
network and aIR, bIR and cIR are coefficients to be determined.
Polynomial model 1: 2
WSS EPNIR aSP b  (5.2)
Polynomial model 2: 2
WSS EPN EPNIR aSP bSP c   (5.3)
Polynomial model 3: b
WSS EPNIR aSP c  (5.4)
Polynomial regression is a special case of multiple linear regression and as such can be analysed
using the ordinary least squares method. The best fits for each of the three polynomial forms is
shown in Figure 5.19 alongside the linear function for the non-stochastic catalogue, although the
best fits for polynomial models 2 and 3 are almost indistinguishable. All regressions are
significant at the 5% level and the coefficients of determination are all above 0.7. The Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974) is a tool used for model selection where a variety of
model formulations have been fit to the same dataset. Assuming that there exists a ‘true’ model
for predicting interdependency response, then AIC measures the relative quality of each of the
candidate models to select the model that minimises loss of information relative to the ‘true’
model. For each model, the value of AIC can be calculated from Eq. 5.5, where nIR is the size of
the dataset, k is the number of independent variables in the model, and SSres is the residual sum
of squares for the model as determined in the regression. The best candidate model is the model
with the lowest value of AIC.
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Figure 5.19 – Plot of observed interdependency response against electric power network performance for combined
non-stochastic catalogue of 1,000 events with best fit linear and polynomial models
 ln 2 1resIR
IR
SS
AIC n k
n
  
 
 
 
(5.5)
The relative quality of each model can be determined by estimating the likelihood of each
model by Eq. 5.6, where L is the likelihood, which is proportional to the term on the right hand
side and where ΔAIC is the difference between the AIC value for the model and the minimum 
AIC value across all models.
0.5 AICL e  (5.6)
The best model by definition has a likelihood of 1. The relative weight of each model is the
likelihood of the model expressed as a proportion of the sum of all model likelihoods. The
results of the AIC analysis are shown in Table 5.13, which shows that polynomial model 2
provides the best representation of the data.
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Table 5.13 – Results of model selection by Akaike Information Criterion
Model AIC Likelihood

Weight
Linear -4863 < 0.01 < 0.01
Polynomial 1 -4894 < 0.01 < 0.01
Polynomial 2 -4931 1 0.96
Polynomial 3 -4924 0.04 0.04
In addition to AIC analysis, an ANOVA (analysis of variance) test between the linear model
and polynomial model 2 is applied to test whether the difference between the linear model and
polynomial model 2 are significant. The test statistic is the residual sum of squares of each
model and is assumed to have an F-distribution. The null hypothesis is that the residual sum of
squares are not significantly different, but the ANOVA test yields a p-value < 0.01, so the null
hypothesis is rejected and the difference in the two models is confirmed to be significant.
However, there are practical considerations that must also be considered when assessing the
applicability of a model that departs from the basic linear function assumed by Haimes and
Jiang (2001).
The development of the interdependency response function, and by extension, the proposed
interdependency index serves two purposes. The first purpose is that a function for
interdependency response can be used as a simplified method for simulating interdependencies
in future risk analyses where detailed nodal modelling of interactions may not be possible (e.g.
lack of data) or undesirable (e.g. cost of resources outweigh perceived benefits of greater
precision). If interdependencies only need to be simulated for one pair of systems with a one-
way relationship, then it is relatively straightforward to apply response functions with more
complex forms. For example, to simulate interdependencies with the linear model found in
Figure 5.19, the equation is subsumed into Eq. 3.106 to give Eq. 5.7. To apply polynomial
model 2 instead, it is simply a case of substituting the polynomial function for the linear
equation, as shown in Eq. 5.8. It is noted that in both cases the intercept term is ignored to
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ensure that there is no interdependency response when there is no loss of performance in the
electric power network.
'0.53WSS EPN WSSSP SP SP  (5.7)
 2 '0.34 0.23WSS EPN EPN WSSSP SP SP SP   (5.8)
The situation becomes more complicated if there are multiple systems or if there are feedback
loops. To find the final performances manually requires iterating through each pair of systems
individually and repeatedly until a steady state is achieved across all systems. As discussed in
section 2.6.2, the problem is simplified by combining all the relationships into matrix form and
solving for a vector of the final system performances. Referring back to Eq. 2.47, the
applicability of the matrix method requires the unknown terms inside the final system
performance vector (x) to be the same as the predictor variables in the interdependency response
function. For example, if Eq. 5.8 is written in matrix form, it would become Eq. 5.9 and the
solution for the final system performances would be given by Eq. 5.10.
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These demonstrate that if the interdependency response function contains terms where the
system performance is raised to some exponent other than 1, then the final system performance
must also contain the same terms. In a scenario such as this, where the performance of the
electric power network is included twice (to the powers of one and two), this leads to a situation
where two of the unknowns are not independent of each other. This, in turn, may prevent the
matrix formulation from being solvable. In this simple example with only one pair of systems
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and a one-way dependency, this does not pose a problem but it may do in more complex
scenarios. This could be avoided by limiting polynomial functions to a single variable term as in
polynomial models 1 and 3 (Eq.’s 5.2 and 5.4). However, in a scenario where multiple systems
are being analysed and there is a system (e.g. the electric power network) that supports more
than one of the other systems (e.g. water supply system and natural gas system), then the
interdependency response function for each relationship must be of the same form, (i.e. the
performance of the electric power network must be raised to the same exponent in each
function). The likelihood that the best fit model for each relationship requires the performance
of the electric power network to be raised to the same exponent is low.
From a purely scientific perspective it is clear that the interdependency response functions for
each pair of infrastructure systems should be described by the model that objectively best fits
the data, whether it is linear, polynomial or some other from. However, other than for the most
straightforward scenarios, this approach can lead to significant complexity in the application of
the matrix methods to solve for the final system performances and at worst, preclude it
altogether. In the latter case the analysis must then be solved manually, which can itself be very
complex and resource-intensive. Whilst this may be feasible for academic research, in the
commercial and public sectors, such a level of complexity may act as a barrier to adoption of
these methods. Furthermore, the assumption that all models should have the same basic form
may be perceived as beneficial for non-academic studies, since it allows standardisation of
model derivation and application procedures for all pairs of systems.
The second purpose for developing the interdependency response function is that the slope of
the best linear fit – the interdependency index – can be used as an objective measure for
quantifying the interdependency between systems for risk information and management. This is
useful since it allows relationships between different pairs of systems to be compared. In the
linear model, and polynomial models 1 and 3, in Figure 5.19, the slope is approximately
equivalent to the expected interdependency when there is total loss of electric power network
performance, and so these models have the same basic meaning. However, the linear function in
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Figure 5.19 underestimates the interdependency index relative to the polynomial models and
ANOVA testing shows that the differences are significant. Compared to a polynomial function,
a linear function is likely to always underestimate the maximum y-value, which is what the
index essentially is. So although they are, by definition, measuring the same phenomenon, it is
questionable whether they are directly comparable. In polynomial model 2, where there is more
than one variable term in the function, neither coefficient has a practical real-world meaning.
They are neither comparable to coefficients from other model forms nor meaningful in
themselves. Direct comparison between different pairs of systems is therefore only valid if the
metrics have the same meaning and have been derived using the same form with the system
performance raised to the same exponent. Whilst this can be done with polynomial functions, it
is not necessarily the case that all interdependency relationships will be describable by a
polynomial function, and even if they are, it is less likely that the best fit relationships will share
the same exponents of system performance. More so perhaps than interdependency simulation,
the interdependency index may be of particular interest to the commercial sector as a simple and
easily conceptualised risk management tool. As such, it is important that its derivation and
application is straightforward and efficient and this is best achieved by adopting a standardised
linear function for all pairs of systems.
5.2.3 Sensitivity tests
The linear function derived in Figure 5.18 is tested for its sensitivity to variations in the
availability of back-up power and variations in the fragility of water supply system assets. The
existing linear function is the baseline, which is defined as the ‘Medium’ scenario. For each
variable four sensitivity tests are conducted representing different levels of reliability: ‘Very
low’, ‘Low’, ‘High’ and ‘Very high’ scenarios, with each test applied to the same non-stochastic
catalogue used to derive the baseline scenario. For back-up power the four scenarios represent
changes in the number of pumping stations that have diesel generators, as shown in Table 5.14,
with additions or removals randomly allocated. The same hazard and fragility results from the
original analysis are assumed, but at the interdependency simulation stage, new performances
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are calculated based on the new allocation of generators. For each back-up power sensitivity
test, the fragility parameters of pumping stations and pipes is kept constant at the baseline
values.
For the fragility sensitivity tests the four scenarios represent changes in the parameters of the
pumping station fragility functions and pipe repair rate functions. For pumping stations, the
median value of the baseline fragility function is multiplied by the coefficients in Table 5.14.
For pipes, the baseline repair rate function is multiplied by the coefficients in Table 5.14. The
same hazard and electric power network results from the original analysis are assumed but the
fragility and performance of the water supply system are re-analysed. For each fragility
sensitivity test, both the pumping station and pipe fragilities are adjusted while the number of
back-up generators remains constant at the baseline value. The best fit linear functions for the
sensitivity tests are shown in Figure 5.20 alongside the baseline function, the ‘Medium’
scenario.
Table 5.14 – Parameters for sensitivity tests for deriving interdependency index from non-stochastic catalogue
Scenario Back-up
generators
Coefficient for pump
fragility
Coefficient for pipe
repair rate
Very high 92 2 0.25
High 69 1.5 0.5
Medium 46 1 1
Low 23 0.5 1.5
Very low 11 0.25 2
For the sensitivity tests in which the number of back-up generators was adjusted, the plots show
a relatively wide spread of results with values for the index ranging from 0.27 to 0.80. The
direction of the variation is as expected in that the more reliable scenarios (i.e. more back-up
power generators) elicit smaller interdependency responses since there are fewer pumping
stations that are vulnerable to power outage.
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Back-up power Fragility
Figure 5.20 – Plots of linear best fit interdependency functions from back-up power (left) and fragility (right)
sensitivity tests
For the fragility sensitivity tests however, two interesting phenomena are observed. Firstly,
there is almost no difference in the best fit lines for the baseline, ‘High’ and ‘Very high’
scenarios. Secondly, the direction of variation is reversed so that it is the less reliable scenarios
(i.e. more fragile assets) in which the smaller interdependency responses are observed. The
behaviour of the interdependency response metric in relation to asset fragility can be
investigated algebraically. The interdependency response between the two systems for the
baseline scenario is given by Eq. 5.11. It is defined as the proportion of population whose water
supply connection survives direct physical damage but fails due to power outage.
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For an alternative model where the fragility of the water supply assets is adjusted, one would
expect the pre-interdependency performance, SP'WSS, to change by some unknown value, ΔSP.
Therefore, Eq. 5.11 needs to be modified to account for this. The revised pre-interdependence
performance metric, SP'WSS|SENS, is simply given by Eq.5.12, where ΔSP is positive if fragility
increases.
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In the sensitivity tests where fragility is increased, the post-interdependency performance has to
account for the fact that there may be some overlap between the additional population that has
become disconnected due to the higher fragility and the population that were already
disconnected in the baseline scenario due to interdependency effects. This is shown
diagrammatically in Figure 5.21, where the bars represent the proportion of the population
disconnected.
Figure 5.21 – Diagrammatic representation of variables required to calculate interdependency response in baseline
scenario and increased fragility sensitivity test
Consequently, to avoid double counting, the revised post-interdependency performance,
SPWSS|SENS, is given by Eq. 5.13, where ρWSS is the proportion of the additional disconnected
population that overlaps. In the sensitivity tests where fragility is decreased, the post-
interdependency performance must account for the fact that some of the population that is no
longer disconnected due to the lower fragility, may now become disconnected due to
interdependency instead. Eq. 5.13 can still be used to represent this but z becomes negative and
the definition of ρWSS changes to represent this new proportion.
 ' '| 1WSS SENS WSS WSSWSS SP WSS SPSP SP IR SP        (5.13)
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Figure 5.20 shows that for two of the sensitivity tests, there is little or no difference in the
interdependency response to the baseline scenario. Each pairwise combination of these three
regressions is compared in a Z-test, (as defined in Eq. 5.1), in which the null hypothesis is that
the slopes of the two regression are equal. In each case the p-value exceeds 0.99 and so the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected, confirming that the regressions are not significantly different.
This means that across the three models, for a particular event, the interdependency response is
the same regardless of the fragility functions used. This occurs when the condition expressed in
Eq. 5.14 is true. Substituting for Eq.’s 5.12 and 5.13 gives Eq. 5.15 and this is rearranged from
Eq.’s 5.16 to 5.20 show that if there are two models, in which the only difference is the fragility
of pumping stations and pipes, they will produce the same interdependency response if the
values of IRWSS and ρWSS are the same. The variation in fragility, represented by ΔSP, drops out
and is not a factor.
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The variables IRWSS and ρWSS both relate to proportions of customers affected by
interdependency. Their values are driven by two aspects: whether or not the pumping station
that the customer is connected to has a functioning mains power supply and if not, whether the
pumping station has a back-up generator. Neither value appears to be explicitly affected by
fragility and so this explains why the baseline scenario and the two more reliable sensitivity
tests produce almost identical regressions. Figure 5.20 also shows that for the two less reliable
fragility sensitivity tests the interdependency responses are lower. For this to occur, then
substituting ‘=’ with ‘>’ in Eq.’s 5.14 to 5.20 gives the condition that ρWSS must be greater than
IRWSS. Given that IRWSS is a function of the baseline pre-interdependency system performance
and therefore constant across all sensitivity tests for a specific event, the implication is that the
value of ρWSS must be influenced by fragility. When fragility is low or moderate, ρWSS = IRWSS,
but when fragility is high, the value of ρWSS increases and ρWSS > IRWSS. This can be explained
with reference to Figure 5.21. If two models with different fragilities are being compared, but
both have low or moderate fragility, then the sum SP'WSS + ΔSP is low and only affects a small
proportion of the population. Assuming that IRWSS, and therefore IRWSS(1-SP'WSS) is relatively
small, the likelihood of overlap between ΔSP and IRWSS(1-SP'WSS) is also relatively small. When
fragility is high then the sum SP'WSS + ΔSP affects a higher proportion of the population and
since, for any two models being compared, the terms SP'WSS and IRWSS(1-SP'WSS) are constant
across both models for a specific event, the likelihood of overlap between ΔSP and is IRWSS(1-
SP'WSS) is higher. The conclusion is that whilst the availability of back-up power is the primary
driver behind the interdependency response, when a system has low physical reliability, it has
an indirect influence on interdependency response, since assets that are vulnerable to power loss
are already classified as ‘failed’ before interdependency is considered. Consequently the
potential for interdependency to have an effect on the system is reduced.
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5.2.4 Extreme event method
A proposed simplified method for deriving the interdependency index, IWSS|EPN, is to estimate it
from the mean interdependency response in the water supply system for cases where there is
complete failure of the electric power network (the extreme event method), as described in
section 3.3. Implementation of the extreme event method is conditional on the assumption that
the relationship between interdependency response and electric power network performance is
linear and passes through, or very close to, the origin – this should occur logically since there
should be no interdependency response if there is no loss of performance in the electric power
network. The data presented in Figure 5.13 and subsequent analysis in section 5.2.1 confirm that
these are reasonable assumptions for this case study, even though a linear function may not be
the optimal fit. Whilst for this case study there is little benefit in applying the extreme event
method over the slope method, the purpose of this analysis is to determine more generally
whether the simpler extreme event method provides a similar result.
The seismic risk assessment in section 5.1 yields just three events in which total loss of
performance occurs in the electric power network. The interdependency responses in these three
cases are 0.30, 0.45 and 0.78, giving a mean value for the interdependency index of 0.51. This is
similar to the value of 0.53 obtained by the slope method but the validity of a value obtained
from just three observations is questionable and the similarity of outputs may be coincidental.
However, the events in seismic risk assessment catalogue can be artificially manipulated so that
a more robust application of the extreme event method is possible. For the manipulated
catalogue hazard and water supply system fragility are not re-analysed and the same ground
motions, ground deformations and physical damage states are assumed as per the original
analysis for each event. However, the fragility of the electric power network is discarded and at
the interdependency simulation stage, the electric power network is simply assumed to have
suffered complete failure and the effect on pumping station is analysed accordingly. Every event
is therefore classified as an extreme event and contributes to the calculation of the
interdependency index using this method. Given that the prior analyses show that electric power
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network is considerably more reliable to earthquakes than the water supply system, these
manipulated events do not represent realistic earthquake scenarios (n.b. they could be realistic
representations of other non-seismic hazards, e.g. atmospheric hazards, which are more likely to
affect the electric power network than the water supply network due to the presence of overhead
cables, or anthropological hazards such as terrorism or cyber-attacks that may be more targeted
to the electric power network). As a means of analysing interdependencies, which is not solely a
seismic phenomenon, these scenarios are valid. Figure 5.22 shows the frequency distribution of
the interdependency indices derived from the 14,428 events in the manipulated catalogue.
Figure 5.22 – Frequency distribution of interdependency indices derived from manipulated seismic risk assessment
catalogue
The results in Figure 5.22 show interdependency indices predominantly in the range between
0.15 and 0.45 and a value of 0.5 is exceeded in only 32 events. The distribution of the results
has a coincident mean and median value of 0.29 and a standard deviation of 0.05. Assuming a
normal distribution, the 95% confidence interval for the mean is 0.19 to 0.40. The
interdependency indices derived using the slope method, 0.48 for the stochastic catalogue and
0.53 for the non-stochastic catalogue, are all significantly higher than this range. In a normal
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distribution the probability of an observation more than three standard deviations higher than
the mean (i.e. > 0.44) is 0.0015.
Given the upwards kink observed in the interdependency response in Figure 5.18, when the
electric power network disconnection is high, it might have been expected that an analysis
focused only on high levels of electric power network disconnection would lead to high
interdependency responses and therefore a higher index. What is observed to occur instead is
that, although barely visible in Figure 5.22, the manipulated catalogue produces values of
interdependency response ranging from 0.15 to 0.78, whilst the original stochastic catalogue
produces responses ranging from 0.30 to 0.78 when there is total disconnection in the electric
power network, albeit with only three observations. In the non-stochastic catalogue there are no
events with total disconnection of the electric power network but there are 17 events in which
disconnection is 0.99. Amongst these events, the interdependency responses range from 0.36 to
0.76 and if the extreme event method is applied to this data, it would yield an interdependency
index of 0.61.The median response in the manipulated catalogue is 0.29, meaning that over half
the observed responses in the manipulated catalogue are lower than the range of responses
observed for the 17 events in the non-stochastic catalogue in which disconnection is 0.99. From
an interdependency perspective, the manipulation of the stochastic catalogue has introduced a
significant number of low impact events that skew the average response downwards.
This skewing is a result of the difference in the nature of the hazard in the catalogues. The
original stochastic and non-stochastic catalogues contain only realistic earthquake scenarios,
whereas the manipulated catalogue contains a much wider range of performance scenarios
including many that would have an extremely low probability of occurring due to an earthquake
but that may occur due to other hazards. The reason why realistic earthquakes produce higher
interdependency responses can be demonstrated by investigating the relationship between the
electric power network performance and the pre-interdependency performance of the water
supply system. Figure 5.23 shows the two performances plotted against each other per event for
the original stochastic and non-stochastic catalogues.
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Figure 5.23 – Scatter plot of performance metrics observation pairs for the electric power network and water supply
system for the original stochastic (left) and non-stochastic (right) catalogues
In both cases there is a strong positive correlation between the two performances, 0.85 for the
stochastic catalogue and 0.87 for the non-stochastic catalogue. The plots show that when
disconnection in the electric power network is high, disconnection in the water supply system is
also high. In the non-stochastic catalogue, for events where disconnection in the electric power
network exceeds 0.9 (38 events), the minimum level of disconnection in the water supply
system is 0.78. In the manipulated catalogue, while disconnection in the electric power network
is fixed at 1.0, the disconnection in the water supply system is distributed as shown in Figure
5.23, where less than 1% of events result in disconnection greater than 0.5.
Furthermore, Figure 5.24 shows how the interdependency response varies with pre-
interdependency performance of the water supply system for the original stochastic and non-
stochastic catalogues. Although the relationship is not as strong as with the electric power
network, the two plots do suggest a moderate trend for interdependency response increasing as
pre-interdependency disconnection increases. Therefore, in realistic earthquake scenarios, both
electric power network disconnection and pre-interdependency water supply system
disconnection are expected to be high at the same time due to observed correlation.
Furthermore, since both these conditions are related to high values of interdependency response,
it follows that in realistic earthquake scenarios, interdependency response will be high. In the
manipulated catalogue where the correlation between performances has been artificially fixed to
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zero, the inclusion of events in which the pre-interdependency disconnection in the water supply
system is low causes the downwards shift in the average interdependency response.
Figure 5.24 – Plot of observed interdependency response against pre-interdependency water supply system
performance for 228 events in stochastic catalogue where electric power network suffered loss of performance (left)
and non-stochastic catalogue (right)
The analysis indicates that the scale of the dependency of one system on another varies
according to the type of hazard and the type of the damage and performance scenarios that can
realistically be expected from that hazard. The use of a manipulated or artificial catalogue, in
which the performance of at least one of the systems is assumed rather than explicitly modelled,
ignores any correlation between performances that might occur due to a specific type of hazard.
It is representative of a wide range of possible performance combinations irrespective of hazard.
An index derived in this way could therefore be described as hazard-independent. However, for
hazards such as earthquakes where there is correlation between performances, only a narrower
range of performance combinations is likely. Therefore for an analysis involving only this
hazard it is more accurate to derive an index based only on realistic scenarios, (although this
may only be possible when resources are available for explicit fragility and performance
modelling of both systems).
The proposed extreme event method relies on there being events in which there is total
disconnection in the supporting system. In this case study, neither of the realistic catalogues
produced a large number of applicable events. To approximate the interdependency index,
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relaxing the extreme event criterion to disconnection levels above 0.9, yields 38 events in the
non-stochastic catalogue with an average interdependency response of 0.59. This is higher than
calculated by the slope method (0.53) but is based on a considerably smaller sample so the
validity of the extreme event method as an approximation of the slope method is inconclusive.
The lack of observations acts as a limiting factor to the application of the extreme event method
to realistic catalogues. In this case study where the supporting system is highly reliable, there
are too few events with high levels of disconnection to make the extreme event method viable.
However, there may be more potential for application of the method to case studies where the
supporting system is less physically reliable.
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6. Conclusions
6.1 Research summary
The literature review in Chapter 2 demonstrates that although the seismic risk assessment of
critical infrastructure systems is not a new topic for academic research, there are shortcomings
in previous studies, particularly with respect to the lack of calibration or validation of proposed
models and the treatment of interdependencies. Although there is now around 15 years of
literature on the issue interdependencies, many studies still fail to consider them and there is no
consensus on their application in seismic risk assessment. There is also no consensus on their
measurement, with many studies subjectively quantifying the strength of coupling between
systems. More specifically for the case of insurance loss estimation, there are no existing
methods or frameworks that are completely adequate for commercial application and there are
no guidelines for the development of new seismic risk assessment models. The findings of the
literature review support the three objectives of the research set out in the introduction, which
are: to produce a modelling framework that outlines methodologies for the development and
application of seismic risk assessment models for the specific requirements of the insurance
sector; to demonstrate the application of the modelling framework with a case study validated
on observed data; and to propose and test a method for the quantification of interdependencies
between infrastructure systems.
A general method for conducting the seismic risk assessment of critical infrastructure systems
that is applicable to the insurance sector is proposed in Chapter 3. The method brings together
individual concepts from existing literature such as Hazus and the SYNER-G project and is
framed in terms of the three loss estimation modules that are already widely in use in
catastrophe models in the insurance sector: hazard, vulnerability and loss. The modules are sub-
divided into a simple eight-step procedure: the classification of infrastructure system assets
(exposure); the creation of a stochastic event catalogue; the prediction of seismic hazard
intensities; the evaluation of asset failure probabilities; the deterministic assignment of
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functional states to assets; the measurement of system performance accounting for
interdependencies; the modelling of asset restoration times; and the estimation of direct and
indirect financial losses. The proposed seismic risk assessment method is only conceptual but is
followed by a set of more specific model development guidelines that will enable insurers to
select model components that are tailored to their study area of interest rather than relying on a
one-size-fits-all model that has itself been tailored to a specific geographical region (e.g. Hazus
for the United States, SYNER-G for Europe). The framework allows for the development of
new model components and functions based on empirical data if these are available or the
adoption of existing model components from the literature, provided their use can be validated
and justified. The guidelines acknowledge the limitations that insurers have in terms of data
availability, resources and expertise for model development and so in the case of some of the
most complex or poorly understood model components – e.g. spatial correlation, liquefaction
triggering and interdependency modelling – the guidelines lists specific methods that are
suitable within these limitations.
The model development framework is applied to the case study of the electric power network
and the water supply system in Christchurch. As well as being a demonstration of the
framework, the case study produces significant research value through the development of new
model components and functions to illuminate problems that have not been adequately
addressed previously. In relation to seismic hazard, the case study leads to the development of a
new spatial correlation model and a new simplified liquefaction triggering model. A range of
existing methods for developing spatial correlation models are tested using data from strong
motion stations recorded during the Canterbury earthquake sequence and the model developed
using the method of Jayaram and Baker (2009) is found to be the most efficient. It is the first
spatial correlation model that has been developed for Christchurch (or for anywhere in New
Zealand), and can be applied to any future study that requires the prediction of ground motions
in the city and surrounding area.
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Three existing methods for simplified modelling of liquefaction triggering are tested including
the Liquefaction Potential Index (LPI), Hazus and the Zhu et al. (2015) model. Comparisons of
model predictions with observations from the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes using
contingency table analysis show that the LPI method performs best. Two new modifications to
the LPI method are also proposed, which make use of VS30 data, which is more widely available
than the VS data needed for the original method. Whilst the model based on direct substitution of
VS for VS30 does not yield good predictions, the model that uses of VS30 to simulate realistic VS
profiles is the second best performing model. Given the issues relating to data availability, the
proposed modified LPI method (with simulated VS profiles) will be more useful to the insurance
industry as a tool for assessment of liquefaction triggering. All three versions of the model
proposed by Zhu et al. (2015) also perform well, but with the caveat that the level of
performance by applying a very low threshold probability (0.1) for liquefaction occurrence,
suggesting that the model may be biased towards negative prediction, although it must be
acknowledged that the Zhu et al. models have not been developed with the intention of making
site-specific predictions. It is found that the Hazus model performs very poorly, with significant
bias towards negative prediction, i.e. underestimating the extent of liquefaction. This is an
important result, since although the Hazus method is only intended for the United States, it is
used widely by researchers for studies located elsewhere and has effectively become the default
method for simplified liquefaction triggering analysis regardless of location. The analysis in this
thesis shows not only that the assumption of the Hazus model potentially unreliable outside of
the United States, but also that there are other alternative simplified methods that could be
applied instead. In the proposed seismic risk assessment model development guidelines, it is
advised that all simplified models are tested in order to find the one most suitable for the study
area.
For damage assessment, new fragility and repair rate functions are developed for buried cables,
substations, pipes, wells and pumping stations. The repair rate functions developed for buried
cables are the first to ever be produced that distinguish buried cables from overhead lines. They
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are developed for specific typologies that exist in the Christchurch distribution network
(PILCA, XLPE, PILCA HDPE), but the paucity of alternatives for modelling damage to
electrical conduits means that they may be of value for any analysis of seismic damage to buried
cables. The repair rate analysis finds that insulation material is the primary factor affecting the
fragility of cables, which is relatively unaffected by conduction material or age. The analysis
also supports the hypothesis of Kwasinski et al. (2014), who postulated that liquefaction is the
predominant hazard affecting cable performance and that ground shaking should have minimal
impact, since the materials used to construct most electrical cables should be able to absorb the
levels of ground strain generated by earthquakes. For substations, two existing methods (Hazus
and SYNER-G) are tested against observations from the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes
and both are found to significantly overestimate damage. Since there are insufficient data to
produced completely new fragility functions, Bayesian analysis is applied using the GEM
procedure to update the Hazus fragility functions with the observed data. The resulting fragility
function, which only predicts probability of failure, is applicable beyond Christchurch to
substations in any system that has undergone significant seismic strengthening.
Although there are many existing repair rate functions in the literature, this thesis has produced
new repair rate functions specifically for application in Christchurch. These differ from other
repair rate functions developed for Christchurch by O’Rourke et al. (2014) since they are
developed using a higher resolution analysis of observed IMs. The functions are developed for
specific typologies that exist in Christchurch and more generally for brittle and ductile pipes.
For wells and pumping stations, Hazus is the only existing source for fragility functions.
Comparison of model predictions with observations from the Darfield and Christchurch
earthquakes shows that the Hazus function significantly overestimates damage. Therefore,
Bayesian analysis is applied using the GEM procedure to update the Hazus fragility functions
with the observed data, to create a new function for estimating probability of failure. Since there
is a lack of existing fragility functions for modelling damage to these assets, the new functions
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are useful as they provide a possible alternative to the original Hazus functions for any study on
seismic performance of water supply systems.
A selection of candidate models are applied to a simplified version of the electric power
network and water supply system in Christchurch and validated by comparing predicted system
performance metrics with corresponding observed values. Two methods for predicting
liquefaction triggering (LPI and modified LPI with simulated VS profiles) and two methods for
applying interdependencies (by mapped supply zones and by geographical proximity) are tested
in the candidate models. The original LPI method leads to significant under-prediction of
customer disconnection in the electric power network, whereas the mean performance
prediction when using the modified LPI method has an error (relative to observed performance)
that is comparable to previous critical infrastructure risk assessments. With the constraint of
applying the modified LPI methods, the smallest error in the prediction of water supply system
performance is achieved when interdependencies are designated by supply zones. This error is
also comparable to previous studies. It is also noted however, that the modelling combination of
the original LPI method and interdependencies designated by geographical proximity also
produces low error predictions for the water supply system. No wider conclusions can therefore
be drawn regarding the effectiveness of the liquefaction triggering or interdependency
modelling methods, but for this specific case study, a model that uses the modified LPI method
and designates interdependencies by supply zones is the only one that is valid. The validated
model is tested for geospatial precision in the electric power network by comparing outage
predictions to observations at the meshblock level. For the water supply system, geospatial
precision is assessed by comparison of predicted to observed proportions of pipe repairs in each
pressure zone. Both tests find that the model is sufficiently precise in its geospatial predictions
of damage.
The final validated model is applied for future risk projection in Christchurch. In hazard terms,
the model generates 14,428 events in 10,000 years. Despite the devastating effects of events in
the Canterbury earthquake sequence, the model indicates that liquefaction is a rare occurrence,
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which is predicted to occur in less than 3% of events. As expected, the model predicts that the
areas the River Avon are likely to be most frequently affected by liquefaction, while the Port
Hills area to the south of city is least vulnerable to liquefaction. However, it is the predicted
engineering risk that is of most value. The forecasts from the engineering analysis can be used
by the system operators, Orion and Christchurch City Council, to assist with disaster
management and emergency planning. In particular, the results help to identify assets most at
risk of failure, and neighbourhoods most at risk of disconnection.
The analysis shows that the electric power network is extremely reliable in earthquakes, with
damage only predicted in 228 events and in most cases the level of customer disconnection is
low (<25%). This reflects the observation that buried cables are predominantly affected by
liquefaction rather than ground shaking and is a vindication of the strategy implemented by
Orion to seismically strengthening their assets following the Edgecumbe earthquake. The
locations of electric power network assets that are most frequently predicted to fail correspond
to the areas that are also most vulnerable to liquefaction, around the city centre and the River
Avon, with the Oxford-Tuam and Montreal substations at particularly high risk. However,
sensitivity testing of potential mitigation strategies identify the Dallington, Pages-Kearneys and
Rawhiti substations as those that are most beneficial to system performance if strengthened.
Geospatial predictions of outage by meshblock show that the most areas at most risk are the city
centre, the suburbs to the north and east and a small part of the Port Hills area to the south.
However, whilst the electric power network is reliable in most events, the system risk curve
shows that significant disruption, including potentially complete outage, can be expected for
strong low frequency events. This is an important finding since there is a high dependency on
electric power from other critical infrastructure systems, in particular water supply, waste water
collection, storm water collection, telecommunications, railways and air transport (Lamb, 1997).
Therefore, these low frequency events can be considered to be high impact events in terms of
infrastructure reliability.
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The water supply system is significantly less reliable than the electric power network with loss
of performance predicted to occur in all events although the level of customer disconnection is
mostly between 10%-30%. Damage to pipes is predicted in every event including weaker high
frequency events. This indicates that seismic upgrading of pipes should be a priority action.
Pumping stations are more reliable with failures predicted to occur in only 500 events, although
in the most damaging earthquakes, a higher proportion of pumping stations are predicted to fail
than pipes. Therefore, whilst the fragility of pumping stations, and in particular wells, which are
representative of primary pumping station fragility, become a critical factor in strong long return
period earthquakes, the main source of vulnerability in the water supply system across all events
is the fragility of the pipes. Sensitivity testing of potential mitigation strategies shows that
strengthening of even the most vulnerable pumping stations leads to negligible improvement in
system reliability. Geospatial predictions of disconnection by meshblock show that the areas at
most risk are Riccarton, Edgeware, Linwood, Halswell, Lyttelton and Governor’s Bay. System
risk curves produced for the two interdependency methods confirm that modelling
interdependency by proximity is conservative compared to modelling interdependency by
known connections, although due to the reliability of the electric power network the difference
is only observable in low frequency events.
Two methods for quantifying interdependency using results from a seismic risk assessment
model are proposed in this research, based on modifications to the Leontief input-output
method. For both methods two new metrics are defined. The interdependency response is the
proportional loss of functionality in a system due specifically to interdependency effects and
varies between events. The interdependency index is the expected interdependency response in
a dependent system when there is total failure in the supporting system, and is assumed to be
constant for a pair of systems. The interdependency index takes a value between 0 and 1 and is
an objective measure of interdependency that can be used for risk management, as proposed in
the research objectives.
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In the first method (the ‘linear slope method’), a linear function is fit through a plot of predicted
interdependency responses in the water supply system against predicted electric power network
system performances and the gradient of the best fit line is approximately equal to the
interdependency index. The analysis is conducted for the 228 events from the future risk
projection in which outages are predicted for the electric power network and then repeated for a
non-stochastic event set designed to increase the number of observations at poor performance
levels. Both analyses produce plots with a high correlation and for which a linear function is a
good fit, and hence validates the proposed method in concept. The stochastic events yield an
interdependency index of 0.48 and the non-stochastic events yield an interdependency index
0.53, both of which indicate a moderate level of interdependency between the two systems.
However, the slopes are found to be significantly different and it is concluded that the result
from the non-stochastic event set method is more reliable for this analysis, since it incorporates
a better distribution of events (in terms of system performance) and in any case, the proposed
interdependency index is deterministic and so does not require a probabilistic event set. If this
method is applied by others, it is recommended that a non-stochastic catalogue is used to avoid
underestimating the interdependency index. Non-linear functions are also tested and do produce
better fits through the data. However, there are significant complexities associated with
application of indices derived in this way and comparisons of indices across different pairs of
systems are invalid if they have been derived using different functional forms. Therefore this
method is not suitable for commercial application.
Sensitivity tests are applied to the ‘linear slope method’ to assess how the interdependency
index is affected by the availability of back-up power and by the fragility of assets in the water
supply system. The results show that the interdependency index changes relatively uniformly
with the availability of back-up power but in the opposite direction, i.e. increasing the number
of generators decreases the index. Asset fragility only affects the index when fragility is high. In
this scenario, the increase in the number of assets that are physically damaged means that there
are fewer assets remaining that are susceptible to interdependent failure. Whilst increasing
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fragility leads to a smaller interdependency index, decreasing fragility has negligible impact.
Therefore, although seismic upgrading of assets improves the physical reliability of a system, it
potentially has no impact on the ability of the system to resist the effects of interdependencies.
The second proposed interdependency quantification method (the ‘extreme event method’) is a
simplification of the ‘linear slope method’ that takes advantage of the assumption that the best
fit line in the ‘linear slope method’ passes close to the origin and therefore, its slope is equal to
the expected interdependency response in the dependent system when there is total outage in the
supporting system. The analysis shows that this can be estimated from the results of a seismic
risk assessment of the two systems, as long as there are sufficient data at that performance level.
However, if performance data are available for both systems, there is little value in this method
since the ‘linear slope method’ can be applied with only marginally greater computational
effort. The potential value of the ‘extreme event method’ derives from being able to estimate the
interdependency index when performance data are only available for the dependent system. This
is done by artificially fixing the performance in the supporting system to total outage for every
scenario event. However, the analysis shows that this method is only valid for hazards where the
performance of the two systems is uncorrelated and so the artificial performance combinations
are realistic. For earthquakes, there is likely to be high correlation between system performances
and so the method cannot be used. Therefore, the proposed ‘extreme event method’ may have
some limited value for quantifying interdependency, but not in the specific case of seismic risk.
6.2 Discussion of limitations
Although this research has produced a number of important and useful findings of scientific
interest, it is necessary to highlight some of its limitations. New liquefaction triggering models
have been developed for Christchurch based on USGS VS30 data as a proxy for VS profiles.
However, this is only example and no conclusions can be drawn on the method’s wider
applicability Furthermore since the method is based on VS approximations, it is recommended to
only use it for regional scale analysis and not for site-specific analysis. It is stated in the model
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development framework that an analyst should not develop an empirical model for predicting
the scale of permanent ground deformations. The lack of existing models however, leads to a
reliance on the Hazus models, which have been developed specifically for the United States and
may not be valid elsewhere. This is a significant issue for infrastructure assets such as buried
cables and pipes, which are particularly susceptible to liquefaction. Despite this, no attempt has
been made in this research to develop a new prediction model.
The fragility analysis and damage assignment methods proposed in the seismic risk assessment
method focus on operational failure rather than damage states. This is due to the focus of this
research on system performance (to inform indirect loss estimations), which only requires
knowledge of whether an asset is operational. For comprehensive loss estimation however,
modelling of damage states and subsequent repair costs should be carried out. More detailed
system performance modelling could also be conducted by considering serviceability in addition
to connectivity. Connectivity analysis may overstate the true performance of a system as it
ignores scenarios where a connection exists but the level of service is sub-standard. However,
consideration of serviceability adds significant complexity to the analysis and is not deemed to
be suitable for application in the insurance sector.
There are limitations in relation to specific components of the case study model. In the fragility
analysis, only empirical methods are considered for the development of new fragility functions.
This is because the model development guidelines have been produced primarily for use in the
insurance sector, for whom empirical methods are the most practical, and the case study
application is intended to reflect that. In practice however, it is possible that analytical methods
would produce more accurate fragility functions for the assets that are studied. Also in relation
to fragility functions, no uncertainty in measurements of ground shaking or ground deformation
are considered, although it should be noted that this is exceptionally rare amongst existing
fragility functions and so does not depart from current practice. This may however be
particularly significant for the fragility and repair rate functions developed in terms of
permanent ground deformations, given the uncertainty associated with the LiDAR
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measurements used here. Restoration time modelling is important for predicting business
interruption losses, which are time dependent. However, it has not been considered in the case
study due to limitations associated with existing functions and a lack of observed data with
which to develop new functions. The procedure for simulating interdependencies by nodal
analysis, becomes more complex when there are more than two systems, especially if there are
feedback relationships. Although the procedure for dealing with this is briefly alluded to in the
literature review, it has not been possible to demonstrate this practically due to a lack of data
from additional infrastructure systems.
As part of the model development testing, the case study draws some conclusions regarding the
suitability of different methods, specifically in relation to liquefaction triggering, fragility
functions and interdependency simulation. It must be stressed that these conclusions are valid
only for the Christchurch case study. More generally, The final model has not been validated on
independent data, and this could be considered to be a limitation. However, it is important to
consider that independent validations are non-existent in the literature on post-disaster critical
infrastructure performance and even examples such as this case study, where models are
developed and tested on the same dataset are exceptionally rare. Therefore, although the lack of
independent validation is in theory a limitation, when viewed within the context of previous
studies, the exercise presented in this thesis exceeds most current practice.
For interdependency quantification, the proposed methods have been based on the Leontief
input-output method for interdependency simulation. This has been chosen for its relative
simplicity and the clarity it gives to the definition of interdependency indices. As such it is the
most suitable approach for insurers or risk managers who require a simple and objective method
for describing interdependency. It has been assumed that whilst there other conceptual
approaches to interdependency modelling (e.g. system dynamics, agent-based modelling) that
could be used as a basis for quantification, these are too complex for the intended end use and
so this research has not attempted to use these methods. Furthermore, the proposed
interdependency quantification methods are applied only to measurements of system
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performance in terms of customer disconnection, which are numerically constrained. No other
metrics are tested and so no conclusions can be drawn regarding the wider applicability of the
methods. Also the case study to which the methods are applied considers only two systems with
a one-way dependency. Due to lack of data, it does not consider the case where a system is
dependent on more than one supporting system, or the case where there is a two-way
dependency that causes feedback. The former is straightforward but requires additional
modelling steps, since ‘marginal’ system performances need to be modelled to isolate the
individual effect of each supporting system so that distinct plots of interdependency response
versus supporting system performance can be produced. The latter is more complex since the
feedback introduces multiple cycles of observations of interdependency response versus
supporting system performance and so further investigation is needed to consider how data from
different cycles are treated.
6.3 Future research opportunities
The limitations of this thesis also present opportunities for potential future research. The model
development guidelines have only been applied to a single case study and it would valuable to
demonstrate its utility by applying it to other case studies where sufficient data are available. It
would be of particular value if they could be applied to a case study where there are data for
empirical model development and independent data for model validation. Given that
infrastructure performance data is generally poorly recorded after earthquakes, the likelihood of
two high quality independent datasets for the same location is low. However, as the earthquake
engineering, insurance and disaster management communities become increasingly conscious of
the seismic risk to infrastructure, there is an opportunity for practitioners to start taking a more
proactive approach to data collection in disaster scenarios, rather than relying on infrastructure
operators whose focus is usually elsewhere in the aftermath of natural catastrophes. Other
valuable extensions to the case study presented here would be the inclusion of more than two
systems, the inclusion of systems with multiple dependencies, and the inclusion of two-way
dependencies with feedback. Further comparative studies would also be useful to test the wider
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validity of the conclusions drawn in this research concerning the relative performance of
interdependency simulation by geographical proximity and interdependency simulation by
known connections.
Liquefaction is extremely important to critical infrastructure risk and the prediction of
permanent ground deformations is a major shortcoming that needs to be addressed. In terms of
liquefaction triggering, this research proposes a modified version of the LPI method based on
simulated profiles. While it is shown to predict liquefaction relatively well in Christchurch, its
wider applicability needs to be tested with a new case study. A comparison between the
effectiveness of the empirical fragility functions proposed in this research and alternative
fragility functions developed by analytical methods would be useful to assist Orion and
Christchurch City Council with the risk management of their assets. Restoration time modelling
is important for estimating business interruption losses and for emergency management
purposes but there are few existing sources for this. Additional studies into restoration times and
how they interact with interdependencies have the potential to provide significant commercial
value in the catastrophe modelling sector.
This research proposed two methods for interdependency quantification. The ‘linear slope
method’ depends on being able to approximate the plot of interdependency responses versus
supporting system performances as a linear function that passes close to the origin. This was
demonstrated for the case study presented here but should be tested with new case studies.
There is also a need to test the method with more complicated interdependency scenarios, such
as dependencies on multiple systems or two-way interdependencies. The ‘extreme event
method’ does not work with seismic risk due to the correlation of performances between
systems. It may be applicable for scenarios where performances are uncorrelated but this
hypothesis needs to be tested.
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6.4 Concluding remarks
Despite the limitations that have been identified and the gaps in research that have yet to be
explored, the investigation presented in this thesis makes a significant contribution to both
academic and commercial understanding of seismic risk to critical infrastructure. The spatial
correlation model for Christchurch will enhance future studies of seismic hazard in the city and
the new fragility functions will enable more precise modelling of risk to infrastructure assets in
Christchurch, but also more widely they present an alternative to the limited number of existing
functions and especially the often automatic adoption of Hazus functions. In particular the repair
rate function for buried cables will be extremely valuable since it is the first of its kind globally.
The model development framework will be useful for then insurance sector for the development
of bespoke models and the simplified method that has been developed for liquefaction
triggering will enhance the capability of insurers to model this hazard, which is currently
deficient. Finally, the analysis of interdependency response in the water supply system has
provided new theoretical insight into the relationship between dependent and supporting
infrastructure systems, and the proposed interdependency index, which is objective and
straightforward to derive, is a useful tool for insurers or other analysts to quantify those
relationships and understand their relative importance for risk management.
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Appendix B:
Infrastructure System Taxonomy
Electric power
Study Components Attributes
ATC-13 (ATC, 1985) Generation plants
Transmission lines
Substations
Building construction class
None
Building construction class
ATC-25 (ATC, 1991) Generation plants
Transmission lines
Distribution lines
Transmission substations
Distribution substations
Fossil fuel or hydro
None
None
None
None
Shinozuka and Tanaka
(1996)
Gate station
Transmission lines
Substations
Buried cables
None
Voltage
Voltage
Voltage
Vanzi (1996) Generation plants
Transmission lines
Substations
None
Voltage
Hierarchy
American Lifelines Alliance
(Taylor et al., 2005)
SCADA equipment
Transmission substations
Transmission lines
Transmission towers
Distribution substations
Distribution lines
Distribution transformers
Office buildings
Office equipment
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
RISK-UE (Pitilakis et al.,
2006)
Generation plants
Substations
Lines
Capacity, Seismic design
Hierarchy, Voltage, Seismic design
Hierarchy, Seismic design
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Study Components Attributes
Shinozuka et al. (2007) Generation plants
Substations
Transmission lines
None
Seismic design
None
Adachi and Ellingwood
(2008)
Gate stations
Substations
Transmission lines
Buried cables
None
Voltage
Voltage
Voltage
Rasulo et al. (2008) Generation plants
Substations
Transmission lines
None
None
Voltage
Azevedo et al. (2009) Transformers
Generation plants
Distribution circuits
Substations
None
Capacity, Seismic design
Seismic design
Voltage, Seismic design
Hazus-MH (DHS, 2009) Generation plants
Distribution circuits
Substations
Capacity, Seismic design
Seismic design
Voltage, Seismic design
Reed et al. (2009) Distribution lines None
Kim et al. (2010) Gate stations
Substations
Transmission lines
Voltage, Seismic design
Voltage, Seismic design
None
Hernandez-Fajardo and
Duenas-Osorio (2011)
Gate stations
Substations
Transmission lines
None
Voltage
None
Leelardcharoen (2011) Control centres
Generation plants
Substations
Transmission lines
None
None
Voltage
None
Poljansek et al. (2012) Generation plants
Substations
Transmission lines
Capacity, Seismic design
Voltage, Seismic design
None
Cavalieri et al. (2014) Generation plants
Substations
Transmission lines
Capacity, Seismic design
None
None
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Study Components Attributes
SYNER-G (Pitilakis et al.,
2014)
Generation plants
Substations
Transmission lines
Capacity, Seismic design
None
None
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Water supply
Study Components Attributes
ATC-13 (ATC, 1985) Treatment plants
Pipes
Pumping stations
Storage tanks
Building construction class
Material, Diameter, Joint, Elevation
Building construction class
Elevation
ATC-25 (ATC, 1991) Aqueducts
Pumping stations
Storage reservoirs
Treatment plants
Storage tanks
Trunk lines
Wells
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
Shinozuka and Tanaka
(1996)
Wells
Pumping stations
Storage tanks
Pipes
Not described
Not described
Not described
Not described
Hwang et al. (1998) Wells
Pumping stations
Storage tanks
Pipes
None
Not described
Not described
Material, Diameter
American Lifelines Alliance
(2001)
Aqueducts
Distribution pipes
Storage tanks
Tunnels
Canals
Valves and SCADA
Elevation, Redundancy,
Appurtenances, Pumps
Material, Diameter, Corrosion
protection, Air valves
Foundation, Roof type, Capacity,
Anchorage
Construction
Geometry, Capacity, Locations of
siphons, flumes, crossings and
other in-line components
None
Chang et al. (2002) Wells
Pumping stations
Pipes
Not described
Not described
Not described
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Study Components Attributes
RISK-UE (Pitilakis et al.,
2006)
Source
Treatment plant
Pumping station
Storage tank
SCADA
Pipes
Tunnels
Canals
Capacity, Power, Pump, Building,
Seismic design
Capacity, Seismic design
Capacity, Power, Building, Seismic
design
Capacity, Material, Size, Seismic
design, Anchorage, Elevation, Roof
type
None
Elevation, Material, Geometry,
Joint type, Corrosiveness, Branches
Construction, Ground conditions
Construction, Reinforcement
Adachi and Ellingwood
(2008)
Pumping stations
Storage tanks
Pipes
Capacity, Seismic design
Elevation, Anchorage, Material
Material, Joint type, Diameter, Soil
conditions
Rasulo et al. (2008) Pipes None
Azevedo et al. (2009) Pipes
Treatment plants
Pumping stations
Wells
Storage tanks
None
Capacity, Seismic design
Capacity, Seismic design
None
Elevation, Anchorage, Material
Hazus-MH (DHS, 2009) Pipes
Treatment plants
Pumping stations
Wells
Storage tanks
Material
Capacity, Seismic design
Capacity, Seismic design
None
Elevation, Anchorage, Material
Javanbarg and Takada
(2009)
Source
Treatment plant
Distribution plant
Pumping stations
Storage tanks
Pipes
None
None
None
None
None
Material
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Study Components Attributes
Tang and Wen (2009) Wells
Pumping stations
Pipes
None
None
None
Kim et al. (2010) Pumping stations
Pipes
Storage tanks
Capacity, Seismic design
Material
Elevation, Anchorage, Material
Wang et al. (2010) Reservoirs
Storage tanks
Pumping stations
Pipes
None
None
None
Material, Diameter
Hernandez-Fajardo and
Duenas-Osorio (2011)
Pumping stations
Pipes
Storage tanks
Capacity, Seismic design
Material
Elevation, Anchorage, Material
SYNER-G (Pitilakis et al.,
2014)
Wells
Treatment plants
Pumping stations
Storage tanks
Canals
Tunnels
Pipes
Seismic design
None
Seismic design
Material, Roof type, Anchorage,
Elevation
Reinforcement
Construction, Ground conditions
Material
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Waste water
Study Components Attributes
ATC-13 (ATC, 1985) Treatment plants
Pipes
Pumping stations
Building construction class
Material, Diameter, Joint, Elevation
Building construction class
ATC-25 (ATC, 1991) Mains
Pumping stations
Treatment plants
None
None
None
RISK-UE (Pitilakis et al.,
2006)
Treatment plants
Lift station
SCADA
Pipes
Tunnels
Capacity, Seismic design
Capacity, Seismic design
Anchorage, Valve intervals
Elevation, Material, Geometry,
Joint type, Corrosiveness, Branches
Construction, Ground conditions
Hazus-MH (DHS, 2009) Pipes
Treatment plants
Lift stations
Material
Capacity, Seismic design
Capacity, Seismic design
SYNER-G (Pitilakis et al.,
2014)
Treatment plants
Lift stations
Tunnels
Pipes
Seismic design
Seismic design
Construction, Ground conditions
Material
360
Natural gas
Study Components Attributes
ATC-13 (ATC, 1985) Holding facilities
Compressor stations
Transmission lines
Distribution mains
Building construction class
Building construction class
Material, Diameter, Joint, Elevation
Material, Diameter, Joint, Elevation
ATC-25 (ATC, 1991) Transmission lines
Compressor stations
Distribution mains
None
None
None
RISK-UE (Pitilakis et al.,
2006)
Production plants
Tank farms
Pipelines
Stations
Seismic design
Seismic design
Material, Diameter, Joint type, Soil
conditions
Seismic design
Chang and Song (2007) Stations
Pipelines
None
Soil conditions, Material, Joint type
Azevedo et al. (2009) Pipelines
Compressor stations
Material
Seismic design
Hazus-MH (DHS, 2009) Pipelines
Compressor stations
Material
Seismic design
Poljansek et al. (2012) Pipelines
Compressor stations
Material
Seismic design
SYNER-G (Pitilakis et al.,
2014)
Pipelines
Compressor stations
Tank farms
Material, Diameter, Joint type, Soil
conditions
Seismic design
Seismic design
Esposito et al. (2015) Pipelines
Compressor stations
Tank farms
Regulators
Material, Diameter, Joint type, Soil
conditions
Seismic design
Seismic design
None
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Oil delivery
Study Components Attributes
ATC-25 (ATC, 1991) Oil fields
Refineries
Transmission pipelines
Storage tanks
None
None
None
None
Azevedo et al. (2009) Refineries
Pipelines
Pumping stations
Tank farms
Capacity, Seismic design
Material
Seismic design
Seismic design
Hazus-MH (DHS, 2009) Refineries
Pipelines
Pumping stations
Tank farms
Capacity, Seismic design
Material
Seismic design
Seismic design
SYNER-G (Pitilakis et al.,
2014)
Processing plants
Pipelines
Pumping stations
Tank farms
Material, Diameter, Joint type, Soil
conditions
Seismic design
Seismic design
362
Telecoms
Study Components Attributes
ATC-13 (ATC, 1985) Switching offices
Towers
Building construction class
None
RISK-UE (Pitilakis et al.,
2006)
Central offices
Cables
Anchorage
Material, Installation, Depth
Hazus-MH (DHS, 2009) Central offices
Transmission lines
Cabling
Seismic design
None
None
Reed et al., 2009 Lines None
Leelardcharoen (2011) Lines
Offices
None
None
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Highways
Study Components Attributes
ATC-13 (ATC, 1985) Bridges
Tunnels
Roads
Terminal stations
Hierarchy
None
Hierarchy
Building construction class
ATC-25 (ATC, 1991) Bridges
Tunnels
Roads
None
None
None
Kawakami (2000) Roads Hierarchy
RISK-UE (Pitilakis et al.,
2006)
Roads
Bridges
Tunnels
Geometry, Topography, Building
environment
Material, Structure, Pier type,
Connection type, Bearing type,
Span, Age, Number of spans, Skew
Span length, Height, Number of
expansion joints, Foundation type
Construction, Ground conditions
Shiraki et al. (2007) Bridges
Roads
None
None
Rasulo et al. (2008) Bridges
Tunnels
Roads
Embankments
Retaining walls
Not described
Not described
Not described
Not described
Not described
Azevedo et al. (2009) Roads
Bridges
Viaducts
Tunnels
None
Material, Number of spans,
Connection type, Deck type,
Number of column alignments,
Environment, Age
same as for bridges
Not described
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Study Components Attributes
Hazus-MH (DHS, 2009) Roads
Bridges
Tunnels
Hierarchy
Age, Construction, Seismic design,
Number of spans, Skew, Width,
Length, Maximum span
Construction
Guikema and Gardoni
(2009)
Bridges Span, Centre span, Geometry, Soil
stiffness, Material, Dead loads
Jayaram and Baker (2010) Bridges Age, Construction, Seismic design,
Number of spans, Skew, Width,
Length, Maximum span
SYNER-G (Pitilakis et al.,
2014)
Tunnels
Embankments
Trenches
Slopes
Roads
Bridge abutments
Construction, Ground conditions,
Hierarchy
Height
None
None
Number of lanes
Height
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Appendix C:
Infrastructure Fragility Functions
Electric power
Study IM(s) Typologies
Generation plants
Hazus (DHS, 2009) PGA, PGDf Capacity, Seismic design
Substations
Ang et al. (1996)
Hwang and Chou (1998)
Vanzi (2000)
Rasulo et al. (2004)
Hazus (DHS, 2009)
PGA
PGA
PGA
PGA
PGA, PGDf
Voltage
Seismic design
None
None
Voltage, Seismic design
Distribution circuits
Hazus (DHS, 2009) PGA, PGDf Seismic design
Conduits
Park et al. (2006) PGA, PGV, MMI None
Circuit breakers
Agnanos and Ostrom (2000)
Rasulo et al. (2004)
Vanzi et al. (2004)
Shinozuka et al. (2007)
Straub and Der Kiureghian (2008)
PGA
PGA
PGA
PGA
PGA
None
None
None
None
None
Lightning arresters
Hwang and Huo (1998)
Agnanos (1999)
PGA
PGA
None
Voltage
Disconnect switch
Ang et al. (1996)
Agnanos (1999)
PGA
PGA
None
Voltage, Seismic design
Agnanos and Ostrom (2000)
Shinozuka et al. (2007)
PGA
PGA
None
None
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Study IM(s) Typologies
Transformers
Hwang and Huo (1998)
Agnanos (1999)
Liu et al. (2003)
Shinozuka et al. (2007)
Straub and Der Kiureghian (2008)
PGA
PGA
PGA
PGA
PGA
None
None
Voltage
None
None
Coil support
Rasulo et al. (2004) PGA None
Current transformer
Rasulo et al. (2004) PGA None
Voltage transformer
Rasulo et al. (2004) PGA None
Horizontal sectionalising switch
Rasulo et al. (2004) PGA None
Vertical sectionalising switch
Rasulo et al. (2004) PGA None
Discharger
Rasulo et al. (2004) PGA None
Bar support
Rasulo et al. (2004) PGA None
Autotransfomer
Rasulo et al. (2004) PGA None
Box
Rasulo et al. (2004) PGA None
Power supply
Rasulo et al. (2004) PGA None
Pothead
Hwang and Huo (1998) PGA None
Control house
Hwang and Huo (1998) PGA None
Capacitor bank
Hwang and Huo (1998) PGA None
367
Study IM(s) Typologies
Regulator
Hwang and Huo (1998) PGA None
Bus
Shinozuka et al. (2007) PGA None
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Water supply and Waste water
Study IM(s) Typologies
Pipes
Katayama et al. (1975)
Isoyama and Katayama (1982)
Barenberg (1988)
Hamada (1991)
Porter et al. (1991)
Wang et al. (1991)
Honegger and Eguchi (1993)
O’Rourke and Ayala (1993)
Heubach (1995)
Ballantyne and Heubach (1996)
Eidinger (1998)
Isoyama (1998)
O’Rourke et al. (1998)
Toprak (1998)
Eidinger et al. (1999)
O’Rourke and Leon (1999)
Eidinger and Avila (1999)
Isoyama et al. (2000)
ALA (2001
Hung (2001)
Pineda-Parros and Ordaz (2003)
O’Rourke and Deyoe (2004)
Pineda-Parros and Ordaz (2007)
Yeh et al. (2006)
O’Rourke et al. (2014)
PGA
PGA
PGV
PGA
PGDf
MSK intensity
PGDf
PGV
PGDf
PGDf
PGV
PGV
PGA
PGA
PGDf
PGV
PGV
PGA
PGV, PGDf
PGA
PGV
PGV
PGV2/PGA
PGA
PGV, PGDf
Soil conditions, Age
Cast iron only
Material
None
Material
Soil conditions
Material
Material
Material, Joint type
None
Material
Material, Diameter
None
None
Material, Joint type
Diameter
Material, Diameter, Soil conditions, Joint type
Cast iron only
Material, Joint type
None
None
Ductility, Buried or above ground
None
None
Material
Sources
Hazus (DHS, 2009) PGA, PGDf Seismic design
Treatment plants
Hazus (DHS, 2009)
SRMLIFE (2007)
PGA, PGDf
PGA
Capacity, Seismic design
Building type, Seismic design
Pumping/Lift stations
Hazus (DHS, 2009)
SRMLIFE (2007)
PGA, PGDf
PGA
Seismic design
Seismic design
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Study IM(s) Typologies
Storage tanks
O’Rourke and So (2000)
Hazus (DHS, 2009)
ALA (2001)
PGA
PGA
PGA, PGDf
Height/diameter ratio, Quantity stored content
Material, Elevation
Anchorage, Material, Size, Seismic design, Roof
Tunnels
ALA (2001)
Salmon et al. (2003)
Argyroudis and Pitilakis (2007)
Corigliano (2007)
Hazus (DHS, 2009)
Argyroudis (2010)
PGA
PGA, PGDf
PGDf
PGV
PGA, PGDf
PGA
Ground conditions
Construction method
Ground conditions, Construction method
None
Construction method
Ground conditions, Construction method
Canals
ALA (2001) PGV, PGDf None
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Natural gas and Oil delivery
Study IM(s) Typologies
Pumping/Compressor station
LESSLOSS (2007)
Hazus (DHS, 2009)
SRMLIFE (2007)
PGA
PGA, PGDf
PGA
Seismic design
Capacity, Seismic design
Building type, Seismic design
Storage tanks
O’Rourke and So (2000)
ALA (2001)
Iervolino et al. (2004)
Berahman and Behnamfar (2007)
Hazus (DHS, 2009)
PGA
PGA, PGDf
PGA
PGA
PGA, PGDf
Height/diameter ratio, Quantity stored content
Anchorage, Material, Size, Seismic design, Roof
Height/diameter ratio, Friction at base, Steel only
Anchorage, Elevation, Steel only
Material, Elevation
Pipelines
Same as pipes in water supply
system
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Telecoms
Study IM(s) Typologies
Central office
Hazus (DHS, 2009) PGA, PGDf Seismic design
Point of presence
Leelardcharoen (2011) PGA None
Tandem office
Leelardcharoen (2011) PGA None
End office
Leelardcharoen (2011) PGA None
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Highways
Study IM(s) Typologies
Tunnels
Same as water supply system
Embankments
Lagaros et al. (2009)
Maruyama et al. (2010)
PGA
PGV
None
None
Bridges
Gardoni et al. (2003)
Choi et al. (2004)
Elnashai et al. (2004)
Mackie and Stojadinovic (2004)
Karim and Yamazaki (2001)
Nielson and DesRoches (2007)
Banerjee and Shinozuka (2008)
Padgett and DesRoches (2008)
Zhang et al. (2008)
Choe et al. (2009)
Gardoni and Rosowsky (2009)
Hazus (DHS, 2009)
Moschonas et al. (2009)
Kwon and Elnashai (2010)
SA
PGA
PGA
SA
PGA, PGV
PGA
PGA
PGA
PGA, PGDf
SA
SA
SA, PGDf
PGA
PGA
Two-span concrete only
Material, Span type
Material, Pier diameter, Centre span, External span
Two-span concrete only
RC only
Multi-span supported concrete girder only
RC only
Multi-span continuous concrete girder only
Deck design, Colum type, Bearing type, Gap distance
RC only
RC only
NBI class, Age, State, No. of spans, Max. span
length,
Length, Seismic design,
Pier type, Deck type, Pier-to-deck connection type
Multi-span continuous steel girder only
Slopes
ATC-13 (1985)
Pitilakis et al. (2010)
MMI
PGA
Slope class
Hierarchy level, Slope yield coefficient
Roads
Hazus (DHS, 2009) PGDf Hierarchy level
Retaining walls
ATC-13 (1985)
Salmon et al. (2003)
MMI
PGA
None
None
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Appendix D:
Christchurch Pipe Fragility Analysis
Zone A – No liquefaction
Material IM Linear form Logarithmic form
R2 p-value R2 p-value
AC PGV 0.548 0.022 0.713 0.004
PGDfH 0.465 0.01 0.266 0.072
PGDfV 0.896 3.36x10-5 0.739 0.001
PGDfMAX 0.653 0.001 0.776 0.0002
PGDfVECT 0.829 6.1x10-6 0.845 3.41x10-6
PGDfGEOM 0.829 3.9x10-5 0.817 5.48x10-5
CI PGV 0.358 0.156 0.261 0.241
PGDfH 0.105 0.479 0.224 0.283
PGDfV 0.311 0.329 0.064 0.681
PGDfMAX 0.849 0.009 0.855 0.008
PGDfVECT 0.537 0.061 0.539 0.06
PGDfGEOM 0.665 0.048 0.529 0.101
GALV PGV 0.533 0.062 0.399 0.128
PGDfH 0.385 0.024 0.132 0.223
PGDfV 0.728 0.0008 0.581 0.006
PGDfMAX 0.453 0.008 0.476 0.006
PGDfVECT 0.565 0.002 0.63 0.0007
PGDfGEOM 0.527 0.011 0.571 0.007
HDPE PGV 0.83 0.0006 0.9 9.7x10-5
PGDfH 0.463 0.015 0.11 0.293
PGDfV 0.775 0.0002 0.596 0.003
PGDfMAX 0.874 1.12x10-7 0.71 4.18x10-5
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Material IM Linear form Logarithmic form
R2 p-value R2 p-value
PGDfVECT 0.603 0.001 0.399 0.015
PGDfGEOM 0.869 2.96E-05 0.704 0.001
MDPE80 PGV 0.813 0.036 0.809 0.038
PGDfV 0.072 0.661 0.117 0.573
Brittle PGV 0.539 0.016 0.746 0.001
PGDfH 0.707 1.25E-05 0.538 0.0005
PGDfV 0.416 0.001 0.157 0.068
PGDfMAX 0.627 1.13E-05 0.716 7.01E-07
PGDfVECT 0.758 3.2E-08 0.842 2.78E-10
PGDfGEOM 0.479 0.003 0.713 3.91E-05
Ductile PGV 0.83 0.0006 0.9 9.7E-05
PGDfH 0.463 0.015 0.11 0.293
PGDfV 0.775 0.0002 0.596 0.003
PGDfMAX 0.874 1.12E-07 0.71 4.18E-05
PGDfVECT 0.603 0.001 0.399 0.015
PGDfGEOM 0.869 2.96E-05 0.704 0.001
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Zone B – All liquefaction
Material IM Linear form Logarithmic form
R2 p-value R2 p-value
AC PGV 0.872 0.0007 0.788 0.003
PGDfH 0.503 0.001 0.598 0.0002
PGDfV 0.184 0.217 0.085 0.415
PGDfMAX 0.404 0.006 0.382 0.008
PGDfVECT 0.512 0.001 0.725 1.44x10-5
PGDfGEOM 0.65 0.003 0.807 0.0002
CI PGV 0.003 0.925 0.001 0.965
PGDfH 0.422 0.03 0.392 0.039
PGDfV 0.197 0.319 0.173 0.353
PGDfMAX 0.639 0.006 0.689 0.003
PGDfVECT 0.44 0.037 0.576 0.011
PGDfGEOM 0.897 0.001 0.893 0.001
CLS PGDfH 0.777 0.048 0.747 0.059
PGDfMAX 0.6 0.07 0.423 0.162
PGDfVECT 0.651 0.052 0.558 0.088
PGDfGEOM 0.846 0.08 0.888 0.057
GALV PGV 0.484 0.055 0.45 0.068
PGDfH 0.089 0.244 0.027 0.526
PGDfV 0.174 0.303 0.264 0.193
PGDfMAX 0.135 0.178 0.051 0.417
PGDfVECT 0.014 0.674 0.001 0.927
PGDfGEOM 0.129 0.309 0.018 0.709
HDPE PGV 0.087 0.479 0.069 0.53
PGDfH 0.006 0.789 0.056 0.416
PGDfV 0.174 0.264 0.049 0.569
PGDfMAX 0 0.956 0.031 0.567
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Material IM Linear form Logarithmic form
R2 p-value R2 p-value
PGDfVECT 0.058 0.406 0.001 0.92
PGDfGEOM 0.334 0.08 0.098 0.379
MDPE80 PGV 0.042 0.696 0.075 0.599
PGDfH 0.91 1.9x10-5 0.806 0.0004
PGDfV 0.341 0.223 0.133 0.478
PGDfMAX 0.766 0.002 0.413 0.062
PGDfVECT 0.859 4.06x10-5 0.884 1.65x10-5
PGDfGEOM 0.826 0.002 0.825 0.002
PVC PGV 0.539 0.266 0.58 0.239
PGDfH 0.771 0.021 0.569 0.083
PGDfV 0.424 0.234 0.246 0.395
PGDfMAX 0.725 0.067 0.752 0.057
PGDfVECT 0.393 0.183 0.468 0.134
PGDfGEOM 0.667 0.047 0.708 0.036
STEEL PGDfMAX 0.809 0.1 0.753 0.132
PGDfGEOM 0.086 0.707 0.106 0.674
Brittle PGV 0.864 0.0003 0.772 0.002
PGDfH 0.58 2.45x10-5 0.571 3.03x10-5
PGDfV 0.015 0.679 0.004 0.833
PGDfMAX 0.576 4.22x10-5 0.569 5.05x10-5
PGDfVECT 0.551 2.13x10-5 0.411 0.0006
PGDfGEOM 0.506 0.004 0.342 0.028
Ductile PGV 0.001 0.946 0.023 0.698
PGDfH 0.477 0.002 0.164 0.096
PGDfV 0.153 0.297 0.125 0.999
PGDfMAX 0.66 4.16x10-5 0.425 0.003
PGDfVECT 0.563 0.0005 0.357 0.011
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Material IM Linear form Logarithmic form
R2 p-value R2 p-value
PGDfGEOM 0.674 0.002 0.338 0.06
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Zone C – Liquefaction, settlement only
Material IM Linear form Logarithmic form
R2 p-value R2 p-value
AC PGV 0.847 0.001 0.825 0.002
PGDfH 0.568 0.0007 0.643 0.0002
PGDfV 0.212 0.213 0.088 0.44
PGDfMAX 0.667 0.0001 0.611 0.0003
PGDfVECT 0.492 0.002 0.673 9.88x10-5
PGDfGEOM 0.817 0.0008 0.877 0.0002
CI PGV 0.358 0.286 0.374 0.273
PGDfH 0.341 0.076 0.23 0.16
PGDfV 0.841 0.028 0.702 0.171
PGDfMAX 0.683 0.003 0.667 0.004
PGDfVECT 0.563 0.02 0.556 0.021
PGDfGEOM 0.755 0.011 0.732 0.014
GALV PGV 0.748 0.006 0.608 0.023
PGDfH 0.18 0.089 0.061 0.339
PGDfV 0.073 0.556 0.134 0.419
PGDfMAX 0.252 0.057 0.16 0.139
PGDfVECT 0.082 0.301 0.026 0.564
PGDfGEOM 0.004 0.873 0.013 0.77
HDPE PGV 0.058 0.567 0.064 0.546
PGDfH 0.271 0.082 0.27 0.083
PGDfV 0.054 0.656 0.073 0.604
PGDfMAX 0.087 0.407 0.123 0.319
PGDfVECT 0.342 0.034 0.367 0.028
PGDfGEOM 0.119 0.403 0.212 0.251
MDPE80 PGV 0.005 0.889 0.007 0.878
PGDfH 0 0.999 0.014 0.882
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Material IM Linear form Logarithmic form
R2 p-value R2 p-value
PGDfV 0.276 0.363 0.273 0.367
PGDfGEOM 0.548 0.152 0.364 0.282
PVC PGDfH 0.052 0.771 0.064 0.747
PGDfMAX 0.781 0.116 0.759 0.129
PGDfGEOM 0.626 0.209 0.554 0.256
Brittle PGV 0.927 3.13x10-5 0.909 6.88x10-5
PGDfH 0.503 0.0007 0.493 0.0008
PGDfV 0.379 0.025 0.239 0.09
PGDfMAX 0.368 0.006 0.45 0.002
PGDfVECT 0.428 0.002 0.344 0.007
PGDfGEOM 0.488 0.011 0.196 0.149
Ductile PGV 0.068 0.496 0.086 0.443
PGDfH 0.003 0.853 0.054 0.404
PGDfV 0.272 0.185 0.182 0.292
PGDfMAX 0.096 0.303 0.326 0.042
PGDfVECT 0.15 0.154 0.009 0.731
PGDfGEOM 0.078 0.435 0 0.988
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Zone D – Liquefaction, with lateral spread
Material IM Linear form Logarithmic form
R2 p-value R2 p-value
AC PGV 0.073 0.605 0.073 0.604
PGDfH 0.726 0.002 0.75 0.001
PGDfV 0.108 0.524 0.125 0.492
PGDfMAX 0.397 0.069 0.334 0.103
PGDfVECT 0.357 0.089 0.224 0.198
PGDfGEOM 0.047 0.641 0.015 0.272
GALV PGDfV 0.984 0.008 0.982 0.009
PGDfGEOM 0.31 0.33 0.331 0.31
HDPE PGV 0.001 0.966 0.001 0.955
PGDfH 0.001 0.949 0.015 0.774
PGDfV 0.024 0.803 0.058 0.695
PGDfMAX 0.171 0.356 0.095 0.502
PGDfVECT 0.223 0.345 0.256 0.305
PGDfGEOM 0.408 0.122 0.299 0.204
MDPE80 PGV 0.045 0.733 0.057 0.7
PGDfV 0.948 0.026 0.97 0.015
PGDfGEOM 0.842 0.028 0.844 0.027
Brittle PGV 0.033 0.731 0.042 0.698
PGDfH 0 0.967 0.007 0.772
PGDfV 0.312 0.193 0.366 0.15
PGDfMAX 0.001 0.794 0.048 0.473
PGDfVECT 0.02 0.63 0.059 0.403
PGDfGEOM 0.214 0.21 0.115 0.373
Ductile PGV 0.859 0.023 0.881 0.018
PGDfH 0.139 0.233 0.027 0.608
PGDfV 0.03 0.71 0.075 0.551
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Material IM Linear form Logarithmic form
R2 p-value R2 p-value
PGDfMAX 0.578 0.007 0.504 0.014
PGDfVECT 0.557 0.008 0.63 0.004
PGDfGEOM 0.376 0.106 0.433 0.076
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Appendix E:
Interdependency event summary
This appendix summarises the key data from the events in the simulated seismic risk assessment
catalogue that are relevant to the simulation and quantification of interdependency effects in the
water supply system. This is defined as the set of events in which there some loss of
performance is observed in the electric power network and hence there is potential for the effect
of interdependency to be activated. There are 228 events in which this criterion is observed and
their source locations are shown in Figure E1. The subsequent tables summarise the
characteristics of these events and the corresponding engineering performance.
Figure E1 – Source locations and magnitudes of 228 events in seismic risk assessment catalogue with
interdependency potential due to loss of performance in the electric power network
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Event characteristics
Event
ID
Magnitude Latitude Longitude Depth Distance2 Max
PGA
Max
PGV
Liquefied sites
(1km grid)
MW ° ° km km g cm/s No %
36 7.1 -42.953 172.814 10 66 0.26 46 141 48
74 6.3 -43.209 172.349 20 40 0.29 53 115 39
164 7.0 -43.194 173.775 17 103 0.28 29 125 43
170 5.6 -43.473 172.690 15 10 0.48 61 140 48
236 5.6 -43.433 172.538 12 10 0.67 60 88 30
320 7.0 -43.459 172.687 19 11 1.11 182 231 79
355 7.6 -42.936 173.691 11 111 0.25 40 111 38
459 5.7 -43.505 172.828 15 20 0.78 103 102 35
479 6.9 -43.045 172.366 10 56 0.22 42 39 13
633 5.5 -43.440 172.842 10 23 0.57 42 74 25
869 5.3 -43.287 172.467 14 28 0.85 46 72 24
1085 7.4 -43.317 171.663 11 78 0.28 40 109 37
1134 6.4 -43.086 172.669 13 49 0.38 38 102 35
1202 6.7 -43.810 172.687 14 33 0.63 70 197 67
1213 5.7 -43.420 172.321 14 199 0.50 41 33 11
1263 5.6 -43.532 172.570 1 2 1.39 210 179 61
1304 6.9 -42.964 172.936 10 68 0.21 27 41 14
1426 8.1 -42.288 170.115 11 243 0.19 42 66 22
1428 6.6 -43.018 172.394 37 58 0.19 35 21 7
1468 6.2 -43.483 172.475 0 10 1.02 155 194 66
1516 7.6 -42.936 173.691 11 111 0.21 50 79 27
1537 6.9 -43.101 172.111 13 60 0.44 51 195 66
1603 5.7 -43.509 172.850 9 22 0.97 69 123 42
1611 5.4 -43.575 172.665 10 9 0.73 43 49 17
1628 5.0 -43.516 172.678 1 8 0.65 98 53 18
2 Distance is from a reference location of the Department of Civil and Natural Resources Building at the
University of Canterbury in Christchurch
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Event
ID
Magnitude Latitude Longitude Depth Distance2 Max
PGA
Max
PGV
Liquefied sites
(1km grid)
MW ° ° km km g cm/s No %
1636 5.8 -43.581 172.661 19 9 0.37 49 44 15
1645 5.4 -43.724 172.655 8 23 0.46 44 13 4
1672 6.5 -43.427 172.407 19 18 0.64 136 183 62
1721 6.5 -43.639 172.622 11 13 0.67 106 154 52
1789 5.7 -43.694 172.498 6 20 1.08 110 126 43
1797 7.6 -42.936 173.691 11 111 0.27 38 118 40
1802 7.1 -42.546 172.716 10 109 0.31 47 110 37
1835 7.2 -43.380 171.838 10 62 0.28 51 91 31
1837 7.5 -42.230 173.891 10 179 0.24 49 117 40
1935 5.8 -43.712 172.465 5 23 0.70 63 119 40
1953 7.1 -42.881 172.503 10 71 0.20 42 48 16
1987 5.8 -43.397 172.838 13 25 0.78 129 141 48
2213 5.3 -43.484 172.581 5 4 1.68 253 156 53
2241 5.7 -43.210 172.400 33 38 0.40 66 35 12
2245 7.7 -42.519 173.043 11 118 0.16 62 80 27
2248 5.8 -43.371 172.697 37 19 0.36 63 37 13
2279 6.1 -43.311 172.037 8 50 0.44 27 70 24
2281 6.9 -43.045 172.366 10 56 0.28 38 101 34
2285 6.6 -43.414 173.155 15 48 0.47 65 178 61
2291 5.6 -43.771 173.141 16 53 0.31 23 13 4
2320 6.8 -43.315 172.467 10 25 0.63 92 198 67
2428 5.3 -43.504 172.509 5 6 1.15 103 138 47
2507 5.9 -43.396 172.375 9 22 0.41 52 102 35
2651 5.5 -43.633 172.558 18 13 0.51 36 40 14
2733 5.2 -43.451 172.622 8 8 0.82 67 63 21
2782 6.0 -43.602 172.625 4 10 1.44 186 213 72
2785 5.4 -43.381 172.728 7 19 0.67 109 164 56
2807 5.6 -43.611 172.779 17 19 0.37 51 38 13
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Event
ID
Magnitude Latitude Longitude Depth Distance2 Max
PGA
Max
PGV
Liquefied sites
(1km grid)
MW ° ° km km g cm/s No %
2886 5.7 -43.612 172.902 14 28 0.54 71 102 35
2916 7.6 -42.936 173.691 11 111 0.36 72 211 72
3029 7.7 -42.519 173.043 11 118 0.33 78 147 50
3169 6.2 -43.246 173.131 9 54 0.33 28 19 6
3233 6.8 -43.008 172.011 14 74 0.37 51 112 38
3527 7.5 -43.317 172.547 11 23 0.90 141 233 79
3688 6.3 -43.349 171.917 11 57 0.34 31 61 21
3746 5.1 -43.463 172.682 14 10 0.47 40 30 10
3754 5.3 -43.477 172.561 7 5 0.61 76 133 45
3805 7.2 -42.823 172.917 10 82 0.34 66 161 55
3809 5.8 -43.366 172.114 7 42 0.55 35 124 42
3848 6.6 -43.030 172.834 10 58 0.44 45 115 39
3855 7.4 -42.602 172.459 11 103 0.16 33 41 14
3871 5.5 -43.452 172.604 4 8 0.84 118 128 44
3932 5.8 -43.645 172.947 20 32 0.43 47 12 4
3941 5.4 -43.600 172.799 16 19 0.58 39 83 28
3997 5.8 -43.419 172.650 3 13 0.92 133 130 44
4086 7.3 -42.793 171.632 11 112 0.23 51 47 16
4216 7.5 -43.317 172.547 11 23 0.46 126 215 73
4225 6.1 -43.677 172.378 2 24 0.73 148 171 58
4353 6.2 -43.576 172.853 12 23 1.03 85 194 66
4360 5.8 -43.108 172.679 10 47 0.47 57 45 15
4373 6.1 -43.425 172.949 3 31 0.40 82 95 32
4428 5.5 -43.666 172.545 5 16 1.29 139 108 37
4433 5.8 -43.258 172.477 15 31 0.35 29 47 16
4492 6.4 -43.682 172.866 11 29 0.68 82 128 44
4496 6.6 -43.617 172.559 2 11 1.11 418 230 78
4563 6.1 -43.634 172.235 15 31 0.59 71 96 33
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Event
ID
Magnitude Latitude Longitude Depth Distance2 Max
PGA
Max
PGV
Liquefied sites
(1km grid)
MW ° ° km km g cm/s No %
4678 6.0 -43.547 172.479 10 9 0.80 92 164 56
4741 6.2 -43.613 172.054 20 44 0.57 67 43 15
4823 5.4 -43.580 172.667 3 9 1.62 223 154 52
4904 5.3 -43.618 172.742 6 17 0.46 39 9 3
4944 6.1 -43.394 172.711 13 17 1.26 242 222 76
4948 5.6 -43.538 172.630 7 4 1.40 225 199 68
4969 6.0 -43.554 172.806 9 18 0.60 93 127 43
4997 7.1 -42.848 171.828 10 97 0.28 47 123 42
5030 7.7 -41.797 172.037 11 197 0.14 32 21 7
5033 6.7 -43.739 172.512 4 25 0.55 134 197 67
5055 5.5 -43.613 172.290 6 26 0.60 48 48 16
5136 5.9 -43.025 172.842 5 59 0.31 19 6 2
5240 7.5 -42.302 173.664 10 162 0.32 57 179 61
5293 6.0 -43.690 172.914 16 33 0.18 26 2 1
5308 6.6 -43.443 172.342 2 21 0.62 83 153 52
5413 5.2 -43.581 172.607 8 7 0.78 86 47 16
5581 5.8 -43.382 172.623 15 16 0.74 72 119 40
5687 7.3 -42.620 173.343 10 118 0.20 37 62 21
5767 5.6 -43.416 172.585 12 12 0.64 52 72 24
5807 7.4 -43.317 171.663 11 78 0.35 51 117 40
5816 5.6 -43.583 172.600 11 7 0.59 110 130 44
6107 7.5 -42.302 173.664 10 162 0.24 42 145 49
6273 5.5 -43.442 172.659 4 11 1.21 111 142 48
6305 5.5 -43.588 172.597 13 7 0.76 60 120 41
6385 7.4 -43.317 171.663 11 78 0.29 46 162 55
6470 7.3 -42.793 171.632 11 112 0.25 43 52 18
6519 5.3 -43.541 172.642 12 5 0.83 69 87 30
6538 6.1 -43.669 172.214 13 34 0.45 40 55 19
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Event
ID
Magnitude Latitude Longitude Depth Distance2 Max
PGA
Max
PGV
Liquefied sites
(1km grid)
MW ° ° km km g cm/s No %
6547 7.1 -42.546 172.716 10 109 0.14 26 1 0
6635 5.8 -43.387 172.671 11 17 0.45 88 95 32
6739 6.5 -43.345 172.409 14 24 0.36 65 148 50
6806 5.4 -43.364 172.408 3 22 0.49 35 25 9
6817 5.4 -43.400 172.451 6 17 0.27 36 2 1
6818 5.1 -43.481 172.813 16 19 0.53 38 61 21
6865 5.7 -43.430 172.274 2 27 0.33 38 15 5
7024 6.2 -43.567 172.805 14 19 1.45 108 241 82
7056 7.5 -43.317 172.547 11 23 0.51 93 223 76
7107 5.9 -43.683 172.717 10 21 0.87 45 83 28
7132 5.8 -43.484 172.771 2 16 1.37 266 194 66
7165 6.9 -43.045 172.366 10 56 0.52 44 128 44
7189 7.7 -42.056 173.656 11 185 0.14 42 22 7
7227 5.2 -43.645 172.594 10 14 0.83 52 93 32
7269 6.2 -43.702 172.910 17 33 1.38 68 123 42
7287 5.1 -43.581 172.512 1 9 1.38 113 112 38
7294 6.5 -44.336 172.678 24 91 0.37 38 46 16
7331 5.5 -43.595 172.475 5 12 0.34 67 20 7
7347 5.8 -43.632 172.509 7 14 0.66 108 145 49
7506 5.1 -43.501 172.637 0 5 2.15 245 183 62
7514 6.5 -43.271 171.993 14 55 0.22 35 26 9
7567 7.7 -42.519 173.043 11 118 0.24 42 118 40
7589 5.5 -43.576 172.735 17 14 0.75 78 40 14
7688 6.7 -44.114 171.789 36 92 0.19 40 27 9
7785 7.4 -43.317 171.663 11 78 0.37 42 151 51
7873 6.4 -43.349 172.882 12 31 0.98 112 174 59
7902 7.4 -43.317 171.663 11 78 0.23 45 107 36
8045 5.8 -43.638 172.309 13 26 0.74 62 157 53
389
Event
ID
Magnitude Latitude Longitude Depth Distance2 Max
PGA
Max
PGV
Liquefied sites
(1km grid)
MW ° ° km km g cm/s No %
8187 7.6 -42.936 173.691 11 111 0.29 45 121 41
8384 5.6 -43.418 172.467 11 15 0.97 92 102 35
8445 5.6 -43.497 172.519 14 6 0.28 36 9 3
8458 5.4 -43.644 172.543 5 14 0.60 62 38 13
8524 6.1 -43.588 173.174 6 48 0.39 37 31 11
8552 5.0 -43.591 172.718 5 13 0.57 48 16 5
8716 7.6 -42.936 173.691 11 111 0.38 80 123 42
8839 5.0 -43.552 172.564 4 4 0.78 104 90 31
8983 5.3 -43.512 172.436 11 12 0.49 42 55 19
9158 5.2 -43.510 172.774 10 15 0.37 42 23 8
9188 7.3 -42.793 171.632 11 112 0.17 28 46 16
9196 7.5 -43.317 172.547 11 23 0.86 125 223 76
9239 5.2 -43.540 172.750 6 14 1.29 113 60 20
9326 5.6 -43.309 172.526 19 24 0.81 48 86 29
9404 5.6 -43.458 172.618 4 8 0.88 185 157 53
9408 7.0 -43.697 172.396 4 25 2.50 247 254 86
9495 6.4 -43.777 172.267 6 38 0.39 48 93 32
9496 7.3 -42.269 172.429 10 140 0.19 30 40 14
9509 7.1 -42.953 172.814 10 66 0.35 65 208 71
9538 5.3 -43.498 172.551 16 4 0.98 71 145 49
9573 5.2 -43.491 172.573 4 3 1.11 92 139 47
9585 6.5 -42.990 172.045 17 73 0.75 57 210 71
9648 7.2 -43.233 171.771 10 73 0.17 26 48 16
9814 6.1 -43.745 172.214 11 39 0.68 52 149 51
9919 6.9 -42.701 172.084 14 100 0.20 28 40 14
9943 6.4 -43.661 172.294 1 28 0.75 82 203 69
10030 5.1 -43.426 172.543 18 11 0.31 29 5 2
10335 5.7 -43.633 172.497 10 14 1.48 136 205 70
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Event
ID
Magnitude Latitude Longitude Depth Distance2 Max
PGA
Max
PGV
Liquefied sites
(1km grid)
MW ° ° km km g cm/s No %
10506 7.5 -43.317 172.547 11 23 0.37 84 218 74
10515 6.0 -43.731 172.469 7 25 0.60 68 123 42
10586 7.5 -43.317 172.547 11 23 1.14 151 223 76
10735 7.1 -42.953 172.814 10 66 0.44 48 138 47
10871 6.3 -43.487 172.424 5 13 1.33 107 214 73
10946 5.2 -43.476 172.513 8 8 0.43 55 28 10
10969 6.9 -42.994 172.170 18 68 0.79 72 216 73
10972 6.3 -43.539 172.053 19 43 0.44 37 87 30
11029 6.0 -43.509 172.848 17 21 0.61 72 51 17
11171 6.8 -43.315 172.467 10 25 0.48 62 196 67
11184 6.1 -43.322 172.069 17 47 0.37 41 122 41
11321 5.0 -43.404 172.662 17 14 0.46 24 21 7
11479 7.1 -42.881 172.503 10 71 0.25 29 62 21
11520 6.2 -43.788 173.262 14 62 0.41 63 96 33
11564 5.7 -43.623 172.589 8 11 0.37 51 53 18
11578 7.5 -43.317 172.547 11 23 0.69 102 218 74
11628 5.5 -43.691 172.691 4 21 1.19 62 97 33
11672 6.0 -43.825 172.589 30 34 0.88 49 29 10
11676 6.4 -43.274 173.220 33 58 0.19 38 12 4
11693 5.9 -43.520 172.368 9 17 1.12 106 224 76
11799 7.4 -42.602 172.459 11 103 0.20 48 78 27
11801 6.1 -43.776 172.125 12 46 0.75 47 161 55
11848 7.0 -43.267 171.469 16 94 0.56 57 186 63
11952 5.3 -43.589 172.762 12 16 0.67 46 63 21
12037 7.0 -43.106 172.237 40 54 0.29 92 155 53
12079 7.6 -42.936 173.691 11 111 0.38 67 152 52
12112 7.0 -43.601 173.014 10 36 0.67 119 225 77
12140 7.1 -42.693 172.253 10 96 0.15 25 8 3
391
Event
ID
Magnitude Latitude Longitude Depth Distance2 Max
PGA
Max
PGV
Liquefied sites
(1km grid)
MW ° ° km km g cm/s No %
12178 5.7 -43.544 172.316 7 22 1.00 67 94 32
12230 7.0 -43.548 172.430 11 13 0.91 231 236 80
12259 5.6 -43.511 172.553 17 3 1.13 90 185 63
12369 6.4 -43.327 172.572 12 22 0.70 73 229 78
12418 7.2 -43.233 171.771 10 73 0.38 56 122 41
12495 5.1 -43.533 172.712 19 10 0.38 30 13 4
12796 6.9 -43.735 172.634 7 24 0.81 181 176 60
12913 7.2 -42.823 172.917 10 82 0.33 44 182 62
12935 5.8 -43.383 172.424 13 20 0.47 67 152 52
12937 7.5 -42.302 173.664 10 162 0.18 37 89 30
13092 5.0 -43.571 172.539 5 7 0.50 59 72 24
13127 5.0 -43.516 172.521 2 5 0.68 110 59 20
13231 5.1 -43.547 172.829 14 20 0.93 59 75 26
13354 6.7 -43.059 172.567 33 51 0.53 60 174 59
13379 7.6 -42.936 173.691 11 111 0.29 72 217 74
13428 6.3 -43.708 172.490 2 22 0.38 50 117 40
13508 6.3 -43.415 172.567 23 12 0.54 63 139 47
13522 5.6 -43.556 172.509 12 7 0.43 68 62 21
13525 6.4 -43.319 172.569 17 22 0.54 86 222 76
13603 6.7 -43.608 172.506 20 11 0.77 173 234 80
13624 5.2 -43.478 172.728 4 13 1.39 95 83 28
13734 6.7 -43.655 172.685 5 17 3.68 297 292 99
13737 6.4 -43.090 172.275 30 54 0.30 32 35 12
13770 7.4 -43.317 171.663 11 78 0.27 39 141 48
13815 7.6 -42.936 173.691 11 111 0.24 32 51 17
13915 7.3 -42.793 171.632 11 112 0.16 31 48 16
13984 5.7 -43.387 172.513 8 16 0.61 54 90 31
14121 7.1 -43.490 171.992 10 48 0.50 72 213 72
392
Event
ID
Magnitude Latitude Longitude Depth Distance2 Max
PGA
Max
PGV
Liquefied sites
(1km grid)
MW ° ° km km g cm/s No %
14158 5.6 -43.524 172.409 16 14 0.59 77 130 44
14163 5.7 -43.452 172.466 1 12 0.76 153 93 32
14250 5.2 -43.470 172.500 13 9 0.56 67 85 29
14262 6.6 -43.521 172.359 19 18 0.35 50 159 54
14271 7.2 -43.380 171.838 10 62 0.35 45 123 42
14348 5.6 -43.378 173.000 3 37 0.44 53 64 22
14403 5.0 -43.620 172.725 29 16 0.28 25 3 1
393
System performance
Event
ID
Cable
failures
Substation
failures
EPN
performance
Pipe
failures
Pumping station
failures
WSS
performance
exc.3 inc.4 exc.3 inc.4
No % No % % No % No % No % % %
36 3 1 0 0 7.4 144 2 8 5 13 8 39.6 39.6
74 0 0 1 3 8.6 112 2 3 2 8 5 44.6 45.5
164 1 0 1 3 4.0 151 2 3 2 3 2 39.7 39.7
170 14 6 5 16 31.0 203 3 22 14 49 32 57.2 67.5
236 2 1 1 3 9.5 130 2 11 7 12 8 39.9 42.4
320 39 16 10 31 68.0 472 8 67 44 94 61 79.5 88.1
355 3 1 2 6 17.5 163 3 5 3 22 14 44.3 48.0
459 11 5 6 19 32.9 186 3 19 12 46 30 40.8 47.8
479 0 0 1 3 8.6 72 1 3 2 8 5 17.7 18.9
633 11 5 3 9 25.6 153 2 18 12 38 25 34.7 39.6
869 7 3 3 9 21.7 103 2 10 6 21 14 43.3 47.1
1085 0 0 1 3 8.1 137 2 16 10 25 16 42.3 42.9
1134 7 3 6 19 23.8 158 3 16 10 24 16 39.1 41.8
1202 12 5 3 9 12.6 257 4 23 15 31 20 70.5 72.7
1213 0 0 1 3 3.4 63 1 1 1 1 1 22.9 22.9
1263 33 14 7 22 63.8 471 8 55 36 73 47 79.2 86.4
1304 1 0 1 3 8.1 82 1 3 2 15 10 20.9 22.1
1426 0 0 1 3 1.7 52 1 1 1 2 1 22.9 23.8
1428 0 0 1 3 0.4 66 1 1 1 1 1 24.3 24.3
1468 38 16 8 25 58.6 355 6 37 24 70 45 71.6 79.4
1516 1 0 1 3 1.7 104 2 5 3 6 4 30.1 30.1
1537 27 11 5 16 26.7 295 5 23 15 38 25 65.9 72.0
1603 20 8 3 9 39.7 243 4 43 28 57 37 50.3 58.0
1611 1 0 4 13 17.8 92 1 11 7 27 18 29.6 33.7
1628 3 1 1 3 8.6 152 2 18 12 21 14 28.2 30.4
3 Analysis excluding interdependency
4 Analysis including interdependency
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Event
ID
Cable
failures
Substation
failures
EPN
performance
Pipe
failures
Pumping station
failures
WSS
performance
exc.3 inc.4 exc.3 inc.4
No % No % % No % No % No % % %
1636 3 1 2 6 10.6 95 2 11 7 18 12 28.1 29.4
1645 0 0 1 3 3.6 38 1 1 1 4 3 10.8 13.7
1672 2 1 4 13 35.6 180 3 17 11 26 17 51.0 52.9
1721 22 9 6 19 25.0 280 5 29 19 44 29 51.8 57.8
1789 1 0 2 6 9.1 154 2 11 7 24 16 51.0 51.2
1797 0 0 1 3 8.1 114 2 9 6 17 11 36.7 37.6
1802 7 3 2 6 4.3 182 3 7 5 10 6 44.3 46.3
1835 0 0 1 3 8.1 97 2 2 1 15 10 33.4 34.8
1837 5 2 5 16 34.7 167 3 9 6 42 27 39.1 45.2
1935 2 1 1 3 2.0 166 3 10 6 10 6 42.8 42.8
1953 0 0 1 3 8.6 112 2 3 2 8 5 34.9 36.2
1987 4 2 2 6 21.3 171 3 23 15 31 20 38.8 39.4
2213 13 5 6 19 36.9 244 4 33 21 40 26 58.4 61.9
2241 1 0 1 3 9.2 56 1 2 1 5 3 30.5 33.7
2245 0 0 1 3 0.6 95 2 3 2 3 2 31.5 31.5
2248 0 0 1 3 0.6 65 1 6 4 6 4 29.2 29.2
2279 11 5 5 16 26.4 132 2 6 4 21 14 35.5 38.4
2281 3 1 1 3 10.7 96 2 6 4 24 16 38.5 44.2
2285 11 5 7 22 35.5 271 4 30 19 51 33 61.6 64.6
2291 0 0 1 3 8.1 51 1 2 1 14 9 22.3 24.4
2320 27 11 8 25 50.5 323 5 37 24 60 39 64.7 73.3
2428 3 1 7 22 37.8 159 3 13 8 29 19 54.0 62.5
2507 5 2 2 6 14.6 148 2 10 6 14 9 41.1 43.5
2651 0 0 1 3 9.6 49 1 4 3 11 7 24.5 24.8
2733 6 2 6 19 21.5 132 2 16 10 24 16 34.2 35.3
2782 40 16 11 34 50.3 506 8 45 29 72 47 76.6 82.8
2785 20 8 5 16 44.4 250 4 27 18 41 27 61.6 67.0
2807 0 0 1 3 9.6 67 1 3 2 9 6 18.6 23.2
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Event
ID
Cable
failures
Substation
failures
EPN
performance
Pipe
failures
Pumping station
failures
WSS
performance
exc.3 inc.4 exc.3 inc.4
No % No % % No % No % No % % %
2886 3 1 2 6 18.4 141 2 9 6 31 20 46.2 51.9
2916 4 2 3 9 19.8 248 4 22 14 31 20 63.4 66.6
3029 1 0 2 6 10.7 130 2 17 11 28 18 31.8 34.7
3169 0 0 1 3 8.1 39 1 3 2 16 10 14.9 16.5
3233 1 0 1 3 10.4 111 2 3 2 9 6 44.7 44.7
3527 59 24 14 44 81.3 579 9 84 55 112 73 90.1 94.9
3688 0 0 1 3 10.4 80 1 3 2 9 6 31.1 31.1
3746 1 0 2 6 2.5 61 1 3 2 3 2 30.1 30.1
3754 1 0 1 3 16.6 150 2 16 10 23 15 47.9 50.1
3805 12 5 4 13 20.0 213 3 14 9 25 16 51.2 56.6
3809 8 3 3 9 23.0 182 3 11 7 21 14 49.7 50.7
3848 14 6 5 16 27.9 192 3 16 10 28 18 42.7 47.2
3855 0 0 1 3 8.1 64 1 0 0 14 9 21.2 23.5
3871 19 8 3 9 40.9 223 4 30 19 50 32 49.2 60.2
3932 0 0 1 3 8.1 47 1 1 1 14 9 14.5 17.6
3941 8 3 2 6 19.3 145 2 12 8 28 18 35.8 40.2
3997 5 2 2 6 5.2 202 3 18 12 18 12 52.2 52.2
4086 0 0 2 6 17.4 79 1 4 3 25 16 23.1 28.5
4216 24 10 6 19 43.2 321 5 30 19 47 31 65.2 70.8
4225 20 8 7 22 45.3 290 5 29 19 71 46 56.4 65.0
4353 40 16 9 28 51.7 391 6 56 36 97 63 72.1 78.0
4360 2 1 1 3 10.4 73 1 4 3 9 6 34.2 34.2
4373 5 2 2 6 17.4 151 2 15 10 27 18 33.0 36.5
4428 0 0 4 13 28.3 134 2 9 6 33 21 43.2 49.1
4433 0 0 1 3 9.6 73 1 4 3 10 6 24.2 26.9
4492 17 7 7 22 29.3 221 4 13 8 36 23 49.0 53.8
4496 48 20 12 38 66.8 585 9 64 42 84 55 81.9 86.2
4563 0 0 1 3 7.4 84 1 3 2 19 12 36.8 42.2
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Event
ID
Cable
failures
Substation
failures
EPN
performance
Pipe
failures
Pumping station
failures
WSS
performance
exc.3 inc.4 exc.3 inc.4
No % No % % No % No % No % % %
4678 23 9 6 19 29.2 301 5 36 23 54 35 70.9 72.7
4741 0 0 1 3 10.7 54 1 2 1 19 12 26.2 26.9
4823 22 9 9 28 45.0 383 6 51 33 95 62 60.4 64.1
4904 0 0 1 3 0.4 46 1 3 2 3 2 20.1 20.1
4944 71 29 14 44 75.1 549 9 75 49 103 67 86.6 91.8
4948 35 14 8 25 47.5 396 6 56 36 110 71 71.3 73.4
4969 12 5 6 19 48.7 262 4 26 17 69 45 58.4 66.5
4997 11 5 1 3 10.7 149 2 4 3 12 8 34.4 37.5
5030 0 0 1 3 17.9 48 1 0 0 24 16 22.2 26.8
5033 14 6 6 19 49.2 303 5 33 21 57 37 74.7 77.5
5055 7 3 3 9 10.6 119 2 16 10 22 14 32.0 33.0
5136 0 0 1 3 13.0 34 1 0 0 8 5 17.8 23.0
5240 7 3 2 6 19.5 205 3 20 13 45 29 50.6 57.2
5293 0 0 1 3 8.6 35 1 1 1 6 4 17.9 19.1
5308 0 0 3 9 6.9 165 3 9 6 11 7 42.6 42.6
5413 6 2 1 3 11.1 102 2 9 6 14 9 26.0 26.9
5581 8 3 2 6 26.6 217 4 21 14 30 19 56.0 59.2
5687 3 1 2 6 8.6 73 1 2 1 15 10 29.2 30.4
5767 2 1 2 6 17.5 113 2 8 5 17 11 34.1 34.8
5807 5 2 1 3 22.5 128 2 8 5 18 12 43.0 48.4
5816 7 3 2 6 5.9 169 3 13 8 16 10 48.7 50.7
6107 4 2 4 13 19.5 157 3 10 6 39 25 41.8 50.1
6273 15 6 6 19 38.8 270 4 38 25 55 36 55.0 60.0
6305 6 2 2 6 12.8 172 3 17 11 25 16 45.0 50.0
6385 0 0 3 9 12.6 149 2 8 5 15 10 38.0 39.9
6470 1 0 3 9 10.9 90 1 8 5 12 8 29.5 31.1
6519 7 3 2 6 28.4 151 2 18 12 33 21 33.8 38.6
6538 2 1 1 3 2.0 108 2 8 5 13 8 33.7 36.2
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Event
ID
Cable
failures
Substation
failures
EPN
performance
Pipe
failures
Pumping station
failures
WSS
performance
exc.3 inc.4 exc.3 inc.4
No % No % % No % No % No % % %
6547 0 0 1 3 3.6 41 1 0 0 3 2 12.9 15.9
6635 2 1 1 3 10.4 133 2 6 4 10 6 42.5 42.5
6739 6 2 3 9 30.5 201 3 15 10 45 29 49.3 57.6
6806 0 0 1 3 1.7 52 1 2 1 3 2 23.5 23.6
6817 0 0 1 3 0.6 40 1 0 0 0 0 28.6 28.6
6818 2 1 1 3 8.1 136 2 13 8 25 16 24.6 26.6
6865 0 0 1 3 22.5 49 1 1 1 14 9 19.2 22.8
7024 64 26 15 47 82.2 548 9 93 60 132 86 88.1 94.1
7056 30 12 4 13 44.2 339 6 37 24 57 37 78.4 82.5
7107 1 0 1 3 8.1 101 2 10 6 21 14 25.5 28.1
7132 42 17 10 31 64.9 363 6 42 27 80 52 73.4 83.4
7165 12 5 2 6 17.3 129 2 5 3 24 16 41.0 46.8
7189 0 0 2 6 2.3 55 1 1 1 1 1 19.9 19.9
7227 3 1 1 3 8.6 89 1 15 10 16 10 28.8 29.7
7269 4 2 4 13 15.9 186 3 22 14 27 18 41.4 44.9
7287 7 3 6 19 45.9 150 2 11 7 43 28 47.7 55.1
7294 6 2 3 9 5.7 108 2 10 6 11 7 30.6 30.6
7331 0 0 1 3 8.6 56 1 4 3 8 5 23.8 24.7
7347 4 2 1 3 17.9 225 4 13 8 28 18 46.3 52.2
7506 40 16 15 47 75.3 473 8 47 31 77 50 75.5 81.9
7514 0 0 1 3 9.6 51 1 2 1 7 5 22.7 28.0
7567 0 0 2 6 8.6 109 2 11 7 23 15 35.7 38.2
7589 0 0 1 3 9.2 73 1 7 5 11 7 22.4 25.6
7688 0 0 1 3 0.4 78 1 2 1 2 1 22.9 22.9
7785 5 2 4 13 31.9 170 3 19 12 44 29 45.0 50.6
7873 21 9 11 34 65.9 326 5 40 26 78 51 62.8 74.2
7902 3 1 3 9 18.2 144 2 8 5 15 10 45.3 49.4
8045 3 1 4 13 39.2 206 3 17 11 42 27 57.0 63.7
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Event
ID
Cable
failures
Substation
failures
EPN
performance
Pipe
failures
Pumping station
failures
WSS
performance
exc.3 inc.4 exc.3 inc.4
No % No % % No % No % No % % %
8187 3 1 0 0 9.2 180 3 17 11 20 13 42.7 45.1
8384 1 0 1 3 4.0 148 2 8 5 8 5 45.8 45.8
8445 0 0 2 6 3.3 41 1 4 3 5 3 22.5 22.7
8458 0 0 1 3 3.6 63 1 5 3 7 5 23.6 25.6
8524 0 0 1 3 8.1 90 1 4 3 14 9 22.1 23.5
8552 0 0 1 3 0.4 61 1 5 3 5 3 18.7 18.7
8716 13 5 4 13 18.2 159 3 21 14 33 21 46.5 49.7
8839 1 0 1 3 10.7 122 2 6 4 24 16 40.0 43.0
8983 2 1 1 3 21.3 69 1 3 2 16 10 31.4 32.3
9158 0 0 1 3 8.6 59 1 4 3 7 5 20.9 21.8
9188 0 0 2 6 12.8 67 1 0 0 7 5 20.7 25.8
9196 37 15 13 41 78.4 386 6 55 36 95 62 74.7 86.8
9239 9 4 2 6 17.9 139 2 23 15 32 21 31.2 32.8
9326 0 0 2 6 12.9 75 1 5 3 10 6 25.1 25.1
9404 12 5 5 16 22.9 224 4 20 13 23 15 54.8 55.6
9408 69 28 23 72 100.0 771 13 98 64 142 92 93.5 98.6
9495 4 2 1 3 21.3 102 2 4 3 17 11 35.4 38.7
9496 0 0 1 3 0.4 65 1 2 1 2 1 18.9 18.9
9509 8 3 4 13 15.3 249 4 15 10 18 12 58.3 61.5
9538 7 3 2 6 15.3 161 3 19 12 23 15 52.9 54.3
9573 6 2 4 13 35.4 209 3 25 16 34 22 50.2 54.2
9585 13 5 9 28 48.2 268 4 30 19 52 34 65.0 71.8
9648 1 0 1 3 9.2 76 1 3 2 7 5 36.5 40.4
9814 6 2 3 9 19.3 222 4 23 15 34 22 51.6 55.4
9919 0 0 1 3 13.0 69 1 1 1 9 6 23.1 24.6
9943 12 5 7 22 46.5 253 4 36 23 72 47 65.8 75.2
10030 0 0 1 3 8.6 47 1 0 0 5 3 16.8 17.7
10335 34 14 11 34 64.9 304 5 41 27 71 46 71.4 77.1
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Event
ID
Cable
failures
Substation
failures
EPN
performance
Pipe
failures
Pumping station
failures
WSS
performance
exc.3 inc.4 exc.3 inc.4
No % No % % No % No % No % % %
10506 21 9 7 22 31.0 317 5 38 25 66 43 66.5 77.8
10515 8 3 3 9 20.2 204 3 18 12 34 22 53.3 57.1
10586 36 15 15 47 75.2 420 7 57 37 90 58 83.9 90.0
10735 6 2 3 9 12.1 222 4 22 14 35 23 47.2 54.0
10871 29 12 13 41 70.9 359 6 44 29 111 72 68.2 76.3
10946 1 0 1 3 0.4 73 1 4 3 4 3 32.4 32.4
10969 52 21 17 53 78.4 427 7 63 41 93 60 80.2 85.9
10972 17 7 2 6 12.6 153 2 3 2 11 7 40.2 43.5
11029 1 0 2 6 17.4 100 2 11 7 30 19 22.2 26.3
11171 5 2 2 6 11.7 210 3 16 10 26 17 56.9 61.6
11184 1 0 1 3 10.4 132 2 10 6 14 9 45.0 45.0
11321 0 0 1 3 8.6 55 1 3 2 7 5 21.9 23.8
11479 1 0 1 3 4.0 116 2 8 5 8 5 30.7 30.7
11520 7 3 1 3 2.0 131 2 14 9 14 9 40.6 40.6
11564 0 0 2 6 10.3 74 1 4 3 12 8 32.8 37.2
11578 22 9 8 25 66.7 391 6 50 32 107 69 74.1 85.8
11628 17 7 3 9 19.4 186 3 27 18 33 21 49.8 49.8
11672 3 1 2 6 10.5 72 1 6 4 18 12 22.5 25.8
11676 0 0 1 3 4.0 44 1 3 2 3 2 14.9 14.9
11693 62 25 17 53 100.0 459 7 74 48 135 88 86.5 90.6
11799 0 0 1 3 4.0 84 1 3 2 3 2 24.1 24.1
11801 0 0 1 3 10.1 167 3 13 8 23 15 40.7 45.2
11848 0 0 3 9 20.3 206 3 17 11 25 16 53.4 56.8
11952 11 5 5 16 27.6 133 2 13 8 26 17 38.5 40.0
12037 0 0 1 3 0.4 141 2 7 5 7 5 35.0 35.0
12079 12 5 2 6 22.7 251 4 19 12 29 19 56.4 56.6
12112 36 15 8 25 56.5 365 6 44 29 66 43 69.4 73.6
12140 0 0 1 3 9.2 42 1 1 1 5 3 13.5 14.2
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Event
ID
Cable
failures
Substation
failures
EPN
performance
Pipe
failures
Pumping station
failures
WSS
performance
exc.3 inc.4 exc.3 inc.4
No % No % % No % No % No % % %
12178 1 0 3 9 29.1 109 2 2 1 17 11 39.6 45.6
12230 46 19 16 50 87.6 646 10 88 57 132 86 95.2 96.2
12259 33 14 7 22 67.6 307 5 47 31 83 54 64.2 77.0
12369 21 9 5 16 34.3 345 6 49 32 62 40 68.1 74.2
12418 15 6 5 16 34.7 171 3 18 12 33 21 48.3 57.4
12495 0 0 1 3 1.7 38 1 0 0 1 1 15.0 15.0
12796 16 7 1 3 14.5 237 4 24 16 41 27 64.6 67.4
12913 6 2 1 3 20.7 189 3 10 6 23 15 48.7 57.1
12935 5 2 1 3 15.4 173 3 10 6 28 18 48.1 51.0
12937 0 0 2 6 18.3 96 2 3 2 15 10 35.4 38.3
13092 1 0 1 3 9.2 93 2 9 6 11 7 36.2 39.4
13127 3 1 0 0 9.2 101 2 5 3 9 6 28.9 32.0
13231 3 1 3 9 21.9 134 2 18 12 29 19 31.0 33.3
13354 6 2 0 0 9.2 180 3 8 5 12 8 46.2 49.4
13379 7 3 3 9 19.1 255 4 24 16 40 26 55.8 58.9
13428 2 1 3 9 18.4 147 2 17 11 19 12 44.4 45.8
13508 13 5 6 19 27.6 240 4 29 19 41 27 56.8 58.7
13522 2 1 2 6 0.7 99 2 12 8 12 8 24.8 24.8
13525 29 12 11 34 69.3 361 6 48 31 92 60 73.1 86.2
13603 31 13 7 22 58.8 407 7 51 33 87 56 73.8 81.2
13624 14 6 2 6 26.9 179 3 26 17 37 24 38.0 41.8
13734 72 30 24 75 100.0 118
1
19 129 84 144 94 96.2 97.9
13737 0 0 1 3 0.6 80 1 0 0 0 0 19.4 19.4
13770 2 1 2 6 11.9 123 2 3 2 8 5 31.4 32.3
13815 0 0 1 3 0.4 56 1 2 1 2 1 24.1 24.1
13915 0 0 1 3 10.1 60 1 1 1 14 9 23.5 25.7
13984 2 1 2 6 10.3 124 2 7 5 15 10 34.9 38.4
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14121 26 11 6 19 53.9 331 5 33 21 70 45 75.8 81.6
14158 13 5 5 16 32.1 142 2 20 13 35 23 49.2 56.8
14163 0 0 1 3 8.1 129 2 13 8 23 15 30.8 32.2
14250 3 1 3 9 9.9 96 2 19 12 23 15 36.0 36.7
14262 3 1 1 3 0.4 166 3 5 3 5 3 41.4 41.4
14271 1 0 2 6 5.8 159 3 5 3 5 3 47.0 47.0
14348 9 4 2 6 0.7 117 2 13 8 13 8 27.0 27.0
14403 0 0 1 3 0.4 37 1 0 0 0 0 17.3 17.3
